Early in the American Civil War, Union supporters and rebel secessionists sought to gain control of Missouri. By 1862, the Confederate rebels had been driven from the state. The Union victory at Pea Ridge, Arkansas on March 7, 1862 solidified Union control of Missouri for the remainder of the conflict, but small guerrilla forces opposed to the Union remained on the loose to plague the people of the state for three more years. The loss at Pea Ridge resulted in orders for the defeated Confederate forces to move east of the Mississippi River for operations in that theater, which deprived General Sterling Price, commander of the Missouri State Guard, of troops for his army. However, the idea that there were thousands of men with loyalties to the South persisted in Price’s imagination. He sent several officers into Missouri to recruit men and bring them back south to join the units under his command. Colonel Joseph Chrisman Porter, a longtime resident of Lewis County in northeast Missouri, was one of these officers. Porter successfully recruited a large group of men and initiated combat operations, which took the Union occupiers by surprise before he was forced to withdraw. In the grand strategic picture of the war, Porter’s campaign in northeast Missouri was fairly inconsequential, but he accomplished his primary missions: recruiting soldiers for the Confederacy and causing massive unrest.

Few large battles were fought during the war in Missouri. Rather, small units of Confederate guerrillas or bushwhackers fought against units of Federal troops and militiamen who patrolled the state. This form of war was often brutal and brought out the worst in the men fighting on both sides. The roots of the conflict paralleled those of the larger war, but certain events in the region made a fratricidal guerrilla war possible. Sectional conflict along the Kansas-Missouri border had been ongoing for a decade prior to the Civil War itself. Colonel Porter was assigned by Sterling Price to recruit men in northeast Missouri where many of the underlying conditions that fueled the guerrillas in the western part of the state did not exist. Porter was fortunate, however, because the preponderance of men with ties to the southern states and the actions of Union occupying troops caused many men to join his fledgling force.

One of the issues that aided Porter was the treatment of men with southern sympathies by Union garrison troops. Until the Union’s preemptive
moves put a stop to Governor Claiborne Jackson and Sterling Price’s efforts to take over the state, many men flocked to the Missouri State Guard. Despite Price’s victory at Wilson’s Creek in August 1861, pressure by Union troops and the Unionist Missouri Home Guard caused Price and the State Guard to retreat to the Arkansas border where many of Price’s men deserted and returned home. Union forces occupying the state as well as Union supporters from Missouri often mistreated the Confederate deserters as well as any others who had voiced support for the Confederacy. This gave many of them a reason to join or assist the guerrilla bands in their home areas.

Many of the people that settled northeast Missouri prior to 1860 came from the South. While most did not bring slaves to the region there were some, concentrated along the Mississippi River. While most of the residents opposed secession, many sided with the South in general. Both sides raised regiments in the region in 1861 and fought a battle at Athens in Clark County on the Des Moines River separating Missouri from Iowa. The volunteer Home Guard regiment, faced by a Missouri State Guard unit that outnumbered them by a four-to-one factor, completely routed the secessionists and drove them from the northeast corner of the state. Both units formally joined their respective militaries and faced each other again on battlefields throughout the South. This was a documented case where neighbor fought neighbor and sons battled fathers.

The Union force enrolled as the Twenty-First Missouri Infantry Regiment. They spent the winter of 1861 securing northeast Missouri from the actions of various guerrilla bands operating in the area and were quite effective. However, when the Twenty-First moved south to join General Ulysses S. Grant’s army in March 1862, it thereby reduced the number of pro-Union men in the region, which made it much easier for Porter and his guerrilla force to operate.

The guerrilla war in northeast Missouri had its origins in orders from General Price sent out in November 1861 imploring Missourians to join his depleted Missouri State Guard, when he sent Porter and others north to recruit. The first attacks had occurred as groups of men wanting to join Price’s Guard moved south and cut telegraph lines and destroyed train tracks and bridges in the process. The actions of these guerrillas, the large numbers recruited in the state, and the nature of guerrilla warfare in general caused General Henry W. Halleck, commander of the Union Department of Missouri, to issue a “shoot on sight” order for anyone caught in the act of guerrilla warfare. This order also contained provisions to punish any Southern sympathizers for property damage in the area. Halleck’s order, coupled with the creation of the Missouri State Militia in November 1861, was designed to put pressure on the people of the state to turn
against the guerrillas in their midst. It often provoked the exact opposite reaction. In northeast Missouri, the guerrilla situation seemed to have ceased, but the arrival of Colonel Joseph Porter, sometime in May 1862, ended that period of inactivity.

That the Confederate Congress sanctioned guerrilla warfare as a legitimate form of war on April 21, 1862 aided Porter’s mission. This allowed the Confederate War Department to issue commissions to Southern officers to recruit partisan rangers. The Confederate actions gave the bushwhackers and guerrillas in Missouri an aura of legitimacy, which caused some reluctant, would-be Confederates to envision themselves as patriotic fighters like the Revolutionary War hero, Francis Marion. The Missouri State Militia responded with General Order 18, which it announced on May 29, 1862. This order reinforced Halleck’s “shoot on sight” proclamation for those caught in the act of guerrilla war, but it also created a policy that any guerrilla soldier or recruiting officer could turn himself in and gain protection by taking an oath to not bear arms against the lawful government of the United States or the State of Missouri.

Many southern Missourians took this oath as a mere matter of convenience and later returned to the guerrilla forces. Neither the Union nor the Confederacy made provisions for holding many troops as prisoners of war. The common manner of dealing with prisoners was to give them parole. A paroled prisoner swore an oath not to take up arms again until a proper prisoner exchange occurred and released him from his vow. For captured guerrillas, though, parole meant returning home where Union forces punished them for their guerrilla actions while treating them as inferiors with no protection under the law. Reprisals occurred and often motivated men to break their parole and return to the guerrillas. During the course of Porter’s campaign, opposing forces executed many re-captured parole breakers.

Joseph Porter was born in Kentucky in 1819. His family moved to Missouri during his childhood, and he later moved to Lewis County in northeast Missouri, where he resided about four miles east of Newark. When General Price sent out his first call for volunteers, Porter enlisted in the Missouri State Guard. The men of his regiment elected him lieutenant colonel and he served as second-in-command of the regiment under Colonel Martin Green, who had fought at Athens. Following the regiment’s defeat, he went south and fought with General Price at Wilson’s Creek, Lexington, and Pea Ridge, suffering a head wound at Lexington where he was cited for bravery. He was one of many officers sent to recruit for Price’s command in 1862. Captain Frisby H. McCullough traveled with him. Price sent another Confederate officer, Colonel John A. Poindexter, to counties in northcentral Missouri near Porter’s operating area, but his recruits were not part of
Porter’s campaign.

Porter swiftly set up a camp and began recruiting men, stockpiling supplies, and building a network of informers. The Southern sympathizers were eager to help Porter and shortly he had over a hundred men in his camp, including his brother Jim. Porter’s mission was twofold: first, recruit as many men as he could and return with them to Price; second, engage in irregular warfare with Union forces, thus tying down men that otherwise would have bolstered the Union armies invading the Confederacy.\(^{10}\)

Porter himself did not consider the men under his command to be guerrillas or bushwhackers, but the fact remains that he operated as such and worked in conjunction with the various guerrilla bands in northeast Missouri. While he did not specifically order the destruction of private property or destroy bridges and train tracks except to throw off pursuit, his force was not enlisted in the Confederate Army while it operated in Missouri and therefore fell under the Partisan Ranger Act of the Confederacy.\(^{11}\) This act enabled recruiting officers to recruit irregular troops who would then make their way through Union lines to Confederate units.\(^{12}\) It fit what Porter and other recruiters were doing, but the discipline was often very poor. More often than not, both sides saw irregulars as nothing more than bandits preying upon the general population. This popular view was seemingly validated in Texas when William Quantrill’s men would move south for the winter. Criminal acts such as robbery and murder were commonplace until spring, when the guerrillas would return to Missouri and resume their depredations.

Porter made his presence known on June 17 when he engaged a Missouri State Militia patrol in western Marion County. Porter’s men captured and paroled the four-man militia patrol, keeping their weapons.\(^{13}\) This was the first indication to the Union that Porter was actively recruiting in the Northeast District. The district was one of eight military districts under martial law that followed the state’s congressional district boundaries. The commander of the district for the Union was Colonel Lewis Merrill who had his headquarters in Macon. He had several units of the Missouri State Militia under his command to enforce the martial law that had been in effect since 1861. These units were scattered across the district in small detachments to maintain an uneasy peace and to look for any possible guerrillas. Porter’s first action surprised Merrill.

In addition to Porter and his recruits there were several guerrilla bands that operated in the region. Most of those bands joined forces with Porter during his campaign, which gave Porter a sizable force of armed men with a very large base of support in the area. Despite the additional manpower and local advantages, Porter faced two obstacles in accomplishing his twin missions. One was the lack of military weaponry needed to fight Union troops; the second was crossing the
formidable barrier that the Missouri River posed to any movements south. The Missouri River was the primary reason for Porter’s campaign occurring as it did. He understood from the beginning of his recruiting that moving a large group of men across the river while engaging enemy forces would require a forced crossing.

He felt that the best way he could accomplish his two objectives was to capture weapons. By doing so, he could arm his recruits to enable them to defend themselves while he continued recruiting. Ultimately, he could force a Missouri River crossing. Porter’s actions in the early stages of his campaign showed that he was carrying out that plan of action. The Union commander in Missouri, General John Schofield, discerned the purpose of these Confederate recruiting campaigns and ordered all boats and other means of crossing the Missouri River not under the guard of his troops to be destroyed or placed under the protection of his troops. He also ordered gunboat patrols of the river and limited navigation of the river. Schofield was determined to prevent any large groups of prospective Confederate soldiers from escaping to the south where they could reinforce the Confederate Army.

Capturing militia patrols was a slow way for Porter to arm his forces while also causing Union forces to search for his camp. After being tipped off that the small arms at the county courthouse in Memphis were poorly guarded, Porter marched around 125 of his men there and captured the town on July 13. He was rewarded with a haul of about 100 muskets with cartridge boxes. While at Memphis one of Porter’s officers, a guerrilla chief named Tom Stacy, whom Porter appointed as a captain, extracted a measure of revenge against a civilian who had bragged about killing two of Stacy’s men several days earlier. The civilian, Dr. William Aylward, had spent time with the Missouri Home Guard unit from Clark County in 1861. During the night Dr. Aylward’s guards, who happened to be a brother and cousin of the two executed guerrillas, hung Aylward and left his body lying in a field.

Actions such as this were rare in Porter’s command, but they did occur. There is no evidence that Porter ordered the killing or that he knew it had been done until several days later. The capture of Memphis brought swift action from the Union forces. On July 18, Porter anticipated the pursuit and laid an ambush at Vassar’s Hill in southwest Scotland County. The Union’s Merrill Horse and 11th Missouri Cavalry suffered eighty-three casualties with twenty-three killed. Porter lost two men, one being Captain Stacy. After the Federals withdrew, Porter held the field and secured the weapons abandoned by his retreating opponent. Porter skillfully executed the ambush and his men fought as a well-disciplined line using volley fire against several rash charges by the militia cavalry led by Major John.
About this time, Colonel John McNeil assumed command of the Northeast District as the general rise in guerrilla activity throughout Missouri necessitated a restructuring of the command situation and areas of responsibility. McNeil had spent the winter of 1861-62 along the Kansas border where the worst guerrilla actions of the war occurred. By 1862, both sides gave little quarter, and the bloody nature of guerrilla warfare had hardened McNeil. He marked his arrival in northeast Missouri by a dogged pursuit of Porter and his forces and an enforcement of Halleck’s “shoot on sight” orders. As McNeil organized his forces at Palmyra, Porter made a long hard ride south in what some interpreted as an attempt to take his force across the Missouri River to Arkansas. By this time, Porter had recruited somewhere between three and four hundred men. 

Porter’s lack of a supply train made this ride and other rapid movements possible. His command lived off the land as it went. He considered each man to be his own quartermaster and sympathetic people in the region greatly aided his men. This came at a cost, though. Porter was chronically short of ammunition throughout his campaign and the morale of his men depended upon his ability to avoid battles that were not in his favor. As with any guerrilla force, its ultimate success depended upon its ability to win fights and avoid those that it could not win. Losing battles would result in losing men to desertion and forfeiting support from the population. Porter’s force was successful until the ride south.

Porter managed to avoid confronting Union forces until he moved through the village of Florida, which was near two bridges that spanned forks of the Salt River. The Third Iowa Cavalry had a detachment there and a short skirmish broke out. The Third Iowa maintained contact with Porter’s force for a couple days while also alerting other militia units of Porter’s location. In northern Calloway County, Porter was joined by another guerrilla band led by Captain Alvin Cobb, but was also informed that Colonel Oden Guitar, leading the 9th Missouri Cavalry of the Missouri State Militia, had combined several units and was nearby. Porter had no choice but to engage them. He was able to find a location near Moore’s Mill suitable for his force and waited for Guitar’s attack, which came on July 28. Two cannon augmented Guitar’s force. The battle was a drawn-out affair in which Porter lost in excess of sixty men killed and one hundred-twenty wounded while Guitar only lost twenty killed and fifty-five wounded.

This action greatly demoralized Porter’s force, and following the battle, many men left to return home. Cobb and other guerrillas also left to go back to their own home counties to resume their activities. Porter’s attempt to cross the Missouri ended. The loss and subsequent defections reduced his command to less

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19 Clopper.

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than one hundred men. At this point Porter was at an all-time low in his campaign and could have easily decided to return to disband or to make a rush to join Price. However, the decision of the Missouri governor, Hamilton Gamble, and the Missouri State Militia commander, General Schofield, to try to end the increased guerrilla activity revived Porter’s campaign. With Gamble’s support, Schofield issued General Order 19, which created a new militia in Missouri, the Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM). All able-bodied men in the state were required to enroll in the EMM regardless of their status, unless they were in the Union army or Missouri State Militia. This requirement affected all those who supported the South, including paroled soldiers. The result was that many men who would not have joined the Confederate recruiters now did so. The main point of the plan was to be able to keep those men under surveillance; the plan backfired.

This might have been the biggest blunder made during 1862 in the effort to end the guerrilla war. The issue of secession had divided Missouri in 1861. Few had wanted to secede or go to war over secession, but the actions of Price and others forced the state into the conflict. Schofield’s order then forced men to choose sides. Thousands chose the South, especially men who were already being mistreated by federal or militia troops. Many of the men who had been captured and released on parole also slipped back to the guerrillas. The order also resulted in federal troops seizing weapons from those deemed unreliable; these Union soldiers had license to enter homes and steal anything they wanted. While the order did augment federal forces in Missouri, it also created thousands of guerrillas, primarily among men who would have remained neutral.

As a direct result of this order on July 22, Porter was flooded with new recruits despite his defeat at Moore’s Mill. He acted quickly to secure as many men as he could and sent out small detachments around northeast Missouri to gather up the recruits, eventually to meet at a prearranged place along the Lewis and Knox County line. Porter himself moved north gathering men, and on August 1 reached Newark. There, he attacked two companies of the Eleventh Missouri State Militia hoping to capture them swiftly to avoid casualties and to seize their arms. The seventy-five militiamen were able to take refuge in a few stone buildings and held out for several hours until Porter ordered burning hay wagons to be pushed against the walls. The parties negotiated surrender. The battle left only a few men dead or wounded on either side. Porter was able to gather up all the weapons and ammunition for his force.

Many more recruits joined Porter that night. At his prearranged meeting point on August 2, he received word that Captain Tice Cain’s guerrillas had captured Kirksville. Also at this point, Porter found himself under close pursuit by
Colonel McNeil’s force, which had quickly moved into Newark after the guerillas’ departure. Porter and his officers decided to go to Kirksville. McNeil followed and steadily gained on them despite his supply train and five cannon.25 His experiences on the Kansas border had evidently shown McNeil the art of moving swiftly in order to fight the guerrillas. The large body of recruits Porter suddenly had, many of whom were not mounted, slowed the Confederates—further benefiting McNeil. Due to the lack of mounts, Porter’s force took four days to reach Kirksville. McNeil’s command was right behind him by the time Porter entered the village. At that point, he had no choice but to fight. While Porter now had over two thousand men, only a quarter had military weapons. A quarter had pistols, shotguns, or squirrel guns, while half of the men were completely unarmed. Eyewitnesses say that Porter was not happy about fighting at Kirksville, but the proximity of the Union cavalry prevented him from being able to find a better location. With Porter stopped, McNeil was able to deploy his forces in a battle formation to his liking. McNeil positioned his five cannon to pound the guerrillas, which he proceeded to do. The Battle of Kirksville only lasted approximately three hours, and it was a very one-sided fight.26

Accounts vary as to the number of casualties, but McNeil’s official statement indicated that Union forces killed 150 guerrillas and wounded over 300. They took forty seven prisoners. McNeil’s force lost five killed and thirty two wounded.27 His cavalry pursued Porter’s fleeing men into the Chariton River bottom where the guerillas escaped pursuit by going into brush that put the cavalry at a disadvantage. However, Porter did not escape pursuit. Over the next few days, other Union forces attacked him as he moved south along the river inflicting more casualties. Porter did manage to ambush his pursuers at least once, inflicting over a hundred casualties, but by August 11, he had to disband his command as it disintegrated around him due to battle losses and desertion.28

Following the Battle of Kirksville, Colonel McNeil had fifteen of the captured guerrillas executed by firing squad on the battlefield, after a short court-martial.29 All fifteen had parole papers on them, which meant they were in willful violation of General Order 18. The executions shocked the region, but they also reflected the growing frustration of Union soldiers and leaders after capturing paroled guerrillas more than once.30 Again, McNeil’s time on the Kansas border almost certainly had a hand in this matter. It was common in the western part of the state where guerrilla activity was most prevalent for prisoners on either side to be shot immediately; however, McNeil’s actions at Kirksville had not been seen in northeast Missouri until this moment. These were not the only prisoners executed by McNeil’s orders in the area. McNeil and his troops worked hard to root out the
guerrillas in the region and shot several other parole violators over the course of the next month.

Porter was resilient and regrouped in Lewis County. His force swelled once again as McNeil and other Union commanders repeatedly swept the region. A patrol of the Knox County EMM captured Porter’s fellow officer, Frisby McCullough, now a lieutenant colonel, and took him to Kirksville where by order of McNeil a firing squad executed him. That action may have been in violation of the rules of warfare; however, McNeil suffered no repercussions. McCullough was a commissioned officer of the Confederate Army and was captured in his uniform. There was considerable debate for years about the actual details of McCullough’s commission and whether or not he was court-martialed.31

Porter tried to get as many men across the Missouri River as he could. He had learned that any attack he made would bring swift pursuit by Union forces. His support from the population was also declining as many of his supporters were under surveillance by federal agents or had been captured. Porter had to keep on the move and apparently arranged a diversionary attack on Palmyra in order to free captured guerrillas and draw attention away from the Missouri River, where many of his recruits were trying to cross over.32 He was successful in releasing the prisoners, but immediately drew the attention of Union forces that pursued him relentlessly, even attacking his camp more than once. McNeil kept the pressure on Porter who decided it was time to leave the region with the men he had left. On October 16, Porter and his men began crossing the Missouri River at Portland in Calloway County. Even then, Union troops caught up with him and prevented many from making the crossing. Porter himself made his way across the river and to the Confederate Army in Arkansas.33

Porter’s capture of Palmyra brought about a government crisis regarding the execution of prisoners. Porter captured a civilian named Andrew Allsman who had been an informant for the Union. Allsman was an older man who had lived in the area for thirty years and had testified regarding the loyalty of various people in Union courts. Regardless of who gave the order, if there even was an order, some of Porter’s men murdered Allsman and hid the body.34 There was no evidence that Porter ordered his death. General McNeil was under immense pressure to do something about Allsman’s disappearance. On October 8, he published a notice in the Palmyra Courier and had copies of letters sent to Porter’s home and posted throughout the area.35

The notice stated that unless Allsman returned unharmed to his family ten days from the date of the notice, McNeil would execute ten of Porter’s guerrillas whom the Union troops had captured. By this time, Porter was already near
Portland preparing to cross into southern Missouri and he never saw or knew about the notice. Since Allsman was already dead, there was no way to prevent McNeil from carrying out his ultimatum, which he did on October 18; he made a grand show of the event. McNeil had once again used extreme measures to counter the guerrilla activity. This time it provoked a reaction from his superiors, after a demand for McNeil to be turned over to the Confederacy to face a trial for murder arrived from no less than the president of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis. Davis sent a message to the Union commander of the Missouri forces, Major General Samuel R. Curtis, stating that if he did not comply by handing over McNeil, Davis would order ten Union officers to be shot. Nothing came of the demand although Abraham Lincoln’s cabinet had at least two heated discussions over the incident that became known as the Palmyra Massacre. Although McNeil was not turned over to the Confederates, no Union officers were ever executed as Davis had threatened.

While McNeil earned his nickname, “Butcher McNeil,” his actions during the second half of 1862 ended the guerrilla actions in northeast Missouri. Following the executions at Palmyra, guerrilla activity in the district all but ceased. The biggest reason for this was that McNeil’s relentless pursuit of the guerrillas resulted in the capture of many of them, while many others, like Porter, fled the state. Several of the guerrilla groups disbanded, as Union forces killed their leaders or otherwise wiped out the bands. In addition, the creation of the Enrolled Missouri Militia achieved its purpose despite having caused many men to become guerrillas themselves. A patrol of the EMM captured Porter’s fellow Confederate recruiter, John Poindexter, on September 1 after Union cavalry had attacked his force several times, dispersing it. For the remainder of the war, the counties of Schuyler, Adair, Knox, Macon, Shelby, Scotland, Clark, Lewis, and Marion saw almost no organized guerrilla activity. Most of the Missouri State Guard units transferred elsewhere and the EMM kept watch over the region.

The number of men that Porter recruited and managed to get to Confederate lines was unknown. There is no record beyond estimates, and they vary. Joseph Mudd claimed that around five thousand men made it to the Confederate Army, but that number seems very high when only approximately thirty thousand Missourians served in the Confederate Army during the war. Mudd took his numbers from a report that indicated Porter raised five thousand men in northeast Missouri, but that does not mean all five thousand made it south. Major General Thomas Hindman, who commanded the Trans-Mississippi Department of the Confederacy in 1862, said that the actions of Porter and other recruiters raised twelve regiments for the Confederate Army. This could have been possible, but
Hindman’s estimation took into consideration all recruiting statewide. Recruits from north of the Missouri River had a difficult time crossing that barrier, though. Mudd countered this by saying Hindman failed to take into consideration the thousands that may have found their way south by going to Illinois and then south across the Ohio River into Kentucky.42

In this regard, the decision of General Sterling Price to send recruiters such as Colonel Porter to Missouri did accomplish part of its mission. Thousands of Missourians did go south and enlist in the Confederate Army in 1862. However, while about thirty thousand Missourians served in the Confederate Army during the war, about 180,000 served in the Union Army. These numbers do not include guerrillas or militia troops. The severe imbalance of those who enlisted in the armies demonstrates that while Price was correct in his judgment that thousands of Missourians would flock to the Confederate cause, he was wrong in thinking that the majority of Missourians supported the Confederacy. What Price did accomplish was to aid in the genesis of a bloody guerrilla war in Missouri, which left bitter hatred in its wake for at least two generations of citizens.

Colonel Joseph Porter made it back to the Confederate Army, but in January 1863, he suffered mortal wounds during a raid into southwest Missouri. He died on February 18. Colonel John McNeil received a promotion to Brigadier General, survived the war to become a postal superintendent in St. Louis, and died in 1891. Porter’s mission had turned northeast Missouri into a battlefield and his departure brought about the lessening of the guerrilla war there, but it did not end it. In the larger context of the American Civil War, Porter’s campaign had little impact, but for the citizens of northeast Missouri, it—and the actions of the occupying Union troops—forced everyone to choose sides, which only intensified the people’s anger and desperation. Although far from the main theaters of the war, guerrillas and recruiting officers such as Joseph Porter brought war’s violence to the men and women of northeast Missouri, destroying their illusions of neutrality.

Notes


11. Joseph A. Mudd, *With Porter in North Missouri* (Washington, D.C.: National Publishing Company, 1909), 26. A note about this source is required. Dr. Mudd served under Porter through the Battle of Moore’s Mill whereupon he left to join the Confederate Army. The nature of Mudd’s book is biased toward Porter and the Confederacy consistently. However, it serves as an eyewitness account based on the best recollections of Mudd years after the actual events. Mudd was almost certainly biased as to why things happened the way they did and in his explanations of what went on, but he was very accurate in describing what actually took place. In that respect, his account is quite factual.

12. Michael Fellman, *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 97-103. There is a degree of conflict in various sources about what to call Porter’s force. They were not Confederate soldiers until they were enlisted into the Confederate Army, but could be considered recruits. They fell easily into the definition of what constituted a guerrilla fighter despite objections from southern sources, which insisted they were soldiers. I have used the term guerrillas to denote them in the text, as they were not Confederate soldiers.


18. *Four Counties*, 521.

19. Mudd, *With Porter*, 79. Mudd spent several pages detailing the executions of men who had served with the Missouri State Guard, captured guerrillas, or southern sympathizers as justification for the murder of Dr. Aylward. What he really did was document the brutal nature of retaliation by guerrillas and their opponents in the region.


21. Ibid., 134.


26. Mudd, *With Porter*, 249. Mudd used eyewitness accounts, official records, and newspaper articles to describe what happened after he left Porter’s command following the Moore’s Mill battle.


30. Ibid., 105.


32. Ibid., 136.

33. Mudd, *With Porter*, 293.

34. Nichols, *Civil War Missouri*, 197.


36. E. F. Perkins, *History of Marion County, Missouri* (St. Louis, 1884), 496-96.

37. Ibid., 495-501.


43. Ibid., 317.
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