Robert Kane

In 1890, US Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, then at the Naval War College, published *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1665-1783*, in which he attributed Britain’s rise as a global and colonial power to the use of the Royal Navy to dominate the North Atlantic and, ultimately, all the world’s oceans. Theodore Roosevelt, an up and coming American politician who already had an interest in naval affairs, wrote a favorable review of that book for the *Atlantic Monthly* in October 1890. In the review, Roosevelt generally concurred with Mahan’s assessment of the role of the Royal Navy in Britain’s rise as a colonial and global power.¹ Mahan’s and Roosevelt’s close relationship and regular correspondence after 1890 and Roosevelt’s growing support for an ocean-going Navy as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and President led some naval historians and Roosevelt biographers to believe that Mahan heavily

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¹ Mahan’s and Roosevelt’s close relationship and regular correspondence after 1890 and Roosevelt’s growing support for an ocean-going Navy as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and President led some naval historians and Roosevelt biographers to believe that Mahan heavily influenced Roosevelt. Mahan (September 27, 1840 – December 1, 1914) was a Navy admiral and historian, who has been called “the most important American strategist of the nineteenth century.” He based his concept of sea power on the idea that countries with greater navies will have greater global impact, most famously presented in *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783*, published in 1890. His concepts globally influenced the shaping of the strategic use of navies, especially in the United States, Germany, Japan and Britain, and significantly contributed to naval arms races after 1890 in Europe, the United States, and Japan. His ideas still permeate the naval doctrine today.
influenced Roosevelt in the development of his ideas about sea power and an ocean-going navy. However, Mahan’s influence on Roosevelt was not as extensive as these authors have claimed as Roosevelt, by the early 1890s, already had well-formed ideas about the importance of seapower, the need for the United States to have a great navy, and its use on the world’s oceans.

The starting point to understand how and why Roosevelt developed a keen interest in naval issues, the importance of sea power, and, thus, his advocacy for creating a large, ocean-going Navy before he met Mahan is an understanding of the development of values and interests in children. According to psychologists, morals and value development begins in children as soon as they can communicate. While numerous environmental factors affect a child's personality, parents, teachers, and other caregivers are active agents in developing the character of the growing children in their charge. Parents, especially non-working mothers as they generally have more daily contact with children than fathers who generally work during the day, are the primary influence on children from birth to about the age of six or seven when children enter schools. From about seven to mid- to late

Figure 2 Admiral Stephen N. Luce (March 25, 1827 –July 28, 1917), US Navy, in 1888. Luce urged the Navy to establish a professional military education institution for senior Navy officers. As a result, the Navy established the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, October 6, 1884 with Luce as its first president. In 1885, he was promoted to rear admiral, and Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose writings had greatly influenced the Navy’s decision to establish the Navy War College, succeeded Luce as president in 1886. U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command.
teens, peers become increasingly important in morals and value development in people. In Roosevelt’s case, his mother’s stories about his “heroic” Confederate Navy uncles, James and Irvine Bulloch, sparked Roosevelt’s interest in naval affairs that he later nurtured into a definitive history of the naval war of the War of 1812. Roosevelt’s naval history not only demonstrated an outstanding grasp of the intricacies of naval warfare in the latter days of sail but also severely criticized the decrepit state of the Navy in the early 1880s, years before Mahan wrote his book on sea power. As a result, Roosevelt began his advocacy to improve the state of American seapower at least six years before he and Mahan met.

Although Roosevelt met Mahan in the summer of 1888 during a visit to the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, the relationship between the two naval advocates did not begin in earnest until Mahan’s publication of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* in 1890. In 1885, the Navy sent Captain Mahan as captain of the USS Wachusett to patrol the western coast of South America. During this tour, Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the president of the newly established Naval War College, selected Mahan as a lecturer in naval history and tactics and ultimately as his successor as president, partially based on Mahan’s *The Gulf and Inland Waters*, a naval history of the American Civil War published in 1883. To prepare for his upcoming assignment, Mahan read books on naval history in the library of the English Club in Callao, Peru. There, after reading Theodor Mommsen’s *History of Rome*, Mahan concluded, according to his autobiography, that the campaigns of Hannibal during the Second Punic War might have ended differently if he had invaded Italy by sea, instead of by land. This “discovery” and additional reading led Mahan to eventually write two of the most influential books on naval history, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, two years after the former book.

In these books, Mahan concluded that Britain’s rise as a great power occurred because of the Royal Navy which Britain, an insular nation, needed to protect its growing overseas trade and expanding global colonial empire. As a result, Mahan came to believe that the United States also needed a great sea-going navy (in 1889, the Navy was rated twelfth among the navies of the world) to protect its growing overseas commerce. Furthermore, this great navy should consist of large modern steel-hulled, armored, big-gunned warships (battleships and cruisers), instead of smaller warships with multiple types of weapons, that
would face similar fleets of warships in “great” fleet actions at sea. As the United States entered the race for colonies in the late 1800s, Mahan also lectured and wrote on the need for colonies, initially as coaling stations for the Navy’s new steam-driven warships, and a canal across the Isthmus of Panama.

The question is to what extent did Roosevelt already believe in the importance of sea power and a large ocean-going navy to the United States when Mahan published his “influence of sea power” books in the early 1890s and to see how much of what Roosevelt believed about sea power and navies came from Mahan after 1890. Roosevelt was born on October 27, 1858, into a wealthy New York City aristocratic family, descended from original Dutch settlers of New York. As a child, he was afflicted with asthma, headaches, fevers, and other illnesses, which led him as a young man to emphasize health, strength, and the outdoors life. More importantly, his mother’s stepbrother was James Bulloch (Uncle Jimmie to Roosevelt) and her younger full brother, Irvine Bulloch. During the Civil War, James commanded a Confederate blockade runner, the Fingal; later refitted a British ship, the Erica, in July 1862, as the Confederate commerce raider, the CSS Alabama; and attempted to purchase two ironclad rams from the Laird shipyard. Irvine served on the Alabama when the USS Kearsage sank the ship off the French coast in June 1864. Irvine finished the war aboard another commerce raider, the CSS Shenandoah which devastated the American whaling fleet in the Pacific. Since the Bullochs did not receive an amnesty from the American
government after the war, they went into self-imposed exile in Liverpool, England.\textsuperscript{12}

During the war, Roosevelt’s mother, nicknamed Mittie, related her brothers’ naval exploits “and their manly, robust, militaristic pursuits” to the young Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{13} Teedie, as he was called as a child, created a game called “running the blockade,” based on his Uncle James’ exploits on the blockade runner.\textsuperscript{14} Since Roosevelt’s father did not serve in the military during the war and, thus, had no tales of heroism in combat, Roosevelt reveled in his mother’s tales of his “infamous” uncles. Brands wrote, “It was probably at this time that the seeds of fascination with the sea and ships were planted in Roosevelt’s mind; these seeds would mature in later years into a preoccupation with sea power.”\textsuperscript{15} In early May 1869, in the midst of the diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Britain over damages to Union shipping during the Civil War by British-made Confederate commerce raiders, the Roosevelt family...
went to Europe. Around May 21, Roosevelt at the age of ten met his famous uncles for the first time and personally heard their tales of valor and excitement on the high seas. To Teedie, the two Bulloch brothers “were almost mythical in stature,” “... two heroic figures from Mittie’s stories, the real thing at last.” In later life, Roosevelt confided to Archibald Butt, a journalist and Army officer who became military advisor to Presidents Roosevelt and William Howard Taft that Uncle Jimmie had “appealed to him more than any man he had ever met.”

Meeting the heroes of his mother’s tales had a profound impact on Roosevelt. A Washington reporter, referring to the belief that Irvine Bulloch had fired the last two shots from the CSS Alabama before she sank, later wrote, “One would suppose that the President, himself, fired the last two shots from the Alabama instead of his uncle [Irvine].” As a grown man, Roosevelt would explain, “It was from the heroes of my favorite stories, from hearing of the feats performed by my southern forefathers and kinsfolk, and from knowing my father [that] I felt great admiration for men who were fearless ... and I had a great desire to be like them.”

As he prepared to assume the office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy on April 19, 1897, Roosevelt recounted that the memories of his Uncle James and the tales of “ships, ships, ships, and fighting of ships” told to him “as a little shaver” by his mother came back to him “till they sank into the depths of my soul.” Grondahl characterized Roosevelt’s appointment to this position as “a culmination of his childhood fantasies of becoming a naval war hero along the lines of his mother’s colorful brothers, Jimmy and Irvine Bulloch.”

Of course, having fantasies about ships and navies does not constitute ideas about the importance and use of sea power. Roosevelt still had a fascination with the sea and navies when he entered Harvard University in the fall of 1876 and struggled through his studies for the first two years. During his senior year, he selected the naval war of the War of 1812 as the topic of his senior paper while looking for a book in the library and finding one by James Fennimore Cooper, “the author he had loved as a boy for his tales of sea and war.” Roosevelt then remembered his Uncle Jimmie and regretted that there was not an adequate history of the naval aspects of the War of 1812. Later, after deciding to turn his thesis into a book during his years at the Columbia Law School, he read numerous books about seamanship, naval histories, memoirs of participants, and British sources of the War of 1812. He requested and went through hundreds of original documents in the Department of the Navy’s archives in Washington, DC. From these sources, he collected extensive
data on the fighting ships of the latter days of “fighting sail,” their armaments, and the crews of both sides. Using the data and information he collected, Roosevelt compiled his own construction plans, tactical diagrams, and statistical tables for his book.25

While working on his book, Roosevelt became tired of writing and decided to take a break. He went to Europe in 1881 but remembered to pack his manuscript. During this trip, he visited his uncles in England and showed James the manuscript. His uncles not only encouraged him to complete his book, but James helped Roosevelt sort out some of the technical issues. Roosevelt even convinced Uncle James to write his own memoirs about his naval exploits during the Civil War.26 Upon his return to New York, Roosevelt renewed work on his book. The end product, published in 1882, was boring to read and full of minute details, written by one who had never experienced war.27 Yet, it “was also scrupulously thorough, accurate, fair, and would remain a definitive study.”28

Roosevelt’s history became the definitive account of the naval aspect of the War of 1812. Both American and British historians have recognized it as such and it is still considered an important work on the topic. He meticulously examined each naval battle of the war and analyzed the absolute and relative strengths of the opposing ships, crews, officers, and armaments. Roosevelt compared the advantages and disadvantages of each side, described the direction of the engagement, evaluated the tactics, and assessed the merits of the opposing actions. For each battle discussed in the book, Roosevelt researched the available records so he could compare the relative force of each side through a comparison of the tonnage of the vessels, the armament, and the crew size of the belligerents.

Since its publication, numerous authors, writing scholarly works as well as general and popular accounts of naval warfare in the War of 1812, have utilized Roosevelt’s work as a source and taken his analyses into account. The book received praise from contemporary reviewers for its scholarship and style, the Naval War College used it as a text, and the Department of the Navy had a copy placed in the library of every ship.29 In 1893, eleven years after Roosevelt published his book, the editors of The Royal Navy, A History from the Earliest Times to 1900, compiled by Sir William Laird Clowes between 1897 and 1903, asked Roosevelt to write the section on the War of 1812, in recognition of the authoritativeness of Roosevelt’s book. In 1910, London and Low published Roosevelt’s section of the Clowes’s history as The Naval Operations of the War between Great Britain and the United
States 1812-1815. Admiral William S. Sims wrote that the great value of Roosevelt’s book was that “it was listened to by the American people and it profoundly reflects the attitude of the nation toward the navy.” Such comments are similar to those that Mahan would receive after the publication of his books, years later. Roosevelt’s naval history of the War of 1812 reveals a number of pertinent conclusions for this study. First, it demonstrated his mastery of early nineteenth century naval warfare as revealed by his detailed descriptions of the ships, their armament and crews, and the tactics of naval warfare. Second, Roosevelt recognized that the individual ship-to-ship actions on the high seas did nothing to materially decrease the overwhelming naval superiority of the Royal Navy and aid the United States in the war strategically, although they did produce tactical victories that raised the spirits of Americans discouraged by defeats in the land war. Roosevelt also believed that the mini-fleet actions on Lakes Champlain, Ontario, and Erie had greater strategic impact on the American conduct of the war than the individual ship battles as these actions allowed the United States to retain reasonable control of the lakes and the northern border region with British Canada and to secure the border from a possible British invasion of the United States from Canada. Ironically, Mahan made the same criticisms of the Navy’s conduct during the War of 1812 in “The Future in Relation to American Naval Power:”

[T]he usefulness of a navy,—not, indeed, by the admirable but utterly unavailing single-ship victories that illustrated its course, but by the prostration into which our seaboarding communications fell, through the lack of a navy at all proportionate to the country’s needs and exposure. . . . They were simply scattered efforts, without relation either to one another or to any main body whatsoever.

Mahan published this article in June 1895, thirteen years after Roosevelt published his history. Roosevelt also experienced and understood the growing interest by some in the 1880s of the need to upgrade the Navy. At the end of the Civil War, the United States had one of the top ranked navies in the world. However, by the early 1880s, the government had let it deteriorate to the point that it was ranked below the navies of eleven other nations. While other countries incorporated the changes in warships and armaments—steel hulls, steam engines, screw propellers, and breech-loading rifled guns—wrought by the Industrial Revolution into their
navies, the Navy still had wooden warships armed with smoothbores and powered chiefly by sail, “vessels too slow to run away and too weak to stand up in a fight.” The reactionary policies of Admiral David D. Porter during his brief time as the de facto head of the Navy between March and June 1869 had much to do with creating the deplorable state of the Navy in the 1870s. Later, recognizing the consequences of his own actions and policies, Porter, now with the rank of Admiral of the Navy, compared the few ships of the Navy to “ancient Chinese forts on which dragons have been pained to frighten away the enemy.” The British called the American Navy “a hapless, broken-down, tattered, forlorn apology for a navy.” The naval maneuvers of the “United Fleets” held near Key West, Florida, in 1874 demonstrated the “tactical ignorance” of American naval officers and the “unfitness” of the Navy’s warships for offensive operations.

There were many reasons for the general disinterest in naval affairs and the low level of naval expenditures during this period. From 1865 to 1877, the nation focused on Reconstruction in the South after the devastating Civil War. In the 1870s, interest in protecting the civil rights of African-Americans in the South waned as large-scale capitalism and industrialization created new domestic problems. Also, the American government was more concerned with the Army’s continual fighting with various American Indian tribes on the frontier than the Navy in the absence of a discernable foreign naval threat to the country. The country and Congress sought to limit military and naval expenditures to pay the $3 billion debt incurred during the late war. President Ulysses Grant gave some attention to naval affairs, but Congress did not appropriate funds for new ships. After the Panic of 1873, Congress, especially the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, was even less inclined to appropriate funds for military expenditures. Finally, the absence of any real threat to the United States and the perceived experimental state of contemporary naval technology gave a budget-conscious Congress the reasons it needed to keep naval appropriations at a level to maintain existing ships, not build new ones using uncertain technology.

Roosevelt was not unaware of the condition of the Navy by the early 1880s. In addition to being a naval history, The Naval War of 1812 also presented a stinging commentary on the state of the Navy in 1882, a testament to his knowledge of the state into which the Navy had fallen by the early 1880s. He wrote, “[it] is folly” for the “great” United States to rely on a navy consisting partially of “antiquated wrecks” and partially of “new vessels rather more worthless
than the old.”39 Later, he compared the large number of “worthless vessels” of 1882
with the few vessels of 1812, which, according to Roosevelt, were superior to any
foreign ship of the same class. He believed that it would be better to use current
funding to construct a few modern warships than to continue patching up “a
hundred antiquated hulks.” He castigated the government, “It is too much to hope
that our political short-sightedness will ever enable us to have a navy that is first-
class in point of size; but there certainly seems no reason why what ships we have
should not be of the very best quality.”40 Roosevelt also realized that the offensive
power of a navy lay in its seagoing warships in his severe criticism of Thomas
Jefferson for wasting money by constructing over 150 one-gun gunboats, barely
suitable for harbor defense, rather than constructing ocean-going frigates. Roosevelt
called the gunboats “utterly useless” and their wartime operations a “painfully
ludicrous commentary on Jefferson’s remarkable project.”41

By 1880s, many, besides Roosevelt, had come to see the need for the
United States to acquire a modern navy. In the past decade, the volume of American
exports had grown 200 per cent, and the probability of an international race for
commercial supremacy indicated that sea power would become more important.42
Small groups of men in the Department of the Navy and Congress began working to
improve the condition of the Navy. Luce, who had founded the United States Naval
Institute in 1873 to promote professional expertise in the Navy, spearheaded a group
of officers in analyzing the needs of the Navy. Certain congressmen, such as
Washington C. Whitthorne of Tennessee and Benjamin W. Harris of Massachusetts,
who alternated as Democratic and Republican chairman of the House Naval Affairs
Committee, had drawn significant conclusions on the state of the US Navy from
revelations of their committee investigations. From March 7, 1881 to April 16,
1882, a vigorous Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt did what he could to gain
congressional support for new modern warships. He inspired and may have written
an endorsement by President Chester A. Arthur in his State of the Union address in
January 1882 for a revitalized navy and followed up in his annual report to Congress
on “our languishing and neglected navy.”43 However, later that year, President
Arthur replaced Hunt, who became American ambassador to Russia, with William
E. Chandler before Congress had had a chance to comment on Hunt’s proposals.44

With Chandler’s support, Congress passed the Navy Act of 1883, which
provided for the construction of the country’s first steel warships, the protected
cruisers Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago, and the dispatch boat, the Dolphin, popularly
known as the “ABCDs.” Numerous problems plagued their construction, such as American inexperience in producing rolled steel for hull plates and forging steel for heavy rifled guns. Although the new ships were much admired by many Americans, they were insufficient for offensive operations. They were small, slow moving, and carried full rigging for sails. For example, the largest, the USS Chicago, measured 325 feet overall, displaced only 4,500 tons, had engines that generated only 5,000 horsepower for a top speed of 18 knots, and was rigged as a barkentine. In March 1885, William C. Whitney became Secretary of the Navy under President Grover Cleveland. Whitney continued advocating for increased funding for modern warships and instituted many reforms within the Department of the Navy. Throughout the 1880s, Congress approved funding for additional ships that incorporated new developments in naval technology: armor, the elimination of sailing gear, and larger, rifled guns. Yet, while the new naval construction program reflected a growing understanding of the tactical significance of contemporary naval technology, it did not “appreciate the strategic advantage inherent in a unified battle force of sufficient strength and endurance to destroy an enemy fleet a thousand miles offshore.” Despite these shortcomings, the President, the Congress, and the American people had begun to recognize the shortcomings and problems of the Navy.

Roosevelt biographies do not mention whether or not he followed the congressional debates on increased funding for modern warships, had any knowledge of the construction of the ABCD ships, or expressed any thoughts on American naval developments of the 1880s. During this period, Roosevelt began his political career with his election to the New York state legislature and left that position to go out West to pursue the life of a ranch owner in North Dakota. Roosevelt also remarried in 1886, following the tragic death of his first wife in childbirth in 1884. Then, in 1889, newly elected President Benjamin Harrison appointed Roosevelt as chief of the Civil Service Commission, marking his return to public service. Yet, it is difficult to believe that Roosevelt completely divorced himself from any interest in the developments of the Navy in 1882 with the publication of The Naval History of the War of 1812 and then, all of a sudden, rediscovered or renewed his interest in American naval development in 1890 with the publication of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1665-1783.

Roosevelt, in the summer of 1888, accepted an invitation from Luce, founder and president of the Naval War College, to speak to the college’s faculty
on Roosevelt’s book, which Luce had acquired for the college’s library. While Luce
saw Roosevelt as an up-and-coming politician and possible patron of the college,
the invitation also recognized Roosevelt as a contemporary expert on at least the
naval aspects of the War of 1812, six years after the publication of Roosevelt’s
book. During this trip, Roosevelt met Mahan for the first time.47 One can only
speculate if Mahan read Roosevelt’s book in preparation for this visit or afterwards
and found his own thoughts about American naval power in concert with those of
Roosevelt.

Yet, Roosevelt still had a significant interest in the further development of
the US Navy into a modern, ocean-going naval force. Roosevelt read Mahan’s book
after its publication in 1890 and wrote the author, “I can say with perfect sincerity
that I think it very much the clearest and most instructive general work of the kind
with which I am acquainted. It is a very good book—admirable; and I am greatly in
error if it does not become a naval classic.”48 Soon afterwards, Roosevelt wrote his
glowing review of Mahan’s book for the Atlantic Monthly in which he generally
agreed with Mahan’s conclusions: refutation of American reliance on privateers, the
need for forward bases and stronger coastal defenses, and a large navy with a “full
proportion” of battleships. Brands wrote that Roosevelt’s reading of Mahan’s book
and the subsequent glowing book review marked Roosevelt’s “discovery of
Mahan” which helped start the latter’s career as one of the first “defense
intellectuals.” Furthermore, Roosevelt “linked up” with Mahan because he
generally agreed with Mahan’s ideas about a modern navy for the growing United
States. The relationship was “symbiotic”—both Roosevelt and Mahan benefitted
from “their joint cause of naval preparedness” and of “American assertiveness
abroad.”49

The publication of Mahan’s book was “well timed, for intensified
‘navalism’ was already in the air.” By 1890, US shipyards could finally build a
satisfactory warship with steel hulls, an adequate steam power plant that drove
screw propellers, and large caliber, rifled guns. Whitney’s successor as Secretary of
the Navy, Benjamin F. Tracy (1888-93), who had read Mahan’s manuscript in the
summer of 1889, continued the shift to new modern warships begun by Hunt,
Chandler, and Whitney.50 Mahan provided the first, if somewhat flawed, systematic
theory on the use and importance of sea power, and it appeared at a time when
technological changes in navies and economic and political developments were
occurring that coincided with his ideas. That Roosevelt would also concur with and
support Mahan’s ideas in the 1890s does not mean that Roosevelt was
overwhelmed with Mahan’s ideas on sea power and navies, Mahan had to convince
Roosevelt of his ideas, and/or Mahan had to teach and reinforce these ideas to
Roosevelt. Roosevelt already held similar views about the importance of sea power
and the need by the United States for a modern, ocean-going navy, consisting of
battleships capable of conducting offensive operations before he read Mahan’s
book. Roosevelt as a young boy had developed a fascination with navies and ships
through his Confederate Navy uncles. His outstanding *The Naval War of 1812*
articulated his knowledge of naval warfare, the condition of the US Navy in 1882
when he published his definitive work and his general ideas on how to modernize
the Navy. Thus, Roosevelt found Mahan to be more of another advocate for the
modernization of the Navy along the general lines that Roosevelt had articulated at
least seven years before, independently of Mahan, rather than a mentor or teacher as
some authors have asserted. Certainly, Mahan may have “said it better” than
Roosevelt that gained the attention of Congressmen and the American public but
not differently.

Notes


7. Ibid., 103. In 1889, Secretary of the Navy Benjamin H. Tracy in his annual report to Congress, ranked the American Navy, in terms of number of warships behind the navies of, in descending order, Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Holland, Spain, Italy Turkey, China, Norway-Sweden, and Austria-Hungary. Walter R. Herrick, Jr., The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), 244.


12. Miller, 41.


15. Brands, 22.

16. Brands, 22; McCullough, 71-72.

17. Letter to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., Letters from Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1924), 50-1; McCullough, 74.


22. Grondahl, 245.

23. Brands, 63-64.


25. Morris, 140.


34. Albion, 199-204.


36. Quoted in Davis, 19.

37. Herrick, 22.

38. Davis, 11-15.

40. Ibid., 114.


43. Albion, 207.

44. Herrick, 28.

45. Ibid., 29.

46. Ibid., 33-36.

47. Brands, 236.

48. No. 292, Letter to Alfred Thayer Mahan, May 12, 1890, in Morison, 221-22.

49. Brands, 236-38.

50. Albion, 208-209; Herrick, 43.
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