Ninety Six: Strategic Backcountry Outpost and Microcosm of the American Revolutionary War

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[Ninety Six] must be kept at all events & I think no reasonable expense should be spared—besides Georgia depends entirely upon it.

—General Charles Lord Cornwallis to Colonel Nisbet Balfour

You know the importance of Ninety Six, let that place be your constant care.

—General Charles Lord Cornwallis to Lieutenant Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon

Though scarcely known today, in the mid-eighteenth century, Ninety Six, South Carolina was a thriving community, built close to the convergence of the Cherokee Path, a key route from the Cherokee lands to Charleston, and the Island Ford Road, which led to the Saluda River and points further southeast. The strategic location of Ninety Six made it a crucial stopover for traders and travelers—it was a location known widely throughout the South during the late colonial period. Today, only a National Park Service Visitor Center and outbuildings occupy the site, and yet, had it developed apace with Charlotte, North Carolina, a site of similar size and situation in the 1760s, Ninety Six, too, could have become a power-house of the New South. The critical strategic nature of Ninety Six led to its destruction by the British in early July 1781, though Loyalist troops had successfully defended the town against the longest field siege of the Revolutionary War less than a month beforehand.¹

Despite its significance to the British during the Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War and the larger-than-life role that it played in the South Carolina backcountry during the late colonial period prior to the war, historians rarely focus on Ninety Six. Cowpens, a remote pasture in the backwoods used for fattening cattle on the way to market, is much better known today because of a battle fought there on a cold day in January 1781 than is Ninety Six. However, fear for the safety of Ninety Six caused General Charles Lord Cornwallis to send Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton racing after Continental Army Brigadier
General Daniel Morgan, which directly led to the British debacle at Cowpens.²

This paper establishes the strategic significance of Ninety Six to the British effort to retake the Carolina backcountry, traces its rise to become both a trading center and a center of justice for the backwoods settlers, and examines why Ninety Six and its surrounding area was a Loyalist stronghold. It also studies both the strengths and shortcomings of General Nathanael Greene and his military engineer, Count Thaddeus Kosciuszko’s approach to the Patriot siege of Ninety

Figure 1 A New and accurate map of the province of South Carolina in North America. Published by John Hinton, c. 1779.
Six. It analyzes why the commander of Ninety Six, British Provincial Army Lieutenant Colonel John Harris Cruger, was much more successful than either Continental Army Major General Benjamin Lincoln at Charleston or Cornwallis at Yorktown in defeating the siege tactics thrown against him.3

The site of Ninety Six, South Carolina, is today an area of rich archaeological interest. Archeologists have found evidence to place human activity at the site as early as 9000 BC with the discovery of a Clovis point there in 2005. The Native American peoples of most interest to students of the Colonial and the Revolutionary War periods in South Carolina are the Cherokee, who are mentioned as inhabitants of the Savannah River headwaters region as early as 1674. Ninety Six is located between the Long Canes Creek, a feeder of the Savannah River, and the Saluda River. The Cherokee figure prominently in the story of Ninety Six, as the site grew up at the junction of Cherokee trading routes, including the Cherokee Path, which ran from the Cherokee Hill Towns to Charleston, and an intersecting trading route, which ran to the Savannah River. Ninety Six’s very name likely came from the distance in miles between its location and the Cherokee town of Keowee, in present-day South Carolina.4

Trade drove the initial relations between the British colonists and the Cherokee; the colonists exchanged firearms, blankets, farming tools, and other items for animal pelts and slaves. The Cherokee sold as slaves many of the unfortunate people that they captured during their various raids and skirmishes with neighboring native peoples. As more settlers migrated to the South Carolina backcountry, merchants established formal trading outposts to facilitate the exchange of goods. Drawn by its well-situated location and pleasing environment, in 1738 Thomas Brown chose Ninety Six as the site of his trading outpost.5 During the middle of the eighteenth century, the government of South Carolina encouraged immigration to the backcountry—partially to provide a human shield between the native peoples to the west and the eastern edge of the colony—which included the Low Country plantations and the town of Charleston.6 As more settlers flocked to the South Carolina backcountry, population pressures, as well as misunderstandings between the various Cherokee peoples and colonists, caused ruptures in the cordial trading relationships that had existed between the two groups. For as the colonists attracted to the backcountry were of diverse population groups, including Scots, Scots-Irish, Germans, Swiss, Irish Quakers and French Huguenots, as well as English, Welsh, and a small group of Sephardic Jews—the Cherokees had their own
distinct town and regional affiliations and loyalties. The colonists did not broadly appreciate the distinctions among the Cherokees at the time, and trading relationships, in some cases, favored the natives of one region over another—leading to unfortunate consequences for the relationships between the Cherokee and the colonists.

Robert Gouedy, a successful trader, migrated to the Ninety Six region in 1751 and established a new trading post a short distance from Brown’s location. Gouedy’s store became the nucleus of a growing community, and as relations with the Cherokee deteriorated during the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1760-1761, they built a stockade around Gouedy’s barn. The fortified barn became the original Fort Ninety Six, and within its sturdy walls, the local militia fought off several Cherokee attacks during 1760. The colonists quickly recognized the strategic significance of the fort’s location at the junction of the Cherokee trading paths and the colonial government designated the small fort as an official provincial military outpost.

The end of the wars with the Cherokee peoples and the cessation of the French and Indian War brought an uneasy peace to the backcountry. A new wave of immigration surged forth from colonies to the north, particularly Pennsylvania and Virginia, and from Europe to further populate the region. However, the previous hostilities had attracted a new element to the backcountry; lawless men displaced by the wars sought to prey on both the Native American tribes and the backcountry settlers. Exacerbated by the increasing levels of violence and retribution that burst out during the wars, and fueled by a level of savagery unknown in other parts of the American colonies, the backcountry colonists adapted their own defense tactics. The means of reprisal became more brutal. The provincial government of South Carolina, its focus on Charleston and the coastal areas, virtually ignored the plight of the new settlers. The backcountry pioneers lacked access to courts and suffered from the depredations of general lawlessness. Eventually, the backcountry settlers formed vigilante groups to protect their interests. The Regulator movement, which initially attempted to bring order to the backcountry, spawned its own increase to the level of backcountry ferocity. After much political wrangling, and on-going violence, the South Carolina Provincial Assembly recognized the need to provide law enforcement and court access to the back county. King George III gave his approval of the measure on November 25, 1769. Ninety Six again benefited from its strategic location, and the South
Carolina Assembly directed that a substantial brick courthouse and jail be built in the town.  

While the backcountry settlers of Ninety Six and its surrounding region were concerned with the constant threat of violence, the more established coastal regions became caught up in the general colonial ferment against British policies enacted following the Seven Years’ War and Britain’s attempts at raising revenue through taxation directed at the colonists. South Carolina’s influential and wealthy planter class split between political radicals and moderates; however, the rebel radical Whig leaders successfully seized control of the state government and established a Provincial Congress and Council of Safety to control the colony.

The radical Whigs moved quickly to consolidate their power and bring the majority of South Carolina’s colonial citizens to their side of the dispute with the British government. They established a Provincial Association, which called upon citizens to sign a statement siding with the rebel cause. Determined to bring their viewpoints to the backcountry and rally the populace to the rebellion, William Henry Drayton and Reverend William Tennant led a delegation to the outlying regions during the summer of 1775. They encountered a mixed reception; while recent settlers from Europe tended to support the Crown, most in the backcountry were apathetic to the political nature of the conflict and supported neither side. Drayton and his Charleston delegation encountered outright hostility at some stops in their journey, particularly when they met Robert Cunningham, Thomas Brown, and Colonel Thomas Fletchall, the leader of the Fair Forest District militia. These men were confirmed Loyalists and strong leaders of like-minded men. To counter the influence of the Loyalist leaders, Drayton called out the local rebel militia, led by Colonel Richard Richardson and Major Andrew Williamson. These men marched against the militia of Fletchall, and both sides camped near Ninety Six. To head off armed conflict, Fletchall proposed a peace conference, which resulted in the Treaty of Ninety Six on September 16, 1775. Cunningham and Brown, who had refused to participate in the meeting, opposed the treaty. Drayton, however, subsequently upheld the terms of the treaty and used it to ostracize the Loyalist leaders.

The resultant conflict between the rebels and the Loyalists led to the first bloodshed of the War for America in South Carolina. Following the Treaty of Ninety Six, the rebels held firm control over the area. The rebels arrested Robert Cunningham, who continued his strong support for the Crown, and accused him of
sedition in early October, 1775. They subsequently jailed Cunningham in Charleston. In response, his brother, Patrick Cunningham, sought a means to whip up Loyalist resistance, and learned of a supply of arms meant for delivery to the Cherokee tribesmen from the rebels. The rebels desired to placate the Indians, provide for their autumn hunting needs, and prevent them from siding with the Loyalists in the British cause. Patrick Cunningham successfully raised fears of renewed Cherokee conflict throughout the backcountry, raised a Loyalist contingent in response to the threat, and seized the weapons and powder en route to the Cherokees. The rebel militia leader, Williamson, reacted by once again raising his troops, this time erecting a fortification at Ninety Six. Cunningham and his supporters—now armed with the stolen weaponry and ammunition—descended upon Ninety Six, captured the courthouse, and attacked the stockade. The combatants sporadically fought the first Battle of Ninety Six off and on over a three-day period, from November 19 to November 21, 1775. It resulted in one rebel death and minimal rebel casualties; however, the Loyalists suffered far greater. They lost fifty-two men killed and one wounded, but they did achieve nominal success. Following the rebels’ defeat at Ninety Six, South Carolina’s Patriot leaders ordered Whig Colonel Richard Richardson to find and arrest the principal Loyalist leaders. Richardson’s force swelled in numbers as he approached Ninety Six, eventually growing to almost five thousand men. As Richardson’s force grew, Loyalist resistance withered away in the South Carolina backcountry. The rebels captured and imprisoned some of the principal Loyalists leaders in Charleston; other Loyalists fled the district. The rebel Whigs regained control of the region.\(^\text{13}\)

The focus of the war remained to the North. However, after years of fighting in the Northern and Middle colonies, the British and American forces reached a stalemate, and because of the British loss at Saratoga on October 16, 1778, the Americans formed an alliance with France, which significantly shaped the remainder of the war. Faced with what then became a global conflict as the Bourbon ally of France, the still powerful Spain, and the Dutch entered the war against Britain, the British reassessed their options and shifted their military strategies to fit the new, increasingly complex, demands on their economic and military resources.\(^\text{14}\) Struggling to find a way to end the war and retain at least some of their American mainland colonies, the British seized upon their Southern Strategy. This strategy built upon the precarious assumption that a significant population of Loyalists existed in the Southern colonies, and only waited upon the military support of Great
Britain to rise and take back control of their colonies. Initial successes followed Britain’s shift to the Southern theatre, as Savannah, Georgia, fell quickly to the British on December 29, 1778. The rebels barely attempted to defend the city. The British followed their victory at Savannah with the conquest of Charleston, South Carolina, on May 12, 1780, which fell following a shattering siege. The loss of Charleston devastated the rebel cause in the South, as the American commander, Major General Benjamin Lincoln, surrendered virtually the entire Southern Continental Army, together with a large number of militia, supplies, and weapons to the British. Only a small force of Continental soldiers still operated in the South, as a contingent under Colonel Abraham Buford was en route to provide additional support for the besieged city of Charleston. In one of the most villainous skirmishes of the Southern campaign, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and his British Legion annihilated Buford’s small command of Continentals at the Waxhaws, South Carolina, on May 29, 1780.

Anxious to seal their victories, the British fanned out forces to pacify the backcountry, establishing strong posts as key strategic towns, including Ninety Six in June, 1780. The British chose Ninety Six not only for its strategic location but also because they believed that large numbers of Loyalists lived in the surrounding area, and stood ready to support the Crown. The newly appointed Inspector of Militia, Major Patrick Ferguson, accompanied the British commander, Colonel Nisbet Balfour, and his troops as they journeyed to Ninety Six, which they took with little effort on June 19, 1780. Cornwallis then chose Lieutenant Colonel John Harris Cruger, a New York Loyalist, to lead at Ninety Six, and Balfour returned to Charleston to take command of the city. Ferguson remained in the backcountry and was initially successful with his campaign to attract and train Loyalist troops near Ninety Six. However, his early triumphs came to a swift and final defeat at the Battle of Kings Mountain on October 7, 1780, where a mixed group of rebel militia gathered from a number of regions decimated the Loyalist troops and killed Ferguson.

Cornwallis, reacting to Ferguson’s defeat at Kings Mountain and other rebel victories gained by the small bands of partisan fighters operating in South Carolina, wrote to Balfour on November 1, 1780, to apprise him of the strategic importance of Ninety Six. Cornwallis stated that Ninety Six “must be kept at all events & I think no reasonable expense should be spared—besides Georgia depends entirely upon it.”
It was Cornwallis’s concern for the safety of his strategic outpost at Ninety Six that caused him to send Tarleton and his troops westward to guard against the possibility that Brigadier General Daniel Morgan and his “flying army” might target Ninety Six when they split from Major General Nathanael Greene’s main Southern Continental Army in January 1781, to launch Greene’s strategy to re-establish rebel control of the South. Following Tarleton’s defeat at Cowpens by Morgan and his motley assortment of Continentals, state troops, and militia on January 17, 1781, Cornwallis continued to express concern for the safety of his key backcountry forts. He cautioned Lieutenant Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon, one of Britain’s most capable Southern field commanders, on February 4, 1781, “You know the importance of Ninety Six, let that place be your constant care.”

Events in the South quickly began to unravel for Cornwallis and the British cause. Enraged by Tarleton’s defeat at Cowpens, Cornwallis threw all his resources into overtaking Morgan and re-capturing the British prisoners that Morgan was rapidly escorting northward, away from the British strongpoints in South Carolina. The British and American forces set a grueling pace in the “Race to the Dan River” as Greene and Morgan directed their forces toward safety. While retreating, they laid a nightmarish path for Cornwallis and his forces through a territory strongly sympathetic to the rebel cause and

Figure 2 Nathanael Greene. Original portrait painted from life by Charles Wilson Peale, c. 1783.
picked clean of food and forage. The resultant Battle at Guilford Court House on March 15, 1781, nominally a British victory, exhausted and decimated the British force. Incapable of further offensive actions, Cornwallis turned north, toward Virginia and destiny, while Greene turned south in April 1781 to take advantage of his renewed position of strength and begin a campaign to retake British southern strongholds, including the post at Ninety Six.20

Meanwhile, the British and Loyalist forces at Ninety Six were not idle. Cruger had significantly improved the fortifications at Ninety Six. Beginning in September 1780, he had worked ceaselessly to secure Ninety Six, building two redoubts and a block house, improving the existing palisade surrounding the village with a deep ditch, which he further enhanced with an abates, felled trees intertwined and set into the ground, with sharpened ends facing the direction of potential attack. Lieutenant Henry Haldane, a military engineer that Cornwallis sent to the post to support Cruger, designed one of the redoubts as a Star Fort, an eight-pointed structure that allowed defenders to fire muskets and cannons in all directions. A ditch and an abatis further protected the Star Fort from attack. Ninety Six’s “Achilles heel” was its water supply, which a small stream to the west of the village provided to the outpost. Cruger positioned his second redoubt—Holmes’ Fort—to protect the water supply. Trenches and covered walkways connected all the fortifications of the post.21

The rebels began their war of posts at some of the less important sites, including Fort Watson. The combined forces of Continental Army Colonel Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee and the partisans of Colonel Francis Marion attacked the fort, which a small group of Loyalists and British regulars held. The rebels introduced a significant innovation during the siege of Fort Watson, when Colonel Hezekiah Maham, accompanying Lee and Marion, designed and led the construction of what came to be known as a Maham tower. Maham designed the tower to rise above the fortifications of the outpost, which allowed the attackers to fire effectively at the defenders. The rebels successfully campaigned against the scattered British outposts, with the Battle of Hobrick’s Hill leading to the evacuation of Camden, long a strategic location for the British. Only two significant outposts remained in British hands: Augusta, Georgia, and Ninety Six. The success of the Maham tower at Fort Watson set the stage for its use at the rebel sieges of Augusta and of Ninety Six.22

Greene led his Army to Ninety Six. Accompanied by the Polish Colonel
Thaddeus Kosciuszko, a military engineer, Greene reviewed the state of Ninety Six’s fortifications and was dismayed by their strength. Cruger, a Loyalist from a prominent New York family, and his Loyalist defenders were well prepared for Greene. Nevertheless, Greene and Kosciuszko elected to besiege the fortifications. While educated in military engineering and held in high regard by Greene as well as Commander-in-Chief General George Washington, it is questionable whether Kosciuszko was familiar with the siege tactics developed by the French engineer, Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban, who had perfected siege tactics in the seventeenth century. Kosciuszko and the rebel sappers dug their initial siege trenches only seventy yards from the Star Fort, which Cruger aggressively protected. Cruger and the fort’s defenders fired on the American sappers with the fort’s small cannons, and wiped them out with a sortie from the fort led by Loyalist Lieutenant John Roney. Their lesson quickly learned, the Americans began their next round of parallel siege trenches “at a more respectful distance [400 yards].”

The American entrenchments, now proceeding at a much safer distance from the Star Fort, proceeded at a furious pace, as Kosciuszko’s sappers worked continuously. As the rebels dug closer to the fort, the defenders’ accurate fire had a lethal effect. Greene ordered that a Maham tower be erected while Cruger countered the latest threat by raising the walls of the Star Fort with sandbags, allowing his riflemen to continue their deadly work. Cruger also attempted to bring down the Maham tower by firing at it with heated cannonballs, but the rebels had constructed the tower of green wood and it did not set ablaze. Greene resorted to firing flaming arrows into the fort; Cruger simply removed the roofs from the interior structures. Lee and his force joined Greene at Ninety Six on June 8, 1781, after successfully seizing the British fort at Augusta. Greene ordered Lee to take the second redoubt, Holmes Fort, and cut off the supply of water to Cruger. Lee’s success controlling the water supply led Cruger to employ naked African American slaves who dared rebel fire to deliver water at night to the fort by way of the trenches that connected the Star Fort to the remainder of the fortifications. Clearly concerned for Ninety Six, Rawdon set out to relieve the town. As Rawdon approached, Greene grew more desperate. He began the construction of a mine to tunnel close to the Star Fort and blast through its walls. Greene sought to delay Rawdon, but Rawdon’s route took him away from the troops of Colonel Andrew Pickens and Lieutenant Colonel William Washington,
who Greene had ordered to slow and divert Rawdon. Balfour was able to get word to Cruger that help was on the way; a farmer leisurely approached the fort, and when close, spurred his horse to a gallop under a hail of rebel bullets. He safely entered the fort and provided his welcome news to Cruger. Both sides were now aware that Rawdon was closing in, and Greene sought to end the siege by an outright assault. The Americans recruited volunteers and sent a small group, the “Forlorn Hope,” to bring down the walls of the Star Fort with grappling hooks. Under heavy covering fire, Cruger’s men attacked the “Forlorn Hope” with two sally parties from the fort, which resulted in heavy losses on the American side. Greene considered his losses, his lack of prospect for success, and the imminent arrival of Rawdon; he judiciously ended the siege. As he had done in previous engagements during the Southern Campaign, Greene lost the battle, but “won the war.”

Compared to the major sieges of the Southern campaign, the sieges of Savannah, Georgia, Charleston, South Carolina, and Yorktown, Virginia, the siege of Ninety Six was a relatively small affair, yet it had moments of intense brutality involving small groups of men, like the “Forlorn Hope’s” final, hopeless assault. The British capture of Savannah undertaken by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell with a force of about 3,000 British regulars and Loyalist troops on December 29, 1778, predated the main British Southern offensive. Confusion among the American rebel defenders’ command allowed Campbell’s forces to take Savannah so quickly that the town itself suffered no damage. A combined American and French force in September 1779 gathered to re-take Savannah. It united approximately 3,500 troops under French Admiral Charles D’Estaing with a force of about 1,500 Continentals and militia led by Major General Benjamin Lincoln. Outnumbered, the British forces fought fiercely. Campbell’s defensive force included Cruger, who likely learned the value of an active and aggressive resistance during this siege. The British, in an intense and bloody defense of Savannah, convinced the Franco-American besiegers that a continued, prolonged siege of Savannah would be far too costly to their forces. The allies lost a significant part of their attack force, including the formidable Colonel Casimir Pulaski, the “Father of American Cavalry,” who fell mortally wounded leading a cavalry charge. All told, the allied losses were over 750 dead and wounded, while the British lost approximately 150 men to death, desertion or battle wounds. The unsuccessful siege of Savannah was the bloodiest engagement since the Battle of
Bunker and Breeds Hills and bequeathed to Cruger, the future defender of Ninety Six, the lessons that the besieged can prevail.27

Unlike the sieges of both Ninety Six and Savannah, the sieges of Charleston and Yorktown resulted in success for the besiegers and were significant turning points in the war. The British siege of Charleston took intensive preparation, the commitment of a large joint British Army and Royal Navy force, the naval transport of almost 10,000 British troops, and the flawless execution of the British Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Henry Clinton. Launched with an attack led by Major General Charles Lord Cornwallis, on March 29, 1780, Charleston fell to the British on May 11, 1780, following a combined land siege and sea bombardment of the city, which cost the American cause thousands of Continental troops and approximately twelve hundred militia. The loss of Charleston virtually wiped out the American Continental force in the South and paved the way for the perilous, and ultimately tragically flawed, British Southern campaign. Lincoln was not successful in protecting the American interests, especially the valuable Continental forces, due in large part to interference from the civilian leaders in Charleston; a factor that did not come into play at Ninety Six.28

The siege of Yorktown turned the tables on the British with a virtual mirror image of the earlier siege of Charleston. This time, the combined Franco-American forces, led by American Commander-in-Chief General George Washington and French Lieutenant General Jean Baptiste de Donatien de Vimeur, the Comte de Rochambeau, aligned against Cornwallis, who had boxed himself and his troops into a trap at Yorktown. French Rear Admiral Francois Joseph Paul, the Comte de Grasse, provided French naval support to the American-led siege of Yorktown, and sealed Cornwallis’ fate. Unlike Cruger’s extensive preparations and aggressive actions, Cornwallis exhibited a surprising malaise, rather than his characteristically forceful and active reactions to his situation, and on October 19, 1781, he surrendered. The British effort to retain its American colonies was shattered.29

In the end, the strategic significance of Ninety Six doomed its future. Ninety Six ended in a blaze of fire and smoke as Rawdon ordered Cruger, late the savior of Ninety Six, to torch the town and shepherd its Loyalist inhabitants to Charleston. With the fall of Ninety Six, the British indeed lost the war in the backcountry.30 No Southern Phoenix rose from the ashes of Ninety Six. The site
of the town, the courthouse, and jail is today marked off with stakes and twine. Together with National Park Service field maps, little but the outline of Ninety Six is left to tell its tale. The earthen area by the remains of the Star Fort traces the siege trenches. The rebels’ attempt to mine the Star Fort is simply now a mound of earth, awaiting future excavation. The Cherokee Path remains, however, a silent, haunted trail through the Southern forest; a testament to the peoples who lived, traded, fought and died at one of the most strategic sites to the British Southern Campaign of the American War of Independence.

Notes

1. Robert D. Bass, Ninety Six: The Struggle for the South Carolina Back Country (Lexington, SC: The Sandlapper Store, Inc., 1978), 13-39; John S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782 (1985; repr., Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1992), 209-214. The term “Loyalist” refers to American supporters of the British and the author has used it in place of the disparaging term “Tory.” The author’s thesis, “Charles Hulett, Continental Army Drummer: A Revolutionary Life Reexamined,” explored the experiences of Charles Hulett, who entered the war as a sixteen-year-old New Jersey militiaman. It examined the political, social, and military milieu of colonial and revolutionary New Jersey, including the province’s demographics and religious denomination affiliations, which influenced the choices made by the residents to either support the British Crown or the Whig rebellion. The study traced Hulett’s career through the war as he experienced life as a militiaman in colonial New Jersey, a member of revolutionary New Jersey’s state troops, a conscripted drummer in the American Continental Army, and a British provincial soldier in the New Jersey Volunteers. It highlighted that an individual’s choice between the Whig concept of liberty and loyalty to the British Crown often turned on pragmatic concerns and emotional ties, rather than upon lofty ideals. For Hulett, the choice to enlist with the Loyalist New Jersey Volunteers in 1780 followed compulsory service with the Continental Army as a nine-month draftee. His actions illustrated that in some cases, Americans made decisions based on the will to survive a long and brutal civil war, not on the resolution to pursue ideological goals. The author’s research of Hulett’s experience in the Provincial Light Infantry concluded that it was very likely that Hulett was among the troops who marched under British Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon to the relief of the Loyalist troops defending Ninety Six. Hulett is the author’s fifth great-grandfather.


3. Pancake, This Destructive War, 209-216. For in-depth studies of Loyalist soldiers and the British Provincial Army in America, see Paul H. Smith, “The American Loyalists: Notes on their Organization and Numerical Strength,” William and Mary Quarterly 15 (1968): 259-277 as well as Stuart Salmon, “The Loyalist Regiments of the American Revolutionary War 1775-1783 (PhD diss., University of Stirling, 2009). Salmon identifies Smith as the most accurate source for numbers of Loyalist soldiers serving in Provincial units—over 19,000—but quarrels with some of Smith’s categorizations.


8. Boulware, “The Effect of the Seven Years’ War,” 404-408.


21. Lawrence E. Babits, “Patterning in Earthen Fortifications,” in *Historical archaeology of military sites: method and topic*, edited by Clarence R. Geier, Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas D. Scott, and
David G. Orr (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 115; Cann, “War in the Backcountry,” 4.


Bibliography


