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INTELLIGENCE FAILURE AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE: REVISITING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

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Robert James Kelly

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my pregnant wife and three children. Without their patience, understanding, support, and most of all love, the completion of this work would not have been possible.
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I wish to thank my fellow classmates in my INTL 699 capstone online class. Their comments and recommendations in the online forums were helpful. I especially appreciate Dr. Robin Thompson whose guidance and advice steered me in the direction I chose, especially when it came to deciding on my quantitative methodology. I would also like to offer a proper thanks to my previous professors from all the other classes I had during this the process of completing this Master’s degree. Without their instruction and knowledge, I would not have been able to get to this point.
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

INTELLIGENCE FAILURE AND STRATEGIC SURPRISE: REVISITING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

by

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Charles Town, West Virginia

Professor Robin Thompson, Thesis Professor

The study of the intelligence failure and strategic surprise that initiated the beginning of the Yom Kippur War has been an endeavor for many scholars since the hostilities ceased 40 years ago. This paper analyzes several articles that have attempted to find which party of the three mentioned in Dahl’s thesis of 2004, the Intelligence Community, policy maker, or deceiver, is responsible for Israel’s ill preparedness for the Arabs’ attack. Since those academics only had access to open source materials, the purpose of this research project is to discover if access to declassified documents found on the CIA’s website, as well as recently released testimonies from the Agranat Commission would have changed the views expressed by the authors in their articles. Using the quantitative methodology of correlation and regression analysis this paper found that declassified documents could have altered the theories of most of the scholars.
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to many changes within the United States’ Intelligence Community (IC). The shift in focus turned from conventional conflict towards terrorists and the possible surprise attacks that they commit. However, the year 2013 brought the U.S. back to the realities of conventional encounters, once again testing the IC’s abilities to predict conflicts and the possibilities of war. For example; will Kim Jong-Un launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying a nuclear warhead? Will Syria give up its chemical weapons, or will it continue to use them on its people? Is Iran developing nuclear weapons, or is it simply attempting to acquire nuclear energy? Will Israel be true to its word, and attack Iran if it does not give up on its nuclear aspirations? Each of these questions are of importance to the United States and its national interests, as well as the national security of its allies, like South Korea, Japan, and Israel. Therefore the IC cannot afford to be taken by surprise when predicting the answers to these questions. Throughout its history, however, the U.S. IC has failed to foresee the hostile actions of other countries. One such case occurred to Israel and the United States’ ICs on October 6, 1973 when the Arab nations of Egypt and Syria conducted a surprise assault to take back lands Israel had taken over from the Six Day War of 1967. This attack then led to the Arab-Israel War of 1973, also known as the Yom Kippur War. Similar to what has been done after many other strategic surprises in history, authors and scholars have attempted to find the root causes to Israel’s intelligence errors as well as where the fault lies for the failures. One such author, Erik J. Dahl, stated that there are three main traditional theories for intelligence failure and strategic surprise, while claiming a fourth theory of his own.
The first theory Dahl (2004) considers is the predominant view in the study of intelligence failure and strategic surprise, which he calls the traditional view. This is a pessimistic point of view and is broad in its scope. There isn’t much concurrence between the different scholars on the particular causes of the failures, but there is specificity in who is responsible. Dahl (2004) breaks the traditional theorists into three smaller subgroups of thought. This paper focuses on these three subgroups as well as the new group that Dahl theorizes is at fault. The first theory, which is the predominant one, puts the onus of intelligence failure on the policy maker, for they are those who do not take the advice of the analyst. The second sub-school of thought finds the foundation of blame for intelligence failure and strategic surprise within the IC. Responsibility is usually placed on the lower level analysts and/or the decision makers at the top of the IC, such as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), although some authors may group such positions in with the policy makers. For the purposes of this paper and unless otherwise specified, when mentioning the IC, the author is referring to analysts of the intelligence branch of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) or AMAN, Mossad, and/or Shin Bet whereas the terms policy maker and decision maker are related directly to the highest officers of the AMAN, such as AMAN’s director, and those who make the policies within the government, like the Prime Minister. The third subgroup that Dahl (2004) categorizes is the small collection of writings which state that the deception of the enemy is the guilty party for intelligence failures and strategic surprise. The final theory comes from Dahl’s (2004) perspective on the case study of the Marine Barracks bombing of Beirut in 1983. He found that analysts share as much of the blame for intelligence fiascos as the decision makers do. Dahl’s thesis was to find specifically “how well…traditional theories of intelligence failure and strategic surprise account for the inability of the intelligence community to warn of terrorist attacks” (Dahl 2004, 2). In the case
of the Yom Kippur War, academics have supported one of these four theories of how Israel could have been taken by surprise.

The four views that Dahl presents in his thesis are those that scholars have been using since the first major U.S. intelligence failure and strategic surprise of Pearl Harbor in 1941. The initiation of the Yom Kippur War is no different. There have been several scholars who have been attempting to place the responsibility of the Arab’s surprise attack since the war ended 19 days later on October 25, 1973. The articles that these academics have written reflect each of the four different points of view that Dahl emphasizes in his paper. There are those, such as Avi Schlaim (1976) and Uri Bar-Joseph (1999), who placed the majority of the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Israeli intelligence analysts and their misperceptions. Others, like Michael L. Handel (1977), Richard K. Betts (1978 and 1980-81), Ephraim Kahana (2002), Arie W. Kruglanski (2003), Jack Levy (2009), and Gabriella Heichal (1999), found fault with the policy makers, for they believed that evidence showed that the intelligence community did actually warn of the Arab’s intentions. Another group of authors, Edwin S. Cochran (1998) and Yigal Sheffy (2006), claimed that the surprise assault was a result of the Arabs’ deceit, rather than any kind of intelligence failure. Finally, there are some scholars, namely Rodney Richardson (1991), Youssef H. Aboul-Enein (2003), and Amnon Lord (2012) who have combined two or all three of these views. Despite the four different theories academics hold towards who was to blame for the intelligence failure and strategic surprise of the Yom Kippur War, each of them had something in common, each used open source materials to develop their ideas and support their conclusions.

The question that this paper hopes to answer is: What new light can the declassified documents of the Yom Kippur War shed upon the traditional theory of intelligence failure and
strategic surprise, as well as would that information change the views of those scholars who have written on this event? The premise of this paper is to investigate the theories of scholars that have studied the Yom Kippur War, while discovering from where they obtained their unclassified evidence. This paper then researches the recently declassified CIA documents and Agranat Commission Report testimonies of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, in attempt to find who is at fault for not predicting this attack and if that information would alter the theories expressed in the academic articles analyzed in this research project.

In order to better understand the intelligence failure and strategic surprise of 6 October 1973, it is important to review some of the significant events that led up to the surprise assault from the Arabs along with the Agranat Commission that met after the war ended. It was the hostilities that Israel initiated with the Arabs in the Six Day War of 1967 that resulted in Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights and the Suez Canal from Syria and Egypt. On October 15, 1970, Anwar Sadat took over the presidency of Egypt from Gamal Abder Nasser. During the first few years of his presidency, Sadat had the Egyptian forces perform military exercises. Some believed that these military maneuvers might lead to aggression with Israel, but eventually resulted in no aggression. One build up in military movements occurred in May of 1973, prior to one of the summits between the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1973. At that time, the U.S. was a strong ally to Israel, while the Russians lent substantial support to the Arab nations of Syria and Egypt. The Arab nations were hoping that the Soviets would convince the U.S. to influence Israel to surrender the captured lands back to Syria and Egypt. Heightened Egyptian and Syrian military preparations were a concern again in September of 1973 and lasted until the war began on 6 October.
On 13 September 1973, Israeli jet fighters were performing an air patrol over the Mediterranean Sea when Syrian planes engaged them. Israel’s air force was successful in downing 13 Syrian jets that day, while Israel only lost one plane. After this encounter, Syria began bolstering their forces along the Golan Heights. Israel’s intelligence community was on high alert during the end of September and into October, not only because of Syrian and Egyptian military movements, but also because of a Palestinian terrorist attack that killed Soviet Jewish emigrants traveling on a train in Vienna.

After the war ended, a national inquiry commission was organized on 21 November 1973 to investigate the IDF’s role during the war. The Chairman of the Commission was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Dr. Shimon Agranat. The Commission heard 90 direct testimonies and reviewed 188 written testimonies. After the final report from the Commission was presented on 30 January 1975, it was found to contain more than 1,500 pages, however only its introduction was made public (The State of Israel, 2008).
CHAPTER II

Literature Review

There have been several authors who have written their scholarly points of view on the subject of who was to blame for the intelligence failure and strategic surprise of the Yom Kippur War. Scholars like Avi Shlaim (1976) and Uri Bar-Joseph (1999) have written articles emphasizing the intelligence analysts’ misperceptions of the Arab’s intentions as well as the lack of warning they provided to the decision makers. However, as Uri Bar-Joseph’s works progressed through the years on the case of this war, he and two other scholars, Arie W. Kruglanski (2003) and Jack Levy (2009), found that much of the onus should have been put on the policy makers instead. In fact, many of the authors that have written articles on this war, such as Michael L. Handel (1977), Richard K. Betts (1978 and 1980-81), Ephraim Kahana (2002), and Gabriella Heichal (1999) stressed intelligence errors but ultimately put the responsibility upon the decision makers. Nonetheless, there are a few academics like Edwin S. Cochran (1998) and Yigal Sheffy (2006) who saw the initiation of this war more as a strategic success for the Arabs rather than an intelligence mistake of Israel. Finally there were a few students of the Yom Kippur War like Rodney Richardson (1991), Youssef H. Aboul-Enein (2003), and Amnon Lord (2012) who gave the responsibility to multiple parties for the strategic surprise and intelligence mistake.

Intelligence Community’s Fault

Author Avi Shlaim (1976) stated that Israel had adequate information about its enemies’ preparations. However, quoting from the former Israeli Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Chaim Bar-Lev; “The mistake lay in the evaluation of the intelligence data and not in the absence of accurate and reliable information” (Shlaim 1976, 350). Shlaim (1976) also discussed
the importance of distinguishing *signals* from *noise*, using Roberta Wohlstetter’s theory of being able to pick out the irrelevant from the relevant. Much of the evidence that Shlaim (1976) used came from the Interim Report of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry published in April 1974. Unfortunately, as Shlaim wrote, this report was the best that he and others had, since “access to material on which to base their research is severely limited by the necessity for secrecy in the work of the intelligence services” (Shlaim 1976, 352). It’s important to realize at this point that Shlaim and many other scholars only had access to open source materials like the Agranat Commission to interpret what happened.

Another author who derived much of the evidence for his article on the Yom Kippur War from the Agranat Commission was Uri Bar-Joseph. However, since two and a half decades had passed between the war and when Bar-Joseph wrote down his theories, he had the advantage of obtaining interviews of participants from the conflict. From those testimonies, Bar-Joseph (1999) also concluded that the intelligence failure did not originate from a lack of warning from the Arabs. Instead, it was a failure to properly interpret the proof the analysts had. According to Bar-Joseph, it’s critical to note that Israel was thrown off guard due not only to “the logic of the situation, but from information from a Mossad human source with good accessibility to Egyptian decision-makers” (Bar-Joseph 1999, 13). The foresight of this informant misled Israeli intelligence, for he estimated that Syria and Egypt would not be ready for war until 1975. Bar-Joseph (1999) claimed that much of the biases that Israel policy makers had stemmed from the Mossad human source. Despite the many sources of information that Bar-Joseph used to derive his conclusions, much of his evidence came from other scholars. He also stated that the Agranat Commission was one of the main bases of information on the subject. Even though memoirs had been written in recent years and had “shed some new light on this case, they do not provide a
solid enough basis for comprehensive and authoritative explanation” (Bar-Joseph 1999, 23).

Bar-Joseph wrote several other articles on the Yom Kippur War throughout the decade and a half following this particular paper. However, interestingly enough his views shifted as he obtained more evidence through the years, finding that the fault was with policy makers rather than with the IC.

**Policy Makers’ Fault**

In 2003, Uri Bar-Joseph wrote an article with Arie W. Kruglanski investigating the psychological factors that could have prevented Israeli intelligence analysts from recognizing the warnings indicating an enemy assault from the Arabs. Up front, the authors denied any plausibility of deception as being a contributor to the intelligence failure and strategic surprise on October 6, 1973. These scholars base this premise off their opinion that Egypt’s deception plan’s quality was poor. In the introduction, Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski’s seemed to be blaming the intelligence community based off the conclusions of the Agranat Commission which stated that “in the days preceding the Yom Kippur war, the Research Division of the Military Intelligence had plenty of warning indicators which had supplied (to them) by AMAN’s Collection Division and by other Israeli collecting agencies” (Bar-Joseph 2003, 76). The authors also cited many other students who adopted the same theory, claiming that this was the majority view. However, when the paper was said and done with, Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski (2003) ultimately found that much of the onus for the intelligence errors must had been placed on two of the policy makers, namely the DMI, Eli Zeira, and the chief estimator for Egyptian affairs, Yona Bandman. Although it seemed that in the previous article, Bar-Joseph placed Zeira in with the IC, in this article he and Kruglanski group Zeira and Bandman in with policy makers due to the role that they took as decision makers for Israel as a whole. The authors’ reasoning was founded
upon their research that these men “(1) placed an unusually high premium on the clarity and coherence of their assessments, (2) exhibited a highly self-assured manner and an autocratic style of decision-making, and (3) tended to suppress, ignore, and reinterpret information inconsistent with their preconception until the very last hours before the outbreak of the war” (Bar-Joseph 2003, 92) These ideas coupled with the influence Zeira and Bandman carried over Israel’s military and civilian officers led to general concurrence that Egypt and Syria were unlikely going to attack.

Several years later in 2008, Uri Bar-Joseph wrote another article solo attempting to dispel another theory that many experts were attributing to the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) initial military defeat at the onset of the Yom Kippur War. Those academics were arguing that Israel’s initial loss was due to the lack of preparation the IDF made for war, rather than the failure of the Israeli IC to provide adequate warning of the surprise attack. Bar-Joseph (2008) provided six major errors which caused trouble for Israel in the initial phases of the war. However, “an analysis of the context within which these mistakes were made shows that their main source, and thereafter the source of Israel’s military failures at the beginning of the war, was the fact that until eight hours before it broke out, war was not expected, certainly not with such a short warning time” (Bar-Joseph 2008, 528). For these reasons, the author ultimately found fault with the intelligence community, but more specifically with the policy makers for failing to provide ample indications of the impending assault from Egypt and Syria to the IDF.

During 2009, Uri Bar-Joseph wrote yet another paper, but this time with Jack Levy attempting to look more at the “role of conscious, politically motivated behavior in the study of intelligence failure” (Bar-Joseph 2009, 462). Although, the authors discussed some of the hypotheses of other scholars for who should have taken responsibility for the intelligence errors,
they believed that one person was to blame more than anyone else. Despite the Arabs’
deceptions and the belief systems of intelligence analysts playing a part in the success of Egypt’s
surprise attack, Levy and Bar-Joseph argued that it was the Director of Military Intelligence
(DMI) Major General Eli Zeira who was the vital link which caused the policy makers to
underestimate the threat of war. The authors claimed that Zeira knowingly misled his superiors
“because his very high level of self-assurance led him to believe that he knew better than his
superiors what the Arabs planned to do (i.e., abstain from attacking) and, in addition, how Israel
should react” (Bar-Joseph 2009, 486). According to Levy and Bar-Joseph (2009) and the
Agranat Commission Report, the chief of staff would have mobilized forces if he had known
about the information that the DMI was withholding.

The last article that Bar-Joseph wrote was in 2012, as he continued his analysis of Major
General Eli Zeira’s part in the 1973 intelligence catastrophe. In this paper, he presented Zeira’s
side of the story. Zeira had written his own account of what transpired. Even though General
Zeira admitted that AMAN “was wrong in its assessments of the probability of a war,” he
“argued that most of the responsibility for that error was not his: the decision makers, including
the prime minister, minister of defense, and military chief of staff, not only possessed all of the
raw data, but also had information that was not available to AMAN, such as King Hussein’s of
Jordan warning during his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir ten days before the
war” (Bar-Joseph 2012, 139). Zeira claimed that the other decision makers’ experiences were no
different from his, and therefore they were ultimately at fault for not concluding that the Arab
attack was approaching. However, Bar-Joseph (2012) also offered insights of new testimonies
and analyses that reveal clear evidence of how Zeira’s incorrect estimate was what brought about
the intelligence failure. Perhaps one of the most condemning witnesses came from Brigadier

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General (Res.) Yoel Ben-Porat who stated that “in the week preceding the war, [Israeli Chief of Staff David] Elazar asked Zeira twice if AMAN's special means of collection had been operated, to which Zeira replied in the affirmative. In reality, he forbade their operation. Since Elazar was aware of these means' abilities, he believed that they were operating, and since they did not indicate a pending war, his own confidence that the Arab preparations were not for attack purposes increased” (Bar-Joseph 2012, 137). Throughout Bar-Joseph’s writings, one recognizes how he shifted blame as he attained more evidence. Authors Ephraim Kahana and Gabriella Heichal were two other authors within the last decade and a half to place blame on Israel’s policy makers.

Heichal (1999) was one author who seemed to believe that in many situations of intelligence failure and strategic surprise that the intelligence community was at fault for not providing the policy makers with the right material they needed to make the appropriate decisions. However, after investigating the case of the Yom Kippur War, Heichal (1999) found that the decision makers had enough suitable information to foresee the Arabs’ surprise attack. She blamed the policy makers for catching the cry wolf syndrome. More specifically, the author found that the false alarms of the Arab attack at the end of 1972 and the postponed assault on May of 1973 had the largest impact on DMI Zeira, Defense Minister Dayan, and Chief of Staff Elazar, although in the end Elazar wanted to mobilize forces, whereas Dayan and Zeira did not. During Heichal’s discussion, she made the valid observation that it was difficult and “complicated to get access to hard, inside evidence, which cannot be disproved by some rumour or story” (Heichal 1999, 210). In the case of the Yom Kippur War, much of the information that could decisively prove who was at fault may have been classified.
Kahana (2002) wrote an article which defined the terms of ‘early warning’ and ‘surprise’. In his paper, the author used the Arab-Israel War of 1973 as a case to determine if the Israel’s IC failure to warn decision makers of the impending attack follows those definitions. At first, it appeared that the author was attempting to put the culpability for the intelligence failure on the Intelligence Branch of the military, AMAN. However, in the end, Kahana (2002) blamed the decision makers and their reliance on the doctrine of deterrence and early warning. Kahana (2002) claimed that decision makers were relying too heavily on the idea that conventional deterrence would prevent any surprise attack. In other words, Israelis believed the Arabs would not attack because Israel’s military strength was too much for the Egyptians and Syrians to overcome. Kahana (2002) also asserted that if deterrence somehow failed, then Israelis trusted the assumption that AMAN would notify the policy makers in due time of any imminent threats coming from the Arabs. Unfortunately, for the Israelis, “early warning had nothing to do with [the Arabs’] intentions” (Kahana summer 2002, 97). Kahana, like many academics studying the Arab-Israel War of 1973, used the Agranat Report and interviews of those involved with this case as a primary source for his evidence. Although it seemed that as time progressed scholars were blaming policy makers as more evidence came to light on the subject of the Yom Kippur War, there were some scholars, such as Michael L. Handel (1977) and Richard K. Betts (1978 and 1980-810) who also had found fault with decision makers even less than a decade after the war.

Despite recognizing all of the intelligence mistakes, scholar Handel (1977) thrust much of the blame for Israel’s lack of preparedness for the inevitable war against the Arabs on the decision makers of the country. He claimed that leaders had four options when it came to considering to mobilize and go to war in October of 1973. First, there was the choice they took
in 1967, which was “mobilization that led to war” (Handel 1977, 482). The second possibility was akin to what they had decided to do in 1960 and in May of 1973, which was to wait for a mobilization from the enemy and to then counter mobilize immediately. Another route that they knew was not viable due to their small army, was to perform an all-out offensive war against their Arab neighbors. The final alternative, which was the option they chose, was to not mobilize at all in order to avoid a war. Handel described the Israeli’s mindset such that “because they did not desire war, they were unable to visualize it actually occurring in the short-range” (Handel 1977, 483). This would then lead to the implications that leadership in Israel would reject any signs of war coming from intelligence evidence. Similar to the previous articles discussed in this paper, Handel used the unclassified part of the Agranat Commission as one of his main sources to support his theory that “intelligence professionals and decision makers often failed to arrive at the correct conclusion” (Dahl 2004, 15). Though he also relied upon other open Hebrew sources, perhaps Handel’s theories could have been altered if he had had access to classified materials.

Another major proponent of the theory that the policy maker was to blame for intelligence failures was scholar Richard K. Betts. He had written several articles discussing the case of the Yom Kippur War, like *Analysis, War and Decision*. Similar to Pearl Harbor, the Nazi’s invasion of the Soviet Union, and the North Korean attack of 1950, Betts believed that the surprise assault of the Arabs on Israel in 1973 contained two prominent phenomena. One was that the evidence of the surprise attack was there, but the information did not effectively rise up the chain. Second, the reports that eventually made it to the “decision makers were dismissed because they contradicted strategic estimates or assumptions” (Betts 1978, 37). In Betts’ (1978) view of cases of attack warning, he saw that policy makers tended to believe the optimistic yet
ambiguous data of success at first. Then when he or she was confronted with differing, pessimistic proof that may have taken a chisel to his or her set-in-stone policy, a leader resisted accepting the evidence, even if the information had become the majority view of the IC. Betts (1978) also pointed out in the case of Israel that the Egyptians had performed three different exercises between 1971 and 1973 that were similar to the one prior to the attack in October 1973. On each of those three separate occasions, the Israeli Chief of Staff mobilized his forces in response and was criticized because of the unnecessary cost. According to the author, this “paradox of self-negating prophecy” (Betts 1978, 44) mixed with Israeli and U.S. analysts believing that the Arabs would be foolish to attack, led to this particular intelligence failure and strategic surprise.

Although Betts usually put most of the onus on decision makers for intelligence follies, in his article Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed, he pointed a finger at the intelligence personnel who somewhere in the chain of communication added that the Arabs were planning to attack Israel at six o’clock on the sixth of October. However, earlier that morning, Israel had received word from a trusted source that the Egyptians were going to attack that day, to which the erroneous time was attached. In this same paper, Betts (Winter 1980-81) also made the astute observation that if Israel had mobilized their forces in the face of the warnings received as they had in the three previous instances between 1971 and May of 1973, the Egyptian President Sadat might have retracted his orders to attack, thus leading Israel to believe that their evidence of an Arab strike was not valid. “The victim's intelligence is always at the mercy of the attacker's option to change his plans. If success in prediction does not nullify itself, however, it can induce complacency” (Betts Winter 1980-1981, 557). Ultimately, however, Betts (Winter 1980-81) faulted the policy maker with this complacency.
Deceiver’s Fault

Major Edwin S. Cochran (1998) of the United States Army took a different approach when looking at the Arabs’ surprise attack on Israel. Most authors studied this case from Israel’s perspective, but Cochran investigated the event from Egypt’s point of view. In fact, it was for this reason, that one might give the majority of the credit for this intelligence error and strategic surprise to the Arabs’ ability to deceive their enemy. Major Cochran (1998) wrote that after Egypt’s staggering defeat in the Six Day War of 1967, the Egyptians were able to capitalize by analyzing Israel’s strengths and weaknesses. Cochran (1998) maintained that Egypt was able to achieve operational deception, as well as technological surprise. The degree of technological surprise was based off fairly simple innovations that the Egyptians were able to use to quickly cross the Suez Canal, which thwarted “Israeli intelligence estimates of the time required for an assault crossing of the canal” (Cochran 1998, 16) and catching Israel off guard. However, the author gave most of the credit of deception to Egypt’s ability to conceal their intentions from Israel. Egypt preconditioned Israeli intelligence to believe that any and all Egyptian movements were simply normal military activity. According to Cochran (1998), another significant part of Egypt’s plan was expelling the Soviet advisers from the country in 1972. This gave Israel the notion that without Russia’s help, the Arabs would shy away from any military offensive. The one idea Cochran could have explored, but didn’t was whether or not Egypt and Syria had any contingency plans if Israel had discovered their deceptions.

Scholar Yigal Sheffy (2006) also gave much of the credit for the Arab’s successful strategic surprise to the Egyptians. Although the author recognized the fact that many of the documents which could still shed light on the subject were still classified as of 2006 when he wrote his article, Sheffy still found enough evidence to argue that “the Egyptian deception was
the decisive – even if not exclusive – factor to affect IDF readiness and its faulty response to the specific threat on the eve of the war” (Sheffy 2006, 811). The author believed that if Egypt had not attempted to deceive, then it would have been highly probable that Israel’s decision makers would have realized the lack of validity of their intelligence estimates early on. The other part of the equation that the author believed could be a factor is the possibility that Israel’s major source of intelligence came from a spy the county had within Egypt’s top inner circle. However, there were speculations that the spy may have been a double agent feeding the Israelis disinformation. The problem that Sheffy (2006) found with this was that there is still not enough proof to support this claim.

**Multiple Parties at Fault**

Marine Rodney Richardson believed that both sides were at fault for the intelligence errors that led to the Arab-Israel War. Major Richardson (1991) discussed the high possibility that worldwide terrorist attacks around 1973 distracted Israel’s decision makers, as well as its intelligence community. The author also mentioned a theory that Israeli intelligence developed called *The Concept*. Though the IC was the theory’s creator, Israeli policy makers adopted it fully. The theory was based upon four different parts. First, the Arabs were not ready for war with Israel until they could attack all of Israel’s airfields. Secondly, Israel felt that its defenses along the Suez Canal were sufficient enough to deter any attacks until forces could be mobilized to reinforce. Third, Israel believed that because of evidence from their war in 1967, the Arabs wouldn’t attack until they had amassed large stockpiles of weapons and supplies. Last, Israel’s leaders thought that the Arabs would not dare attack again, since Egypt and Syria had already experienced how much more superior Israel’s forces were to their own in the Six Day War of 1967 (Richardson, 1991). Unlike the other authors, Richardson did not consult the Agranat
Commission. Instead, he borrowed all of his information from open source editorials and other research papers on the subject, though that’s not to say that those sources used didn’t utilize the Agranat Commission as evidence. Nonetheless, this may explain the differences that he came to for his deductions about who was at fault. However, similar to the other authors, he may have drawn different conclusions if he had had access to secret documents.

Another author who gave much praise to Egypt’s ability to deceive was U.S. Navy Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein. Like Major Cochran, Aboul-Enein (2003) discussed the importance Israel’s attack in 1967 had on Egypt’s ability to reevaluate and exploit Israel’s weaknesses of overconfidence. Aboul-Enein (2003) also believed that Israeli intelligence was also at fault for Egypt’s successful surprise attack. After all, it was Israel who assumed that certain stipulations had to be fulfilled if the Arabs ever thought about attacking. For example, Israel had the misconception that the Arabs wouldn’t attempt an assault until they could simultaneously attack all of Israel’s airfields, which wouldn’t be possible until Egypt had acquired “long-range Soviet fighter-bombers and would have adequate pilots and aircraft” (Aboul-Enein 2003, 54). According to Israeli intelligence estimates, this would happen until 1975. The author did give some credit to Israel’s intelligence, when he mentioned the case of an AMAN officer arguing five days before the attack that Egyptian exercises and deployments were cover for an actual strike against the Suez Canal. Unfortunately for Israel, the officer’s report never left his commanding officer’s desk.

Amnon Lord (2012) was another author who placed the fault with the policy makers of Israel, but who also gave some credit to the disinformation campaign that the Egyptians and Russians laid out. Lord (2012) believed that in the end, the Israeli leaders, such as Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Prime Minister Golda Meir, Mossad chief Zvi Zamir, and Chief of Staff
David Elazar, were paralyzed to do anything. Lord stated that this occurred because of leadership’s own evaluations of the evidence independently. They became trapped due to the “charade of disinformation [from the Egyptians and Russians] and internal contradictions, while above them all flew the flag of ‘They [the Arabs] wouldn’t dare [attack]’” (Lord 2012, 8).

Another component that didn’t help the Israeli policy makers, according to Lord (2012), was the fact that the United States’ leadership, specifically Henry Kissinger, the United States national security adviser, was against any kind of preemptive attacks coming from Israel. Lord, like other scholars, also mentioned the impact that DMI Eli Zeira could have had, had he switched his position about the low probability assessment of an attack coming from the Arabs.

**Summary**

When studying intelligence failure and strategic surprise as it pertains to the Yom Kippur War, academics have come to different conclusions as to who was at fault. Some, like Bar-Joseph (1999) and Schlaim (1976), found that the Intelligence Community and its analysts were to blame for not providing the right information to the policy makers, whereas others, such as Arie W. Kruglanski (2003), Jack Levy (2009), Michael L. Handel (1977), Richard K. Betts (1978 and 1980-81), Ephraim Kahana (2002), and Gabriella Heichal (1999) believed that Israel’s leaders had enough evidence to mobilize forces, but did not react in time. There were also scholars, namely Edwin S. Cochran (1998) and Yigal Sheffy (2006), who found that Egypt was successful enough in their deception to catch Israel off guard. Then there were those authors like Rodney Richardson (1991), Youssef H. Aboul-Enein (2003), and Amnon Lord (2012) who put the responsibility of the intelligence errors on multiple parties, whether that was Israel’s IC, Israeli decision makers, and/or the Arabs as the deceivers. However, the one thing that each of these academics had in common, was the fact that each used open source materials to establish
and provide evidence for their claims. They did not have access to the classified materials that accompanied the events of the Yom Kippur War, but had they been able to study such secret information, perhaps their conclusions would have been different. Now that many of those documents have been declassified, it is the objective of this paper to not only look at the sources through which previous scholars have sifted, but to also search through and attempt to discover details within those declassified papers that might shed light on which theories of intelligence failure and strategic surprise were most accurate. This paper provides a quantitative study using correlation and regression analysis to find the answers it seeks.
CHAPTER III

Methodology and Research Strategy

This research paper conducted a quantitative study. The theories of this study were based upon those mentioned in Erik J. Dahl’s paper about the traditional theories of intelligence failure and strategic surprise, and who was to blame. There were four different theories mentioned in Dahl’s work. Each of these could be applied to most historical accounts of intelligence failure and strategic surprise. This paper used the case of the Israel-Arab War of 1973. The paper has gathered the points of view of scholars on this particular case, and this section discusses how it searched for the articles presented in the literature review as well as how the author obtained the sources of these academics’ evidence towards their theory. A hypothesis is then offered. From there, the research design is discussed along with the details for how the author went about showing whether his hypothesis is sound or not.

Theories

As has been mentioned previously, this paper is based off of four different theories that Eric Dahl (2004) presented in his paper, *Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence against Terrorism*. First is the view that intelligence analysts are responsible for not recognizing the warnings and signs associated with surprise. The second point of view is that policy makers should have taken the onus for intelligence failures and being strategically surprised. The third theory is based on faulting those who were doing the deceiving. The final point of view blames some combination of two or three of these groups. Using the specific case of the surprise attack of the Arab coalition against the Israelis on October 6, 1973, this paper found these four different views within the scholarly works of those who have researched this specific historic event.
OSINT Searching Methods

After having established a baseline for what to look for in the works of other academics who have written research papers on the Yom Kippur War, the author began searching through American Public University System’s (APUS) Online Library to find scholarly articles. The author sifted through the following search engines: EBSCOhost, JSTOR.org, ProQuest, Praeger Security International, Columbia International Affairs Online, and APUS’s Online Book Catalog. Searches were performed using the words and phrases; Yom Kippur War, surprise, intelligence failure, and Arab-Israel War 1973. These words and phrases were also used in a general search over the World Wide Web using the Google search engine. The author executed a final search on the United States Air Force’s (USAF) Air University Library website. After conducting the searches as written, the author found a plethora of articles written about the subject of the intelligence failure and strategic surprise of the Yom Kippur War. All of those same works were those previously discussed in the literature review section of this paper. The authors of those articles used open source materials to obtain their conclusions of who was to blame for the intelligence failures associated with this strategic surprise. The question could then be asked; what would happen if these scholars had had access to the classified data associated with the Yom Kippur War?

Declassified Material Searching Methods

The majority of the once classified information that had been collected for this research paper was studied from the documents that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America released on the CIA’s website. These documents were located in the Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room from the agency’s website library under the 1973 Arab-Israeli War link. Under this link there are 42 web pages of 419 declassified documents and
articles which the author searched and read through in order to find additional information that could answer the question of who was to blame for the intelligence failure and strategic surprise that occurred on October 6, 1973.

The author also wanted to find more information about any of the three reports of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, since these were a primary source of evidence in the majority of the articles which scholars used to support their theories. It was then discovered that the majority of the Agranat Commission reports were classified when most of the academics wrote their articles. The author then performed a search for the Agranat Commission through APUS’s Online Library on the following search engines: EBSCOhost, JSTOR.org, ProQuest, Praeger Security International, Columbia International Affairs Online, and APUS’s Online Book Catalog. A few pages containing a small part of the Interim Report of the Agranat Commission were found in an electronic book through APUS’s Online Book Catalog titled Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History, edited by Bernard Reich. Unfortunately, this book did not provide any help towards achieving this paper’s objectives and therefore was not used. A general search for Agranat Commission was also completed on the Google search engine. Although there were no actual documents found directly from the Agranat Commission using this method, there were a few news articles found from the Times of Israel and the Israel National News websites which provided information from the Agranat Commission reports that was classified up until its release to the public in 2012 and 2013. The information found on these websites along with the once secret CIA documents composed the declassified sections of tables.
Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this paper is that the once classified information analyzed in conjunction with the open source evidence would have changed the assumptions the scholars made. The independent variables were the open source intelligence (OSINT) information and the declassified material. The dependent variable was the assumptions made from the materials.

Research Design

The research design that this paper used is correlation and regression analysis to test its hypothesis stated above. The data consisted of the OSINT information that other scholars used to gain their conclusions as well as the declassified materials that the Central Intelligence Agency had made available along with some other previously secret information gathered from news articles that had been published within the past year and couple months. This study found whether or not there was any correlation between the OSINT and the declassified information. The control group in this case was the OSINT, whereas the experimental treatment group was the declassified information. After the OSINT and declassified information was analyzed, the author set a scale of strength from one to five, on how well the evidence supported the four different theories. These scores were presented in tables for each article in the Appendices along with a total strength score, which were the scores added up at the end, along with an average strength score, which took those total strength scores and divided it by the total number of pieces of evidence presented in the table. There were four different sections of tables mirroring the different subsections in the Literature Review, with a table for every article reviewed. The declassified document scores were also presented in the tables of Appendices 5 and 6. The declassified documents were grouped into two sections with a total of six different tables. The first section was for that information supporting the theory for the IC’s fault. This section had
four tables; evidence from before 1 September 1973, evidence between 1 September and 5 October 1973, evidence on 6 October 1973, and evidence after 6 October 1973. These tables also had a total score and average score, the same as the OSINT article tables. A chart for each of the four traditional theories was constructed in the *Conclusion*. The charts contained the OSINT article based on its theory along the X axis of the chart, each paired with the declassified tables’ sections for the *IC’s fault* and the policy makers’ *(PM)* fault. The Y axis of the charts listed the total average strength scores from one to five. After assigning the strengths for each of the four theories with the two studies, the average support strength numbers were then plotted to reveal how well the assumptions of the different types of evidence correlated.

Looking first at the open source information, this paper examined each of the scholarly articles and found from where each of the academics retrieved the evidence for their arguments. Most of the sources were located in the reference sections and the footnotes of their works. The author of this paper then analyzed the proof presented in the articles and created tables. As indicated in the paragraph before, there was a table created for each work studied in this thesis. One of the tables’ columns consisted of the different sources that each of the scholars used. The *referenced material’s* reference format was copied verbatim from the article itself in order to maintain the integrity of what the author’s source was, thus nothing was lost in translation. Another one of the columns consisting of the *quote* itself was also copied verbatim from the article, posted in italics with the citation in order to maintain the context. Again, this helped so that nothing was lacking in any kind of paraphrasing. The column after the *quote* contained which of the three arguments the evidence supported in the article, namely whether it blamed the intelligence analysts, the policy makers, or the deception of the Arabs. Lastly, there also was a column giving a quantitative ranking of how well the evidence supported the claim.
The strength of the evidence supporting that particular claim was ranked one to five. A strength of one was *does not support the theory*; a strength of two was *barely supports the theory*; a strength of three was *somewhat supports the theory*; a strength of four was *supports the theory*; and a strength of five was *strongly supports the theory*. The strength of the evidence was based off of how specific the quote was; whether the assessment was derived from a person’s bias or from a specific piece of evidence; and whether the information could possibly be used to support one of the other two theories in which case it was given a strength of one, unless it was from an author whose views were for *multiple parties at fault*. An example of a quote that had a support strength of two is as follows: “The Agranat Commission's separate recommendations for dealing with the intelligence personnel shed further light on the causes of what has come to be known in Israel as *the breakdown*. Major-General Eliyahu Zeira, the Director of Military Intelligence, had only been at his post for one year before the war and had found established patterns of work. But he adopted *the conception* whose rigidity destroyed the openness required in confronting inflowing information” (Schlaim 1976, p. 353). This evidence is based off a concept that is not tangible. Although it does support the author’s theory, it cannot be proven from this quote that Zeira had in fact adopted *the conception*. Plus, the quote does not provide amplifying confirmation that *the conception* “destroyed the openness in confronting inflowing information” (Schlaim 1976, p. 353). However, if the author had evidence of such *destruction* within the quote, then the strength could be considered a three. A strength of four would require at least a specific physical example, such as something he said or did, illustrating how Zeira had adopted *the conception*. Finally, a strength of five would require a direct quote from Zeira that was either officially heard from a reliable source or that he wrote in a document showing admission that he was the cause for the intelligence failure as a result of *the conception*. There
were total support strength scores and average support strength scores provided under each table. The total support strength score added all the strength scores in the table together, while the average support strength score divided that total score by the number of quotes in the table, or in other words the number of rows in the table. Once all of the open source evidence had been compiled, the paper then proceeded to gathering declassified information on the Yom Kippur War.

Like the open source material, the declassified documents contained evidence for one or more of the theories for who was responsible for the intelligence failure and strategic surprise. The author took that information and created tables with rows of the once classified data. The information from the documents had been copied into the tables’ Quote columns verbatim, the same as it was in the OSINT tables and for the same reasoning. The columns consisted of the specific document that the information was found in, the copied text from the documents, as well as a column for which of the three different views of who is to blame: the intelligence community and its analysts, the policy maker, or the deceiver, in this case the Arabs. Similar to the unclassified tables, the final column was also a column for strength scores which contained the strength of the evidence ranked one to five. A strength of one was doesn’t support the theory at all; a strength of two was barely supports the theory; a strength of three was somewhat supports the theory; a strength of four was supports the theory; and a strength of five was strongly supports the theory. Like the OSINT tables, these scores were based on specificity. Also like the open source tables, there were total support strength scores and average support strength scores provided under each table.
**Limitations**

Despite the amount of documents that the CIA has declassified, there still remained limitations outside of which this paper could not and was not able to work. The CIA only provided those records which were internal to the United States and the failings of its IC and policy makers. Nonetheless, Israel’s IC provided most of the United States’ intelligence found in the declassified documents of this project. There were no specific declassified documents that came directly from Israeli intelligence. Unfortunately, the search for documents relating to the Yom Kippur War and the Agranat Commission Reports on the IDF’s English website did not produce results that could help the thesis of this paper. The search only provided ten open source articles about events that had taken place on a few of the anniversaries of the 1973 war, but did not yield any once classified documentation. It is also important to note that there was a language limitation. Much more could have been found if the author was able to read Hebrew and Arabic as those are the official languages of Israel. As can be noted in many of the references from scholarly articles on this topic, a good amount of the testimonies and biographies were written in Hebrew. The final limitation recognized in this work, was the lack of evidence found from the Egyptian side, thus not being able to give much light to the theory of the deceiver being at fault except for what is found in the articles reviewed.
CHAPTER IV

Findings and Analysis

Beginning with the scholarly OSINT articles, this section analyzes each article that was reviewed in the Literature Review section of this paper, as well as evaluate each of the declassified documents found to support one of the three theories. This section does not step through each piece of evidence from all the sources used, but highlights some of the more important quotes that were utilized to support the authors’ theories. In order for the reader to see all of the evidence used along with the strength scores associated with them, tables have been provided with each article in the Appendices.

OSINT ARTICLES (Intelligence Community’s Fault)

Avi Shlaim [1976]

Author Shlaim used the Agranat Commission Report to support his claim that the intelligence community was to blame for the Arab’s surprise attack on Israel. The Agranat Commission stated that the Intelligence Community had the information and yet continued to subscribe to what it called the conception. It’s important to note that Shlaim (1976) grouped the Director of AMAN, Eli Zeira, in with the Intelligence Community. The strength of the evidence that Shlaim (1976) used from the Agranat Commission varies (See Table 1.1). He did have one example that strongly supported the failure of the Israeli’s intelligence community, where an intelligence officer attempted to send up strong evidence of Egyptian war preparations. However, later into the chain of command, a senior intelligence officer kept that information from entering the hands of the decision makers (See Table 1.1, # 6). This instance provided strong evidence due to the fact that it gave excellent details of how the IC did not provide sufficient warning. Shlaim (1976) also utilized the Insight Team of the Sunday Times and
Jerusalem Post Weekly to provide proof that somewhat helped at putting the onus of the intelligence failure on the IC (See Table 1.1, # 7). Unlike the previous information, this data was not specific. The strength of evidence could have been greater if it had provided who precisely had told the U.S. not to believe the data it had collected was an indication of eventual hostilities.

Uri Bar-Joseph [1999]

In Bar-Joseph’s 1999 article about the Yom Kippur War, he provided a considerable amount of strong evidence that the intelligence agencies were at fault for the Arab’s being able to catch Israel off guard (see Table 1.2). In this particular article, Bar-Joseph (1999) was grouping AMAN’s director, Eli Zeira in with the rest of his organization, along with his analysts. Like Shlaim, Bar-Joseph (1999) acquired data from the Agranat Commission to make his case. However, unlike Shlaim who did not have nearly as many sources available to him in the 70s, Bar-Joseph (1999) was able to use other written materials in their Hebrew form that helped his argument. Much of his information was derived from Aryeh Braun’s Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War and Eli Zeira’s testimony in the The October 73 War: Myth Against Reality. It’s only when Bar-Joseph (1999) combined sources to drive home his theory that his evidence received a five for strength. For example, Dayan’s article by itself received a three when discussing the lack of concern that AMAN had for the human intelligence (HUMINT) it received in relation to Egypt and Syria collaborating against Israel (see Table 1.2, # 6). The low strength score was due to its lack of specificity and because “as far as is known” (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 13-14), Dayan had no additional proof to support his claim that anybody in AMAN had taken the warning seriously. However, in most of the instances where Bar-Joseph (1999) used Dayan’s article with evidence from the Agranat Commission, or Zeira’s source, his evidence was detailed and was able to strongly support his theory. Other sources that helped increase the strength of
Bar-Joseph’s evidence came from Shlomo Nakdimon’s *Hussein Told Golda: The Syrian Army Took Offensive Positions*, Aharon (Roni) Bergman’s *Hussein warned Golda*, and an interview with Lieutenant-Colonel (retd.) Aviezer Ya'ari (See Table 1.2, #7, 8, & 17). Towards the end, Bar-Joseph (1999) also utilizes AMAN’s SIGINT Unit Commander, Yoel Ben-Porat’s book *Neila: Locked On* to better illustrate Zeira’s roll in Israel’s intelligence failure.

**OSINT ARTICLES (Policy Makers’ Fault)**

*Uri Bar-Joseph/Arie W. Kruglanski [2003]*

Similar to Bar-Joseph’s previous article in 1999, he and Kruglanski (2003) put a large amount of onus of the intelligence failure on the IC. However, in this particular article they focused on two men within AMAN leadership with the majority of their sources, namely Eli Zeira and an ex-officio government intelligence advisor, Yona Bandman. Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski (2003) use Bar-Joseph’s own book, *The watchman fell asleep: The surprise of Yom Kippur and its sources*, from which some of his strong evidence came (See Table 2.1, #7, 8, & 9). He again referenced the Agranat Commission, and Ben-Porat’s *Neila: Locked On* to strengthen his theory’s claim as he did in his 1999 article (see Table 2.1, # 4, 6, & 8). The authors also used Bandman’s own words from an interview against him in conjunction with the Agranat Commission, which made for strong substantiation that Bandman had a large hand in the intelligence error (see Table 2.1, # 4).

*Uri Bar-Joseph [2008]*

Since Bar-Joseph was attempting to analyze “Israel's inadequate war deployment when firing commenced and its impact on the failure to repel the attack” (Bar-Joseph 2008, p. 509) in his 2008 article, he did not veer much, from the point of view he presented in his 2003 paper with Kruglanski for who was to blame for the intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War. It
was perhaps for that reason that only two pieces of evidence were found to have come from outside sources supporting the policy maker argument presented throughout his writing. In fact, he only used his book *The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur* and its quotes as the sole source for providing evidence towards the intelligence mistake. Despite his support towards blaming policy makers for the intelligence failure, he presented proof which could be seen as supporting the theory that it was the intelligence community’s as well as the policy maker’s responsibility for Israel’s lack of preparation for the surprise attack (see Table 2.2). From the quotes analyzed, AMAN could be held responsible since they provided the policy makers with faulty estimates. However, the policy makers could still be blamed as Bar-Joseph’s (2008) quotes showed the decision makers not heeding other evidence that came from Mossad and the United States contradicting AMAN’s evaluations and presenting the signs of an impending attack from the Arabs.

*Uri Bar-Joseph/Jack Levy [2009]*

Bar-Joseph and Levy (2009) peered deeper into the role that “conscious, politically motivated behavior” (Bar-Joseph 2009, p. 462) had in intelligence failure and thus presented evidence supporting the claim that policy makers were responsible for Israel’s surprise on 6 October 1973 (see Table 2.3). The authors utilized some of Bar-Joseph’s past publications to back their claims. In one instance, they presented proof from Bar-Joseph’s *The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources* that received a strength score of four due to its detail of how Israel’s Chief of Staff failed to completely mobilize the reserves despite having clear evidence that there was an “Egyptian deployment along the front” (Bar-Joseph 2009, p. 484, see Table 2.3, # 5). The authors also used other documents, like the Agranat Commission, Ben-Porat’s *Neila: Locked-On*, Bartov’s *Daddo – 48 Years and 20 More Days*, and Yaari’s *The
Road from Merhavia, which also helped Bar-Joseph and Levy’s quotes to receive a support strength score of four (see Table 2.3, # 6 & 8).

Uri Bar-Joseph [2012]

In Bar-Joseph’s (2012) final article, he put most of the onus of the intelligence failure on one person, namely AMAN’s director, Major General Eli Zeira. He gleaned the majority of his evidence from the Agranat Commission and books written by Yoel Ben-Porat, Arie Braun, Arieh Shalev, Zvi Zamir, and Efrat Mass (see Table 2.4). The Agranat Commission somewhat supported his accusations as it referred to ‘the conception,’ which led to Zeira’s caution towards utilizing the intelligence instruments that he had at his disposal, therefore not exposing the critical information that could have given Israel the warning it needed. Better evidence of Zeira’s fault, as well as Bandman and Shalev’s neglect came from the commander of AMAN’s SIGINT unit during the war, Yoel Ben-Porat. In his book, Neila: Locked-On, he discussed the SIGINT data that each of the leaders had disregarded prior to the surprise attack. Even more crucial was the apparent lie that Zeira had told chief of staff, David Elazar a week before the war. Elazar shared with Ben-Porat that Zeira claimed twice to have used special means of collecting on the Arabs, and to have gathered nothing, which increased Elazar’s speculations that the Arabs were not preparing to attack. Bar-Joseph (2012) also utilized other evidence from Ben-Porat’s book, as well as citing Arie Braun’s Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War, originally written in Hebrew, to show more evidence that Zeira was not providing critical warnings to the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff. The specific examples Bar-Joseph (2012) used (see Table 2.4, #3) from these sources supported his theory that the intelligence failure fell on the shoulders of decision makers. Bar-Joseph (2012) also used the Director of Mossad’s, Zvi Zamir, book, With Open Eyes, to support his view. Overall, Bar-Joseph (2012) had some of the best supporting
evidence for his conclusion that the majority of the intelligence failure should have been placed on the policy makers, namely Zeira. Many of his sources received a support strength score of five because of their specificity and since they came from those who were present and first hand insiders to all that occurred at their levels. The evidence from the Agranat Commission data, however, referenced the conception theory which both policy makers and the intelligence community supported and did not conclusively support one party’s culpability over the other.

**Gabriella Heichal [1999]**

Gabriella Heichal’s (1999) support for her point of view that Israel’s policy makers were at fault came from a number of different OSINT sources (see Table 2.5), a few of which gave her a four in terms of support strength. However, it was only when the information was combined in two cases that her support strength was at four (see Table 2.5, # 4 & 5). In one instance Heichal (1999) combined the testimonies from Ben Porat, Ze’ev Schiff’s Earthquake in October, and Bartov’s Dado, 48 Years and 20 Days to help add enough detail indicating that the policy makers, like the Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister, did not attempt to dispute AMAN’s low estimations of war despite the warning signs that were present. In the other quote, Heichal (1999) utilized the Hebrew newspaper Ma'ariv from 1975, Herzog’s The War of Atonement, and again Schiff’s work to show the disagreements that occurred amongst policy makers, causing confusion as to what should be the end decision for Israel towards deploying their reserve forces to the front lines. It’s important to note that Heichal (1999) grouped DMI Zeira in with the policy makers since she considered him a major decision making head within Israel, critically affecting its policy of troop deployment. Heichal (1999) also used the Agranat Commission in her support of how Zeira continued to sustain his previous beliefs that the chances for war were
low in spite of the warnings and indications coming from the Soviet’s withdrawal from the Arab nations (see Table 2.4, # 6). This statement received a support strength score of four as well.

**Ephraim Kahana [2002]**

Author Kahana (2002) did an excellent job of laying out in chronological order, the series of events that led up to the surprise attack of the Arabs. Within his article, he used his sources to give the reader a sense of what was happening between and amongst Israel’s IC and policy makers. Although he presented proof of how some might blame the AMAN for the intelligence failure, his conclusion and the bulk of his evidence supported the theory that it was the policy makers who should have taken the fall. Much of his information is derived from the Agranat Commission. However, he also utilized the Zvi Lanir’s *Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis*, Zeira’s book, *The October 73 War: Myth Against Reality*, a couple of Shlomn Nakdimon’s works, Ze’ev Schiff’s *A Foreign Ruler Warned: The Intelligence and Golda Meir Ignored*, Braun’s *Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War*, Herzog’s *The War of Atonement*, Bartov’s *Dado, 48 Years and 20 Days*, as well as the transcript of a conversation between Israeli Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff (see Table 2.6, # 1, 3, 5, 7 & 8). The documents used in the previously referenced quotes gave a support strength score of four to Kahana’s (2002) argument that the policy makers in Israel were conflicted with one another as to what the Arab’s intentions were before 6 October. DMI Zeira was also grouped into the fray of policy makers and was shown to have had a critical impact on other policy makers and their ultimate error of trusting in the Concept (see Table 2.6, # 8).

**Michael Handel [1977]**

Despite other scholars using Handel’s article as a source, the paper itself did not utilize many other documents to substantiate his argument that the policy makers were to blame for the
intelligence failure of Israel. Handel used sources, like the Agranat Commission, to find fault with the Israeli IC on a couple of occasions, but only used it once to support his point of view against policy makers. However, the one Agranat Commission reference received only a support strength score of two as it was based off assumptions about how the IDF may have influenced Defense Minister Dayan rather than giving specifics towards anything he did or said which could have led to policy decisions towards the intelligence failure (see Table 2.7, # 1). Handel also referenced Prime Minister Golda Meir’s autobiography to show how other policy makers brushed her concern aside about the Russians leaving Egypt. Unfortunately, the specifics do not enter into Handel’s article and thus it received a support strength score of three (see Table 2.7, # 2).

Richard Betts [1978]

Richard Betts (1978), who wrote his article a year after Handel’s work on Israel, used Handel’s article as a source of reference to help his argument that policy makers were at fault for the intelligence failures. However, similar to Handel, Betts’ (1978) sources did not give enough detail as to strongly support his claims (see Table 2.8). Only one of his quotes with a referenced document received a strength score higher than two, which had a score of three (see Table 2.8, # 4). Part of his source from the quote came from a personal conversation that Betts (1978) had with Handel, though there was no mention of where Handel obtained his information. The other part of the quotation from Betts (1978) originated from Shlaim’s Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War. The source only somewhat supported Betts’ (1978) argument as it assumed without substantial proof that criticism for mobilizing the reserves in times past affected the Israeli Chief of Staff so as to not mobilize them in October 1973.
**Richard Betts [1980-81]**

In Betts’ (1980-81) second article that was analyzed, there were only three sources used to support his theory that the policy maker was at fault for the intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War. However, only Ze’ev Schiff’s *October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973* could give Betts’ (1980-81) point of view a support strength score of four (see Table 2.9, # 1). The one issue that Betts’ statement had was that many scholars may not consider Aryeh Shalev a policy maker since he was a representative for the IDF at the cabinet meeting. That could be an argument for grouping Shalev in with the IC. It is a similar case with Eli Zeira, which also was mentioned throughout this paper. It was inconclusive as to whether the other sources were placing the blame on the policy maker or the IC, and therefore they received a support strength score of one (see Table 2.9, # 2).

**OSINT ARTICLES (Deceiver’s Fault)**

**Edwin S. Cochran [1998]**

Major Cochran’s (1998) paper presented the point of view that the Arab’s deception was at fault for Israel’s surprise. Cochran (1998) used Samuel W. Wax and Avigdor Levy’s *Arab-Israeli Conflict Four: A Preliminary Assessment*, T. N. Dupuy’s *The Ramadan War: An Arab Perspective of the October War*, Edgar O’balance’s *The Fifth Arab-Israeli War -- October, 1973*, and the Insight Team of the London Times’ *Yom Kippur War* as his sources, all of which together resulted in quotes with support strength scores of four (see Table 3.1). The OSINT information Cochran (1998) used provided insight into how Sadat and the Arabs were attempting to deceive the Israelis. However, what could have strengthened Cochran’s (1998) argument was if he had shown with reliable sources Israel’s side of the story, presenting how the deceptions
affected Israel’s intelligence information, and thus illustrating the deception’s success as opposed to an intelligence blunder. None of his sources provided such evidence.

**Yigal Sheffy [2006]**

Yigal Sheffy (2006) utilized several sources to help support his theory that the Arabs should receive the credit for a successful surprise assault on Israel. There were a couple of Egyptian references, Anwar Sadat’s autobiography and Egypt’s *Periodical Intelligence Summary*, that only gave a small amount of backing to Sheffy’s (2006) argument (see Table 3.2, # 1-3). However, other sources from Egypt, like Saad el Shazli’s *The Crossing of the Suez* and Aharon Zeevi’s *The Egyptian Deception Plan*, gave a support strength score of four to Sheffy’s claim. It was the works written by those outside of Egypt, namely Herzog’s *The War of Atonement*, Bar-Joseph’s book, Braun’s *Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War*, and Bartov’s book, that strongly supported Sheffy’s (2006) point of view when grouped together, as they not only contained a detailed example, but also showed how Israel gave into the deception.

**OSINT ARTICLES (Multiple Parties at Fault)**

**Rodney C. Richardson [1991]**

Major Richardson (1991) put the onus an all parties for the 1973 Arab-Israeli War’s intelligence failure and strategic surprise. Unfortunately, his sources did not provide much support strength to all the theories. Although Lester Sobel’s *Israel and the Arabs: The October 1973 War* provided an excellent example of how the terrorist attacks prior to the surprise assault could have deceived Israeli policy makers and the IC, it does not provide conclusive proof that the terrorist events were intentionally executed for that purpose. It did give some better indications of how the IC and policy makers were distracted, supporting the view that either group could have been at fault for the intelligence failure, but the source was not specific enough
and did not give examples of how each group was diverted from their focus on Egypt and Syria. For this reason, the support strength score for the IC and policy maker theories was a three (see Table 4.1, # 1). The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, on the other hand, provided a good example of how the IC was to blame for the intelligence failures due to the stagnation found within Israeli intelligence organizations, garnering a support strength score of four towards that point of view (see Table 4.1, # 3).

**Youssef H. Aboul-Enein [2003]**

Lieutenant Aboul-Enein (2003) wrote a similar article to Major Cochran’s in that he used a couple of the same sources to support his claim that it was as much an Israeli IC failure as it was a successful deception conducted by the Arabs. However, Aboul-Enein (2003) utilized a few more documents that gave much more support strength towards the view of deception than anything else. His Egyptian sources, Manaal Nour-al-Din’s *Heroism Behind the Lines*, Hassan el-Badri’s *The Ramadan War, 1973*, and Abd-al-Ghanny Al-Gamassy’s *Memoirs of Al-Gamassy: The October War 1973*, as well as the Israeli lecture *Israeli Intelligence and the Yom Kippur War* given by Doron Geller all illustrated outstanding examples of Arab deception (see Table 4.2, # 1-4). However, neither did the quotes nor the other sources provide evidence of how Israel followed along with the deceptions, thus being able to give a support strength score of five that Israeli intelligence was in fact deceived. Like Major Cochran, Lieutenant Aboul-Enein (2003) also utilized the same example from the Insight Team of the London Sunday Times to show how the Israeli IC and its leadership needed reorganization (see Table 4.2, # 6).

**Amnon Lord [2012]**

Although journalist Amnon Lord (2012) attempted to argue that Israel’s intelligence failure and strategic surprise could be the fault of Israeli policy makers as well as a successful
deception by the Russians and their Arab allies, he only provided one source that somewhat
supports the *deceiver’s fault* theory (see Table 4.3). His sources backed the policy maker part of
his claim with a support strength score of four. That evidence came from an interview with Eli
Zeira, the Agranat Commission, and Bartov’s *Dado: 48 Years and 20 More Days* (see Table 4.3,
# 3-5). Similar to Bar-Joseph (2003, 2008, 2009, and 2012) and a few others mentioned in this
paper, Lord (2012) grouped Zeira in with other policy makers. Lord (2012) did provide one
statement that was considerably strong in sustaining the accusation that policy makers were at
fault (see Table 4.3, # 6). Interestingly, the quote not only placed blame with Israeli policy
makers, but U.S. leaders as well. The one source that Lord (2012) used in attempt to support the
theory of deceit is the Dinitz File from the Israel State Archive (see Table 4.3, # 7). The quote
by itself did not give the reader any indication of deception until he or she read later into the
article that those Russians which were visiting the Israelis were in fact Soviet KGB
disinformation experts. Although it is only an assumption that the Russians were in on any kind
of Arab trickery, it may have been a decent assumption considering the job descriptions of those
Soviets that were meeting with Israel’s policy makers (see Table 4.3, # 8). Other than that
evidence presented by the Dinitz File, Lord (2012) did not provide any other evidence to support
any Arab attempt at deception.

DECLASSIFIED MATERIAL (Before 1 September 1973)

21 July 1972 (See Table 5.1, # 1)

A Weekly Summary illustrated that Israel and the U.S. intelligence communities were
aware that Sadat removed the Soviets for several purposes, one of which was due to Russia’s
reluctance to support military hostilities against the Israelis (CIA, 2013).
28 July 1972 (See Table 5.1, # 2)

A Weekly Summary stated that Israel thought that Sadat’s removal of the Soviets was a deceptive tactic for domestic purposes. This could somewhat support the claims against the IC (CIA, 2013).

14 February 1973 and 28 February 1973 (See Table 5.1, # 3 & 4)

Two CIA documents of Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Trends showed that the IC had evidence of the Soviets attempting to deter the Arab states from hostilities in order to reclaim their lands from Israel (CIA, 2013).

06 April 1973 (See Table 6.1, # 1)

In a memorandum to Henry Kissinger, Ambassador Richard Helms described a conversation he had with the Shah of Iran. Within that conversation he mentioned that Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Hassan El-Zayyat, felt a lot of pressure to attack Israel. This supported arguments that policy makers in the U.S. were well aware of pressures that were built up on Egyptian leaders to begin a frontal assault on Israel (CIA, 2013).

01 May 1973 (See Table 6.1, # 2)

A memorandum from National Security Advisor, Kissinger, to President Nixon supported the theory that policy makers were at fault for the intelligence failure since policy makers had clear indications from Sadat’s contacts that Sadat was willing to use military action against Israel, going against rational thought. However, the U.S. did not know at what point Sadat would attempt such actions (CIA, 2013).

05 May 1973 (See Table 6.1, # 3)

In a memorandum to Kissinger, the IC analyzed Egypt’s intentions from a speech Sadat made earlier in May. The breakdown on the memo stated that Cairo may have been playing
psychological warfare with Israel, hoping that the U.S. would put pressure on Israel to give into diplomatic concessions with Egypt. However, the memo also acknowledged the threat that the situation could have had if Sadat passed the point of no return and felt like he had to enact hostilities upon Israel, thus giving credence to the theory that the policy maker was responsible for the intelligence failure (CIA, 2013).

07 May 1973 (See Table 6.1, # 4)

In an intelligence briefing given to President Nixon, indicators supported the Russian’s attempts at quelling Egypt against taking hostile actions towards Israel. This would also have appeared to point at Egypt’s increased desires to begin hostilities in May. However, because this coincided with the increased tensions in the region from Egypt during this time, it merited only a theory support score of three because of the time gap between May and October (CIA, 2013).

09 May 1973 (See Table 5.1, # 5)

Via an intelligence bulletin, the U.S. IC stated their knowledge about the amount and type of aircraft that Egypt was acquiring from other Arab nations. The document also presented the idea about having more of an advantage over Israel’s air defense if Egypt and Syria were to launch a coordinated attack. The build-up of military aircraft could have been taken as warnings for preparations towards launching future attacks. However, this did not help the U.S. or Israel to know the time frame in which that could take place (CIA, 2013).

11 May 1973 (See Table 5.1, # 6)

The Weekly Summary gave insight to Egyptian preparations for war against Israel, but also showed how the IC analysts believed that Sadat would exhaust his diplomatic options before attacking, which ended up holding true. As history shows, Egypt did not attack in May and waited to see what happened during the summit between the U.S. and the Soviets. However, this
summary also presented the idea that despite keeping a close eye on Egypt and its allies, Israel, as well as the United States, believed that Egypt would not dare attack until it had better military means (CIA, 2013).

**14 May 1973** *(See Table 5.1, # 7; See Table 6.1, # 5)*

An intelligence cable illustrated the seriousness with which the IC was taking Egypt’s preparations for war in May. However, the key idea that this cable made was that the IC was aware Sadat would probably not have attacked unless negotiations at the future summit between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. did not produce the results satisfactory to the Arabs. Those that were in Egypt believed that it was naïve to think that Sadat was bluffing in his preparations for war against Israel (CIA, 2013).

A Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) meeting also provided insight into Israeli Prime Minister Meir’s thoughts about Egypt. In May, she and Israel did not believe that Sadat would attack as it would have been irrational for Egypt to think that it could win any kind of military confrontation with Israel. However, it seemed that Meir was also aware that Sadat could still attempt the *illogical*. Ultimately, according to the WSAG meeting, both the U.S. and Israel were under the impression that Sadat was threatening military action only as a psychological maneuver to get what Egypt desired, rather than true indications of future hostilities (CIA, 2013).

**15 May 1973** *(See Table 6.1, # 6 & 7)*

Two members of the National Security Council, Harold H. Saunders and Richard T. Kennedy, wrote a memorandum to Kissinger about their concerns of an attack mounted by the Egyptians upon Israel. Their insider information came from King Hussein of Jordan who believed that an Egyptian-Syrian offensive would attempt to take some the lost territories back,
in hopes that their military efforts could hold off Israel until a ceasefire was called. This document is valid enough to receive a support strength score of four towards the theory that policy makers failed to see the likelihood of an Arab assault. Policy makers did not take King Hussein at his word, despite the fact that National Security Council members seemed to take him quite seriously (CIA, 2013).

In a second memorandum to Kissinger from Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council, Saunders appeared to change his concern from one letter to the next. In this memo, he assessed that the military preparations on the Egyptian side were in fact an exercise, which turned out to be true according to history. Saunders’ estimate would change, however, if Egypt were forward deploying their surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to the front lines. On the other hand, Saunders showed concern that Syria’s preparations seemed more legitimate for hostilities. Nonetheless, Saunders concluded that Syria would not attack unless Egypt assisted (CIA, 2013).

16 May 1973 (See Table 6.1, # 8)

In a President’s briefing, intelligence evaluated Arab military movements in Egypt and Syria. The CIA believed that the Arab’s actions could have made situations difficult for Israel if there was a coordinated assault from both Egypt and Syria. Despite the evidence being inconclusive as to Sadat’s military intentions, Israeli intelligence viewed the probability for the outbreak of war as low. However, the briefing stated that Israel was concerned more about Syria’s activities over Egypt’s, but Israel didn’t believe that Syria would initiate hostilities alone (CIA, 2013).

17 May 1973 (See Table 6.1, # 9)

In a National Intelligence Estimate, the IC attempted to predict how future actions of the U.S. and Israel along with the U.S.S.R. would have affected the choices that Sadat and Egypt
would have made towards military hostilities against Israel. Although Sadat was under a lot of pressure and had put his military into what seemed to be a better position to attack Israel, his intentions appeared to be as of this date purely psychological. This was based off of recent history within the few years preceding 1973, as the Egyptians tried to increase United States’ anxiety towards pressuring Israeli concessions between 1969 and 1971. Even though, those attempts failed and Egypt switched its focus to the Soviets, the IC estimated that Sadat was trying to put pressure on the U.S. and Russia again right before the two summits in June of 1973, which could have produced some diplomatic results in Egypt’s favor. But if those summits did not yield the outcomes that the Arabs desired, then the IC saw that Egypt may have had no other choice but to initiate hostilities. The other threat that the IC believed existed was the possibility of Sadat threatening to send Israel past the point of no return, forcing Israel to take preemptive measures (CIA, 2013).

**31 May 1973 (See Table 6.1, # 10)**

Although a document to the Acting Secretary of State from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Ray S. Cline, stated much of what was in the intelligence estimate of 17 May, the paper contained other evidences of an impending attack from the Arabs that were not in the estimate. Cline mentioned that if negotiations from the summits in June failed from Egypt’s point of view, then it was possible to foresee a military assault coming from the Arabs sometime in the fall. Egypt’s National Security Adviser, Hafiz Ismail, told European leaders that the then current stalemate was more dangerous to Sadat than going to war with Israel. Although, the comments of Ismail seemed to fit the narrative of psychological warfare, Cline also believed that they were quite accurate. He also mentioned King Hussein of Jordan (he spells Husayn) and King Faysal of Saudi Arabia and their opinions that Egypt would initiate
military action upon Israel. This letter lent strong support to the theory that policy makers were
given warning about impending attacks from the Arabs sometime during the autumn season of

1 June 1973 (See Table 5.1, # 8)

A document from the CIA indicated how the stalemate was becoming more unbearable
for Egypt with each passing day (CIA, 2013).

7 July 1973 (See Table 6.1, # 11)

A document from the Iranian ambassador to the Kissinger and the White House gave a
support strength of five that policy makers in the United States had prime intelligence from King
Hussein and Jordan intelligence of Syrian plans for a coordinated attack with Egypt upon Israel.
This document also recorded the fact that Israelis were privy to the same data, as Jordanians
exchanged intelligence with Israel (CIA, 2013).

DECLASSIFIED MATERIAL (Between 1 September and 5 October 1973)

18 September 1973 (See Table 5.2, # 1)

A CIA document that showed despite continued strain of relations between Egypt and the
Soviets that Sadat was still trying to buy advanced weaponry from the Russians. This helped
illustrate how Sadat was beginning to boil over about the United States and U.S.S.R.’s attempt to
keep Egypt and Israel in a continued stalemate (CIA, 2013).

20 September 1973 (See Table 5.2, # 2)

In a memorandum that the CIA produced, the IC revealed that Sadat was continuing his
attempts at building an Arab coalition against Israel and the United States. The IC believed that
Sadat felt he was losing to the psychological warfare against Israel and the United States. This
could somewhat support the theory that the IC was not sensitive enough to realize that Sadat was
getting closer to military confrontation (CIA, 2013).

29 September 1973 (See Table 5.2, # 3)

In a document that appeared to be shared with other U.S. intelligence agencies, the CIA showed that it had previous reports of Syrian plans to attack Israel along the Golan Heights. The reports stated that the Syrian military was supposed to be in position by the end of September. This offered strong support for the argument that the IC had the proper information to foresee an assault coming from Syria upon Israel (CIA, 2013).

30 September 1973 (See Table 5.2, # 4)

INR director Cline told the U.S. Secretary of State about the reports of Syrian military preparations in briefing memorandum. Cline stated that Syria could have been organizing its military in retaliation against Israel after Israel thrashed the Syrian air force on September 16th. Much of the information that the U.S. had accumulated about Syria’s movements had come from Israel’s Defense Minister Dayan, who revealed much of his data via a broadcast. Despite King Hussein’s concern about Syria’s plans, the IC estimated that the military movements were for defensive purposes only, rather than for a planned attack. This document supports the point of view that the IC had the information, but misinterpreted the intelligence, delivering their flawed estimates to the policy makers (CIA, 2013).

In an assessment of Syria to Kissinger, the CIA revealed that there had been four separate predictions for a Syrian attack on the Golan Heights, one after 15 May 1973, one between 15 July and 15 August, one for 30 August, and now one for the end of September. However, the CIA estimated that the buildup of forces at this time was typical and purely defensive, and that there was no evidence of an imminent assault. This memorandum also stated that it was the view
of the CIA that Sadat’s military movements up to this point were for moral, political, and
economic influences against Israel. This, along with the thoughts that Syrians would not attack
because they knew they couldn’t win, showed that the IC was not unified in its conclusions about
an attack coming from Syria. This also supported the view that the IC was at fault for the
intelligence failure (CIA, 2013).

1 October 1973 (See Table 5.2, # 5)

An Intelligence Information Cable divulged that although Syrian military preparations
were once thought to be offensive in nature, they were at this date assessed to be defensive. This
came from recent Asad comments as well as expressed fears from the Syrian Chief of Staff,
Hikmat al-Shihabi, that Israel would invade their borders once again. The IC believed that the
Syrians were highly afraid of any Israeli assault, especially after the small air war the two
countries had in September. The Cable was given a support strength of four towards the theory
that the IC was to blame for the intelligence failure because of the incorrect interpretations that
Syrian deployments were purely defensive just five days before the surprise Arab attack (CIA,
2013).

3 October 1973 (See Table 5.2, # 6)

Within an Intelligence Information Cable, the name of an intelligence source was still
blocked out. In the opinion of that source, Syrian military actions were seen as defensive rather
than offensive. The source was revealed to be a Syrian military officer, who told the U.S. IC that
Syria had performed such military maneuvers as training each year, but that this time it was out
of fear of an impending Israeli assault on the front lines. This document showed that the IC had
received either bad intelligence from what appeared to be a rogue Syrian officer who did not
have all the facts of Syria’s intent for the deployment of forces, or that the Syrian officer was a
double agent of sorts, attempting to feed disinformation to the U.S. about their offensive military preparations. Either way, this document could be used to show that the IC was at fault for not properly vetting their source (CIA, 2013).

**04 October 1973 (See Table 5.2, # 7)**

A Watch Report showed that the IC still perceived that despite all the military movements seen within the borders of Egypt and Syria, an Arab-Israeli conflict was not likely to result. The report also showed that the IC viewed Egyptian military deployments as an exercise. This offered strong support to the theory that it was the IC’s responsibility for the intelligence mistake (CIA, 2013).

**DECLASSIFIED MATERIAL (06 October 1973) (See Table 5.3)**

In a watch committee meeting, consisting usually of senior intelligence officers from the different intelligence agencies, chaired by the Deputy DCI, evidence showed that despite the hostilities which had broken out between Israel and the Arabs, the IC continued to claim that it had no concrete proof that a coordinated assault from the Syrians and the Egyptians started the conflict. The IC believed that the fighting commenced simply from tensions along both borders. The meeting also produced verification that the IC saw the quick withdrawal of Soviets from the Arab nations as possible producer of the conflict rather than a sign that the conflict was coming. This document illustrated the lack of correct analysis of the situation prior to 6 October, thus providing strong support towards the point of view that the IC was to blame (See Table 5.3, # 1).

In an intelligence memorandum, comments were made about the Russians’ lack of knowledge about the impending conflict between the Arabs and Israelis, due to the U.S.S.R. Naval movements (or lack thereof) within the Mediterranean (CIA, 2013). This lent support to the fact the IC was not looking for the right indicators in some instances (See Table 5.3, # 2).
During a Special Actions Group Meeting, Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, DCI, William Colby, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Alfred Atherton, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, General Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy Secretary of State, Kenneth Rush, had a conversation over the conflict which had erupted in the Middle East between the Arabs and Israelis. The meeting revealed a few important points as far as to how much the IC and U.S. policy makers did not know before the war began. It showed that despite the amount of data the U.S. IC had about military movements within Egypt as well as the testimony of Israel’s Prime Minister stating Israel would not preemptively attack, the United States was still considering Israel as an initiator of the conflict. On the other hand, Mr. Atherton indicated that the U.S. had all the evidence to prove that Israel was taken by surprise. General Scowcroft also divulged that until 5 October, Israel was of the opinion that the Arab military maneuvers were defensive. Admiral Moorer stated there were reports received that Sadat was losing control of the military. The conversation also exposed the possibility that Sadat successfully deceived Israel and the U.S (CIA, 2013). Ultimately, this meeting supported the theory that the IC did not properly analyze the intelligence they possessed, so as to be able to give policy makers a correct assessment of what was happening in Israel (See Table 5.3, # 3).

According to an intelligence memorandum, the Israelis said that they did not start mobilizing their reserve forces to the front lines until noon on 6 October. The coordinated Syrian and Israeli attack began two hours after that, despite reconnaissance sweeps at 0354 in the morning as well as associated alerts of Egyptian and Syrian military preparations (CIA, 2013). Either this was an indicator of bad intelligence analysis, of policy makers being indecisive and
not moving their forces in due response to the intelligence gathered, or a little of both scenarios (See Table 5.3, # 4).

A memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon revealed that the Israelis didn’t reverse their low assessments of an Arab attack until early on the morning of 6 October (CIA, 2013). This memo appeared to somewhat support the claim that a good portion of blame for the intelligence failure should have been placed on Israel’s IC, for their mistaken assessments of the intelligence they had prior to that morning (See Table 5.3, # 5).

During a different Washington Special Action Group Meeting, Henry Kissinger asked a question to which DCI Colby and Admiral Moorer responded, supporting the claim that the IC had incorrectly estimated the Egyptian military movements as an exercise. In fact, the IC even had before seen the bridges which the Egyptians constructed over the Canal, but continued to mistakenly assess that the Arabs would use them for an attack when they did (CIA, 2013). This lent a support strength of five to the IC’s fault theory (See Table 5.3, # 6).

DECLASSIFIED MATERIAL (After 6 October 1973)

09 October 1973 (See Table 5.4, # 1)

According to a memorandum sent from National Security Council member, William Quandt, to Kissinger, Israel judged the Arab’s military buildup as defensive. This could have supported either argument of it being a failure on the IC or policy maker’s part (CIA, 2013).

12 October 1973 (See Table 5.4, # 2)

A Central Intelligence Bulletin gave credence to the IC having intelligence that they did not properly analyze. The IC saw that the Soviets had significantly increased the use of their reconnaissance satellites over the Middle East starting on 4 October, which was an indicator that the U.S.S.R. may have had warnings the Arabs were about to begin their assault. This was given
a support strength score of three since it could not have been used by itself as evidence of the Arab surprise attack (CIA, 2013).

**16 October 1973 (See Table 5.4, #3)**

According to an intelligence memorandum, the Soviets were producing signs between 3 and 5 October that hostilities between Israel and the Arabs were going to occur. This supported the theory that the IC missed or could have incorrectly assessed vital data that should have warned Israel and the U.S. of an imminent assault (CIA, 2013).

**23 October 1973 (See Table 5.4, #4)**

On what some considered to be one of the last days of the Yom Kippur War, General Thomas wrote a memorandum to the Deputy DCI, General Daniel O. Graham. The memo supported the claim that the IC failed to recognize the signs that indicated Egypt and Syria’s intentions for war with Israel, months in advance. It implied that there were differences between the military preparations that the Arabs conducted in the weeks preceding the war and the many exercises organized in times past. For whatever reason, the IC discounted the variances. The memo suggested that the failed analysis could be due to the convincing and controlled behavior that Sadat and Assad demonstrated (CIA, 2013).

**24 October 1973 (See Table 5.4, #5)**

A memorandum for the Deputy DCI showed that the collection side of the IC was claiming to have gathered the information necessary to have forecasted the surprise Arab assault. This stated that U.S. intelligence agencies were on record with having predicted against an attack. If the memo had been specific as to details of the DDI and DIA going on record, it would have received a support strength score of five, but instead received a score of four (CIA, 2013).
27 October 1973 (See Table 5.4, # 6)

DCI Colby wrote a warm up to the post-mortem for the Yom Kippur War in a memorandum to Kissinger. Colby stated that the reason for the intelligence failure was not for wont of enough evidence but for proper analysis and interpretation by the IC of the data available (CIA, 2013).

20 December 1973 (See Table 5.4, # 7)

DCI Colby submitted a Preliminary Post-Mortem Report that identified many of the short falls of the IC. The report went into detail and provided examples from several documents of poor intelligence analysis on the IC’s part. Some of those examples had been discussed in this paper already and were found within the archives of the declassified documents that the CIA had provided. A few other examples were not discovered, and, for whatever reason, the documents from which the samples were taken had not been put up on the CIA’s website. In particular, quotes from documents dated a day or two before the attack, showed the deficient analysis of the collected data that could have helped identify the surprise attack if investigated properly. Although, the report identified a couple of minor weaknesses in the collection arena, the flaws were negligible and insignificant. According to this report, analysts had many preconceived notions which Israeli analysis only strengthened. Many Israeli interpretations focused on political signs that the Arabs were trying to find non-violent means to their ends of obtaining lost territories, rather than preparing for a frontal assault on Israel. Unfortunately, there were no specifics as to Israel’s side of the intelligence downfall. On the United States’ part, this document provided strong support to the theory that the IC, in particular the analysts, were at fault for the intelligence failure. It’s important to note, however, that the report did not discuss
the analysis and judgment of U.S. policy makers, since that would have been outside the scope and authority of the report (CIA, 2013).

03 April 1974 *(See Table 5.4, # 8)*

The only document to mention the Agranat Commission from the declassified documents found on the CIA’s website was a Central Intelligence Bulletin. Unfortunately, the bulletin did not contain any specifics of the Commission and could not lend any insight into whether the Agranat Commission’s conclusion was truly substantiated. It therefore did not lend much support strength to the argument that the Israeli IC was at fault for the intelligence failure, except to say that that it was the consensus of the Commission (CIA, 2013).

01 September 1975 *(See Table 5.4, # 9)*

An intelligence report that revealed many of the important details of the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, did not discuss in any detail the events that led up to the war. It only stated that Israel failed to see the signs of the impending attack. One detail that was of note in the report, was the lack of proper analysis of a line of earth mounds that the Egyptians had built. Israel had misidentified these hills of dirt as observation posts, when in reality, they contained tanks and other antitank weaponry. If these mounds had been properly recognized for what they were, it would have provided more evidence towards the Egyptian’s intentions for an attack. This gave some more credence to the idea that Israel’s IC failed in proper analysis of the evidence they had (CIA, 2013).

01 January 1993 *(See Table 5.4, # 10)*

Harold Ford from the CIA History Staff, wrote a classified Secret article laying out William Colby’s career as the DCI. In that article he presented a few of the details surrounding the start of the Yom Kippur War. One of the telling parts of Ford’s paper was the fact that the
U.S. Intelligence Community received much of its information and analysis from Israel’s IC. This alone put much of the onus for the surprise on Israeli intelligence. Many higher echelon intelligence officers within Israel had correctly identified false alarms in earlier instances of heightened alerts, when decision makers, like David Elazar had predicted war. This, of course, gave those officer’s words more weight when they insisted that an Arab attack was not going to happen before 6 October 1973. Ford also put a part of the blame on Israel’s policy makers. Israel’s leaders could have deliberately miscommunicated their alarm to the U.S., in fear that the United States would have attempted to force Israel to make concessions with the Arabs in order to deter any attacks from Egypt and Syria or in lieu of preemptively striking the Arabs. Finally, Ford also offered up the viewpoint that Sadat had performed an outstanding job of deception against the U.S. and Israel, especially if he was behind the Sai’qa terrorist attacks which had distracted Israel’s leaders, IC, and press from the military preparations of Egypt and Syria. Ford offered valid evidence for each of the three different theories for who’s to blame for the intelligence failure and strategic surprise of the Israel-Arab War of 1973 (CIA, 2013).

28 October 2012 *(See Table 6.2, # 1)*

The testimony of Chief of Staff David Elazar was revealed from recently released Agranat Commission sections in a news article written by Annie Lubin (2012). Elazar admitted to not believing in the chances of the Arabs attack. He believed that he would have received a preliminary warning from AMAN, but did not get the indications that he was looking for until the morning of the attack (Lubin, 2012). This evidence gave more support to the idea that the onus for the surprise should have fallen on the policy makers.
More newly released testimony from the Agranat Commission appeared in *The Times of Israel* article written by Mitch Ginsburg (2013). In this article he disclosed some of the words of Prime Minister Golda Meir from the Commission. The Prime Minister had relied heavily upon the military experts around her to determine whether or not the specific evidence that was being passed was of significance. However, her testimony, which was over 100 pages long, illustrated the watering down of information that was passed. For example, DMI Zeira stated that the sudden departure of the Soviet dependents from Egypt on 3 October could have been a sign of an attack, but that it was probably in response to the feud between Egypt and Russia or an impulsive decision that Egyptian president Sadat made. Ultimately, Meir seemed to be kept out of the loop, thus freeing her from some of the responsibility of not calling up the reserve forces to the front lines in time (Ginsburg, 2013). However, the article lent strong support to the claim that even though Meir may not have had all the pieces of the puzzle to produce a clear picture, the Israeli policy makers overall had most of the information to be able to predict the Arab attack, but instead clung to their biases. Plus, the most condemning part of the article was in the beginning when Meir stated that Israel could have preemptively struck Egypt with Israel’s air force. Nonetheless, Meir did not order the strike due to the possibility that the United States would have not provided the backing it did if Israel had preemptively hit the Arabs. She even went so far as to state during the Agranat Commission that “even in the aftermath of the war, she did not regret her refusal to unleash the air force on the amassing Egyptian troops on the western side of the Suez Canal” (Ginsburg, 2012).
Maayana Miskin (2013) wrote an article revealing more testimony from the Agranat Commission, that of Tzvi Zamir, Eli Zeira, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and intelligence officer Menachem Digli. In the newly released sections, Zamir stated that Prime Minister Meir was kept from much of the important intelligence in the days before the surprise attack. There was much arguing over whether the reports indicated a war or a military exercise, and Zamir didn’t want to give Meir an incomplete account of what was occurring. Dayan testified that he had told Chief of Staff Elazar that if Elazar were to call up the reserves, it would be seen as an act of aggression. Zeira bore record that he had received plans of the Egyptians crossing the Suez Canal, but that he deliberately did not reveal those to Elazar because they seemed illogical. A second report of similar plans came across his desk two days later, and he still refused to tell the Chief of Staff. Digli stressed that he had recommended to Zeira that the military should have used a vital intelligence system a week before the assault, but that Zeira refused to use the system until the day before 6 October (Miskin, 2013). This testimony gave much support to the theory that Israeli policy makers were at fault for the intelligence failure.
CHAPTER V

Conclusion

After carefully sifting through and analyzing the open source scholarly articles, the declassified information from the CIA’s website, and the recently revealed testimonies from the Agranat Commission that were contained in the Israel news sources, this paper was able to shed some light on the overall picture of what led to the Israeli intelligence failure and strategic surprise of 6 October 1973. The information from Chapter IV as well as the Tables in the Appendices and the Charts in this section also helped this paper to conclude whether the information found within the once classified documents would have altered the conclusions of those authors reviewed in this paper. Finally, it was important to note that besides answering the main question of this paper, this project’s research had been able to produce other deductions that were also of significance.

Light Shed from Declassified Documents

First, the overall research of this paper was able to find some pieces of the overall picture, helping to explain why the Arab assault took the United States and Israel by surprise. It’s essential to realize that the U.S. IC was attaining most of its intelligence data during the months leading up to October from Israel’s IC. This was the reason why the support strength scores could have been used towards blaming Israel’s intelligence community as well as the United States’ IC. The weeks and days leading up to the June 1973 summits between the Soviets and the U.S., showed that a part of the U.S. Intelligence Community believed that Sadat was making military preparations along the front lines as part of his own psychological warfare. Those with this assessment assumed that because of the United States’ influence over Israel, the U.S. would have persuaded Israel to make concessions with the Arabs during the June summits. Despite
seeing the Egyptian military movements as an exercise, these analysts also believed that it was possible for Sadat to be pushed into a corner if the June summits did not yield the desired outcome of Israel returning the occupied lands. The declassified documents predicted that either Sadat would push his exercises to the point of no return, or that Israel would become nervous enough to fire the first shot preemptively. Nonetheless, these reports stated that if there were to be hostilities, they wouldn’t occur until after the June summits had concluded. However, none of the documents that the CIA released discussed any of these forecasts after June. Entering into September, the declassified documents from the United States switched focus from Egypt to Syria. After Israel’s air force pummeled Syrian jets over the Mediterranean on 13 September 1973, Syria had begun moving many of their forces to the front lines of the Golan Heights. Though it seemed some believed that these movements appeared offensive in nature, the majority of the estimates pointed more towards a defensive posturing of the Syrian military. Either way, those who thought that these might have been indications of an attack by the Syrians correctly recognized that Syria would not have initiated anything without Egypt. However, the U.S. documents did not show any signs of a threat coming from Egypt. Over all, the declassified material expressed a similar view held by Israel; that the Arabs wouldn’t dare initiate a war that they could not win.

**Hypothesis Supported**

After attempting to put quantitative scoring to the evidence that scholars had presented for each of the different theories of the intelligence failure and strategic surprise of the Yom Kippur War, this paper had been able to deduce whether or not declassified documents from the U.S. and Israel could provide additional insight and perhaps even change the opinions of those scholars. Although both academics who offered evidence for the theory that the IC was solely
responsible for the intelligence errors revealed good quality scores, the once classified data could still have enhanced and even changed their assumptions. The several authors who represented the opinion that it was in fact the policy makers who were at fault for Israel’s ill preparedness had varying results in total scores, but also could have benefitted from having had access to the once classified information. Unfortunately, the evidence gleaned from the CIA was not suited for determining the responsibility of the Israeli policy makers since it only presented the U.S. policy makers’ positions. The couple of authors that argued on behalf of the Arab’s successes towards deception presented a decent amount of evidence to support their theory as well. However, they too may have believed differently if they had had the proper access to the classified information of that time. Finally, it seemed that the few scholars who combined the different theories had the correct idea, though they also would have gained much more understanding if they had read the formerly classified evidence.

Authors Schlaim (1976) and Bar-Joseph (1999) both presented strong supporting evidence for their conclusions that the Intelligence Community was at fault. However, both scholars could have benefited from having known what was contained in the classified sections of the Agranat Commission as well as many of those documents from the CIA’s website as is portrayed from Chart 1. It’s important to note here that Schlaim (1976) really only had access to a small part of the open source sections of the Agranat Commission Report along with a couple of newspaper articles in 1976. Schlaim’s (1976) strongest evidence illustrated the disconnect that existed between the lower and upper echelon intelligence officers of the Israel’s IC (see Table 1.1, # 6). Bar-Joseph also utilized parts of the Agranat Commission that were unclassified, but because more information had come to light through the writings of those that were first hand observers; he had the ability to present stronger support for his claim. Bar-Joseph’s strongest
evidence also showed a divide within Israel’s IC. However, the disagreements from Bar-Joseph’s best open sources illustrated that DMI Zeira was a large contributor for the lack of reliable intelligence being passed to those policy makers that needed it (see Table 1.2, # 1, 7, 8, 12, 16, 17, & 19). The declassified documents that supported Schlaim (1976) and Bar-Joseph’s (1999) theory helped solidify the fact that Israeli and U.S. intelligence communities had the impression that the Arabs would not dare attack, despite all of the signs that existed. The intelligence information was varied on its assumptions that Sadat would not initiate hostilities prior to September 1973. Some evidence written before the June 1973 summits between the super powers, Israel, and the Arabs demonstrated the belief that Sadat’s indications of military prepping were only psychological. However, others felt that aggressions would ensue if Sadat did not get what he desired from the June summits. Unfortunately, there were no declassified documents commenting on Sadat’s intentions after not having achieved his goals of acquiring control of the Sinai during those summits. Even though there were differing views seen within the declassified documents between 1 September and 5 October 1973, the consensus among those in the U.S. IC, who received a large part of their opinions from Israel’s IC, was that there was no proof the Syrian military movements could be correlated with Egyptian armed preparations (see Table 5.2, # 4). In the end the declassified documents could have helped strengthen Schlaim’s (1976) arguments, but the evidence that Bar-Joseph (1999) presented was more solid than what was found in the CIA documents showing an IC failure. Nonetheless, the declassified evidence presented towards blaming the policy makers was even sounder than what Bar-Joseph wrote in 1999. Therefore, if both authors had been able to use the once classified evidence, they would have placed blame on both the IC and policy makers for the intelligence failure.
Bar-Joseph (2003, 2008, 2009, & 2012) later changed his theory and, along with Handel (1977), Betts (1978 & 1980-81), Heichal (1999), and Kahana (2002), wrote about the failing of Israeli intelligence, but concluded that the responsibility in actuality fell upon the policy makers. The evidence exhibited in the different articles quantitatively analyzed in this paper illustrated a variety of strength scores which in the end could have been strengthened tremendously from those declassified documents evaluated from the Israeli news websites of today. The scores for the once secret CIA documents were not used in the overall scoring of the declassified material presented in the charts due to the fact that the evidence only condemned U.S. policy makers instead of Israel’s leaders. Earlier articles written by Handel (1977) and Betts (1978 & 1980-81) did not contain much evidence to strongly support their argument against policy makers. As was shown by Schlaim’s (1976) paper, the amount of open source evidence during that time was backing the supposition that the IC was at fault for the intelligence failure. It’s easy to see from Chart 2 that Handel (1977) and Betts (1978 & 1980-81) both could have used better support for
their arguments from declassified sources. Despite having more evidence after writing articles decades later than Betts and Handel, scholars Heichal (1999) and Kahana (2002) also could have benefited from the once classified sources to prove their points. Both authors utilized the Agranat Commission Report, like Schlaim (1976) and Bar-Joseph (1999) who used it to back their claim against the IC. However, Heichal (1999) and Kahana (2002) also were able to reference the writings and testimonies of first hand witnesses to formulate their conclusions.

Bar-Joseph (2003, 2008, 2009, & 2012) evolved his position as his writings progressed. Unfortunately, not all of his papers were formulated around the idea of who was to blame for the intelligence failure. This limited the amount and strength of the evidence he presented in support of his view against policy makers in 2008 and 2009. However, his other two articles from 2003 and 2012 contained substantially more strength from the open source evidence he used. Nonetheless, all of his writings and evidence towards his point of view would have been fortified if he had been able to utilize the declassified documents that have been released, especially the testimonies that were released within the past year and a half from the once classified portions of the Agranat Commission. Again, similar to the authors arguing against the IC, the scholars that supported the theory against the policy makers would have blamed both parties if they had had access to the once secret information.
Authors Cochran (1998) and Sheffy (2006) attempted to show the Egyptian side of 6 October 1973 and the events leading up to that day. Both scholars believed that the Arab attack was a success in deception rather than a failure in intelligence. The open sources that Cochran (1998) used were a little more proven to support his point of view than the declassified documents backing the argument against the IC. However, the once secret evidence that substantiates the claim against the policy makers was stronger than both Cochran (1998) and Sheffy’s (2006) data. Nonetheless, their evidence supporting the deceiver’s fault perhaps could have helped those that blamed the IC and policy makers to see that deception was also a factor for the successful surprise attack (See Chart 3). Either way, both author’s points of view may have changed to those who believed that there were multiple parties to blame for this intelligence failure and strategic surprise.
Those that chose to sustain the view that multiple parties were involved attempted to utilize open source data similar to the evidence used in the other articles. Richardson (1991), Aboul-Enein (2003), and Lord (2012) all could have profited from using the declassified material (See Chart 4). Aboul-Enein, had strong evidence supporting the deceiver’s side of the story. Lord (2012) did the best job at supporting the argument made against policy makers. However, the one author that blamed all parties, Richardson (1991), had the weakest evidence supporting his theory. Despite Richardson’s (1991) weak scores, he had the right idea that all the other authors should have followed in blaming all three parties for Israel’s ill prepared state on 6 October.
Final Considerations and Recommendations

In lieu of all the evidence presented when putting the once classified material together with the open sources presented in the articles, this paper is able to make some other analyses related to the main question answered. While sifting through the plethora of information provided by those scholars reviewed, it is vital to note that the majority of the used data came from Hebrew and Arabic sources. As time has passed since the Yom Kippur War, many points of view have been brought to light through interviews and writings of those that were first hand witnesses to the events in Israel and Egypt. If this paper had had access to that evidence and been able to read Hebrew and Arabic, then it may have significantly enhanced the research of this paper. The open sources reviewed in this paper revealed much that cannot be found within the declassified documents, especially those from the CIA’s website. Unfortunately, it appears that in the days leading up to the war, Israel did not communicate much of its intelligence to the
U.S. IC and policy makers. The reasons for the lack of communication between the two nations can lead to another vital point that must be made.

In Dahl’s (2004) thesis he discussed three main groups that are involved when it comes to placing blame for intelligence failures and strategic surprise. However, this paper has discovered two additional groups that can be added to the mix, other nations and those that are at the highest leadership positions of the IC, such as the DMI of Israel and the DCI of the United States. As witnessed in the once secret documents from 6 October 1973, the U.S. had no idea who had initiated the hostilities on the front lines of the Suez Canal when the war first began. Policy makers and intelligence leaders discussed assumptions, one of which was that Israel had preemptively attacked. However, Prime Minister Meir had promised the U.S. that she would do no such thing. This was, in fact, the case since this seemed to be one of the reasons that Israel was so ill prepared for the Arab’s assault, and why the United States can be seen as one of the factors for the success of the Arab’s attack. Israel received a good amount of military, economic and intelligence aid from the U.S., giving the United States a lot of influence over many political decisions that Israeli leaders made. This was a major contributor for Israel not pushing reinforcements to the front lines earlier than they did. Prime Minister Meir did not want any assumptions on the United States’ part that Israel had initiated hostilities, and was a part of the reason why Israeli leadership put off deploying their reserve forces.

A second group that can be created after looking over the material researched in this paper is those leaders of the IC, like DMI Zeira. It has been displayed in this paper that Zeira’s role in the intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War was somewhat ambiguous. Should he have been grouped with the IC or the policy makers? It seems as though the answer to this question is neither. Zeira was an entity in and of himself. As he received reports from his
subordinates contradicting his views that an Egyptian assault was low, he neglected to share that information with policy makers, influencing their decisions. There’s also the fact he didn’t follow through with orders that he received from Israeli national leaders. He was prompted to use intelligence systems days prior to the attack hoping to gain valuable information and did not pass those commands to the officers under him, as he thought there was no need for such devices.

Ultimately, five separate groups can share the blame for the intelligence failure and strategic surprise of the Yom Kippur war; Israel’s IC, DMI Zeira, Israeli policy makers, the Arabs, and the United States. Each played a part in leading to Israel’s ill preparedness for the surprise attack of Syria and Egypt. However, it was only through the combined picture that the evidence from both once classified and open sources provided that these conclusions could have been derived. In the future, classified documents will continue to be released and will add more pieces to the puzzle. As time passes, more research can be put into that information, especially as it pertains to secret Israeli documents outside the Agranat Commission. More research can also be done as data is revealed from hidden Arabic documents. As far as investigating intelligence failures and strategic surprises in general, this research project has revealed that waiting for classified information to be released is just as beneficial to finding who is to blame for those mistakes. Also, as information comes out, those events must constantly be revisited to come to the proper conclusions of who is responsible.
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APPENDIX 1

TABLE 1.1 Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Referenced Material</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Theory Supported</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Interim Report of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, Jerusalem, 1 April 1974.</td>
<td>The responsibility for these mistakes is attributed by the Commission primarily to the Director of Military Intelligence and his principal assistant who heads the research department, the only body in the country which deals with intelligence evaluation. These officers failed in that the warning they gave to the IDF was totally inadequate. At 4:30 on the morning of October 6, the Director of Military Intelligence announced, on the basis of new evidence, that the enemy would attack on both fronts at 18:00. This short warning did not permit an orderly mobilization of the reserves in accordance with the established timetables and procedures. The additional mistake of four hours concerning the actual timing of the attack further impaired the preparedness of the standing forces at the front and the deployment of the reserves (Schlaim 1976, p. 352).</td>
<td>IC/Policy Maker</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Interim Report of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, Jerusalem, 1 April 1974.</td>
<td>The Commission indicates three reasons for the error of those charged with evaluation. First, their stubborn adherence to &quot;the conception,&quot; resting on two assumptions: (a) Egypt would not go to war until she was able to stage deep air strikes into Israel, particularly against her major military airfields, in order to neutralize Israel's Air Force; (b) Syria would not launch a full-scale war against Israel unless Egypt was in the struggle too. This conception may have been correct at the time it was formulated, but its first and crucial part was not reassessed in the light of political and military changes in the area. Second, the Director of Military Intelligence had guaranteed that his department would give sufficient advance warning of such an all-out attack to permit the orderly call-up of the reserves. This promise became the firm foundation of the</td>
<td>IC/Policy Maker</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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IDF's defense plans. The Commission tersely observes that it found no grounds for such a definitive guarantee. Third, during the days that preceded the war, the research department possessed considerable information about threatening enemy moves which were supplied by the intelligence and other agencies. But the Director of Military Intelligence and his assistants did not correctly evaluate the warning this information contained because of their doctrinaire adherence to "the conception" and their willingness to explain away the enemy's deployment at the front lines-although it was unprecedented in its scale and direction-as evidence of a defensive move in Syria and a multidivision exercise in Egypt (Schlaim 1976, p. 352).

| 3 | Interim Report of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, Jerusalem, 1 April 1974. | The Military Intelligence's belief in the correctness of its evaluation did not begin to falter until the morning of October 5, when a particularly clear piece of evidence was difficult to reconcile with the assumption of a harmless exercise and defensive maneuver. Even then, the right conclusion was not drawn and the chances of war were given in the military jargon as "low probability" and even as lower than low. It was on the basis of this confidence that Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan concluded that full mobilization was not yet necessary, and the Chief of Staff merely placed the standing army on full alert. Only at the dawn of Yom Kippur, after receiving an additional piece of clear-cut information, did the Director conclude that war would break out that very day (Schlaim 1976, p. 353). | IC | 4 |

| 4 | Interim Report of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry, Jerusalem, 1 April 1974. | The Agranat Commission's separate recommendations for dealing with the intelligence personnel shed further light on the causes of what has come to be known in Israel as "the breakdown." Major-General Eliyahu Zeira, the Director of Military Intelligence, had only been at his post for one year before the war and had found established patterns of work. But he adopted "the conception" whose rigidity destroyed the openness required in confronting inflowing information" (Schlaim 1976, p. 353). | Policy Maker | 2 |
With Lt. Col. Yonah Bendman, the head of the Egypt branch in the research department, the belief in "the conception" reached its peak. This is evident from a report he issued on October 5, containing a long list of offensive Egyptian preparations. His conclusion was that, although the deployment showed apparent signs of offensive intent, no change had taken place in the Egyptian view of the balance of power between them and the IDF, and that consequently the likelihood that they intended to renew the war was low (Schlaim 1976, p. 353).

Military Intelligence actually suppressed views contradicting its senior officers' unconcern. On October 1, a young intelligence officer, Lieutenant Benjamin Siman-Tov, presented a startling document entitled "Movement in the Egyptian Army-the possibility of resumption of hostilities." This document summarized and analyzed the information concerning the build-up across the Suez Canal. On October 3, Siman-Tov presented a second and more detailed report. In these two reports he pointed to a number of important facts that could not be squared with the view of the Egyptian moves as an exercise. On the basis of these facts the Lieutenant gave his evaluation that the exercise camouflaged the final phases of preparation for all-out war. Siman-Tov's reports got no further than the senior intelligence officer in the Southern Command, Lt. Col. David Gedaliah. Gedaliah's reports to GHQ in Tel-Aviv contained no trace of Siman-Tov's dissenting conclusions. He had "erased" the penetrating questions which were apt to arouse doubts about the nonoffensive intentions of the Egyptians because "they stood in contradiction to Headquarters' evaluation that an exercise was taking place in Egypt." His thinking, the Commission concludes, was trapped in a vicious circle. He did not fulfill his duty as an intelligence officer to treat every item of information and every evaluation without prejudice. His conduct was particularly reprehensible because the evidence of a picture taken by a reconnaissance flight on October 4, which showed an alarming
reinforcement of the Egyptian forces, should have assumed a special significance in the light of Siman-Tov's evaluation (Schlaim 1976, p. 353-354).


Pressures for conformity operate not only within a professional group but also between professional groups. This at any rate is suggested by the interactions between Israeli and American intelligence agencies in the period preceding the October War. As early as May 1973, the CIA and the State Department's own Intelligence and Research Bureau gave the American Government a generalized warning that war in the Middle East was coming "soon." This estimate was supported by information which came in during September from America's excellent monitoring system with its highly secret base in southern Iran and its SAMOS satellites. The Israeli Intelligence was alerted, but dismissed the forecasts of war; in turn, the American intelligence community's evaluation of the extensive indicators that had been picked up was heavily influenced by the opinion of its Israeli opposite number. Dr. Kissinger has revealed that "We asked our intelligence, as well as the Israeli intelligence, on three separate occasions during the week prior to the outbreak of hostilities to give us their assessment of what might happen. There was the unanimous view that hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of it happening." Questioned about why U.S. intelligence miscalculated the intentions of the Arabs, he added: "Surprise would never be possible if there were no misjudgments of intentions. And obviously the people most concerned, with the reputation of the best intelligence service in the area, were also surprised, and they have the principal problem of answering the question which you put to me" (Schlaim 1976, p. 360-361).

TOTAL SCORE: 23
AVERAGE SCORE: 3.3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>The Commission of Inquiry - The Yom Kippur War, An Additional Partial Report: Reasoning and Complement to the Partial Report of April 1, 1974, 7 volumes, Jerusalem: 1974, Vol. 1 (hereafter Agranat, Vol.1) p.71 (Hebrew). Aryeh Braun, Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War, Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1992, pp.21-2 (Hebrew)</td>
<td>Israel's intelligence agencies, primarily Military Intelligence (AMAN), closely followed these developments and provided their consumers with precise reports on Arab growing capability to attack. In addition, Israel obtained at least 11 strategic warnings, informing that the increasing military preparations near its borders were not geared to defensive needs (Syria) or exercise (Egypt), but were intended for war. Nevertheless, on the day before the war started DMI Zeira told Meir: 'We still see as highly probable the possibility that the Egyptian and the Syrian state of alert derives from fear from us, and as slightly probable that the real intention of Egypt and Syria is to carry out hostile acts on a limited scale. . . . [We estimate the option off crossing the Canal at the lowest probability .... Neither Egypt nor Syria are optimistic with regard to their possible military success, if they make a large-scale attempt, especially because of their air inferiority' (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 12).</td>
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<td>Zeira's evidence, Agranat, Vol. 1, p.85.</td>
<td>Israel had no concrete information about Sadat's principal decisions to go to war. It nevertheless gained some information on the basis of which 'it could be concluded that already in early 1973 a change took place in the position of the Egyptian government which reached the conclusion that in its fight against Israel Egypt would have to fight with the available military means' (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 12-13).</td>
<td>IC</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Eli Zeira, The October 73 War: Myth Against Reality, Tel Aviv: Yedi'ot Ahronot, 1993, p.68-9, 210 (Hebrew).</td>
<td>AMAN's analysts, however, were not sensitive enough to assess that such a change had occurred. They were more familiar with Egypt's and Syria's war plans. In mid-April 1972 AMAN provided its consumers with a 40-page detailed report with maps of the Egyptian war plan, including the</td>
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goals of the Egyptian offensive, the planned array of the seven divisions scheduled to take part in the invasion, the crossing zones of each of the five infantry divisions projected to cross first, and the location of the ten crossing bridges (two for each division) that were to be thrown over the Suez Canal. According to Zeira, the only significant operational change in October 1973 was that one brigade crossed the Canal a few miles from where it was predicted to cross according to AMAN's 1972 report. In addition to providing Egypt's war plan, AMAN obtained and distributed the Syrian war plan as well about six months before the war (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 13).


Israel was well aware of Egypt's need to be able to counter IAF deep penetration raids. This stemmed not only from the logic of the situation but from information from a Mossad human source with a good accessibility to Egyptian decision-makers. The information provided by him, years before the war started, served as the basis for AMAN's estimation that Egypt and Syria would not be ready for war before 1975. According to this source Sadat believed that politically Egypt and Syria should initiate a war if the diplomatic efforts to move Israel back to the 1967 borders according to UN resolution 242 failed. Militarily, the necessary condition was that Egypt receive advanced fighter squadrons capable of attacking Israel's hinterland, and Scud missiles, which would enable Egypt to deter Israel from attacking Arab strategic targets. Thus was born, in 1971, the first component of what would later become known as the 'conception'. Its second component was the estimate that Syria saw itself as being unable to launch a war against Israel alone. On this basis, AMAN's analysts assessed in January 1973 that war was unlikely at least until 1975 (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 13).
In April 1973 the agency reported that 18 Libyan Mirage and 16 Iraqi Hunter attack-fighters had arrived in Egypt, and that others, from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were scheduled to arrive. But DMI Zeira estimated that objectively this made no significant change in the Egyptian-Israeli balance of military capabilities though, as he put it, the Egyptians might have viewed it differently. Shortly after the establishment of the Egyptian Scud brigade, AMAN reported on this development, and that its commanding officers were, for the time being, Soviet (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 13).

In mid-September Israel received its first concrete warning about a coming war. It came from a good source, probably human intelligence (Humint), informing that Sadat had decided to initiate a war at the end of 1973 and that Asad was informed of this decision and promised to attack Israel simultaneously on the Golan Heights. According to this piece of information, the Syrian president made his decision after Soviet advisers promised him that if Egypt and Syria attacked Israel simultaneously, the Syrian army would completely occupy the Golan Heights in 36 hours. As far as is known, the warning did not turn any red light in AMAN's corridors (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 13-14).

After 13 September, when 13 Syrian MiG-21s were shot down in a large-scale air battle, AMAN's prime explanation for the increase in war readiness was Syrian need to take revenge for its air losses, or fear of greater escalation. In the weeks that followed the Syrian war preparation continued. Air photographs taken on a sortie on 23 September showed that...

the Syrian army was fully deployed in its first line of defence and that its tank reserves, artillery, and infantry divisions had been advanced to the rear of this line. AMAN reported these findings a day later. This led the Chief of Northern Command, Major-General Yitzhak Hofi, to conclude that the present Syrian array already left no room for additional EW indicators. In the following days Israel received four warnings that Syria's preparations were for a war. The first came on 25 September. King Hussein of Jordan, accompanied by Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifai, arrived in Israel in his helicopter and met with Prime Minister Golda Meir upon his urgent request. According to the protocol of the talk, Hussein told Meir: 'From a very sensitive source in Syria, from which we received information in the past and passed it on ... all the [Syrian] units which were scheduled to be in training have now, for more or less the last two days, been in positions for a pre-attack .... This includes their aircraft, their missiles, and everything else. . . . The Syrians are in prejump positions.' Meir asked: 'Is it possible that the Syrians will start something without complete cooperation with the Egyptians?' The king answered: 'I don't think so. I think they are cooperating.' Following the meeting Meir immediately called Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan, who asked Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General David Elazar and DMI Zeira to evaluate this warning. He came back with a calming response, and Meir left for a trip abroad the morning after (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 14).

This calming response did not reflect, however, a consensus in AMAN's Research Branch. The head of the Jordanian section, Lieutenant-Colonel Zusia Kaniazer, who ex officio was aware of the Hussein-Meir meeting, reported its content through unofficial channels to the head of the Syrian section, IC 5
Ahronot, 29 Sept. 1993; Ze'ev Schiff, 'Was There a Warning?' Ha'aretz, 12 June 1998; an interview with Lieutenant-Colonel (retd.) Aviezer Ya'ari, 10 August 1998. According to Zeira (p.95), this was the first time the king gave concrete warning of a coming war. Braun (p.24) notes that a senior person, implying the king, warned Israel in late April 1973 of military movements from various Arab states to Egypt. According to this warning, this concentration of forces in Egypt made a military confrontation in the near future unavoidable (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 32 under NOTES).

Lieutenant-Colonel Aviezer Ya'ari. In comparison to other officers in their branch, these two officers estimated the warning to be of a more alarming nature. Ya'ari, who had already a reputation of being an 'alarmist' about Syrian military preparations, discovered that significant information, directly relevant to his ability to provide an effective warning, was not delivered to him in official channels. When he complained about it to the head of the Research Branch, Brigadier-General Aryeh Shalev, the latter admitted that regarding certain sensitive information this was and would remain the case. Shalev also rebuked Kaniazer for passing on, without authority, sensitive information to Ya'ari (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 15).

The second warning came on 28 September from a 'good source' which reported that Syrian ground forces were on a fifty percent alert and their air force and ground forces had taken up combat positions. The source quoted many Syrian officers who believed 'that this time it will be a war and not just a clash'. Nevertheless, the source also gave indications that Syria was not yet ready for war. A third warning came on the night of 29-30 September from very reliable US intelligence sources, which warned Israel that as of the end of September a Syrian offensive aimed at occupying the Golan Heights could be expected. According to the sources, which also described the essence of the Syrian attack plan, the
Syrian army had already started its battle procedure. Finally, at the end of September the CIA warned Prime Minister Meir and Defence Minister Dayan of a coming war. The American warning, which was delivered through the Mossad, was based on information similar to the information Meir received in her meeting with King Hussein. It seems that the king gave the same warning to the CIA, which delivered it to Israel

\[Bar-Joseph\ 1999,\ p.\ 15\]

A number of intelligence and military officers, some EW indicators sufficed to conclude that Syria had prepared a military initiative. Thus, the IDF's Deputy Chief of Staff, Major-General Yisrael Tal, regarded the forward deployment of the bridging tanks units and the surface-to-air batteries as clear indicators of Syrian offensive intentions. Similarly Lieutenant-Colonel Shabtai Brill, who in 1973 served in AMAN's main signal intelligence (Sigint) unit, concluded that the advancement of the SU-7 aircraft to a front airbase meant that the Syrian and the Egyptian military preparations were for war. But the most significant incident in which warning signals were translated into a concrete alert took place on the night between 30 September and 1 October, following a telephone call Lieutenant-Colonel Ya'ari received from the head of the Egyptian section in the Research Department, Lieutenant-Colonel Yona Bandman. Bandman informed Ya'ari that according to a warning received earlier that night, war would start on 1 October. He added that the information was analyzed and found to be false. Nevertheless, coming on the background of earlier warnings and being the first to link Syrian war preparations to Egyptian intention to launch war, Ya'ari decided to take this warning more seriously. He called the Intelligence Officer of Northern Command, Lieutenant-Colonel Hagai Mann, and suggested that the Command's state of alert be raised. This was done. In the morning, after
his initiative became known to his commanders and war did not break out, Ya'ari was rebuked by Shalev for expressing outside the Research Branch an estimate that contradicted the Branch's official assessment. The same day, on the background of calming estimates of AMAN's high echelons, the increased state of alert of the Northern Command was called off (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 16-17).

11 Agranat, Vol.1, p.79 Consequently, then, AMAN's final report, which was distributed on Friday noon, described in detail the many indications of Syrian war preparations. But at the end of this long list it nevertheless said that, 'there is no change in our evaluation that Syrian moves derive from apprehension, which has increased during the last day, of an Israeli action. The probability of an independent Syrian action (without Egypt) remains low' (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 17).

12 Agranat, Vol.2, p.309; Yoel Ben-Porat, Neila: Locked-On, Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1991 (Hebrew), pp.48-50; Aryeh Braun, Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War, Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1992, pp.44-6 (Hebrew) Vol.1, pp.159, 174 On the night of 30 September-1 October, Israel received the first of a series of concrete warnings of Egypt's intention to go to war. A good Mossad Humint source reported that the large-scale Egyptian crossing exercise that started on 30 September would on 1 October become a real crossing of the Canal with the Syrians joining in. As recalled, the warning triggered a temporal raise in the state of alert of the Northern Command. Similarly, it brought Major-General Shmuel Gonen, the head of Southern Command, who received this warning through unofficial channels, to call off leave in his command. Colonel Yoel Ben-Porat, the commander of AMAN's Sigint unit, also decided to put his unit on a war readiness state of alert. But AMAN's dominant interpretation of the situation was very different. DMI Zeira delayed relaying the warning to Chief of Staff Elazar and Minister of Defence Dayan. He told Elazar on the morning of 1 October that after a night discussion with his analysts it was
concluded that war would not break on 1 October and that in order to let the Chief of Staff have a night's sleep he did not convey his conclusions to him. Elazar immediately told Dayan about this message. While Dayan seemed to have been disturbed by Zeira's conduct he avoided taking concrete measures against him (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 18).

13 Agranat, Vol.1, p.12. AMAN's interpretation of the situation was expressed in a report of 30 September which stated that: A large-scale combined arms headquarters exercise for the occupation of Sinai [Tahrir 41] is to be held between 1 and 7 October. It appears that the headquarters of the air, air-defence, and naval arms, as well as the field armies, divisions, and special forces, will participate. Because of the exercise the level of readiness will rise (as of 1 October) to the highest in the air force and all participating units, and leaves are cancelled. . . . From the information about the expected exercise and the call up of reserve soldiers for a limited time, it becomes apparent that the advancement of forces and other preparations which are taking place or are expected in the coming days, such as completion of fortifications, mobilization of civilian fishing boats, and checking of operational readiness of the units, which could be seen as alarmist, are connected only to the exercise (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 18).

14 Aryeh Braun, Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War, Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1992, p.49 (Hebrew) The Agranat Commission concluded that the Mossad's director, Zvi Zamir, should have informed Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir of this warning, which he did not. A day later, a Mossad source warned, probably in continuation of his report of two days earlier, that (a) there was an intention to attack Israel; (b) the Egyptian army was in full state of alert; and (c) the operation would start as an exercise, but according to all indications would transform into a real attack. But the warnings fell on deaf ears. Estimating Egypt as being incapable for the time being of overcoming its vulnerability to Israeli deep penetration raids, 'Tahrir 41' served as AMAN's explanation for the war.
preparations along the Suez Canal. Thus, Brigadier-General Aryeh Shalev, head of AMAN's Research Department, told Prime Minister Meir on 3 October: According . . . to the best of my knowledge and opinion . . . on the basis of a lot of material we have from recent days - Egypt still believes that it cannot go to war .... This [Shalev's estimate] derives from the possibility of knowing, and impressions of things they themselves think, that the possibility of a joint Egyptian-Syrian war does not seem to me as probable. Since there is no change in their estimate of the [IDF] forces in Sinai, that [these forces] can go on fighting in Egypt, I reach the conclusion that this is merely an exercise. On the 10th of the month they are already releasing their reserve forces (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 19-20).

Similarly, even after the interpretation of the air photographs, which showed a dramatic increase in Egyptian war preparedness along the Canal, AMAN's estimation did not change. Paragraph 40 in the agency's summary of the situation some 24 hours before war started said: 'Though the mere emergency setting along the Canal front implies, allegedly, indicators for aggressive action, to the best of our knowledge there is no change in the Egyptians' evaluation of their balance of forces with the IDF. Hence, the probability that the Egyptians intend to renew fire is low' (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 20).

The evacuation of Soviet ships was considered in AMAN's reports of 5 October as 'certainly an extraordinary move'. Similarly Zeira told Golda Meir and her cabinet ministers 'such a move took place only once, when there was a fear that the Egyptians might implement what they defined as "the year of subduing". It was in 1971: an act that signifies the USSR's...
reservations about an Egyptian attack.' In a discussion earlier that day he expressed, for the first time, doubts with regard to the conception's validity. He told Dayan: 'Though in the fundamental assessment I do not see a change, I do not see either Egypt or Syria attacking, despite the Russian action, but this gives me doubt.' Perhaps in light of this doubt, Zeira added during Friday morning's discussions that he was waiting for additional information, which might shed some light on the Soviet decision (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 21).


On 5 October at about 5:00pm, about 21 hours before 'H' hour, AMAN's Sigint unit obtained information, from a good source, which said: 'We have learned that Syria has decided to evacuate the Soviet experts and that Soviet planes have started flying them from Damascus to Moscow'. This, according to the message, was the outcome of a 'Syrian and Egyptian intention to launch war against Israel'. The message triggered Ben-Porat, the commander of the Sigint unit, to urgently call the head of AMAN's Research Department, and to read him the top secret information on an unsecured telephone line. It was telexed to the department at 5:15pm. According to the standard operational procedure the duty officer of the Research Branch drafted an emergency report to be immediately disseminated to political and military consumers according to a dissemination list. Before sending it, however, he consulted his direct superior who advised him to consult the department's head. Shalev directed him to consult DMI Zeira, who decided to delay the distribution of this report. It was finally disseminated on Saturday only a few hours before hostilities broke out, when it had already lost its warning value (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 21).

18 Yoel Ben-Porat, Neila: Locked-On, Tel

As Chief of Staff David Elazar said three months after the war: 'On Friday the 5 October I was in my office until
9:00pm and the whole GHQ staff was in the office until about 7:00pm. We could do everything. I went home at 9:00pm thinking to myself that everything that had to be done according to the intelligence information was done, not knowing that four hours earlier, war information arrived in the floor above me [in AMAN's Research Department] and nobody showed it to me .... Had I seen the information at 5:00, 5:30, 6:00 pm - I would have issued a mobilization order for the reserve army. Because we were already under grade C state of alert since the morning, the mobilization offices were opened. Everything could have been done fast. The cabinet ended its Friday meeting deciding that if mobilization of the reserve army was required, I and the Minister of Defence had the authority to do it - without additional cabinet approval. Had we done so on Friday at 6:00pm, the reserve units of the Northern Command would have reached the front line before the beginning of the war, and the Syrians could not have broken through the front. The reserve forces of the Southern Command would not have arrived [on time], but at least they could have moved to the front in an orderly fashion and not a tank here and there, like crazy, unequipped and not on tank transporters. Moreover, I would have had a whole night for the regular army. . . .

According to the 'Dovecote' plan [the defence of the Canal line by the regular army] that was exercised a few times, I would have flown a paratroop brigade to the [Bar-Lev] strongholds and we would have taken them all, including the empty ones. Thirteen artillery batteries could have been deployed on the Canal. The regular division of Sinai would have been deployed at the front. The Egyptians would not have crossed the Canal. Perhaps they could have succeeded in the gaps, between the strongholds, but not along the whole line, without casualties and as if they were on parade (Bar-
Disuse of special means of collection and lying to superiors about it must have had a similarly devastating effect. As is known today, as part of AMAN's war preparations, over the years the agency had built up certain means of intelligence collection to be used only in emergency situations. Israeli policy makers, who knew of the existence of these special means, tended to view them as a sort of a national insurance policy. As tension before the war grew high, Zeira's superiors questioned him about the operational status of these means and Zeira always told them that AMAN was using all its means of intelligence collection. Zeira, however, did not tell his bosses the truth. Lieutenant-General Ehud Barak, the IDF Chief of Staff between 1991 and 1995, confirmed in 1993 that 'until 5 or 6 October the intelligence community did not use all the sources it could have used in order to ask whether there would or there would not be war'. The commander of AMAN's Collection Department in 1973, Colonel Menahem Digli, and the commander of the agency's Sigint Unit, Colonel Yoel Ben-Porat, testified similarly. Furthermore, each of them asked Zeira, on several occasions since 1 October, to activate these special means. Each time he refused, and on Friday, 5 October at 5:00pm such means had still not been activated. The Agranat Commission concluded that Dayan's 'confidence in AMAN's evaluation [that war was unlikely] increased after the chief of AMAN answered on 5 October that he was using all available means to collect all possible information and warnings'. The Chief of Staff said after the war: 'Before the war, when I asked Eli [Zeira] whether, when he said "low probability", he was relying also on these [special] means, his answer was positive .... This, of course,
confused me even more - since I knew the capability [of these means]; and if they did not provide information on war, it was a sign that everything was all right. Now I understand that I was not told the truth’ (Bar-Joseph 1999, p. 30-31).

TOTAL SCORE: 85
AVERAGE SCORE: 4.5

## APPENDIX 2

### TABLE 2.1 Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise

<table>
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Referenced Material</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Theory Supported</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Time (1973, 30 July). Interview with Moshe Dayan, p. 13.</td>
<td><em>In April and May 1973, after a number of warnings, Israel’s political-military elite (mainly Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Chief of Staff David Elazar) reached the conclusion that Egypt was likely to launch a war in the coming months. In contrast, AMAN’s official estimate, professed by Zeira and Bandman, was that the likelihood of Egypt doing so remained low. As time passed, the validity of this assessment became evident, and policymakers such as Dayan—who in May ordered the IDF to prepare for a war in the summer—assessed in July that no war would take place within the next decade (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 82).</em></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Bar-Joseph, U. (2001). The watchman fell asleep: The surprise of Yom Kippur and its sources. Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan.</td>
<td><em>This tendency was particularly apparent when it came to the traditional conception of Egypt’s military weakness. That conception (in force since the end of the March 1969–August 1970 War of Attrition along the Suez Canal front) stated that without a fighter force capable of attacking Israeli air bases, and without surface-to-surface missiles with a sufficient range to reach Israel proper (for deterrence purposes), Egypt would avoid a major military initiative. Such conditions were not to be met for years. Consequently, Zeira and Bandman assessed, at least since entering office, that the likelihood of an Egyptian attempt to cross the Suez Canal was close to zero. In mid-September 1973 they assessed that during the next 5</em></td>
<td>Policy Maker</td>
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years, the Egyptians were unlikely to estimate “that they have the capability to occupy the Sinai desert or a part of it, since this means an overall confrontation with Israel” (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 83).

Zeira and Bandman’s unqualified adherence to the traditional conception stands in stark contrast to the views of other experts who recognized the feasibility of an Egyptian offensive under some conditions. Dayan, who understood well that Anwar Sadat was under growing political pressure as long as the “no war, no peace” situation persisted, believed (until summer 1973) that the Egyptian leader might take military measures to alter the status quo. Major-General Aharon Yariv, Zeira’s predecessor, assessed in mid-1972 that the present situation was likely to last until mid-1973. Then it was possible that Sadat would perceive a limited military option as feasible. The head of the Mossad, Zvi Zamir, estimated in April 1973 that the Egyptian army had bridged many of the gaps that prevented it from launching a war and was now more capable than ever before to take such action. And the chief of staff David Elazar estimated in August 1972 that, despite the expulsion of the Soviet personnel from Egypt, continuation of the status quo would increase Sadat’s frustration and that during 1973 he might initiate a war (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 83-84).

4 Interview with Yona Bandman, Lieutenant-Colonel (Res.), head of branch 6 in AMAN’s research division (17 August 1998). Conducted by Uri Bar-Joseph, Tel Aviv, Israel. Agranat (investigation committee, [Bandman] regarded providing consumers with all courses of action available to the enemy as unprofessional, and he thought that an intelligence advisor’s duty is to provide the consumer with the clearest possible estimate (interview with Bandman, 1998). Consistent with this belief, he insisted on 5 October 1973—24 hours before the war started—on adding his

Policy Maker 3 5
| 5 | Agranat (investigation committee, Yom Kippur war) (1975). The report of the Agranat commission. Tel Aviv: Am Oved. p. 157 | Also consistent with that need was [Bandman and Zeira's] tendency to avoid or suppress information at odds with their own assessment. The most critical instance in which Zeira behaved this way took place a mere 20 hours before the war broke out, when he decided to delay the dissemination of information about Soviet knowledge that Egypt and Syria intended to launch a war. Explaining this decision, he told the members of the Agranat investigative commission: I saw no reason to alert the chief of staff at 11:00 PM to tell him that there is such a message, and to add what we wrote later, that the source was not our most reliable one and that there were mistakes. . . . And it should be remembered that [when making the decision] I knew and the chief of staff knew that the whole IDF is at the highest state of alert. . . . This was how I felt that night, and I assume that the chief of staff felt similarly. . . . So the chief of staff would have seen it and, I assume, would have said: fine. . . . But the whole army stands ready? Fine (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 85-86). | Policy Maker | 5 |
| 6 | Ben-Porat, Y. (1991). Neila: Locked-on. Tel Aviv: Edanim. | When making this decision, Zeira was undoubtedly aware of the fact that in a series of discussions earlier that day the chief of staff repeatedly said that after putting the regular army on the highest state of alert, all he needed now was one more war indicator in order to request the | Policy Maker | 4 |
mobilization of the reserve army. By deciding to hold this warning from Elazar, Zeira must have realized that he took a chief of staff’s decision. This, of course, was far beyond the realm of his professional discretion by most standards. The chief of staff, who learned about this warning only after the end of the war, maintained that had he received it when it arrived, he would have taken certain measures that would have changed the course of the war (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 86).

| 7 | Bar-Joseph, U. (2001). The watchman fell asleep: The surprise of Yom Kippur and its sources. Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan. | Although denying his immediate superiors critical information at the most critical moments was, by itself, very peculiar, another series of decisions derived from Zeira’s unusual perception of his professional duties was even more serious. Five or six days before the war started the chief asked Zeira if all of AMAN’s means of collection were operating. A day before the war started the minister of defense asked him the same question. The day before the war started, the chief of staff and minister of defense asked Zeira if all of AMAN’s means of collection were operating. Senior officers in AMAN—specifically the heads of the collection and research departments and the commander of the SIGINT unit—asked him to activate these means. What all of them had in mind were certain means—sometimes referred to as “Israel’s national insurance policy”—which were to be operated at times of tension and were likely to collect high-quality warning indicators in case Egypt or Syria intended to launch an attack. Zeira led his superiors to understand that the “special means” were indeed activated. But in reality, believing that war was unlikely, he avoided ordering their operation (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 86). | Policy Maker | 5 |

| 8 | Bar-Joseph, U. (2001). The Bandman did not have to contend with hard evidence | | Policy Maker | 5 |
watchman fell asleep: The surprise of Yom Kippur and its sources. Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan.

Agranat (investigation committee, Yom Kippur war) (1975). The report of the Agranat commission. Tel Aviv: Am Oved. p. 405

inconsistent with his “Egyptian fears” hypothesis. But four paragraphs later, in summarizing activity on the front, he wrote in flagrant contradiction of known facts: “Routine activity was observed this morning along the Canal sector.” All the reports from Israeli observation posts along the front, however, told an opposite story: massive movements of heavy weaponry, including tanks, to positions on the front line; senior Egyptian officers’ reconnaissance of Israeli strongholds; large numbers of soldiers getting organized for some kind of action; blackout in the town of Port Said in the northern sector; and so on. “Toward the evening of Yom Kippur,” a battalion commander testified after the war, “the line became full to capacity.” By no reasonable standard could this be considered “routine activity.” Nor could it be construed as the Tahrir 41 exercise; activity in former Tahrir exercises was very different indeed from the actions of the Egyptian army in early October 1973 (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 87).

9 Interview with Yona Bandman, Lieutenant-Colonel (Res.), head of branch 6 in AMAN’s research division (17 August 1998). Conducted by Uri Bar-Joseph, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Post factum Bandman would maintain that he ranked collection sources by his own order of reliability: SIGINT and air photographs came first, then open sources, and last HUMINT sources. In the case of Yom Kippur, the best warnings in fact came from Mossad HUMINT sources, but they were never incorporated into Bandman’s reports. One cannot help but wonder whether the causal direction was actually inverse—whether Bandman ranked HUMINT sources so low because they so often contradicted his preferred conception that war was impossible (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 87-88).


In the early hours of Yom Kippur, after receiving an excellent warning from the Mossad, the chief of staff finally ordered the IDF to prepare for war that would
start at around sunset. By now, Zeira’s belief in the validity of his conception was badly shaken. And yet, even now when every piece of information clamored “war,” he was reluctant to abandon it totally. He continued casting doubt whether there would be a war, emphasized that Sadat did not need it politically, and speculated that if the Egyptians initiated hostilities they would nevertheless avoid crossing the canal, implicitly because such a move was beyond their military capabilities (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 88).

In contrast to the normative behavior in AMAN, [Zeira] refused to sign a new document assessing that war was now likely. Another officer had to produce this document. Bandman himself then prepared a new intelligence review that estimated the likelihood of war as low. He submitted it to Zeira, who, before approving its distribution, consulted his predecessor Yariv, who had arrived at his office. Yariv advised him to avoid its dissemination, and Zeira accepted the advice (Bar-Joseph 2003, p. 88).
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<td>1</td>
<td>Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 170. For a detailed analysis of the causes for the Israeli surprise in October 1973, see pages 81-189, 235-51.</td>
<td>This surprise was the outcome of the failure by Military Intelligence (AMAN), Israel's sole national intelligence estimator in 1973, to provide, on the eve of the war, a warning that war was highly likely. Despite the fact that AMAN had an almost-perfect picture of the deployment of the Egyptian and Syrian armies along the border with Israel, as well as numerous other war indications and information obtained from reliable Arab sources (including King Hussein of Jordan) that Egypt and Syria planned an attack, AMAN's experts estimated twenty-four hours before the outbreak of the war that &quot;the probability that the Egyptians intend to renew fighting is low .... [and] the probability of a Syrian independent (without Egypt) action remains low.&quot; On the basis of this estimate the Chief of Staff avoided demanding the mobilization of the reserve army and additional moves. He changed his mind only ten hours before firing commenced, after he received a warning from the head of the Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks (the Mossad), Major General (Res.) Zvi Zamir, who had been informed in a meeting with a top Egyptian source that war would start on 6 October. Zamir's source was Dr. Ashraf Marwan, a close advisor of President Anwar Sadat and a son-in-law of the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser (Bar-Joseph 2008, p. 511).</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, 87-89,96-97, 114-15.</td>
<td>Israel had been in possession of the plan for a Syrian offensive since April 1973. An updated version of the plan was delivered during a secret meeting between King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Golda Meir on the evening of 25 September. On 30 September, the U.S.</td>
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Central Intelligence Agency provided Israel with the same plan. It was distributed by AMAN on 2 October, together with an estimate that war was unlikely (Bar-Joseph 2008, p. 511).

Table 2.3 *Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure*

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<td>1</td>
<td>Bar-Joseph, <em>The Watchman Fell Asleep</em>; Samuel M. Katz, <em>Soldier Spies</em></td>
<td>While the dispersion of information can be a problem, so can the excessive concentration of information. One of the factors in Israel’s intelligence failure in 1973 was the fact that the directorate of military intelligence (AMAN) held a monopoly on the Israeli intelligence estimate. As a result, warnings that were provided by the Mossad did not receive the attention they deserved. Israel acknowledged the problem after the war, restructured its intelligence system, and distributed responsibility to the Mossad, the Foreign Office, and to the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) local commands (Bar-Joseph 2009, p. 469).</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski, “Intelligence Failure and the Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise,” <em>Political Psychology</em> 24 (March 2003): 75–99;</td>
<td>Organizational culture is also important. Among other things, it shapes the extent of the free flow of information, which provides an atmosphere in which intelligence officers are encouraged to question pre-existing assumptions and to ‘think outside the box.’ The managerial style of the leader of the organization also plays an important role in shaping the acquisition and dissemination of intelligence, and can interact with organizational culture. Bar-Joseph and Arie Kruglanski argue that both Lieutenant Colonel Yona Bandman, AMAN’s leading estimator for Egyptian affairs, and Major General Eli Zeira, director of military intelligence (DMI), had authoritarian styles. Their emphasis on decisiveness over debate and lack of tolerance for open and extended discussions contributed to premature cognitive closure and to the intelligence failure (Bar-Joseph 2009, p. 469).</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Bar-Joseph, <em>The Watchman Fell Asleep</em>, 50–51, 185–186; Bar-</td>
<td>In light of what is known today about the information that was available to Israel prior to the war, it is clear that</td>
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| 4 | Agranat Commission. The Agranat Report. | The second element of conventional interpretations of the 1973 intelligence failure focuses on the collective mindset of Israel’s top political, military, and intelligence echelons and their failure to adjust their beliefs in response to incoming information about the looming threat. This hypothesis was central to the report of the Agranat Commission, the only official investigation of the Yom Kippur War. The report focused on the dogmatic beliefs of DMI Eli Zeira, those of the head of AMAN’s research department, Brig. Gen. Arie Shalev, those of the head of the Egyptian branch in the research department, Lt. Col. Yona Bandman, and those of the intelligence officer of the southern command, Lt. Col. David Gdalia. Individually and collectively, they believed that Egypt... | Policy Makers/IC | 1 |
would avoid war with Israel as long as it did not have the capability to hit Israeli air force bases, and that Syria would not launch war without Egypt (Bar-Joseph 2009, p. 483).

| 5 | Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, 69–73, 162. | Israeli policymakers were aware of the possibility that Egypt might initiate a war and that Syria would join. This was the conclusion reached by Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. David Elazar, in a secret discussion they held in mid-April 1973. On the basis of this discussion, Dayan directed the IDF to prepare for war by the end of the summer. Although Dayan changed his mind and had estimated since July that war was not likely in the foreseeable future, Meir and Elazar remained concerned about this issue. On the morning of 5 October, when the dimensions of the Egyptian deployment along the front became clear, the Chief of Staff raised the state of alert of the regular forces to the highest level since 1967. He avoided two additional steps: ordering a full deployment of the regular forces for war, and demanding the mobilization of the reserve army, which, in the Israeli case, constituted about 80 percent of the IDF ground forces. The authorization to mobilize the reserve army rested with the government. In light of the already tense situation, an emergency cabinet meeting that took place at noon empowered Golda Meir and Dayan to authorize such a move (Bar-Joseph 2009, p. 484–485). | Policy Makers | 4 |

| 6 | Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, 160–161, 173–174. | At the morning meeting, as well as in the meetings at the defense minister, prime minister, cabinet, and IDF general headquarters forums that convened in its aftermath, the Chief of Staff made it clear that if he were to receive another indication for war, he would demand the | Policy Makers | 4 |
mobilization of the reserve army. He also explained that he had avoided demanding it so far since he did not believe that the Arabs could launch an attack without AMAN knowing it. As is known today, much of this confidence rested on Elazar’s familiarity with certain intelligence assets—known as the “the special means of collection or, euphemistically, as “Israel’s national security policy”—in the form of “eavesdropping devices planted in strategic military locations” in Egypt that AMAN had built prior to the war in order to obtain clear-cut indications that Egypt intended to launch an attack. The sole person who had the mandate to authorize their activation was DMI Zeira. A few days earlier, the chief of staff had asked him if these means had been activated and had received a positive answer. At a meeting with the Defense Minister on that Friday at about 9:00 am, Dayan asked if they brought any information, and Zeira said that “all was quiet.” The Chief of Staff, who participated in this meeting, heard his intelligence chief’s answer as well. What the Chief of Staff and the Defense Minister did not know was that DMI Zeira had lied to them. Since 1 October, a number of senior intelligence officers, including the commander of the agency’s collection department, the commander of the signals intelligence unit (848, later 8200), and the head of the research department, had requested Zeira to activate the means, but he had refused to do so. On 5 October, the activation of these means was raised once more in a meeting he held in the early hours of the morning. Zeira refused again. When he had told Elazar a few days earlier that these means were operational, and when he had let Dayan and Elazar think so a few hours later, he had simply lied to them. On the same day, Zeira acted similarly again.
He sat next to the chief of staff in all the meetings that took place on 5 October, and he heard Elazar saying that he was waiting for another piece of information to demand the mobilization of the reserve army. Nevertheless, he did not inform Elazar about a high-quality warning that AMAN collected at about 4:00 pm, which explained the Soviet emergency evacuation from Syria and Egypt that had been initiated about 24 hours earlier by the Kremlin’s knowledge that the Arabs planned to attack soon (Bar-Joseph 2009, p. 486).

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<th>7</th>
<th>Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski, “Intelligence Failure and the Need for Cognitive Closure.”</th>
<th>Zeira undoubtedly was quite confident that war was unlikely. He deceived his superiors not because he wanted Israel to fall victim to the Arab surprise, but because his very high level of self-assurance led him to believe that he knew better than his superiors what the Arabs planned to do (i.e., abstain from attacking) and, in addition, how Israel should react. A thorough analysis of certain features of his personality provides a more comprehensive explanation for his unique behavior (Bar-Joseph 2009, p. 485–486).</th>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep, 249.</td>
<td>The Chief of Staff, who learned only after the war that he was misled by Zeira with regard to the operational status of the special means of collection, said that this “confused me more, since I knew [the special means] capability and if there was no war information from them, it was a sign that all was in order.” The Agranat Commission concluded that Dayan’s confidence that the concept was valid and war was unlikely was strengthened after he heard from DMI Zeira on the morning of 5 October that AMAN was using all its means of collection. In addition to juridical considerations, this was the main reason for the Commission’s decision to exempt Dayan from</td>
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responsibility for the blunder. Upon hearing about the warning AMAN received on 5 October in the afternoon, the chief of staff said that had he received this information in time, he would have demanded an immediate mobilization of the reserve army and would have taken further measures to deploy the regular army for war. If these measures had been taken twenty rather than eight hours before war started, the Syrian army would not have broken the defense line in the Golan and the course of the war would have been entirely different (Bar-Joseph 2009, p. 486).

## TABLE 2.4 Confronting the Intelligence Fiasco of the Yom Kippur War

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<td>1</td>
<td>Agranat Commission, The Agranat Report (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), p. 19-20 [Hebrew]</td>
<td><em>The root of the problem, according to the Commission, was 'the stubborn adherence to what Israeli intelligence referred to as 'the conception,' according to which Egypt would only go to war if it could guarantee for itself aerial ability to attack Israel and especially Israel's main airports, in order to neutralize the Israeli Air Force.' Syria, according to 'the conception,' would attack Israel only if Egypt would attack. The Commission also concluded that the adherence to 'the conception' led Zeira, Shalev, and Bandman to explain the unprecedented Egyptian and Syrian military preparations as merely reflecting 'Syrian defense activity and a widespread Egyptian military exercise.' For that reason, AMAN's director was also &quot;excessively cautious in utilizing other intelligence tools that were at his disposal, which could have exposed important complementary information (Bar-Joseph 2012, p. 136).</em></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Yoel Ben-Porat, Neila [Locked-On] (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1991), 175 pp [Hebrew]; Arieh Shalev, Kishalon ve-hatslahah be-hatra'ah: ha'arakhat ha-modi'in likerat milhemet Yom ha-Kipurim [Success and Failure in Vigilance: The Israeli Intelligence Assessments Towards the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 2006) pp. 102-104</td>
<td><em>The Agranat Commission's conclusions received a clear and authoritative reinforcement in the book Locked On by Brigadier General (Res.) Yoel Ben-Porat, who was the commander of AMAN's SIGINT unit during the war. The book describes, for the first time, the dynamics among AMAN's senior officers in the days that preceded the war and highlights how critical warnings, some from SIGINT sources, were disregarded by Zeira, Bandman, and Shalev. The most important information in Ben-Porat's book is what he was told by the chief of staff, David Elazar. In the week preceding the war, Elazar asked Zeira twice if AMAN's special means of collection had been operated, to which Zeira replied in the affirmative. In reality, he forbade their operation. Since...</em></td>
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Elazar was aware of these means' abilities, since he believed that they were operating, and since they did not indicate a pending war, his own confidence that the Arab preparations were not for attack purposes increased (Bar-Joseph 2012, p. 137).

| 3 | Arie Braun, Mosheh Dayan be-Milhemet Yom ha-Kipurim [Mosheh Dayan and the Yom Kippur War], (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1993), pp. 45-46; Ben-Porat, pp. 65-66, 103. | Ben-Porat's book, along with a book written by Defense Minister Dayan's military aide during the war, reflects that in several critical instances, Zeira did not pass on vital warnings to the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff. A Mossad source's warning, which was received on September 30th shortly before the beginning of the Egyptian military exercise that served as a cover for war preparations—was not delivered to the Defense Minister on time. The warning conveyed that the military exercise could turn into a war... Another critical information item, which was deciphered by Ben-Porat's Unit 21 hours before the war began, detailed that the Soviet foreign ministry informed the Iraqi ambassador to Moscow that the emergency airlift to evacuate Soviets from Syria and Egypt, which the Kremlin suddenly began a day earlier, was the result of an official notice from Syria and Egypt that they intended to attack Israel. The chief of staff heard about it, for the first time, only after the war. He then said that if he had received it in time, he would have mobilized reserve troops, some of which would have reached the front in time, and also deployed the regular army for war. Under those circumstances, the war would have turned out completely different. The decision not to disseminate this information was made by AMAN's director (Bar-Joseph 2012, p. 138). |

| 4 | Zvi Zamir and Efrat Mass, Be-enayim pekuhot: rosh ha-Mosad matri'a: Ha-im Yifra'el makshivah? [With Open Eyes] (Or Yehuda: Policy Maker 5) | According to Zamir, a central cause for the intelligence failure was the distinction which existed in 1973 between the Mossad's role as a collector of intelligence information and AMAN's role as the exclusive estimator of that information. |
Zamir emphasizes that since Sadat's decision to open fire even without acquiring additional fighter-bombers and ground missiles had become known about a year before war started, Mossad's assessment was that the probability for war was high. This assessment was also based on good knowledge of the Egyptian war plans. Unlike AMAN, which continued to see the Egyptian plan to advance into the Sinai as the main war goal, Zamir listened to what Marwan told him and made it clear to the Prime Minister, already in early 1973, that at the core of Egypt's war concept was the occupation and defense of a ten kilometer territorial strip east of the Suez Canal, from which it could conduct a defensive battle against IDF counter-offensives on the basis of abundant anti-tank weaponry supported by the massive air-defense formation west of the canal. Zamir estimated that this was a reasonable plan that the Egyptians had the ability to carry out. But since the Mossad had no role in national intelligence estimations, all that Zamir could do was to tell Prime Minister Meir, who was in charge of his agency, his own personal estimates. In their regular meetings, Zamir understood that Meir did not intend to challenge AMAN's assessments, which were accepted by Defense Minister Dayan. In Zamir's meetings with Dayan, the Defense Minister made it clear that he endorsed AMAN's assessments rather than Mossad's. Under these circumstances, the chief of the Mossad found himself in a frustrating position in which his intelligence assessment had no influence on top security decisions (Bar-Joseph 2012, p. 147).

TABLE 2.5 Perception, Image Formation and Coping in the Pre-Crisis Stage of the Yom Kippur War

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<th>Theory Supported</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>H. Bartov, Dado, 48 Years and 20 Days, Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978, p.319.</td>
<td>The different hierarchies involved in the decision-making process were the intelligence, the Chief of Staff, the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister. As in every democratic country, the military is under civilian control. In Israel this means that the Defence Minister had a broad area of authority, which might be enlarged or shrunk, depending upon the power relationships between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff. As warning of an impending attack spread, an unusual decision was made in a partial cabinet meeting on 5 October according to which Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff David Elazar, would have the authority to mobilize the reserves, even without a prior cabinet decision. A decision to mobilize the reserves was made only four hours prior to the attack. The information dissemination processes, the bureaucratic processes involved and the contribution of personality characteristics due to coping processes of the leaders involved will be analyzed, to verify if some general conclusions may be arrived at (Heichal 1999, p. 202).</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>H. Bartov, Dado, 48 Years and 20 Days, Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978, p.273.</td>
<td>The political signals of Sadat did not go unnoticed and neither did the Egyptian military preparations. The Minister of Defence, however, felt that Israel should not escalate the situation. Should it come to the worst, the military was ready to execute the routine plans and there was no need to mobilize additional reserves. Thus it may be concluded that the Minister of Defence acted in a way of least possible resistance, that he did not assimilate the threat, as it was not in correspondence with his images as</td>
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to the danger to which Israel was exposed, and was disregarded until a later date. At the end of July, Dayan was quoted as saying: 'During the next ten years the borders of Israel will be stabilized according to the existing lines, and there will be no outbreak of a major war' (Heichal 1999, p. 207).

| 3 | The Jerusalem Post, 11 August 1973. Ze'ev Schiff, Earthquake in October, Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan Modan, 1974, p.12 (Hebrew). | On 10 August Dayan said: 'Our military superiority is a consequence of both the weakness of the Arabs and our strength. Their weakness depends on factors which will not easily be changed.' One should remember that on 13 September there already was a continuous movement of Soviet weaponry to Syrian ports. On 26 September during a visit at the Golan Heights Dayan remarked: 'The surface-air missile constellation on the Syrian side is higher than anything known in the whole world. Israel is cognizant of the situation' (Heichal 1999, p. 207). | Policy Makers | 2 |

<p>| 4 | Yeshayhu Ben Porat et al., Hamechdal [The Failure], Tel Aviv: Hotza'a Meyuchedet, n.d., p.18 (Hebrew). Conception, in this context, means a stereotyped way of thinking which predominates and thus hinders the creation of new images (Heichal 1999, p. 219). Ze'ev Schiff, Earthquake in October, Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan Modan, 1974, p.18-20 (Hebrew). H. Bartov, Dado, 48 Years and 20 Days, Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1978, | The Agranat report concluded that during the days preceding the war the intelligence branch (research) had enough knowledge provided to it by the collecting agencies in the state but they were not weighed correctly as the 'conception' predominated the thinking of the people. On 3 October in a partial Cabinet meeting, no one disputed the assessment of the military intelligence that the likelihood of war was low. According to Schiff, Prime Minister Meir agreed to the distinction made between Syria and Egypt and that it was not worthwhile for Egypt to attack Israel. On that day, the Soviets were already pulling their families out of Egypt and Syria. On 4 October the Chief of Staff assessed that there was no high likelihood that war would break out (Heichal 1999, p. 207). | Policy Makers | 4 |</p>
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<td>Ze'ev Schiff, Earthquake in October, Tel Aviv: Zmora Bitan Modan, 1974, p.19 (Hebrew).</td>
<td>The Egyptian posture had become one of attack. This situation was not considered to be grave enough for Dayan to decide on mobilization of the reserves. Though Elazar said that 'We have no proof that the enemy is not going to attack' but decided the highest alert possible in the IDF, Dayan opposed complete mobilization of the reserves on the day the war began. After the war Elazar complained that there were hundreds of intelligence pieces that never reached him and were scattered in the different research branches. A false alarm has two main effects: (a) the amount of sensitivity to the same kind of threat is depreciated; and (b) the activity undertaken in response to a subsequent alarm is lessened, and there may be a tendency to relate to the expenses involved. The facts as published show that both kinds of consequences had their influence on Dayan, Elazar and head of the Military Intelligence Eli Zeira. As they were the heads of the different hierarchies, their convictions were of major importance. Both Dayan and Elazar deliberated about the need to mobilize the reserves because of the frequency of the mobilizations and their economic cost. Their conclusions were different at the end: Elazar pressed for maximal mobilization, and Dayan decided there was no need to mobilize (Heichal 1999, p. 208, 212, 213).</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Agranat Commission Report, p.20.</td>
<td>First, the Soviets knew of an impending attack, and anticipating the military consequences of a counter attack by Israel was withdrawing their personnel. Such an interpretation was alarming in its implications. Alternatively, if Soviet-Syrian relationships have deteriorated badly, as some speculated, Syria might have requested all Soviet advisers to leave, but this would not</td>
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explain why Soviet personnel were being withdrawn simultaneously from Egypt. Third, it was possible that the Soviet Union had accepted Syrian allegations, broadcast repeatedly in the last days that Israel was about to attack. Again, however, if this were so, Moscow would have asked Washington to warn Israel against attack and no such warnings were delivered.... In a series of briefings the next morning (that is, 5 October) he (Zeira) presented all three interpretations . . . but accepted none, explaining he did not know why Soviet personnel were withdrawn and that he is awaiting further information (Heichal 1999, p. 215).

TABLE 2.6 Early Warning versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War of 1973

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<td>1</td>
<td>Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of the Yom Kippur War; Additional Partial Reports and Complementary Matter to the Partial Report, Arguments and Complementary matter to the Partial Report of April 1974, p. 60 (Hebrew) (hereafter The Agranat Commission, p. 135-136 &amp; 149-150 Zvi Lanir Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hame'uhad 1983, p.28 (Hebrew)</td>
<td><em>Eli Zeira distinguished three possible modes of action by the Egyptians, one of which was the crossing or the Suez Canal. In this regard he claimed: I am certain that we will know about it in advance, and will be able to give warning several days ahead.</em>&quot; When questioned by the Prime Minister, as to the means used to derive such a warning, he said: 'By the preparations: the preparations cannot be hidden.' Yet on other occasions Zeira was also heard to voice reservations. At a conference of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) corps commander, in spring of 1973 he stressed that despite his confidence in the ability to give a warning, planning should not rule out a situation of no warning, and appropriate planning measures should be undertaken. In fact, until the last moment Zeira was not entirely convinced that a war was about to erupt, and all the decision-makers were similarly unconvinced (Kahana 2002, p. 82).</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Interview with Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eli Zeira, Zahala, 27 Jan. 1999.</td>
<td>*Egypt would not embark on war against Israel unless it could first assure itself the capability of attacking Israel's chief military airfields, by long-range Sukhoi bombers and Scud missiles, in order to paralyze the Israeli Air Force. The Egyptian component of the Concept was not an assessment by Israeli Intelligence analysts of the Egyptian capabilities nor was it an assessment of how the Egyptians considered their capabilities. The Egyptian component of the Concept was Humint information provided to the Mossad secret service by an Egyptian top source (hereafter, the Top Source). This was not the case with any of the</td>
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The Agranat Commission p.70.

Information collected by Aman's Signals Intelligence (Sigint) department or by the Mossad. No item of information unequivocally contradicted the existing position. Moreover, three events of the 'cry-wolf scenario' served as tests of the Concept, and in the end supported and reinforced it. Following an evaluation of the situation by Aman's Analysis section. Zeira, head of Aman, concluded that Egypt wished to create the impression that its back was against the wall and that it had no alternative but to go to war (Kahana 2002, p. 83).

3 Eli Zeira in his book The October 73 War: Myth Against Reality (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonoth 1993) p.98
See also Zeev Schiff, 'A Foreign Ruler Warned: The Intelligence and Golda Meir Ignored'. Ha'arez. 15 Sept. 1993, p.5b (Hebrew)
The Agranat Commission, p.12

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3 The most senior source, although not an Israel agent, was King Husseim of Jordan. His identity is no longer secret, as General Zeira referred to the King in his hook and mentioned his name explicitly in a seminar on the Yom Kippur War. Hussein met Prime Minister Golda Meir at a Mossad guest house in north Tel Aviv on 25 September 1973 and warned her that 'the Syrian army is in [sic] occupying [an] attack position, adding that he suspected these moves were being coordinated with Egypt. The King recommended that Israel accept a diplomatic solution to the conflict in order to avoid a military conflagration. The next day, 26 September, the King conveyed the same warning through the CIA, and it reached the Mossad on 30 September. The matter before the Israeli military leadership, then, was not the content of Hussein's warning but its interpretation, especially in regard to the indications on the Golan Heights. At the 26 September general staff meeting, Zeira assessed the probability of a Syrian operation as low due to fear of IDF retaliation. The only explanation offered by Zeira for the Syrian actions was that they were taken in response to the shooting down of their 13 fighters, or as a preventive measure in case of any
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<td>Yedioth Aharonoth 1992) p.40-41 (Hebrew)</td>
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<td>Further IDF operation. The Chief of Staff excluded any possibility of a Syrian attempt to occupy the Golan Heights without Egyptian involvement in the war - which was one of the components of the Concept. While he admitted that gaining warning of a limited operation would be very difficult to achieve, he claimed that having early warning of an all-out war was all but guaranteed (Kahana 2002, p. 88).</td>
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<td>Arie Braun. Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonoth 1992) p.40 (Hebrew)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>From that point, all decisions were based on the assumption or a limited operation and not a war. The measures decided on by the Chief of Staff were to place the Air Force on attack alert and reinforce the Golan Heights with two tank companies and one artillery battery. The Minister of Defense added that steps should not be taken due to assessment of the probability of a limited operation, but due to warnings of a possible Syrian attempt to occupy an Israeli post or settlement on the Golan Heights. The position of the Chief of Staff, which was adopted by Dayan was based on Zeira's assessment. In sum, the Israeli defense authorities were confident that an early warning would be available in case of a full-scale Syrian attempt to occupy the Golan Heights. The steps taken were merely against a limited action whose likelihood was considered low (Kahana 2002, p. 90).</td>
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<td>The Agranat Commission p.13</td>
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<td>Following the Chief of Staff's decision, the Minister of Defense added that there were no substantive signs for a war about to be started by Syria. However, Dayan suggested that attention be paid to the heavy Syrian deployment and the fact that the Israeli settlements were located on the Golan Heights. He asked the Chief of Staff to find a solution to the possibility that a Syrian force might try to penetrate the thin IDF defense line in order to occupy a settlement. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff ordered</td>
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</table>
reinforcement of the Golan Heights by yet another armored battalion and an artillery battalion, as well as the laying of landmines along the frontier. Plans were also made for retaking any part of the Golan Heights that might be occupied (Kahana 2002, p. 91-92).

| 6 | The Agranat Commission p.13 | Following a meeting between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff on 2 October, the latter checked with Aman for the significance of the Syrian-Egyptian activity. Aman's assessment of the Egyptian activity was that it was an exercise only. Regarding the Syrian deployment, Aman admitted that it had no explanation, but maintained that Syria had no intention of attacking. However, the Chief of Staff asked Aman about the reliability of the information that Syria would not start war without Egypt. Aman's reply was as follows: (1) We do not know for sure of Syria's intentions. (2) There was general information from a source [the reference is to King Hussein] and more detailed information from the Americans based on it. (3) A verbal message from another source in Egypt [apparently the Top Source] warned of the intention of opening an Egyptian Syrian attack on 1 October. (4) Aman had no adequate additional indications that may attest that the Syrian army indeed had aggressive intentions in the short term. (5) According to Aman's evaluation the state of emergency was chiefly put in place on account of growing fears of Israel. (6) In Aman's opinion Syria did not estimate that it could risk a general war with Israel, or to go to war without Egypt the Concept was still in force. (7) An additional possibility of low likelihood was that the state of emergency had been declared because of the Syrian intention to conduct some kind of reprisal for the downing of its aircraft, and the emergency array would provide Syria with maximal defense against our response (Kahana 2002, p. 91-92). | Policy Makers/IC | 1 |
| 7 | Arie Braun. Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonoth 1992) p.60 (Hebrew) The Agranat Commission p. 22 Israel Tal, National Security: The Few Against the Many (Tel Aviv: Dvir 1996) pp.210. (Hebrew). The Agranat Commission p.22 Shlomo Nakdimon, Low Probability: A Narrative of the Dramatic Story Preceding the Yom Kippur War and the Fateful Events that Followed (Tel Aviv Revivim 1982) p.28 (Hebrew). Chaim Herzog. The War of Atonement (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonoth 1974) p.70 The Agranat Commission p.40-1, 273 | Following these three events in the era of information, Aman altered it assessment from no war to 'low probability.' However, it should be emphasized that in the Cabinet meeting of the morning of 5 October, Zeira stated explicitly that 'technically the Egyptians and the Syrians are ready, prepared, and able to start a war at any time.' In any case, Zeira concluded that it was more likely than not that war would be avoided. Zeira's position was adopted by the Chief of Staff, who claimed that if Egypt and Syria were going to attack Israel the Israeli intelligence community would probably get indication of it, inter alia from the Top Source. He knew that the head of the Mossad was going to meet him. Nevertheless, the Chief of Staff decided to prepare for war without any further early warning. The preparations proposed by the Chief of Staff were that regular troops would halt an attack on the front line together with the Air Force, and mobilization of the reserves was to be made ready (Kahana 2002, p. 94). | Policy Makers | 4 |

| 8 | Arie Braun. Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonoth 1992) p.67 (Hebrew) Shlomo Nakdimon, Low Probability: A Narrative of the Dramatic Story Preceding the Yom Kippur War and the Fateful Events that Followed (Tel | On these grounds, the Chief of Staff decided to declare a Stage 3 alert, for the first time in several years, and to dispatch the 7th Tank Brigade up to the Golan Heights and an artillery brigade to Sinai. The decision on mobilizing the reserves would be taken in the light of additional indications that the head of the Mossad would presumably bring from London. The Minister of Defense approved the Chief of Staff's decision and recommended reporting to the United States on the imminent Soviet evacuation and | Policy Makers | 4 |
requesting the American administration to sound out its significance from the Soviets themselves. It was also recommended that the United States be told of the Israeli assessments of greater probability of war and be asked to warn Egypt that Israel was aware of its intentions and was ready from them. The Prime Minister approved these recommendations and authorized the Minister of Defense to mobilize the reserves if the need arose during the Yom Kippur fast without convening the government. Even after receipt of this information from the Top Source, the assessment of the head of Aman was that Sadat was not in an international or internal position to launch an attack, knowing that he would lose any war that might break out. Sadat, according to Zeira, might be deterred, perhaps by Israel’s mobilizing the reserves or by conveying him a message that his intentions were known. The Chief of Staff, however, decided that measures should be taken under the assumption that war was going to break out. The emphasis here is on the Chief of Staff’s assumption of this, not his knowledge. He asked the Minister of Defense to authorize the call-up of the entire reserve combat force and to order the Air Force to deliver a preemptive strike.”

But the Minister of Defense remained hesitant in view of the Top Source’s message that Egypt might still be deterred without military action. Therefore, he recommended that the IDF take only defensive measures and avoid any that might be interpreted as moving towards war. His argument was that the international community; especially the United States, might blame Israel for causing an escalation towards war. In sum, the measures that were taken went forward on the assumption that war was going to start but not under any certainty of it. The Concept, while eroded, remained all-powerful, so much so that even when the war began at 1.55
Dayan replied that he was entirely opposed to a preemptive strike, and asked the CoS why he needed general mobilization of the reserves for a war that was supposed to begin 12 hours later [then it was believed that the opening salvos of the war would be tired at 6 o'clock in the evening. Elazar replied with a joke. He was, he said, reminded of the Jew who emerged from a brothel at a very early morning hour. When asked what he was doing there so early, he said that he was due to have a very busy day and he wanted to get that out of the way. About the mobilization of the reserves, the CoS said that they would be required for the stage of counter-attack, so he wanted to begin already in the morning with the mobilization to get that out of the way. It is worth noting that the sense of superiority and self-confidence caused the CoS and the Minister of Defense to believe that for the blocking stage the standing army might be enough. Dayan retorted, 'You don't mobilize the entire reserve array just on the basis of what Zvika Zamir [that is, the Top Source] knows. Dado
I want to call up the entire array of divisions so that we can push them back and move into a counter-attack as early as possible. Incidentally, a mobilization of this sort might make the Arabs abandon their planned attack.' Dayan replied, 'You can do that with 30,000 men, you don't need 500,000. I'm in favor of calling up only the forces essential for defense.'

Arie Braun. Moshe Dayan and the Yom Kippur War (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Aharonoth 1992) p.87-8 (Hebrew)

TABLE 2.7 The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise.

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<th>Theory Supported</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(State of Israel, 1975: 46). State of Israel (1975) The Agranat Report. Tel Aviv: Am Oved. (Hebrew)</td>
<td>The danger of success should be noted here. During earlier alerts toward the end of 1971 and December 1972, Israeli intelligence predictions that war would not break out proved correct. It is not clear, however, whether the Egyptians never actually intended to go to war or whether they were deterred by Israel's countermobilizations. At any rate, Defense Minister Dayan was influenced by the successful evaluation of the IDF's intelligence in April-May 1973, in all relating to the intelligence's capacity to warn of forthcoming war (Handel 1977, p.493).</td>
<td>Policy Makers</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>(Meir, 1975: 355-366). MEIR, G. (1975) My Life. Tel Aviv: Steimatsky.</td>
<td>Egypt in 1972, whether a deliberate move of deception or the result of a genuine conflict of interests, the Israelis to believe that Russian support for Egypt had diminished and that Egypt would be less willing to accept military risks without that support. As it turned out, Russian advisors and technicians had gradually returned to rebuild the Egyptian military infrastructure, and the flow of Russian weapons had continued uninterrupted. Prime Minister Meir was the only one, in a cabinet meeting held on October 5, to compare the evacuation of Russian advisors from Arab countries on the eve of the Six-Day War with the evacuation occurring at the time of the cabinet meeting. Her comments were brushed aside (Handel 1977, p.499).</td>
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TOTAL SCORE: 5
AVERAGE SCORE: 2.5

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Michael I. Handel, Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations, Jerusalem Paper No. 19, 1976); Avi Shlaim, &quot;Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,&quot; World Politics, xxviii (April 1976), 378; Abraham Ben-Zvi, &quot;Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks,&quot; World Politics, xxviii (April 1976); Amos Perlmutter, Israel's Fourth War, October 1973: Political and Military Misperceptions, Orbits, am (Summer 1975); U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Intelligence (hereafter cited as HSCI Hearings, U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975;</td>
<td><em>In several cases, hesitancy in communication and disbelief on the part of leaders were reinforced by deceptive enemy maneuvers that cast doubt on the data</em> (Betts 1978, p. 37).</td>
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<td>Draft Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, published in The Village Voice, February 16, 1976, DP. 76-81.</td>
<td>Ray Cline testified, defending his analysts' performance in October 1973 and criticizing Secretary Kissinger for ignoring them: Unless something is totally conclusive, you must make an inconclusive report….by the time you are sure it is always very close to the event. So I don't think the analysts did such a lousy job. What I think was the lousy job was in bosses not insisting on a new preparation at the end of that week [before war broke out]. . . . the reason the system wasn't working very well is that people were not asking it to work and not listening when it did work' (Betts 1978, p. 39).</td>
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<td>HSCI, Hearings. 656-57.</td>
<td>Moreover, principals tend to believe that they have a wider point of view than middle-level analysts and are better able to draw conclusions from raw data. That point of view underlies their fascination with current intelligence and their impatience with the reflective interpretations in 'finished' intelligence (Betts 1978, p. 40).</td>
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<td>HSCI Draft Report, 78; Ben-Zvi, 386, 394; Perlmutter, 453</td>
<td>Frequent mobilizations strain the already taut Israeli economy. Moreover, countermobilization can defeat itself. Between 1971 and 1973, the Egyptians three times undertook exercises similar to those that led to the October attack; Israel mobilized in response, and nothing happened. It was the paradox of self-negating prophecy. The Israeli Chief of Staff was sharply criticized for the unnecessary cost (Betts 1978, p. 40).</td>
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challenging intelligence officers, complained that he could no longer argue effectively against them, and consequently was unable to influence his colleagues when he was right. (Betts 1978, p. 40). Personal communication from Michael Handel, November 15, 1977.

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<td>5</td>
<td>HSCI Hearings, 634-36</td>
<td>Critics charged Henry Kissinger with crippling U.S. intelligence by refusing to keep analysts informed of his intimate conversations with foreign leaders (Betts 1978, p. 46).</td>
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TOTAL SCORE: 11
AVERAGE SCORE: 2.2

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake: Yom Kippur 1973, trans. Louis Williams (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1974), pp. 17-18.</td>
<td><em>When Arye Shalev, the Israeli military spokesman in the cabinet meeting three days before the October 1973 War, interpreted new Syrian dispositions as defensive, he did note &quot;some exceptional aspects&quot; in the positioning of artillery and a bridging battalion. He also said ammunition uploading by Egyptian units did not suggest a routine exercise and might be a prelude to a genuine attack. Nevertheless, Shalev concluded, the weight of reliable evidence indicated an exercise, and he ascribed the intensity of Egyptian alert to fears that Israel might seize the moment to attack</em> (Betts 1980-81, p. 560)</td>
<td>Policy Makers</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Michael I. Handel, Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War, Jerusalem Paper No. 19 (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, 1976), p. 46-7. Avigdor Haselkorn, &quot;Israeli Intelligence Performance in the Yom Kippur War,&quot; Hudson Institute Discussion Paper 2033 (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y., July 1974), pp. 1, 15n.</td>
<td><em>A defender may know the enemy has equipment designed to accomplish certain tasks, but may assume it will not really work or can be countered easily, especially if it is simple. Israeli leaders in 1973 were impressed by the Suez Canal as a natural barrier. With little experience in wide water crossings themselves, they were not sensitive to how important such operations were in Soviet doctrine or to how well Russian advisers had trained Egyptians in the art of bridging. Arab use of infrared and other night-fighting gadgetry was also surprising. Moshe Dayan also cited Egypt's capacity to build and replace pontoon bridges as a logistical surprise in the October War</em> (Betts 1980-81, p. 567, 569)</td>
<td>Policy Makers/IC</td>
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**TOTAL SCORE: 5**  
**AVERAGE SCORE: 2.5**

TABLE 3.1 *The Egyptian Staff Solution: Operational Art and Planning for the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.*

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Samuel W. Wax and Avigdor Levy, &quot;Arab-Israeli Conflict Four: A Preliminary Assessment,&quot; Naval War College Review. January-February 1974, 8 Dupuy, T.N, &quot;The Ramadan War: An Arab Perspective of the October War.&quot; Army, March 1975, 15 Insight Team of the London Sunday Times. The Yom Kippur War. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974, 110</td>
<td>Although the Egyptians could not completely conceal their preparations for attack, they could conceal their intentions, and sought to prevent Israeli preemption or mobilization through deception and strict secrecy. The Egyptian deception plan was based on preconditioning, that is, presenting Israeli intelligence analysts with an observable pattern of &quot;normal&quot; military activity. For example, the Egyptians called up their reservists 22 times during the Summer of 1973. Similarly, they repeatedly brought bridging equipment to the canal and then removed it so that, as Shazly commented, &quot;Israel was used to its presence.' Likewise, they disguised the deployment of key assault units by random troop movements along the length of the canal (Cochran 1973, p. 10).</td>
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<td>Dupuy, 14. After the Soviets were sent home by Sadat, the Israelis felt that the Egyptians would not be capable of handling sophisticated equipment without their assistance. They apparently did not attach much significance to the fact that many Soviets quietly returned to Egypt. Following the war, Sadat stated, &quot;I expelled them to give myself completely [sic] freedom of maneuver.&quot; O'Ballance, &quot;The Fifth Arab-Israeli War -- October, 1973, 309, and Insight Team of the</td>
<td>One of the most significant aspects of the Egyptian plan was Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers in July 1972. He expected this action to lead the Israelis to conclude that war was unlikely, since they believed that the Egyptians could not attack without Soviet technical advice (Cochran 1973, p. 10).</td>
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Proper selection of the attack date was critical. Ismail later explained the reasoning behind the selection of 6 October as D-Day: There was the general consideration that the situation had to be activated when Arab and world support for us was at its highest. More particularly, we needed: first, a moonlit night with the moon rising at the right time; second, a night when the water current in the canal would be suitable for crossing operations; third, a night on which our actions would be far from the enemy's expectations; and fourth, a night on which the enemy himself would be unprepared. Ismail had imposed the requirement of a long night so that the Egyptian buildup on the east bank would have cover of darkness, but he also wanted a night when the moon shone through the first half and then set. The last bridges might have to be laid by moonlight, but the tanks could find their way across by starlight. This requirement dictated an autumn attack, since only by September or October would there be ten or twelve hours of darkness. The need to have moonlight, but not a foil moon that would swell the ebb and flow of tide, reduced the possible dates in any one month to four or five days. Further limitations were imposed by the Golan front. By November or December, there was a risk of snow on the Syrian plain, which would bog massed armored formations in a sea of mud. These particular considerations suggested 6 October. On that day, astronomical calculations gave us the best times for moonrise and moon set. Our scientists examined the records of the old Suez Canal Company to assess the speed of water currents, and that day was found most suitable. In addition, the Israelis would not expect any action from our side during the month of Ramadan. And for their part, they would be preoccupied by a number of events, including

TOTAL SCORE: 12
AVERAGE SCORE: 4

**TABLE 3.2 Overcoming Strategic Weakness: The Egyptian Deception and the Yom Kippur War**

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dani Asher, li-shebor et ha-konseptsiyah [Breaking the Concept] (Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot 2003) p.69 (in Hebrew). The book examines the Egyptian perception of the 1973 war. Also: Yossef Katarivas, ‘Tfisat ha-bitahon shel yisrael be-’ene medinot arav’ [The Arab States’ Perception of the Israeli Security Doctrine] (in Hebrew), in Golan and Shai, ‘milhama ha-yom’ pp.9–49. Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity: An Autobiography (New York: Harper &amp; Row 1977), p.244.</td>
<td><em>Egypt went to war in order to achieve three strategic objectives: (1) to restore its national honour and pan-Arab prestige, forfeited in public eyes after its military defeat and Israel’s capture of the Sinai Peninsula in the 1967 Six Day War; (2) to exploit military success as a lever to end the stalemate and revitalize the diplomatic process, which would bring international pressure on Israel to return to the bargaining table; (3) to force Israel to soften its stubborn stance regarding the return of the Sinai</em> <em>to Egyptian sovereignty. These goals were defined by Anwar Sadat (who had inherited the Egyptian Presidency from Gamal Abd al-Nasser in 1970) and had reached maturity by late 1972. They replaced previous war objectives, aimed at recapturing the Sinai Peninsula but since recognized as unobtainable. In order to achieve the new limited objectives of what may be called ‘a strategic compromise’, Egypt discovered it no longer needed to occupy the entire peninsula by force, or gain control over the 40–50 kilometre strip (as the crow flies) lying between the Suez Canal on the west and the Gidi and Mitla Passes in the mountainous ridge on the east, as previously intended. Crossing the Canal and capturing a foothold along an expanse as narrow as 9–12 kilometres east of the waterway (‘four inches . . . a foothold, pure and simple’ according to Sadat’s picturesque description), was now considered sufficient. Such an accomplishment would regain prestige on the one hand and accelerate renewal of the political process on the other (Sheffy 2006, p. 812).</em></td>
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<td>Egyptian War Office, Military Intelligence Directorate,</td>
<td><em>These threats could materialize if the Israelis were to learn in advance of the Egyptian decision to go to war and of its</em></td>
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Timing. This would allow the Israelis to mobilize their reserve formations (the IDF’s main combat component) in time, deploy in force along the canal and react in tune with their established security doctrine. This doctrine, intensively studied by the Egyptians since 1967, called for the launching of a pre-emptive counteroffensive and thus rapidly transferring the battle to enemy territory before the latter could begin its own offensive moves. To thwart such threats with any efficiency, it was essential to surprise the Israelis over any Egyptian decision to go to war and the prospective date of any such war. Surprise would thus kill two birds with one stone: slow up IDF defensive deployment and prevent an Israeli pre-emptive strike. It was this strategic surprise that the Egyptians sought to achieve by means of deception (Sheffy 2006, p. 813).


Zvi Lanir, ha-hafta’a ha-besisit: modi’in be-mashber [Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis] (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad 1983) p.40-47 (in Hebrew);

The Egyptian deception’s rationale was, therefore, two fold. First, a ‘fundamental deception’, lasting several months at the least, was meant, according to testimony by Sadat and other senior officials, to freeze the victim’s perception, specifically that Egypt has still renounced the military option, intending to sustain the diplomatic negotiations with regard to future Israeli withdrawal This was accompanied by a follow-up ‘situational deception’, shorter in length, that by presenting a plausible ‘explanation’ aimed at eliminating any Israeli suspicion aroused by the inevitable discrepancy between its erroneous perception (supported by the fundamental deception) and the evolving reality once open activity had begun (Sheffy 2006, p. 818).

**4** Saad el Shazli, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research 1980), p. 211

Aharon Zeevi, ‘tochnit ha-hona’ah Egyptian memoirs, the most prominent among them being a book by the then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Saad al-Din Shazly, demonstrate just how few were in the know. According to Shazly, the commanders of
the Egypt’s Second and Third Armies were officially informed about the moment of truth only five days before ‘D Day’, divisional commanders were enlightened only 72 hours before ‘H hour’, brigade commanders 48 hours earlier and battalion COs only 24 to 12 hours in advance. Egyptian POWs stated that most troops belonging to the first assault echelon were told they were at last heading for a real war only minutes before they entered their rubber dinghies (Sheffy 2006, p. 821).

Quoted in Arie Braun, Moshe Dayan be-milhemet yon ha-kipurim [Moshe Dayan and the


Intelligence reports regarding the ‘exercise’ began to arrive in Israel on 25 September 1973, 11 days before the war’s outbreak. A Special Intelligence Summary, disseminated by the DMI’s Production and Assessment Division five days later, clearly demonstrates the impact of the process: Between 1–7 October, a large-scale joint staff exercise on the occupation of Sinai is going to take place . . . Because of the exercise the state of alert will be raised (as of 1 October) to the highest in the air force, and all the units, which are to participate in the exercise, and all leaves will be cancelled. As noted, it was reported of the advance of a division from Cairo to the Canal Zone, with additional reports on [other movements] . . . The information about the expected exercise and the call of reserve soldiers for limited time, implies, therefore, that the advancement of forces and additional preparations that are underway or will be done in coming days, such as completion of fortifications, mobilization of civilian fishing boats, and check of state of readiness of units, which, at first sight, can be seen as alert signals, are, in actuality solely connected to the exercise. A day later, the Daily Intelligence Summary stated that ‘the joint command exercise has begun’ and connected the highest level of alert
within the entire Egyptian armed forces as well as mobilization of reservists to the exercise. Just how great was the influence of the bogus exercise on the Israeli decision-makers? And how much did the deception, even if indirectly, contribute to the Israeli surprise? Answers to these questions can be suggested following a comparison of the positions taken by the leadership in September–October on the one hand and during a previous alert in April–May 1973 on the other, when information was received (and not for the first time) about imminent Egyptian intentions to go to war. Despite the lower volume of early warning signals received in April and their weaker intensity, no reassuring explanation was then forwarded. Contrary to the belittling of the DMI’s stance, the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General David Elazar and the Minister of Defence, Moshe Dayan, took the April reports and the early warning signals much more seriously than they did in October, as shown by the IDF’s decision to take several steps to improve readiness and increase preparedness (Sheffy 2006, p. 823-824).

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<th>Yom Kippur War</th>
<th>Hanoch Bartov, Dado. 48 Years and 20 Days</th>
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# APPENDIX 4

## TABLE 4.1 Yom Kippur War: Grand Deception or Intelligence Blunder

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sobel, Lester A. Israel and the Arabs: The October 1973 War. New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1974.</td>
<td>A major incident occurred on May 30, 1972, when three, PLO hired, Japanese gunmen attacked Lod International Airport. This was followed by numerous terrorists activities which lead to the September 5, Munich Olympic Massacre by Black September. On September 19, an Israeli official, Dr. Ami Shachori, was killed in his London embassy office when he opened a letter bomb sent by the Black September Organization. Terrorism struck again on July 1, in Chevy Chase, Maryland. Col. Yosef Alon, naval attaché of the Israeli Embassy, was gun down outside his home by members of the Black September organization. The last incident prior to the war involved the September 28th, train hijacking of Soviet Jews on their way to Israel via Austria. Conducted by two members of the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, this incident occupied the political and military leadership in Israel for over a week. Whether intentional or coincidental, the diversion of Israeli decision makers was most effective for the Arabs (Richardson 1991).</td>
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<td>Steven, Stewart. The Spymasters of Israel. New York: MacMillian, 1980.</td>
<td>The Egyptians' use of deception, denial and disinformation were certainly a determining factor in their success. These elements combined with the Israelis' attitudes, distractions, and internal intelligence problems allowed the Arabs to conduct a national level, surprise attack unequaled since</td>
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Operation Barbarossa in 1941, when German armies attacked the Soviet Union (Richardson 1991).

As far back as 1963, numerous recommendations had been made to reorganize the dangerously inflexible intelligence community. As a result of bureaucratic hostility within the agencies and funding cutbacks, these modifications were never implemented. Ten years later the system was even more vulnerable to mistakes derived from preconceptions or vested interest. Organized along strict military lines where no civilians were employed, rank was meticulously observed. A number of senior officers had been assigned to the same job for six or seven years. This stagnation of personnel tended to present the same line of thinking with no outside opinions to check or contradict evaluations levied by the hierarchy. Such was the case involving Lieutenant Benjamin Simon-Tov, a young intelligence officer at the Southern Command Headquarters. On October 3, he submitted his second paper accurately outlining the activities, preparations and ultimate intentions of the Egyptians. His boss, Lieutenant Colonel David Gedaliah, who was relieved of his job after the war, found the reports heretical and subsequently, sat on them (Richardson 1991).
TOTAL IC SCORE: 9
AVERAGE IC SCORE: 3

### TABLE 4.2 The Yom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Referenced Material</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Theory Supported</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manaal Nour-al-Din, Butulaat Waraa al-Sittar [Heroism Behind the Lines] (Cairo: Egyptian Writer’s Association, 1997), 29-30.</td>
<td>The Egyptian deception plan can be divided into three components: economic, political, and military. A flood of communiqués and reports on Egypt’s economic instability and its inability to afford another war were made public. The reports stressed the importance of a political solution to return the Sinai. Political deception stressed the status quo through the “No War, No Peace” slogan. The Egyptians highlighted their acceptance of the Rogers Plan and publicly expelled Soviet advisers. Many believed Sadat was working toward Western rapprochement. An element of the Rogers Plan stipulated that the United States would not look kindly at an Israeli first strike. This would cloud the Israeli decision to react in spite of growing intelligence indicating an attack. Military deception, the final component, involved a series of military exercises designed to act as faints for the real attack (Aboul-Enein 2003, p. 53).</td>
<td>Deceiver</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Hassan el-Badri, The Ramadan War, 1973 (Fairfax, VA: Dupuy Associates, 1978), 46-47.</td>
<td>The concept of surprise occupied a large portion of the Egyptian general command’s planning. Coordination with Syria occurred 6 months before D-Day (6 October). Militarily, the plan was to deceive Israel as to the intention of launching an offensive operation. The Egyptians also had to be concerned with concealing its main assault’s timing, size, and direction. An emphasis on the defense was undertaken as part of the deception. After enduring four wars, the Israelis had become accustomed to the Egyptians and Syrians fortifying and conducting defensive operations. Thus, preparations for defensive operations continued as normal and were even</td>
<td>Deceiver</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
heightened because the Arabs knew that Israel expected this. This defensive strategy was heavily emphasized in military radio traffic. False reports of negligent standards, faulty missile systems, and the difficulty of absorbing tons of Soviet equipment were exchanged on open radio to deceive Israeli signals intelligence operatives. The Egyptian military staged exercises with different force structures and sizes along the Suez so as to hide the true order of battle for the Suez Canal crossing. They assembled troop concentrations for the actual attack over a 4-month period, with crack units being moved three weeks before D-Day under the pretense of massive engineering projects for defensive fortifications of the western side of the canal. Crossing equipment was brought from the rear to the front and back again, along with incidental moves of combat engineer units, to deceive the Israelis into believing this was simply movement training. They conducted well-practiced mobilization of reserves in a way in which the maximum number of forces would be ready for zero hour. Forty-eight hours before H Hour, 20,000 reservists were demobilized as Israeli monitors watched (Aboul-Enein 2003, p. 53).

Perhaps the simplest, yet most effective, deception plan was the use of a company of the most undisciplined soldiers in the Egyptian Army one day before D-Day. They were to further reinforce Israeli contempt of Egyptian forces by washing their clothes along the canal and loitering about in an undisciplined fashion. Israeli reports indicated that they were pitiful in their appearance. They were eating oranges, swimming, and sucking on sugar cane stalks. Other deceptions included a public announcement by the War Ministry accepting
applications from armed forces personnel wishing to make a mini-pilgrimage (Umrah) to Mecca during the holy month of Ramadan (Aboul-Enein 2003, p. 53).

| 4 | Doron Geller, “Israeli Intelligence and the Yom Kippur War,” The Department for Jewish Zionist Education, Lecture Series (April 1999), online at <www.jajz.ed.orl.il/juice/service/week11.html>, accessed 29 January 2002, 2. | The Arabs practiced extraordinary operations security. In Egypt, only Sadat, War Minister Field Marshal Ismail Ali, and a dozen generals of the General Command knew the plan. In Syria, not more than 10 people were told of the plans. Egyptian and Syrian divisional commanders were told of the war on 1 October. Brigade and battalion commanders of both sides were told of the war on 5 October while most troops and officers were informed no more than 2 hours before H-Hour (Aboul-Enein 2003, p. 53). | Deceiver | 4 |

| 5 | Steven Stewart, The Spymasters of Israel (New York: MacMillan, 1980), 295. | The seeds of Israeli intelligence failure were sown in the tactical success of the Six-Day War. Israeli military intelligence developed a concept (the “Conceptzia”), which stipulated that an Arab-Israeli war would occur only if certain conditions were met. A combined Arab attack would not occur unless Arab forces possessed the means to simultaneously attack all Israeli airfields. Hence, 1975 was deemed the year of attack. Egypt was acquiring long-range Soviet fighter bombers and would have adequate pilots and aircraft for the attack by 1975. Here, the Israelis practiced mirror imaging, a cardinal intelligence sin. Another aspect of the concept was that the Suez Canal, with the formidable Bar-Lev Line, would be a sufficient barrier to give the Israelis enough time (48-hours) to mobilize. They did not expect an attack during Yom Kippur, the Jewish High Holiday, when only a skeletal force was deployed and mobilization was difficult. Finally, it was believed that the Arabs would not attack unless they possessed enormous stockpiles of weapons and equipment and that | IC | 3 |
they were only capable of guerrilla warfare, not conventional attacks, as evidenced by their performance in three wars. This concept was adopted fully by Israel’s chief of military intelligence, and he squashed any indicators that violated these rules (Aboul-Enein 2003, p. 53-54).

Since 1963, reorganization led to Aman being arranged along strict military lines. Officers were assigned at Aman for 6 to 7 years. By the early 1970s, no outside thinking took place, and no contradiction of analysis was made within this strict military hierarchy. A searing example of this is the story of Lieutenant Benjamin Simon-Tov, who 5 days before the war argued that Egyptian exercises and deployments were a camouflage for a real assault. His report sat on the desk of his commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gedaliah (Aboul-Enein 2003, p. 54). |
| IC | 4 |

From 1969 on, Israeli intelligence distracters included a new emphasis—terrorism. The Palestinian Liberation Organization was active in 1972. The Lod Airport was attacked, the Munich Olympics was disrupted, an Israeli diplomat was killed in London with a letter bomb, the Israeli Naval attaché was gunned down in front of his home in Maryland, and a train carrying Soviet Jews on their way to Israel through Austria was hijacked. Many intelligence specialists were drained from other sources to form a new antiterrorism cell, which affected Israel’s ability to concentrate on Syrian and Egyptian maneuvers (Aboul-Enein 2003, p. 54). |
| IC | 3 |

**TOTAL DECEIVER SCORE: 16**  
**AVERAGE DECEIVER SCORE: 4**  
**TOTAL IC SCORE: 10**
AVERAGE IC SCORE: 3.33

## TABLE 4.3 Intelligence Failure or Paralysis?

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<tr>
<th>#</th>
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<th>Quote</th>
<th>Theory Supported</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 344</td>
<td>Yitzhak Rabin noted on many occasions that, during most of the crises in Israeli history, Israeli intelligence was wrong. Years before the Yom Kippur War, Shimon Peres once said that &quot;the intelligence is very problematic, and it is inadequate for decision-making.&quot; He added that &quot;the politicians' judgment is poor. They do not judge intelligence properly&quot; (Lord 2012, p. 2).</td>
<td>Policy Makers</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, protocol, March 13, 1973, State Archive, sec. 60-8163/3.</td>
<td>Yaakov Hazan, a leader of the left-wing Mapam Party and Member of Knesset, articulated what was understood by the political conceptzia. He was close to Golda Meir and no doubt expressed her assessment at the time. He told the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that &quot;the objective chances for peace are greater now&quot; (Lord 2012, p. 4).</td>
<td>Policy Makers</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Interview with the author [Eli Zeira], September 2011.</td>
<td>Israel received information that Gaddafi was pressuring Egypt and Syria to launch a military action against Israel. Now, in mid-April, the Israeli leaders obtained access to Gaddafi's thoughts, and his position was, that because of the unfavorable balance of power, Egypt was not yet ready to go to war. &quot;We don't believe Gaddafi is pressuring Sadat to go to war in the immediate future,&quot; Dinitz was advised from Jerusalem. Nor did Israel detect any signs that the Soviet Union was pushing Sadat toward war. Despite the accumulation of fighter squadrons in Egypt on the western bank of the Suez Canal, during the spring of 1973 there were no new developments in the military sphere. Two major airfields were being renovated at the time, a project lasting months. &quot;And it's only logical that you don't go to war when those airfields are out of commission,&quot; said Major General (ret.) Eli Zeira (Lord 2012, p. 6).</td>
<td>Policy Makers</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Hanokh Bartov, Dado: 48 Years</td>
<td>A key meeting at Meir's office on April 18 revealed the</td>
<td>Policy Makers</td>
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<td>Page</td>
<td>Author</td>
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<tr>
<td>259</td>
<td>Eli Zeira</td>
<td>partial Agranat report, 70.</td>
<td>differences between the top leaders concerning the military forecast. Zeira explained his assessment that no war was about to break out. His estimates were passed on to the Americans. But the chief of staff, defense minister, and Mossad chief drew opposite conclusions from the same facts. General Elazar’s words expose the source of the October blunder at its inception. &quot;There is internal logic in favor of war,&quot; he said. &quot;The mere number of [peaceful] years gains a different quality.... It should be judged that indeed they have an intention to fight.&quot; Yet, immediately after that sentence, Elazar exchanged his military role for that of a political leader and said: &quot;If we are exposed as too ready, then with the first threat...they have already achieved their first goal, which is to give momentum to political actions and maybe cause the Americans to be more flexible.&quot; (Lord 2012, p. 6).</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>Eli Zeira</td>
<td>partial Agranat report, 70.</td>
<td>The liberty which the chief of staff took in political matters damaged his ability to assess the military situation accurately and spilled over to underlings, among them the head of Military Intelligence. &quot;All in all,&quot; reasoned Zeira, &quot;it seems that Egypt's main goal today is to create the feeling of being on the brink of war mainly to influence the atmosphere in the Nixon-Brezhnev discussions about the Middle East—to create the image of a country in despair on the brink of hostilities...capable of receiving aid from other Arab countries and opting for warlike activity&quot; (Lord 2012, p. 6).</td>
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Policy Makers

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<td>6</td>
<td>The combination of the détente and the expulsion of the Soviet advisers seemed to strengthen Meir’s assessment that the Soviets were now exerting a moderating influence and the chances of war had diminished. But if the Soviets were supposedly fostering moderation, the Americans were muzzling Israel and trying to force it further into dependency. Shortly after, in November 1972, one of the most important early-warning alarms of Egypt's bellicose intent was delivered. Nevertheless, Kissinger warned Israel via Rabin: &quot;I hope that Israel has no intentions to initiate a preventive war against Egypt. It's most important that Israel not break the ceasefire, even when it has intelligence reports about Egyptian intent to renew the war.&quot; As Rabin noted, that was exactly how Israel behaved in October 1973 (Lord 2012, p. 4).</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>The author has consulted the Dinitz file. Chômer Dinitz, at the Israel State Archive. The file is comprised of two boxes. The first is: Aleph/4996/1, 93.08.06 containing correspondence dating from ca. March 20, 1973, to September 30, 1973. The second, 4996/2, 93.08.06, contains materials from October 1, 1973, to the end of the Yom Kippur War. When the author refers to a specific piece of the Dinitz correspondence by date, the reader can know its source. Dinitz file, March 24, 1973</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>This quote has no reference but Three months earlier, in mid-June, an important visit to</td>
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Policy Makers 5

Deceiver 3
goes with the above section in showing that the Primakov was a
"specialist in disinformation operations."

Israel by a Soviet emissary took place. The famous
journalist and KGB agent, Victor Lewis, a specialist in
disinformation operations, met with top officials at the
Prime Minister's Office, among them Gazit, who reported
that Lewis had said "Soviet military experts are completely
disillusioned...they recognize the absolute Israeli military
superiority which will last for many years. And they warn
against any Arab military adventure which would amount
to committing suicide." Combined with the earlier
discussions with Primakov-who was also a disinformation
specialist and editor of a book on the subject-it seemed that
the Israeli decision-makers fell into a trap of deception
(Lord 2012, p. 7).

TOTAL DECEIVER SCORE: 3
AVERAGE DECEIVER SCORE: 3
TOTAL POLICY MAKER SCORE: 22
AVERAGE POLICY MAKER SCORE: 3.67

## APPENDIX 5

### TABLE 5.1 Declassified Evidence-IC’s Fault before 1 September 1973

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Referenced Material</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Theory Supported</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Weekly Summary CIA 21 Jul 1972</td>
<td>President Sadat said his action was taken in order to facilitate consultations on a &quot;new stage&quot; in the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Sadat's argument, which follows that of a series of articles by al Ahram editor Haykal, was that Egypt now requires complete freedom of action in dealing with Israel. Sadat alluded to a disagreement with Moscow over the supply and control of Soviet weapons, and he said that he could not accept restrictions on Egypt's ability to make its own political decisions. Sadat observed that Cairo did not want &quot;friendly advisers&quot; to fight Egypt's battle, and he implied that by taking over missions and equipment formerly controlled by the Soviets, he would free the USSR from responsibility for Egypt's future actions. Many factors went into Sadat's decision, but Soviet refusal to release new advanced weapons to his armed forces, Soviet reluctance to endorse military action against Israel, and the abrasive relations between some Egyptian officers notably Defense Minister Sadiq-and their Soviet advisers clearly weighed heavily (CIA, 2013).</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Weekly Summary, CIA 28 Jul 1972</td>
<td>The Israelis see Sadat's move as a diversionary tactic to damp down domestic frustrations by demonstrating Egypt's independence from its superpower ally (CIA, 2013).</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>FBIS Trends, CIA 14 Feb 1973</td>
<td>The Soviet side again declared that in light of Israel's rejection of a &quot;just political settlement,&quot; the Arab states &quot;have the full right to use any form of struggle&quot; in liberating their occupied territories. (Versions of this</td>
<td>IC</td>
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formula in previous Soviet-Egyptian communiques, since its introduction in the document on as-Sadat's April visit last year, have variously referred to "other means," all means at their disposal, and "diverse means in accordance with provisions of the UN Charter") (CIA, 2013).

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<tr>
<th>4</th>
<th>FBIS Trends, CIA 28 Feb 1973</th>
<th>The commentary recalled that, as pointed out in the communique on the recent Moscow visit of Egyptian national security adviser Hafiz Isma'il, the USSR stressed that the Arab countries &quot;had full right to use every means of struggle&quot; to liberate their territories (CIA, 2013).</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Bulletin 9 May 1973</td>
<td>ARAB STATES – ISRAEL: Transfers of Libyan and Iraqi ground-attack aircraft to Egypt have improved Cairo's capability to attack Israeli targets, but Israel's military superiority is not threatened. About 30 Libyan Mirages—probably Mirage 5s and some 16 Iraqi Hunter aircraft were transferred to Egypt last month. The Mirage 5 is superior to all other ground-attack aircraft in the Egyptian inventory, including the SU-7 Fitter A, the swingwing SU-17 Fitter B, and the MIG-17 Fresco. Both the Mirage and the two Fitter variants can reach targets in Israel proper, but only the Mirage can fly at the low altitudes required to penetrate Israeli defenses and still reach Israel with an adequate payload. The Libyan Mirages are believed to be flown by Egyptians. The Hunters, which have about twice the payload capability of the MIG-17, would be useful in ground-attack missions close to the Suez Canal. In such a role, they would complement Egyptian use of MIG-17s, MIG-21 interceptors configured for a strike role as well as the Mirages and Fitters. The aircraft add only slightly to the numerical superiority in aircraft already held by the Arabs. The new aircraft, however, could make it more</td>
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</table>
difficult for Israel to defend against air attacks, particularly if Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated strike (CIA, 2013).

| 6 | WEEKLY SUMMARY 11 May 73 | In the past several weeks, Egypt and other Arab states have taken a number of measures that could be interpreted as preparation for hostilities against Israel. These actions could also be taken as part of an effort to arouse international concern and stimulate new pressures on the US to force Israel to be more accommodating on a peace settlement. There is no conclusive evidence that Sadat has made a decision to attack. Both Sadat and his advisers are aware that their military prospects are poor at best; a fresh disaster might well sweep away Sadat and his regime. His military preparations are not, in any case, complete, and he has not exhausted his political options. The UN session on the Middle East, now set for late May, and the US-USSR summit will be critical factors. Military moves by other Arab governments seem in harmony with Sadat's purpose. The major gap in the Arab line-up—one to which the Arabs are accustomed—is the refusal of the Jordanian Government to place its forces at the disposal of the "eastern front." Israel professes to see no serious threat of war, although Tel Aviv may be less relaxed than it has indicated. The Israelis are watching most particularly for any signs that the Egyptians or other Arabs are developing a serious capability to damage Israel itself. Such a development would lead the Israelis to consider a pre-emptive strike (CIA, 2013). |
| 7 | Intelligence Information Cable 14 May 1973 | KNOWLEDGEABLE EGYPTIAN OBSERVERS, CONTRARY TO VIEWS EXPRESSED FOR SOME TIME IN THE PAST THAT EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT WAS BLUFFING IN HIS THREATS TO LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL, NOW BELIEVE SADAT
IS SERIOUS AND THAT TO CONSIDER THAT HE IS
BLUFFING IS UNREALISTIC AND NAIVE. THIS
CHANGE IN OPINION IS BASED ON POSITIVE
INDICATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THAT
SADAT IS MAKING AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO
COMPLETE ALL PREPARATIONS BOTH IN THE
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN FRONTS TO REACH THE
"APPROPRIATE" LEVEL OF MILITARY
PREPAREDNESS. FOR EXAMPLE, SADAT IS PLACING
MORE EMPHASIS ON OBTAINING ADDITIONAL
AIRCRAFT AND TRAINING MORE PILOTS FOR THE
AIR FORCE. IN ADDITION, THE TRAINING
PROGRAM FOR THE ARMED SERVICES IN GENERAL
HAS BECOME MORE CONCENTRATED,
ACCELERATED, AND IS BEING CONDUCTED WITH
MORE SERIOUSNESS THAT HERETOFORE.
PREPARATION FOR THE HOME FRONT IS ALSO
RECEIVING MUCH MORE ATTENTION THAN IN THE
PAST. SUCH SECTORS AS CIVIL DEFENSE,
SUPPLIES, SERVICES, PROPAGANDA
DISSEMINATION, AND THE ECONOMY ARE BEING
REORGANIZED. 3. ANOTHER CONSIDERATION IS
THAT SADAT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE DESPERATE
IN HIS PLANNING. HE IS CONTINUING HIS EFFORTS
to resolve the impasse diplomatically and
IT IS BELIEVED THAT HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE
RECEPTIVE TO ANY SORT OF ENCOURAGEMENT
TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION PARTICULARLY
AS WOULD INVOLVE THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT. ANY PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF A
POSITIVE NATURE TOWARD EGYPT FROM
PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE
SADAT TO STAND DOWN SOMEWHAT ON HIS
MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATIONS DESPITE HIS, SADAT'S, RECENT SPEECH IN WHICH HE MADE RATHER SCURRILOUS REMARKS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES. ONE POSITION THAT SADAT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ACCEPT IS A RECOMMENDATION BY THE UNITED STATES FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. SADAT REMAINS SERIOUS ABOUT ACHIEVING THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS BEFORE ANY RENEWED CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL. OBSERVERS IN EGYPT ARE CONVINCED THAT SADAT IS SERIOUS ABOUT RENEWING HOSTILITIES SHOULD HIS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FAIL AND THAT IT WOULD BE NAIVE TO THINK THAT HE IS SIMPLY BLUFFING IN HIS RESOLUTE POSITION ON THIS ISSUE (CIA, 2013).

TOTAL SCORE: 22
AVERAGE SCORE: 3.14

TABLE 5.2 Declassified Evidence between 1 September and 5 October 1973

<table>
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<th>Referenced Material</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Theory Supported</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Soviet Developments: Continuing Strains in Soviet-Egyptian Relations 18 September 1973</td>
<td>Continuing differences between Moscow and Cairo have been highlighted by a reported exchange of letters between Brezhnev and Sadat. Recent indications of strains include:  * Friction over arms, in <em>A Le Monde</em> interview last week, Sadat indirectly chided the Soviets for failing to give Egypt up-to-date weaponry. Sadat approached the Soviets last month seeking to purchase additional Soviet aircraft for hard currency.  * Detente. Sadat complained that Moscow and Washington are trying to collaborate and freeze the Middle East problem in its present form. Sadat reportedly expressed greater bitterness over Soviet than US policy.  * Jewish immigration. Sadat vigorously criticized Jewish immigration from the USSR to Israel (CIA, 2013).</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: The Cairo Summit and its Repercussions 20 September 1973</td>
<td>Sadat has come to believe that the US and Israel are joined in psychological warfare against the Arabs, designed to demoralize them and ultimately to force a surrender to Israeli mastery. He has put heavy emphasis on this in his public and private remarks; he clearly fears that this US-Israeli strategy is succeeding. Sadat's recent moves to build a stronger Arab community and, internationally, to portray Israel and the US as standing alone in face of the, good opinion of mankind constitute his psychological counter strategy. Without a working relationship and normal diplomatic ties with Husayn, also a leader of a &quot;confrontation&quot; state, Sadat could hardly claim to be building the Arabs' strength. In this context, the overt estrangement between Syria and Jordan also hurts Sadat's policy, and he will undoubtedly maintain what pressure he can on</td>
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President Asad to follow Egypt's example in dealing "normally" with Husayn. What ultimately comes out of Sadat's efforts to strengthen his negotiating base and enlarge his freedom to maneuver through essentially psychological moves will depend mainly on external factors--especially Israeli perceptions--over which he will have little if any control. The Israelis have missed or chosen to miss earlier indications of Egypt's desire to rid itself of responsibility for the Palestinian problem, and they will only see signs of progress in this latest development if other factors--apprehension over diplomatic isolation or fear that US support for the Israeli position is weakening—combine to make them desire movement toward a settlement. The Israelis will not negotiate until they are ready, and whatever minor success Sadat has had in promoting misgivings in Tel Aviv about a revival of the eastern front or a new degree of military cooperation is not at this point great enough to persuade the Israelis that the moment for serious movement on their part has arrived (CIA, 2013).

3 COUNTRY: SYRIA/ISRAEL/ARAB STATES
DOI: LATE SEPTEMBER 1973
SUBJECT: COMPLETED DEPLOYMENT OF SYRIAN UNITS FOR ASSAULT UPON ISRAEL
29 September 1973

PREVIOUS REPORTS HAVE DESCRIBED DETAILS OF A SYRIAN PLAN FOR A MASSIVE ASSAULT UPON ISRAEL INVOLVING AT LEAST FOUR SYRIAN DIVISIONS. THE PROPOSED ASSAULT WAS TO BE LAUNCHED UPON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ALONG A BROAD FRONT 80 KILOMETERS WIDE, AND WAS AIMED AT OCCUPying THE GOLAN HEIGHTS UP TO THE PRE-JUNE 1967 BORDERS. EARLIER REPORTS OF THIS SYRIAN PLAN STATED THAT SYRIA WOULD BE MILITARILY SUPPORTED BY TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT FROM EGYPT, IRAQ, MOROCCO, ALGERIA, AND THE SUDAN;
**TO: The Secretary**  
**FROM: INR - Ray S. Cline**  
**Syrian Military Intentions**  
**30 September 1973**

There are reports that Syria is preparing for an attack on Israel, but conclusive evidence is lacking. In our view, the political climate in the Arab states argues against a major Syrian military move against Israel at this time. The possibility of a more limited Syrian strike -- perhaps one designed to retaliate for the pounding the Syrian Air Force took from the Israelis on September 13 -- cannot, of course, be excluded. On September 26, during a visit to Israeli positions on the Golan Heights, Defense Minister Dayan stated, according to a Jerusalem broadcast, that Syria had massed hundreds of tanks and artillery pieces just

*H owever, recent reporting has mentioned only Syrian units, which were to be in place for an assault scheduled to be ready sometime between 19 and 25 September 1973. The actual timing of the assault, if it was indeed to be mounted, was not yet definite; all units involved were to be in place by 25 September, but the attack was not automatically to begin upon positioning of the units. All Syrian army units are expected to be in position by the end of September. Infantry Divisions 5, 7, and 9 have completed their deployment in their allotted sectors. Brigade commanders have the operations order now, and are briefing battalion commanders at their headquarters in secrecy. Missiles and anti-aircraft units are deployed close to the front lines to support the attack at zero* (CIA, 2013).
beyond the Israeli lines in the area. Syrian units are expected to be in position by the end of September for an attack on Israel that has been in preparation since May. Missiles and anti-aircraft units are deployed close to the front lines, and Damascus is taking civil defense precautions. King Hussein was seriously concerned about the plan, and the Jordaneans had agreed to receive on September 30 the chief of Syrian intelligence, who was bringing a message from the Syrian Chief of Staff. (Of possible relevance in this connection, the Jordanian Premier was to carry a message from the King to Syrian President Asad on September 29 and one to Egyptian President Sadat on October 1 ...there had been strange activity by the Syrian military in the past two days and that all civilian cargo vehicles had been commandeered. Our capacity to obtain evidence on Syrian ground preparations is extremely limited, but apart from Dayan's allegation we have as yet no information to indicate that Syria is preparing for military action against Israel. If Syria were already in an advanced state of military preparation, the Israelis almost certainly would have approached us with considerable alarm through liaison channels. There is no evidence to connect the increased readiness of Egyptian air and air defense units, which went into effect on September 26, with any Syrian military moves. In our view, Syrian military activity at this time would more probably be part of a contingency plan for defense than the final steps before offensive action. When the Syrian plan was under discussion in May, Syria and Egypt were talking about resuming hostilities. This alarmed King Faisal, who tried to dampen their zeal for fighting and to make clear to the US that he expected
some shift in US policy toward Israel if Saudi oil were to flow in the requisite amounts. The indications have been that Syria and Egypt accepted Faisal's strategy and were downplaying the military option for the moment. Also arguing against a Syrian military adventure at present are the current Syrian efforts to consolidate the fedayeen movement under Saiga and Syria's desire for assurance of Jordanian cooperation in meeting an Israeli counterthrust before launching action of its own (CIA, 2013).

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<th>MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SUBJECT:</strong></td>
<td>CIA Assessment of Purported Syrian Military Preparations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>30 September 1973</strong></td>
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Since last May detailed reports of a Syrian operational plan for an assault on the Golan Heights. This operation was to be launched sometime after 15 May; it would occur between 15 July and 15 August. Another prediction was made for 30 August; and now a report says the attack is to be launched at the end of September. There has in fact been a build-up of forces in the Golan Heights area characterize the build-up as normal and similar to others observed in the past; the Syrian units remain in defensive positions. The Golan Heights area last week saw no signs of an imminent attack. The assertion that Damascus has commandeered civilian trucks for military use cannot be confirmed. Assessment: what may well be the Syrian contingency plan for attacking the Golan Heights, and last summer's maneuvers may have been conducted on the basis of this plan. The build-up referred to in press accounts can be accounted for by the arrival of SAM equipment programmed for the area, and by the shifting of units no longer deemed vital to protecting the border with Jordan. The elaborate contributions from other Arab countries in support of the attack--described in earlier accounts have not materialized, and Iraq's...
internal troubles leave it in no position to support the Syrian Army. The whole thrust of President Sadat's activities since last spring has been in the direction of bringing moral, political, and economic force to bear on Israel in tacit acknowledgment of Arab unreadiness to make war. A unilateral Syrian attack for the purpose of retaking and holding the Golan Heights has no hope of success. The defeat and destruction of the forces earmarked for the operation would cripple the Syrian Army, and would have profound consequences for the cautious and pragmatic President Asad (CIA, 2013).

<p>| 6 | Intelligence Information Cable | Reported Syrian preparations for an apparently offensive action against the Israeli occupied Golan Heights of 1 October 1973, the highest levels of the [blanked out] were of the opinion that current Syrian military activities which they believe are occurring as reported, are actually defensive in nature in spite of the original offensive nature of the Syrian operation plan. [Blanked out] reasoning is based on the following statements by Syrian officials: Asad told that he is not certain what Israel is up to, but it appears that they are going to strike if they can later. During a discussion of the need for the Arabs to avoid adventurism, Asad commented &quot;What makes you think I care less for Damascus than you care.&quot; Shihabi consistently expressed fears of an Israeli incursion into Syria and of the problems which would confront Syria if such an action were to take place. Comment: Although the Syrian deployment as previously reported is undoubtedly true, the Syrians have given the impression that they are &quot;scared stiff&quot; of an Israeli attack. This attitude has been reinforced by such actions as the recent air battle in which the Syrians lost heavily to the |
|   | Country: Syria/Israel |   |
|   | Subject: Syrian military movements toward Syrian-Israeli cease-fire line. 1 October 1973 |   | IC | 4 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>COMBINED WATCH REPORT of the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD</td>
<td>4 October 1973</td>
<td><em>Middle East We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future, although the risk of localized fighting has increased slightly as the result of the buildup of Syrian forces in the vicinity of the Golan Heights. Egyptian exercise activity under way since late September may also contribute to the possibility of incidents</em> (CIA, 2013).</td>
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**TOTAL SCORE: 34**

**AVERAGE SCORE: 4.25**
### TABLE 5.3 Declassified Evidence against IC on 6 October 1973

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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Referenced Material</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Theory Supported</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Special Meeting of the Watch Committee 6-Oct-73</td>
<td>1. The Watch Committee met in special session at 0900 on 6 October 1973 to consider the outbreak of Israeli-Arab hostilities and Soviet actions with respect to the situation. 2. We can find no hard evidence of a major, coordinated Egyptian/Syrian offensive across the Canal and in the Golan Heights area. Rather, the weight of evidence indicates an action-reaction situation where a series of responses by each side to perceived threats created an increasingly dangerous potential for confrontation. The current hostilities are apparently a result of that situation, although we are not in a position to clarify the sequence of events. It is possible that the Egyptians or Syrians, particularly the latter, may have been preparing a raid or other small-scale action. 3. The available evidence suggests that the Soviets became alarmed by the escalating situation and withdrew a number of personnel, probably dependents, on a hasty basis. This action itself served to further heighten tensions. Other than the above, we have seen no evidence of soviet military alerts or other preparedness measures (CIA, 2013).</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Intelligence Memorandum 6-Oct-73</td>
<td>6. Soviet Naval Activity in the Mediterranean: The movements of the Soviet Naval Forces in Mediterranean suggest that they had little advance warning --- at best a day or so of the potential for fighting in the Middle East. The surface forces are now beginning to concentrate in the Eastern Mediterranean, but most of the submarines are in</td>
<td>IC</td>
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Mr. Schlesinger: Does NSA have any messages that tell us who started it?
Mr. Colby: Damascus Radio says Israeli forces launched the attack.
Mr. Schlesinger: Their reputation for veracity is not very high, but if the Israelis didn't start it it's the first time in 20.
Mr. Rush: Mrs. Meir told Ambassador Keating that Israel would not launch a preemptive attack.

Adm. Moorer: Over the last two or three months, North Korean pilots have been coming into Egypt to fly the XS aircraft that the Soviets left behind there. Also the Soviets have been giving the Syrians an abnormally large number of surface-to-air missiles. It could be that Israel felt things were getting out of hand and followed their normal reaction and let fly. The missile buildup in Syria is denser than around Hanoi—and they are the new attack missiles, too. They're not operational yet, but the Israelis may have decided to try to knock them off before they became operational.
Mr. Atherton: I accept that Israel will preempt when they can. But all the evidence is that they were caught by surprise. This is the last day in the year (Yom Kippur) when they would have started something. And there were no signs of advance Israeli preparation.
Gen. Scowcroft: Yes, until yesterday they had assessed the situation as being defensive.

Mr. Rush: The Soviets were very quick in getting their people out. They must have received some good intelligence.
Mr. Colby: Egypt has been very soft in recent months. Sadat has obviously been trying to withdraw from the edge.
Mr. Rush: On that hypothesis, do you think Faisal has been deceiving Sadat?
Adm. Moorer: We had a report two weeks ago that Sadat was losing control of his military.
Gen. Scowcroft: And the buildup of Egyptian and Syrian forces has been unmistakable.
Mr. Schlesinger: That could argue either way. The Israelis may have seized the opportunity.

Mr. Colby: I've just received some additional items. They've confirmed fighting at Little Bitter Lake near Suez, with aerial dog-fights. Reuters reports that Egypt and Syria attacked Golan and Sinai and that the Israelis replied. The Israeli Military Attache here says Egypt attacked across the southern part of the Canal and that Egypt was bombing Sharm-el Shaik. I'm not sure how much of that is real.

Mr. Rush: If we accept the Israeli view that they have been attacked, this could be deadly for us in the Arab world. We could say the situation is unclear.

Mr. Schlesinger: If Egypt and Syria started this deliberately and calculatingly, the only reason would be that they think they can trigger an embargo. That is the only rational reason for proceeding in this manner, particularly with the growing relations between Faisal and Sadat.
Mr. Rush: You mean Faisal was deceived by Sadat?
Adm. Moorer: There's the remote possibility that Sadat has lost control.
Mr. Colby: All the indications are not there.
Mr. Rush: Coordination with the Syrians would have to have been without Sadat's knowledge.
Gen. Scowcroft: It would be hard for him not to know.
Adm. Moorer: He may not have been able to stop it.
Mr. Atherton: This is one of the two tracks Sadat was talking about six months ago. Then he did his flip-flop. You could make the case that his change of heart was a master deceit.
Gen. Scowcroft: If so, he was awfully clever---better than his track record would indicate.
Mr. Atherton: But we did have a report of this scenario in May.
Gen. Scowcroft: No question.

Adm. Moorer: They have two more hours of daylight there. The Syrians and Egyptians may try to do something at night when they are not so vulnerable to Israeli air. The attack began at 2:00 p.m.
Mr. Atherton: But it was apparently moved up. The original plan was to attack at nightfall.
Adm. Moorer: That argues for the Egyptians and Syrians having started it. It would be to Israel's military advantage to start at daylight and in the Arab's favor to start in the late afternoon (CIA, 2013).

1. A briefing by the Israeli military officer for the attaché corps at 1630 local time placed the blame for the attack on the Egyptians and Syrians. The Israeli officer stated that the Egyptians and Syrians launched simultaneous air attacks at 1400 local. The Arab aircraft, which were said to number in the "tens" on both fronts, attacked military targets in northern Israel, the Golan Heights and - in the western and southern Sinai. The defending Israeli
a aircraft reportedly shot down over a dozen aircraft in these initial attacks. According to the Israelis the IDF did not commence mobilizing until noon and were not yet completely mobilized. He claimed this was a planned, coordinated attack by the Syrians and Egyptians, and that the Israeli decision to mobilize was not made till today in the hopes of preventing such an attack. As a result of the Egyptian maneuvers and associated alerts, the reports of Syrian redeployments, and rumors of Israeli preparations to attack, both Arab and Israeli forces were much more than usually alert to movements by the other side and would have been conducting vigorous reconnaissance. Israeli aircraft made a fast sweep up and down the canal this morning at 0354 Tel Aviv time (CIA, 2013).

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<tr>
<th>MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT</th>
<th>6-Oct-73</th>
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<tr>
<td>FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER</td>
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<td>SUBJECT: Arab-Israeli Fighting</td>
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<td>Fighting broke out on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts at about 2:00 Middle East time (8:00 a.m. Washington). Tension had been building for several days as a result of the high state of Egyptian alert and Syrian troop redeployments. Yesterday the Soviets began to fly transport planes into Damascus and Cairo to take dependents out of the area, apparently in anticipation of imminent conflict. Early this morning the Israelis, reversing their earlier assessment, told us that they had firm intelligence that a coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack would take place before nightfall. The Israelis told us that they would not open hostilities, and we have no reason to believe that they</td>
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did. Their reconnaissance planes were active just prior to the outbreak of the fighting, however, and our intelligence sources are not exactly sure how the battle began. In the first day of combat, most of the fighting has been along the cease-fire lines. The Israelis appear to have attained control of the air, but have not bombed Arab airfields or made deep raids beyond the cease-fire lines. The Egyptians have managed to cross the Suez Canal in a few areas, and are trying to maintain their toeholds in the Sinai. Israeli counterattacks against these positions can be expected during the night. The Israelis will be very reluctant to accept a cease-fire with a return to the status quo ante (CIA, 2013).

Mr. Kissinger: How did they pull off such a surprise?
Mr. Colby: Because they had had this exercise going for the last few days, and there had been a lot of activity, much of it unimportant.
Adm. Moorer: They have done it before. They have moved their forces up to the Canal and have sent raiding parties across. They have even exercised this bridge operation. We took some pictures of it once (CIA, 2013).
TABLE 5.4 Declassified Evidence against IC after 6 October 1973

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<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Referenced Material</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Theory Supported</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: WILLIAM B. QUANDT SUBJECT: Talking Points for Meeting with Bipartisan Leadership of Congress 9-Oct-73</td>
<td>I want to make clear that neither we nor the Israelis expected this war. We had noted the Arab buildup and had queried the Israelis about it, but they told us they thought it was defensive in nature. Two hours before the war started, Prime Minister Meir sent us a message saying she thought hostilities were imminent. She volunteered that Israel would not attack first and we conveyed this message to the Arabs and Soviets. We did not stop Israel from acting (CIA, 2013).</td>
<td>IC/Policy Maker</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Bulletin 12-Oct-73</td>
<td>USSR: Soviet satellite reconnaissance of the Middle East has increased since early October. Two high resolution photoreconnaissance satellites currently are in orbit. One of these, Cosmos 597, which is in an orbit that will provide optimum coverage of the Middle East, may be brought down this morning after only six days. Cosmos 596, a low resolution photoreconnaissance satellite, was brought down early on 9 October after completing one half of the normal 12-day mission. Similarly, Soviet Elint satellite monitoring of the Middle East has been at a high level since 4 October (CIA, 2013).</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Moscow and the Coming of the Middle East War 16-Oct-13</td>
<td>The weight of evidence strongly suggests that Moscow knew in late September that Egypt and Syria were considering the initiation of hostilities. By 3 October, and probably only on that day, however, the Soviets apparently concluded that hostilities were imminent. Their actions over the period from 3 to 5 October show</td>
<td>IC</td>
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an increasing level of concern. By 5 October the Soviet leaders probably expected war to break out at any time, but they may not have learned of the precise time of attack until immediately before it occurred. The Soviets undoubtedly accumulated further evidence that hostilities were imminent over the next week or so and by 3 October the Kremlin thought it necessary to order the evacuation of Soviet dependents from Syria and Egypt. The evacuation began on 4 October, and between that date and the 6th there were other signs of Soviet concern. On 4 October, Moscow's military and intelligence components were significantly increasing their activity. A TASS man in Cairo told the US Embassy around 10 October that the Soviets first learned of Egyptian attack plans at the end of September. On 3 October Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov gained the impression from a conversation with Sadat that an attack was imminent. Vinogradov therefore recommended evacuation of dependents and Moscow concurred. AM 5 October - Soviet officials in Washington make urgent calls on State officials regarding reports of an Arab-Israeli military build up. Soviets indicate suspicion that Arab governments might be behind such reports (CIA, 2013).
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Graham.
THROUGH: General Thomas
SUBJECT: Arab-Israeli Post Mortem

23-Oct-73

The intelligence available to the community during the three weeks before hostilities was heavily weighed with what many analysts refer to as "fright factors." There were references to the assault preparations for the attack final preparations, and movement of units. The major forces in Egypt have been disposed for combat along the Suez Canal for years. There had been few changes in these forces since late 1971. President Sadat had designated 1971 as the year of decision in the Arab-Israeli struggle and it passed without evidence of decision. Training of Egyptian forces had been relatively intense for the past several years and our analysts saw the activities of late September as essentially carbon copies of a preceding series of readiness conditions, mobilization exercises and the like. The post mortem must find the differences between this period and preceding exercises and determine why the differences were discounted. The positive indicators on the Syrian front are more numerous and less equivocal, on first glance, than the indicators on the Egyptian front. My first impression here is that an unusually effective security operation was in effect. There is considerable evidence that the decision for a joint Arab attack was made prior to May, 1973. The preparation of the operation plan, development of the cover plan, and final deployment appears to have taken place with security measures and military skill. Indications of the decision by Syria and Egypt to attack have not surfaced yet. The negative indicators are vague and are interwoven into the political
background of the region. Many of the analysts believe that the Arabs realized after 1967 that a classic military victory over Israel was not possible— in this generation. Arab rhetoric and military action of 1967-1971 was viewed as a means of bringing Great Power pressure on Israel to return captured Arab territory. Therefore, a serious Arab effort to achieve classic victory was not likely as a rational decision by Arab leaders. The political signals from Sadat and Asad in recent months have been interpreted by most analysts as models of rational, restrained behavior. The relations between Syria and Egypt on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, appeared to be warmer and more effective in terms of military support in years past. Perhaps the analysts viewed this as a reason against an Arab military initiative and the Arab leaders saw it as a reason to strike before their military effectiveness declined in the face of the U.S.-Soviet détente (CIA, 2013).

5 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Post-Mortem on Middle East War
24-Oct-73
The problem will be to make a post-mortem honest. DDI and DIA are exposed as being fully on the record against an attack. The collectors in particular are taking their traditional position that the producers were given all the information and paid no attention to it. The story is a good deal more complicated than that, and such an attitude does not help to get at the truth (CIA, 2013).

6 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Our Intelligence Community Staff has begun a thorough review all intelligence community activities pertaining to the Middle East crisis. We hope to learn some valuable lessons from this exercise, and I will be happy to share them with you when the study is completed. You may,
SUBJECT : Critique of Middle East Crisis

27-Oct-73

however, be interested in some of the following preliminary conclusions: a. There was an initial analytical failure in the sense that the intelligence community did not issue a clear warning of impending Arab-Israeli hostilities. As you have noted, this was not so much a question of turning up the "facts," but one of interpretation and analysis. Over a period of time many of our Middle East analysts apparently developed a conceptual framework that simply did not allow them to accept what in retrospect turned out to be fairly good evidence of impending hostilities. Our judgments on Arab military effectiveness were also deficient and led us to initially miscalculate the course the fighting would take. Somehow we must build into our analytical process an automatic challenge or advocacy of variations to the consensus. 3. The best judge of our intelligence performance during this crisis really is with you as its principal customer. I have in train a post-mortem which will include interviews with your staff and others who might cast a light on this question and give us a basis for improvement. I would be particularly appreciative of any comments you might make beyond the quite appropriate ones you have made on our error in not predicting the outbreak of hostilities (CIA, 2013).

1. There was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 6 October. Those elements of the Intelligence Community responsible for the production of finished intelligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its imminence. The information provided by those parts of the Community responsible for intelligence collection was sufficient to prompt such a warning. Such information (derived from both human and
INTELLIGENCE
Following Review by the
United States Intelligence Board
Prepared by the
Intelligence Community Staff

technical sources) was not conclusive but was plentiful,
ominous, and often accurate.
2. Our post-mortem survey suggests that there were
errors of evaluation among all producing offices. These
can be attributed, in part, to attitudes and preconceptions
lying behind the analysis, and also to various systemic
problems affecting the analytical effort. Certain
substantive preconceptions, reinforced by official Israeli
interpretations, turned the analyst's attention principally
toward political indications that the Arabs were bent on
finding non-violent means to achieve their objectives and
away from indications (mainly military) to the contrary.
It is true, of course, that the analyst was faced with the
tremendously demanding task of discriminating between
the good and the bad in the flow of information crossing
his desk. And the machinery of which he is a part did not
always make his task any easier or provide him with
systematic ways to challenge the quality of his own
assessments.

II THE COMMUNITY'S PERFORMANCE
The problem of whether there was or was not an
intelligence "failure" concerning the Middle East in 1973
can be subdivided into three primary questions:
(1) Were intelligence analysts given enough information
in time to conclude (before 6 October) that the possibility
of war was sufficiently serious to justify some form of
warning to intelligence consumers? Yes, Community
analysts were provided with a plenitude of information
which should have suggested, at a minimum; that they
take very seriously the threat of war in the near term.
Though not conclusive, and though much of it could be
explained away as signifying a rehearsal rather than the
main event, data from a variety of sources indicated in
September that something very big was brewing in both Egypt and Syria. (See the discussion of the Collection Effort in Section III) This, together with a general awareness (confirmed again in the spring of this year) that Sadat wished to keep his military options open, should have led the analysts to assign far more weight to the possibility that Sadat's intentions were hostile.

(2) Assuming that the information made available to them did indeed seem to warrant or demand such forewarning, did the analysts in fact effectively utilize it? No, as indicated, the assessments which appeared in various intelligence periodicals, spot reports, and memoranda, did not sufficiently utilize the information available and consequently did not provide a warning of impending hostilities. A thorough search of the material issued prior to 6 October has failed to turn up any official statement from any office or committee responsible for producing finished, analytical intelligence which contributed anything resembling a warning, qua warning. There was some rather timid cautionary advice, of the sort, emphasized below, in quotations from two assessments:

“We continue to believe that an outbreak of major Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the immediate future, although the risk of localized fighting has increased slightly as the result of the buildup of Syrian forces in the vicinity of the Golan Heights. Egyptian exercise activity under way since late September may also contribute to the possibility of incidents.”


“There are reports that Syria is preparing for an attack on Israel but conclusive evidence is lacking. In our view, the political climate in the Arab states argues against a
major Syrian military move against Israel at this time. The possibility of a more limited Syrian strike perhaps one designed to retaliate for the pounding the Syrian Air Force took from the Israelis on September 13—cannot, of course, be excluded.

-INR Memorandum to the Secretary, 30 September 1973. But these qualifications deal only with the possibility of small-scale military actions. They thus could not have served as warnings of major hostilities even had they been far less different than they in fact were. (3) If analysts did not provide forewarning, what did they offer in its stead? Instead of warnings, the Community's analytical effort in effect produced reassurances. That is to say, the analysts in reacting to indicators which could be interpreted in themselves as portents of hostile Arab actions against Israel, sought in effect to reassure their audience that the Arabs would not resort to war, at least not deliberately. Thus: "Syria-Egypt- The movement of Syrian troops and Egyptian military readiness are considered to be coincidental and not designed to lead to major hostilities."

-DIA Intelligence Summr, 3 October 1973.

"Egypt - The exercise and alert activities under way in Egypt may be on a somewhat larger scale and more realistic than previous exercises, but they do not appear to be preparing for a military offensive against Israel."


"Egypt- The current, large-scale mobilization exercise may be an effort to soothe internal problems as much as to improve military capabilities. Mobilization of some personnel, increased readiness of isolated units, and
greater communication security are all assessed as parts of the exercise routine....there are still no military or political indicators of Egyptian intentions or preparations to resume hostilities with Israel."
-DIA Intelligence Summary, 6 October 1973.
"Israel-Egypt-Syria-Both the Israelis and the-Arabs are becoming increasingly concerned about the military activities of the other, although neither side appears to be bent on initiating hostilities...For Egypt a military initiative makes little sense at this critical juncture....Another round of hostilities would almost certainly destroy Sadat's painstaking efforts to invigorate the economy and would run counter to his current efforts to build a united Arab political front, particularly among the less militant, oil-rich states. For the normally cautious Syrian president, a military adventure now would be suicidal, and he has said so."
The Watch Committee met in special session at 0900 on 6 October 1973 to consider the outbreak of Israeli-Arab hostilities...We can find no hard evidence of a major, coordinated Egyptian Syrian offensive across the Canal and in the Golan Heights area. Rather, the weight of evidence indicates an action-reaction situation where a series of responses by each side to perceived threats created an increasingly dangerous potential for confrontation. The current hostilities are apparently a result of that situation....It is possible that the Egyptians or Syrians, particularly the latter, may have been preparing a raid or other small-scale action.
There were many reasons why the intelligence analysis which reached the consumers conveyed these essentially
reassuring messages, not all of them good. But surely it will be recalled, as analytical shortcomings are identified in this paper, that the hindsight of the post-mortem process bestows an element of wisdom which is denied those--in this instance Intelligence analysts--who must deal in foresight. Indeed, what may seem so clear now did not, could not, seem so clear then. Still, there is no gainsaying the judgment that, whatever the rationale, the principal conclusions concerning the imminence of hostilities reached and reiterated by those responsible for intelligence analysis were quite simply, obviously, and starkly--wrong.

III. THE COLLECTION EFFORT
In intelligence jargon, the principal categories of the effort to obtain (collect) Information are HUMINT (human sources: clandestine, military, and diplomatic), SIGINT (encompassing communications [COMINT] and electronic intelligence [ELINT] and PHOTINT (including satellite photography). A post-mortem survey of collection activities in these three areas of acquisition during the crisis period reveals that there were problems which were peculiar to each country involved and which (in the aggregate affected the quality, dissemination, and ultimate value of the data collected. But there were no major weaknesses or uncompensated omissions in the overall effort. In particular, information concerning, for example, the kinds and numbers of weapons in the Arab's inventory was adequate (though the effectiveness of some Soviet weapons--e.g., the SA-6, which had not previously been observed in combats--came as something of a surprise) some HUMINT too should be counted as quite good. Intelligence from Human Sources Specifically concerning clandestine reporting, it is apparent (at least
in retrospect) that in late September gave a clear indication of impending hostilities Syrian Army units are expected to be in position by the end of September. Missiles and antiaircraft units are deployed close to the front lines to support the attack at zero hour. Cities, particularly Damascus, are in the process of taking all possible civil defense precautions (CIA, 2013).

| 8 | Central Intelligence Bulletin 3-Apr-74 | *ISRAEL: The preliminary report issued late yesterday by the five-member Agranat Commission, which investigated Israeli shortcomings connected with the October war, praised Prime Minister Meir for doing in a responsible manner everything she could. It also cleared Defense Minister Dayan of direct responsibility, in view of the advice and information given him by Chief of Staff Elazar and intelligence chief Zeira. Elazar, while rejecting the commission's accusations, promptly announced his resignation, which has been accepted by the cabinet. The others named will probably follow suit. Placing the blame squarely on the military, the preliminary report recommended that Elazar and Major General Gonen, commander of the Egyptian front at the start of the war, be suspended from active duty pending the commission's final report, which is expected late this month or early next. The report further recommended removing General Zeira as intelligence chief and dismissing other senior military intelligence officers, including Brigadier General Shalev, Zeira's deputy for estimates. The report will only partially mollify the government's critics, who are likely to charge the commission with turning a blind eye to the larger question of fixing political responsibility for the October failings. The opposition may also criticize the commission for seemingly making a scapegoat of the military, which | IC | 2 |
The Israelis, because of overconfidence and because they failed to recognize that their occupation of the Suez Canal's east bank deprived them of advance warning of an Egyptian attack, did not react to mounting evidence of Arab intentions. Long before the war, the Egyptians had built a series of earth mounds overlooking the Israeli side of the canal. They were thought to be no more than observation posts. On the outbreak of war, however, these mounds sprouted tanks and antitank units, the latter armed with Sagger missiles carried by men or BRDM vehicles (CIA, 2013).

There were a number of reasons why US intelligence did not do a better job in anticipating the Egyptian-Syrian attacks on Israel in October 1973. To an important degree, the Intelligence Community relied heavily on Israeli intelligence for data and judgments on the Middle East. Although the Israelis had previously been remarkably accurate, in this instance they were not. President Nixon was "stunned by the failure of Israeli intelligence. They were among the best in the world, and they too, had been caught off guard." Henry Kissinger's recollection is that "every Israeli (and American) analysis
before October 1973 agreed that Egypt and Syria lacked the military capability to regain their territory by force of arms; hence there would be no war." There were many reasons why Israeli intelligence miscanned the coming attacks. In an earlier invasion false alarm in May 1973, when Israeli Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. David Elazar had predicted war, Israeli military intelligence leaders had disagreed. This judgment had heightened the intelligence officers' credibility. In turn, these officers held stubbornly to certain questionable "lessons" learned from the 1967 war: that Egypt would not attack until its air force had neutralized Israel's, and that Israel would have at least 48 hours' warning before an invasion. There were many reasons why Israeli intelligence miscanned the coming attacks. Since Secretary Kissinger had been prodding Israel toward peace negotiations its leaders did not want, they may have deliberately understated their degree of alarm about a surprise attack for fear that the White House would push them all the harder toward such negotiations. Such a thesis can be inferred from Kissinger's own account: "The approaching [Middle East peace] diplomacy distorted the Israelis' perspective as well. They acquired a vested interest in belittling Arab threats lest the United States use the danger of war as a pretext to press Israel for concessions." In addition, during the crucial weeks just before 6 October, Israeli attention had been distracted by Palestinian terrorists' attack on a train bearing Soviet Jewish emigres to Vienna (the "Schonau" affair), and by the subsequent negotiations for the release of those emigrants taken hostage. That crisis dominated the news in Israel, while Egyptian and Syrian matters were given back-page treatment. The terrorists in question were members of the
Syrian-controlled Sai’qa. It has never been established whether the timing of their terrorist attack was a coincidence or a deliberate act to divert Israeli watchfulness. Moreover, the mastermind of the Egyptian-Syrian invasions of Israel, President Sadat, had done a brilliant job of misleading the Israelis-and American intelligence. As Kissinger later wrote, Sadat "paralyzed his opponents with their own preconceptions." By orchestrating a false war scare in May, and then repeating more "scares" in the form of Egyptian and Syrian troop concentrations opposite Sinai and the Golan, Sadat lulled Israeli watchfulness. Hence Israeli and US intelligence judged the Arab military concentrations in the first week of October to be simply more of the same. And, whether or not the Sai’qa terrorist attack was also part of a larger Egyptian-Syrian deception plan, Sadat had created a certain aura of progress in Arab-Israeli deliberations at the United Nations, a development that found an expectant Henry Kissinger there when the attacks on Israel occurred (CIA, 2013).

TOTAL SCORE: 30
AVERAGE SCORE: 3

TOTAL SCORE FOR IC DECLASSIFIED EVIDENCE: 108
TOTAL AVERAGE SCORE FOR IC DECLASSIFIED EVIDENCE: 3.48

## APPENDIX 6

### TABLE 6.1 Declassified Evidence against Policy Makers before 1 September 1973

<table>
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<tr>
<th>#</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN PLEA FOR U.S. MEDIATION FROM: AMB. RICHARD HELMS, TEHRAN TO: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON 6 April 1973</td>
<td>SHAH STATED THAT HE SENSED IN ZAYYAT'S ATTITUDE ALMOST IRRESISTIBLE DOMESTIC PRESSURE IN EGYPT TO RESUME SOME TYPE OF HOSTILITIES AGAINST ISRAEL WITH LARGE ARMY ON ACTIVE DUTY PLUS CONCOMITANT COSTS OF MAINTAINING IT, EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP FEELING INCREASINGLY IMPELLED QUOTE TO DO SOMETHING UNQUOTE. SHAH SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD ZAYYAT MOST EMPHATICALLY THAT EGYPT SHOULD NOT FRONTALLY ATTACK ISRAEL ACROSS THE CANAL UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. QUOTE FIRE YOUR GUNS IF YOU WANT UNQUOTE THE SHAH STATES HE TOLD HIM BUT AN ATTACK INTO SINAI QUOTE WOULD BE SUICIDAL FOR EGYPT UNQUOTE (CIA, 2013).</td>
<td>Policy Maker</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER SUBJECT: Information Items 1 May 1973</td>
<td>Egyptian Strategy: Egyptian strategy during the recent UN Security Council debate on Israel's Beirut raid provides one more indication of President Sadat's intentions. Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyat initially took a very hard line that would have forced us to veto the proposed resolution. At the last moment, however, the Egyptian tactics shifted, in part out of deference to Lebanese requests, but perhaps also as a signal to us that a full-scale confrontation was not desired at this point. Zayyat also wanted to be certain of accomplishing his primary task of scheduling a Security Council review of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict in</td>
<td>Policy Maker</td>
<td>4</td>
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May, which required our support. That Egyptian strategy suggests that President Sadat may want to see pressure on the U.S. build steadily over a sustained period rather than to provoke a confrontation prematurely. He is concurrently laying the groundwork for a political effort to parallel his widely advertised preparations for war. The question after that will be whether Sadat will choose to use later political developments - the U.S.-Soviet summit, plans for Egyptian-Libyan merger, and the Israeli elections -- as further excuses to delay military action. Some military preparations have already begun, but as yet no one here sees a pattern of planning for a specific operation at a specific time. Although it does not now appear that Sadat has made a final decision on his future strategy, he is clearly engaged in an effort to convince others that he has a realistic military option. For the moment, he seems to be trying to use it to force political progress, but the more he raises tension, the greater will be the immediate danger of hostilities if he decides political efforts are at a dead end. This estimate assumes that Sadat is still operating primarily on the basis of rational calculation; more and more of his Arab contacts, however, have come away from recent conversations with him persuaded that he is in a frame of mind to "do something foolish" (CIA, 2013).

3 MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Middle East Military Situation 5 May 1973

These moves are part of general Arab planning to increase the pressures on Israel. The transfers of men and equipment strengthen to some degree the armed forces of Syria and Egypt, but the main effect at this stage is psychological. The major gap in the Arab lineup is the refusal of the Jordanian government to place its forces at the disposal of the Egyptian-Syrian
"eastern front." Egyptian support of the anti-American campaign by the fedayeen is designed to step up pressure on the US, and through Washington, on Israel. The ruckus between the fedayeen and the Lebanese government is an embarrassment to Egypt and the other Arabs; it distracts attention from that aspect of the Arab-Israeli confrontation that Cairo wants to emphasize even though it also contributes to the sense of tension surrounding the area. The suddenness of the flare-up in Lebanon illustrates the danger that in the next few months the various military moves may develop a momentum that Cairo will not be able to control. The events of 1967 argue that most Arab governments are not able to resist giving the situation a shove once it has started rolling. Sadat has said so often that he is now dead serious that it will be progressively more difficult to find excuses for inaction, more especially when other Arab leaders have fulfilled their commitments to his cause. The Soviet role in this situation is somewhat ambivalent. While they have an interest in sustaining a level of tension that underscores the seriousness of the problem and the need for US initiatives and Israeli concessions, the Soviet leaders are counseling the Arabs against precipitate military action. The Soviet position in the area would suffer if the Arabs, using Soviet weapons, were beaten again. Another war would risk an involvement that might endanger detente with the US--the centerpiece of Brezhnev’s foreign policy. Sadat’s May Day speech indicated that he has felt pressure from the USSR to continue to pursue a "peaceful solution." There are also signs that Moscow is using third parties to warn Cairo of the dangers of new war. The Israelis will be watching most particularly for any signs that the
Egyptians or other Arabs are developing a serious capability to bomb Israel itself. Such a development would lead the Israelis to consider a pre-emptive strike. The timing and the atmospherics for such a strike would be influenced by diplomatic considerations, particularly the impact on the US. We have seen no sign that the Israelis are close to thin point yet; the risk of losses would be higher and the rewards probably lower than in 1967 (CIA, 2013).

4  PRESIDENT'S TUESDAY BRIEFING
7 May 1973

The Soviets and the Mid East: In recent days we have received a number of reports which suggest that the Soviets are trying to caution Egypt against renewed hostilities and that they are doing this through third parties, notably the Syrians who have played an intermediary role before. There is also the related report that Syrian President Asad made a secret trip to Moscow last week; some Arab press accounts are saying Asad returned from Moscow and immediately called off Syrian-based fedayeen activity in last week's Lebanese confrontation. The Soviets have also reportedly asked the French to counsel Egypt against any renewed armed action. We have no basis for assessing these indicators yet. Such a Soviet effort would not be inconsistent with their apparent efforts to anti-US tensions after the Israeli raid on Beirut.

Rather, the Soviets, on the broader issue of war with Israel, may be concerned at the combined circumstances now of inter-Arab efforts in recent weeks to build up Egyptian and Syrian military capability, Sadat's increasing talk of "some" action to break the stalemate or, at a minimum, to draw attention of the US and USSR with particular reference to the June summit, and the fact that both Egyptian and Syrian military forces are at

Policy Maker

3
These preparations are as necessary for psychological as for military purposes. President Sadat hopes to arouse US concern and thereby lead the US to press Israel for concessions. A. Sadat probably does not want to risk war at this juncture, and he undoubtedly hopes that his psychological gambits will obviate the need for it; even if they fail to arouse us, they may help his Arab image temporarily. B. He further hopes that the UN session on the Middle East (late May or early June) or the US-Soviet summit, or both, will produce diplomatic pressure on Israel. C. In the meantime, his military preparations serve to create tensions that lend urgency to his diplomacy.

IX. Sadat has been under pressure to avoid hostilities. A. The Soviets—worried not only about the effect of another Arab defeat on their position in the Middle East, but also about the effect of a new crisis on detente with the US—have been advising against precipitate action.

X. We doubt that Egypt will deliberately initiate military action, at least until after the conclusion of the US-Soviet summit, even though the temptation will be strong to do something that would focus attention on the problem as the summit draws near. A. The period from mid-June on will be a particularly dangerous one if Sadat is not able to argue convincingly, from the summit results or from other developments, that he is making progress. B. The military preparations—and the pressures for militancy from Qadhafi—could develop a momentum of their own even if Sadat calculated that he could draw back at the last moment. He could also talk himself into believing that the Israeli response would be

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<th>DCI WSAG BRIEFING 14 May 1973</th>
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<td>Policy Maker 4</td>
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manageable

XII. Israeli officials are playing Egyptian threats of renewed hostilities in low key, while at the same time keeping at the ready. A. Mrs. Meir has said that it would not be logical for Egypt to renew the fight and be defeated; but Israel must be prepared for Sadat to do the "illogical."

XIII. The Israeli attitudes stem in part from a desire to avoid Big Power intervention and the fear that a "dangerous" situation might ultimately lead to an imposed settlement--a development they have always felt would be detrimental to Israel's security. A. The Israelis believe that Sadat's moves are designed less for fighting than to create a climate of concern that would help Egypt get better terms. The Israelis also say they believe that much of Sadat's activity is for domestic effect.

XIV. At the same time, Israel continues to demonstrate to the Arabs its military power (e.g., the recent Independence Day parade and fly-by in Jerusalem, and current maneuvers of the crack Golani brigade on the Golan Heights). A. Israeli officials have repeatedly warned publicly that the Arabs would be dealt another devastating military defeat. B. Israel's traditional preoccupation with the advantages of surprise in warfare suggests that it will--if the Arabs make moves that Israel feels threaten its security--under-take pre-emptive action. F. Libyan Mirages before they could be used against them. While Egypt is viewed as the principal enemy, Defense Minister Dayan has also warned Syria. He indicated that Israel would regard the move of regular Syrian forces into southern Lebanon as a threat to Israeli security (CIA, 2013).
general Middle East war in 1969, but they are pretty well out of date now. They need to be revised in the light of the changed situation. What are the situations we are most likely to face now? I can see, for instance, the following: Resumption of the war of attrition A general Arab offensive mounted without regard for the probability that the Israelis would defeat it. An Israeli pre-emptive attack. 2. A coordinated Egyptian-Syrian offensive perhaps with Iraqi reserve support. King Hussein believes this scenario to be likely. Egypt's minimal objective, as in the previous case, would be to raise tensions and stimulate outside diplomatic efforts to end the crisis and impose a settlement. At a maximum, the Egyptians might hope to cross the Canal and hold some territory until a new cease-fire could be arranged. US and Soviet interests once again would depend on the evolution of the conflict, with pressures for US involvement building if the Israelis were unable to counter the Arab offensive thrust quickly (CIA, 2013).
information they are preparing for war. 3. Forward movement of SAM sites in large numbers towards the Canal would cause concern. However, the missile order along the Canal has generally not changed. 4. Stationing of "symbolic" forces of other Arabs on Egyptian territory is not an indicator of war. Such moves relate to Sadat's efforts to portray a closing of Arab ranks, to enhance his image (in his view) re the US. They do not change any balance of forces in the area. 2. Analysis of Syrian posture. 1. Syria has taken steps which could be interpreted as preparation for war: (a) Syrian forces on the front are more actively conducting exercises than in previous months. (b) Syrian air force attack exercises against Israel are in their greatest period of concentration and for the first time include MIG-21 participation. (c) Recent arrivals of AN-12 aircraft from Algeria are noteworthy. [Algeria has reportedly promised to station some MIG squadrons, possibly some MIG-21s, in Syria.] 2. However, there are also indicators calm will prevail, the order of battle along Golan is quiet and there are forthcoming elections at Home which will occupy the Syrian military. Overall conclusions 1. Probability is low that Sadat intends to renew hostilities as he realizes the severe consequences. Moreover, Sadat doesn't really both an affront to his personal self-respect and position (which renewal of fighting would defeat). 2. Syria will not independently renew fighting, though it may participate at some future point if Egypt began fighting first (CIA, 2013).
movements have included:  -Transfer of over fifty aircraft to Egypt--from Libya (Mirages), Iraq and possibly Saudi Arabia.  -Algerian transfer of aircraft to Libya and reports of an Algerian promise to transfer aircraft also to Syria.  -Moroccan commitment to station some Moroccan troops in Syria.  -Related training on new equipment, especially in Egypt and Syria, and an upgrading in the alert status of their armed forces.  The current assessment of these moves is as follows: 1. They do not threaten Israel's superiority, an opinion which the Israelis share. At a minimum, however, CIA believes they could make it more difficult for Israel to prevent some air attacks, particularly if Egypt and Syria were to launch a coordinated attack.  2. There is inconclusive evidence on the issue of whether President Sadat has decided to resume hostilities. The latest official Israeli estimate is that the probability is low and that his maneuvers are to support his and the Arab political position. Israeli defense officials are concerned about the Syrian military build-up, but they presently do not believe Syria would independently initiate hostilities with Israel (CIA, 2013).

| National Intelligence Estimate Possible Egyptian-Israeli Hostilities: Determinants and Implications 17 May 1973 | Believing that perpetuation of the present Middle Eastern situation is intolerable for himself and for Egypt, Sadat is pressing ahead with his campaign of threats in the hope of inspiring US pressure on Israel. This could, over time, get out of control. But substantial Egyptian-Israeli hostilities appear unlikely in the next few weeks. The danger probably will rise if Middle East debates in the UN Security Council (early June) and the Nixon-Brezhnev summit (late June) pass without any results Sadat considers useful. The US and the USSR have some, but limited, leverage in the situation. | Policy Maker | 5 |
Among factors tending to precipitate hostilities:
Continuing diplomatic stalemate, combined with Egyptian conviction that hostilities would stimulate more active US and Soviet involvement in the settlement process Egyptian calculation that hostilities would trigger anti-US action by the Saudis and other oil producers - leading to US pressures on Israel. Provocative actions by Egypt or other Arab parties and preemption or retaliation by Israel

I. THE PROBLEM

II. SADAT'S CURRENT INTENTIONS

2. Sadat is under heavy pressure to achieve some progress toward recovering lost territory. Having been, in his view, responsive to US and UN initiatives and having the Soviet military advisers, he now field. Since he has, in the last two years, become US more conspicuous than ever in the role of Israel's arms supplier. He believes that for him and for Egypt, to do nothing is to perpetuate an intolerable situation.

3. Sadat does not yet appear committed to an attack on the Israelis. While military movements to date have put Egypt in a somewhat better position to launch a military action, additional preparations would be required for any sizable move. Further, the campaign of threats and warnings probably is intended to continue through two pending events that offer Sadat another chance to bring pressure on the US (and thereby on Israel): Middle East debates in the UN Security Council (early June) and the Nixon-Brezhnev summit (late June). Thus, hostilities appear unlikely in the next few weeks.

4. Psychological brinkmanship is no new tactic for the Egyptians. The war of attrition (1969-1970) was an Egyptian attempt to increase US anxiety and to force US diplomatic action
toward Israeli concessions. It resulted, among other things, in US arms sales to Israel and devastating Israeli air raids on Egypt. In 1970, Egypt agreed to a cease fire and to enter indirect negotiations-through Jarring. In 1971, Egypt was willing to discuss with the US an interim agreement. These were all ways of seeking favorable peace terms. They all failed. Subsequently, Cairo switched tactics-trying to pressure Moscow and to appeal to the US. 5. In the period beyond the summit, Egyptian calculations may change. The danger of hostilities probably will rise if the UN debates and the summit pass without any results judged useful by Cairo. This does not mean that hostilities will then become inevitable or even probable. Sadat and his advisers remain aware of Arab military weaknesses. And they are not under compelling domestic pressure to go to war. But in the next few weeks or months the Egyptians probably will have postured, gesticulated, threatened, and talked themselves closer to the brink than they now are. Sadat wants a controlled crisis, but he cannot control the reactions of the very many other parties involved. Moreover, in limited tensions change with events; events can assume a momentum of their own.

III. ISRAEL'S POSITION
6. Israeli desires with regard to the summit are quite different from those of Egypt; Israel does not want, the US to engage in serious discussions of the Middle East with the USSR. Israel wants the US to remain calm about the Arab-Israeli situation and will be particularly careful about contributing to military
solution of the Arab-Israeli problem on terms tolerable to Egypt can only come about through actions of the Great Powers. They were frustrated by the failure of the USSR to push the Egyptian cause in the Moscow summit of 1972. Their disappointment was reflected in, for example, the unceremonious ordering of the Soviet military withdrawal from Egypt. They are trying again to persuade the Great Powers to act, and the US is the principal target of their efforts. If Sadat is once again disappointed, the temptation to resort to military action in order to force the US hand might prove irresistible (CIA, 2013).

| 10 | To: The Acting Secretary From: INR -Ray S. Cline Growing Risk of Egyptian Resumption of Hostilities With Israel 31 May 1973 | A recent National Intelligence Estimate 30-73, May 17, 1973, (copy attached) concludes that "substantial Egyptian-Israeli hostilities appear unlikely in the next few weeks" but that the danger of Egyptian resumption of hostilities "probably will rise if the UN debates and the summit pass without any results judged useful by Cairo". INR is inclined to state the case on the risk of hostilities for a political purpose with a little more urgency. If the UN debate of next week produces no convincing movement in the Israeli-Egyptian impasse, our view is that the resumption of hostilities by autumn will become a better than ever lot, and that there is even a slight chance that Cairo may precipitate events before or during the June 13 Nixon-Brezhnev summit. Sadat now considers that the cease-fire serves only American and Israeli interests. It is facilitating the integration of the Sinai (and other occupied Arab lands) into the Israeli economic, political, and military systems. Moreover, American help is giving Israel a steadily increasing military advantage over Sadat. He believes that the US lost interest in ... a major effort at |

| Policy Maker | 5 |
an overall settlement after the cease-fire ... into force, and that the US-backed interim agreement would only play into Israeli hands. Sadat's national security adviser, Hafiz Ismail, has recently been saying to European leaders that the no-war, no-peace situation is more dangerous for the future of Egypt than war itself. To be sure, this is a useful line to use in order to increase Western anxieties about a crisis, but it probably accurately reflects Sadat's feeling that the present situation is both an affront to his personal self-respect and ruinous of national morale, dignity, and constructive purpose. For him, the key to an escape from this debilitating situation is the recovery of the Sinai, at least in the formal sense of its return to Egyptian sovereignty. Out of respect for Israel's capability for military retaliation, Sadat has long preferred a political settlement to renewed combat, and so far, he has indeed confined his efforts to the political field. Since he has, in the last two years, become convinced that Israel will make no adequate concessions on its own, through Jarring or in any other channel, he has begun to concentrate on trying to build up pressures on Washington of a diplomatic, economic, and psychological nature to persuade the US to exact concessions from Israel. These steps reflect Sadat's recognition that Washington has a key role in Middle Eastern developments, in terms of both American relations with Israel and American policy on other major regional issues. Lately, however, even these pressures on the U.S. no longer seem very promising to him, and mounting evidence indicates that he is becoming ever more strongly tempted to resort to arms. Although he has no illusions that Egypt can defeat
Israel militarily, he seems on the verge of concluding that only limited hostilities against Israel stand any real chance of breaking the negotiating stalemate by forcing the big powers to intervene with an impaired solution. Should he shed his last doubts about whether military action is essential to achieve this American shift, the only remaining decision would relate to the timing and scope of his move. The outcome of the debate will also significantly influence the timing of any new Egyptian resort to arms. If Cairo believes that it has established a strong momentum in its favor, if Moscow has promised Sadat that it will vigorously press Nixon during the summit, or if some short-term negotiating initiative has been launched, Egypt will very probably refrain from starting hostilities before or during the summit. In fact, there is a strong chance that Sadat will see things this way; nevertheless, it is still possible, though much less likely, that Sadat may feel so desperate about moving off dead-center that he will act in the next few weeks to force his problem to the top of the Big Two's agenda. Although there have been many diplomatic and intelligence reports about coordinated Syrian and Egyptian plans for a simultaneous invasion of the Golan Heights and the Sinai respectively, it is not very relevant to which the credibility of any particular military scenario. From Sadat's point of view, the overriding desiderates is some form of military action which can be sustained long enough, despite Israeli counterattacks, both to activate Washington and Moscow and to galvanize the other Arab states, especially the major oil producers into anti-American moves. Sadat knows that Israeli air power can inflict massive damage on Egyptian (and Syrian) military and
industrial installations. However, he may believe that Israel will refrain from heavy bombing of civilian targets and from acquiring and holding additional areas on the western side of the Suez Canal. Whatever Egypt's combat prospects, there is no doubt that Sadat has already made major progress in involving other Arab countries in his preparations for confrontation with Israel (and the US). For one thing, there is has been a variety of actual or projected deployments of Arab forces closer to the front line, including Libyan Mirages, Iraqi Hawker Hunters, and possibly Kuwaiti and Saudi Lightenings to Egypt, Algerian MiGs to Libya, and Moroccan troops to Syria. Both Husayn and Faysal appear convinced that Egypt will initiate hostilities. While Husayn fears that another Arab defeat will make him a scapegoat if he has avoided the fray (as he will surely try to do), Faysal has lent support to Sadat's psychological warfare efforts by indicating to Washington the possibility of an eventual reduction or shutdown in the flow of Saudi oil to the US (CIA, 2013).

11 TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER (EYES ONLY), WHITE HOUSE
FROM: AMB. HELMS, TEHRAN
7 July 1973

AS SOVIET ARMS POUR INTO SYRIA AND IRAQ, HUSSEIN HAS LEARNED FROM HIS INTELLIGENCE SERVICE THAT AN ATTACK FOR PURPOSE OF RETAKING GOLAN HEIGHTS WAS ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR JUNE, HAS OBVIOUSLY SLIPPED, BUT COULD OCCUR AT ANY TIME FROM NOW ON. JORDANIANS HAVE COPY OF ACTUAL MILITARY PLAN WHICH HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH EGYPTIANS. (YOU CAN GET IT FROM AGENCY IF ITS DETAILS ARE OF INTEREST.) IT HAS ALSO BEEN COORDINATED WITH IRAQ IN THE PROCESS OF SECRET MILITARY TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES,
ACCORDING TO JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE. (HUSSEIN TOLD ME IN ULTIMATE CONFIDENCE THAT ONE OF THEIR SOURCES IS COMMANDER OF ONE OF ARMORED BRIGADES WHICH WOULD LEAD ASSAULT ON ISRAELI ANTI-TANK DEFENSES. IN ADDITION, JORDANIANS AND ISRAELIS ARE EXCHANGING INTELLIGENCE THESE DAYS ON MILITARY THREAT.) OF COURSE, FOREGOING MAY BE EXAGGERATED, ATTACK MAY NEVER COME, SYRIA MAY CONTENT HERSELF WITH PRESSURING LEBANON ON FEDAYEEN ISSUE AND LEAVE GOLAN HEIGHTS ALONE. BUT TO HUSSEIN, ADVENT OF ALGERIAN, MOROCCAN, EVEN SUDANESE TROOPS PLUS SOME EQUIPMENT MEANS SERIOUS MILITARY PLANS ARE AFOOT IN SYRIA. HE POINTS OUT THAT THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY BRIGADE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO DEPART JORDAN FOR IRAQ TO GET TRAINING TO BE USED FOR FOMENTING TROUBLE IN PERSIAN GULF AREA. (ALTHOUGH PALESTINIANS ARE TRAINING IN IRAQ, IT SEEMS A BIT ALARMIST TO BELIEVE THEY WOULD USE REGULAR ARMY MEN IN BRIGADE STRENGTH, OR LESS, WHEN THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF RESIDENT TERRORISTS IN GULF TO CARRY OUT DESIRED TASKS) (CIA, 2013).

TOTAL SCORE: 49
AVERAGE SCORE: 4.45

TABLE 6.2 Declassified Evidence against Policy Makers after 6 October 1973

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<td>2</td>
<td>Ginsburg, Mitch. 12 September 2013. Golda Meir: 'My heart was drawn to a preemptive strike, but I was scared.' The Times of Israel (Assessed 04 December 2013) <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/golda-meir-my-heart-was-drawn-to-a-preemptive-strike-but-i-was-scared/">http://www.timesofisrael.com/golda-meir-my-heart-was-drawn-to-a-preemptive-strike-but-i-was-scared/</a></td>
<td>Because the article should be read in its entirety, the reader should follow the link under Referenced Material.</td>
<td>Policy Maker</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Miskin, Maayana. 31 October 2013. Revealed: Info Withheld from PM before Yom Kippur War Israel National News (Assessed 19 December 2013) <a href="http://www.timesofisrael.com/golda-meir-my-heart-was-drawn-to-a-preemptive-strike-but-i-was-scared/">http://www.timesofisrael.com/golda-meir-my-heart-was-drawn-to-a-preemptive-strike-but-i-was-scared/</a></td>
<td>Because the article should be read in its entirety, the reader should follow the link under Referenced Material.</td>
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**TOTAL SCORE: 15**

**AVERAGE SCORE: 5**

**TOTAL SCORE FOR DECLASSIFIED PM EVIDENCE: 64**

**TOTAL AVERAGE SCORE FOR DECLASSIFIED PM EVIDENCE: 4.5**