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A Lealet in One Hand: Psychological Warfare Tactics in the Edward Lilly Papers

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A LEALET IN ONE HAND: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TACTICS
IN THE EDWARD LILLY PAPERS

A Master Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

Of

American Public University

By

Gloria Van Rees

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

December 2016

American Public University

Charles Town, WV
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my Husband and Mother
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. Jon Mikolashek for his patience and guidance throughout the thesis process. I also appreciate the staff of the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

A LEALET IN ONE HAND: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TACTICS
IN THE EDWARD LILLY PAPERS

by

Gloria Van Rees

American Public University System, Approval Date Here

Charles Town, West Virginia

Professor Jon Mikolashek, Thesis Professor

The following is a history of psychological warfare tactics as seen in the papers of Edward Lilly, former historian of the Office of War Information. The study considers Lilly’s position in the OWI during World War II and the subsequent collection of papers he gathered on the topic after the war. The study includes a discussion of military policy in World War II as it pertains to psychological warfare and the how that appears in the draft chapters of Lilly’s unpublished writings. The examination discusses the creation of psychological warfare tactics, as well as the men who made the decisions. The Edward Lilly papers are by no means a complete history of psychological warfare in World War II, but rather a specific window into the innovations of psychological warfare employed by the U.S. military to defeat the Axis powers in Europe.
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INTRODUCTION

Psychological warfare is as potent a weapon as any bullet. Hearts and minds may be targets for infantry, but they are a very different target for propaganda and psychological warfare units. Psychological warfare has been part of war since man picked up weapons against each other however World War II saw the beginning of modern psychological warfare. Much has been written about psychological warfare in clandestine operations, yet I intend to focus on psychological warfare efforts as documented by Edward Lilly in his role as a historian for Office of War Information during the war. Lilly’s position meant the bulk of information regarding the Allied Psychological Warfare effort made it across his desk. It is worth noting that though there are a fewer papers dealing with espionage operations, the vast amount of information within the Lilly papers deals with psychological warfare operations on the front lines and the work to meet those demands. The Lilly papers contain a lot of insight into propaganda operations, but do make a point of connecting the importance of propaganda practices to overall psychological warfare doctrine of the time. To that end the philosophies and work of many men influential in the development of psychological warfare practices are present in the Lilly papers. C.D. Jackson gained notoriety for his propaganda work during the Cold War, but he began World War II as an editor for Time/Life. His evolution to propaganda maven is seen in the Lilly archives. Elmer Davis was a well-respected journalist who left a lucrative position with CBS Radio to head up of the Office of War information, and as a result was the man who hired Lilly to be the agency’s historian.

The Lilly papers show the creativity utilized by a wide variety of people. The Lilly archives contain documents and memos to everyone from playwrights, to pulp fiction writers, to many journalists and newsmen who used their skills to not only cover the war, but rather impact
it directly. It is easy to look at psychological warfare through a Cold War lens with an existing vocabulary of PSYOPS insight, but in reality as is evident in the Lilly Papers, Psychological Warfare tactics utilizing modern technology was in its infancy in World War II. Colonel Charles Hazeltine wrote a pamphlet detailing why and how psychological warfare was important. Hazeltine noted that Psychological Warfare is “Anything that makes the enemy less confident in himself, his army, his government, or the cause he fights for.”¹ To that end Hazeltine argued, propaganda is the firepower and can only result from a thorough study of “what the enemy is thinking and what new ideas will affect that thinking.”² A telling factor of just how new the practice of psychological warfare was for the United States is how an idea in one agency could come to fruition in another and be carried out by another one entirely. There was seemingly no agency jurisdiction over an idea. However, the Psychological Warfare Branch and the Office of War Information created the operation infrastructure and strategic vision to create opportunities for men and women to use propaganda and psychological warfare to affect the outcome of World War II. This will include looking at the various Allied newsrooms created to distribute propaganda, to combat propaganda units embedded with troops, to the use of occupational propaganda immediately following beach landings.

The Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas is a trove of primary documents relating to the development and implementation of psychological warfare from the memos of the men who created it. I intend to show the development of psychological warfare as reflected in the Lilly Papers had a profound role in shaping the war effort in the European Theatre. Lilly, a historian by trade, was so prolific writing about psychological warfare tactics that many of his later works written for the U.S. National Security Council and Psychological Strategy Board are still

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² Ibid
classified. Yet, unpublished drafts of his writing on psychological warfare tactics during World War II, covering both the history of psychological warfare and the history of the Psychological Warfare Branch are readily available at the archives. There is a highly condensed redacted version focusing largely on post-1946 work available online through the CIA archives. The Lilly papers are largely overlooked archive materials highlighting the ground-breaking work in psychological warfare and the men and women who created and organized such tactics undertaken on western front to beat Nazi Germany. There has been little research focused solely on the work of Edward Lilly in World War II and a thesis on the material in the archives would contribute to the body of knowledge of psychological warfare in World War II.
Psychological warfare is a broad topic with many aspects to explore. This paper will focus on psychological warfare as it is contained in the archive and papers of Edward Lilly. A historian by trade, Elmer Davis hired him to be the historian for the Office of War Information in 1944. As a result of his position, Lilly took ownership of a very specific segment of the paperwork regarding psychological warfare practices by the United States during World War II. The sources cover everything from scribbled memos in pencil, to top-secret letters between high-ranking officials, and pamphlets meant to educate the men on the front lines.

The Edward Lilly Papers are archived at the Eisenhower Research Library in Abilene, Kansas. The papers occupy 24 linear feet and number more than 46,000 pages. However, only part of the archive deals with World War II. Lilly worked for the Office of War Information gathering material on the branch until it was dissolved by Executive Order from President Truman in 1945. Lilly then went to work as the historian for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A bulk of the Lilly Papers deals with post-war and Cold War psychological warfare activities. The primary materials in the Lilly papers pertaining to this thesis will focus around on Lilly’s unpublished chapter drafts on the history of psychological warfare during World War II.

Filed within the Lilly Papers are the writings and correspondence of Colonel Charles B. Hazeltine, who was the military head of the Office of War. His talent at communicating the military importance of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) and OWI’s objectives is a key reason for the program's success. Hazeltine also diagrammed the organization of the OWI and how it related to the PWB, including enumerating of the various roles and human resource requirements for the OWI in the midst of a war effort that sapped any and all resources.
The draft chapters cite many of the memos, telegrams, letters and paperwork contained in the archive. As a result there are materials and writings by the men Lilly worked with in the archive. These primary materials help to establish objectives and tactics in the developing practice of psychological warfare and, to a smaller extent propaganda practices during World War II. Many of the people referenced went on to bigger and better things after the war. Biographies of these men make up the bulk of secondary material. *Empire: William S. Paley and the Making of CBS* by Lewis Paper touches on media tycoon William Paley.³ He worked closely with General Eisenhower for the Office of War Information and obtained the rank of Colonel. He went back to his pre-war position as the head of CBS and is became a pioneer of television. *In All His Glory* by Sally Bedell Smith has some great insights into the work that Paley did under Charles D. Jackson, who everyone called C.D., in the PWB during his wartime stint away from America’s first news network.⁴ *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage* by Douglas Waller takes a closer look at some of the organizational decisions of the PWB and how propaganda gained the confidence of military leaders.⁵ William “Wild Bill” Donovan was the Coordinator of Information and founder of the Office of Strategic Services. He appears often in Lilly archives, but the focus will not be on his careers, but rather on his work with Elmer Davis and how it pertained to the objectives of the Office of War Information.

*Psychological Propaganda: The War of Ideas on Ideas during the First Half of the Twentieth Century* by Lynette Finch provides a breakdown of the philosophical reasons for the


need for a non-military means to persuade an abatement of conflict.\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Breaking the German Will to Resist} by Philip Taylor and N. C. F. Weekes gives a fleshed out look at the reaction to work first executed among the Lilly Papers.\textsuperscript{7} It is a good insight into the trajectory and efficacy of ideas the PWB undertook. Any work on psychological warfare must investigate the propaganda activities of Nazi Germany. Leonard W. Doob’s article "Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda" details the tenets of good propaganda followed by German propaganda minister.\textsuperscript{8} Knowing the principals of German propaganda compliments the observations in the Lilly papers.

There are a number of sources that give a good foundation of American propaganda work in World War I and the period leading up World War II. \textit{How We Advertised America} by George Creel highlights the propaganda work George Creel and the Creel Committee during World War I.\textsuperscript{9} Creel worked closely with President Woodrow Wilson to sell the war and shape information policy of the Great War. Heber Blankenhorn was a key figure in World War I propaganda activities and makes an appearance in the Lilly Papers. Gilbert Gall’s article “Heber Blankenhorn: The Publicist as Reformer” focuses on one of the men that played a role in psychological warfare in both conflicts.\textsuperscript{10}


\textsuperscript{9} Creel, George. 1920 \textit{How We Advertised America}. Literary Licensing, Amazon Kindle Edition.

There are some books written by men who make appearances in the Lilly papers. Robert Sherwood was a successful playwright and speechwriter for Roosevelt. He was a part of the OWI from it’s inception. Sherwood’s book, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: an Intimate History* gives context to the relationships in the White House. The topic is unique given Sherwood’s own considerable contribution to the war effort. In *Robert E. Sherwood: The Playwright in War and Peace* Harriet Hyman Alonso wrote about the paradox of Sherwood’s life as a pacifist who had an active part in the war; as the creative mind working within the confines of government bureaucracy.

A caveat that makes the Lilly Papers so unique is that for all the access Lilly had to sensitive information about the Allied psychological warfare effort and groundbreaking work in propaganda, Lilly was not involved in policy decisions. His work is unique in that it presents itself as an unbiased source of information capturing the ideas, thoughts and feelings of the men shaping history as it happened, with little critique on Lilly parts. He was in essence curating history as it happened. The details on the creation of the Office of War Information and the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) are evident throughout the archive. This includes meeting minutes, diagrams of organizational structure. In reality it is the blueprint of how to create a government organization. This makes the archive a rich source material. The downside of this is that there is very little research dealing with Lilly’s work. Secondary material on Lilly and his work is very thin. This does however, bolster the need for this thesis to research and qualify the work Lilly did for the Office of War Information.

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Chapter One  
FROM ISOLATION TO INFAMY  

On December 6, 1941 the United States was preparing for war. Not overtly, but plans were already underway to go to war with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the Empire of Japan. The war had been a long time coming for the United States. It would take years and millions of lives to end it. Men once destined for academia or newsrooms found themselves swept up in the tide of war and funneled into military and government roles that did not exist prior to Pearl Harbor. Dr. Edward Lilly was one of those men. He went from college professor at Catholic University to government worker. Elmer Davis, head of the Office of War Information, tapped Lilly to be the OWI’s official historian. It is rare that a historian is charged with history of an event while it is still on going, but Lilly’s work provides a distinct look at the OWI during World War II. The majority of Lilly’s writing has never been publically available except in various chapter drafts, yet the work that is available shows the importance of psychological warfare in World War II and illustrates the work of men from all walks of life who joined a number of agencies to go to war in Europe armed only with words.

Psychological warfare is a weapon that cannot be credited with directly winning any war. Yet, paradoxically that is its purpose. Propaganda greatly influenced World War II. Psychological warfare like any useful weapon or tactic of war developed out of a very real need. At the beginning of World War II propaganda and psychological warfare were equals. They terms were synonymous. Propaganda as a facet of psychological warfare emerged after World War II. In the Lilly papers the terms do shift in meaning. The divergent labels will be discussed, but any assumption of propaganda being a simple part of psychological warfare is hindsight bias and not backed by the Lilly papers. Through using modern concepts of psychology, the Allies
worked diligently throughout the war to engage their enemy on a psychological level. Yet, the work of the men behind shaping the psychological weaponry has largely been overlooked.

This thesis intends to show that the development of psychological warfare as seen in the Edward Lilly papers had a profound role in shaping the war effort in the European Theatre. As Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower sat at the center of the work undertaken by the Office of War Information (OWI), the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) and to a lesser extent the Office of Special Services (OSS). The war against Nazi Germany was total warfare to such a degree that even thoughts were considered fair game.

To understand the foundations of psychological warfare practices in World War II, the work in that area during World War I must be examined. It was the first modern war which repurposed political discourse with consistency to shift native perceptions to undermine the enemies war efforts. An example in a document not among the Lilly papers, but released by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2006, Dr. Edward Lilly writes, “A classical example during World War I of such a psychological maneuver was President Wilson’s announcement of his “Fourteen Points.”13 Lilly goes on to describes how the “Fourteen Points” was marketed as a trade-off of a peaceful future for peoples and militaries literally stuck in the mud and debris of war. In terms of an operational organization in 1917 the United States had only a handful of groups committed to propaganda and intelligence gathering. The War Department had a Psychological Branch. General John J. Pershing had an Intelligence Division. President Wilson formed his own Committee on Public Information headed up by investigative journalist George Creel. Creel exercised little influence during the inter-war period, but during World War II by those charged with creating psychological warfare tactics studied his methods. There was very

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little cooperation between these agencies, yet each one exploited different aspects of Wilson’s proposed foreign policy for the Allied advantage. Sometimes repeating what another agency was saying, sometimes contradicting the policy message. The Americans used everything from news stories, to leaflets, to maps to reach the German population. Lilly noted that, “Such psychological activity contributed in major fashion to the disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire and accelerated, if it did not cause the weakening of the German government, which made armistice necessary.”

Lilly did not give any specifics of events that led to the dissolution of the Central Powers. Yet, when it comes to propaganda there is always very little to show for a successful campaign. Unlike more direct forms of warfare, victory in psychological warfare is far less obvious. There are no explosions to mark a direct hit. In that regard psychological warfare from the beginning of time has been about the craftsmanship of soft power influences over a hard power defeat. For example a soft power defeat could be low morale among troops or inciting controversy on the home front in lieu hard power military victory. The successful American use of propaganda during the World War I led, paradoxically, to the systematic dismantling of the organizations. The propaganda masters who honed their skills during the War were out of a job and their accomplishments noted down in a plethora of reports. Yet, neither military nor government officials took the necessary steps to evaluate the accomplishments of the organizations. The war was over.

Before discussing the development of psychological warfare there we need define the terms often applied to the topic. Much of the modern understanding of psychological warfare comes from the work of Harold Lasswell, a political scientist whose seminal work Propaganda Techniques of World War I proved to be very influential in shaping attitudes towards

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14 Lilly, 1951, 6
propaganda. It could be said that the work was perhaps nowhere more influential than in Germany. Lasswell focused on propaganda as it relates to modern military campaigns. It greatly influenced the Nazi propaganda minister Josef Goebbels. During World War I and into the 1920’s and 1930’s, propaganda was the chosen term for a rather hazy practice of subverting support for any cause that benefitted the country. Lasswell, however, defined propaganda as “the management of opinions and attitudes by direct manipulation of social suggestion rather than altering other conditions in the environment or the organism.” This is not a definition that qualifies as military use per se largely because it is does little to highlight the benefit to a military to use propaganda. It could be just as affective for advertising as the Army. As shall be discussed the vagueness of a propaganda payoff was a reason why it was not readily adopted by the military in a wider scope at the outset of World War II. However, Lasswell’s definition does provide a philosophical underpinning. Only as Europe crept toward war again was the concept utilized by militaries on all sides. Propaganda, particularly in the English-speaking world was a negative term. Lasswell, being American, was one of the first to shift the focus of what propaganda was perceived to be to what it could mean. As Lynette Finch writes, “Lasswell’s text was the first major American publication to argue that the use of propaganda during warfare was neither ominous nor insidious.” In reality, Lasswell propagandized propaganda; he used the concept on itself. It was during the inter-war years that propaganda shifted in Germany from taboo term in the mainstream to a widely accepted tool. The United States populace and press never embraced psychological warfare, which is ironic considering the number of journalist who

17 Ibid
went to work for the agencies. World War I used propaganda tools, albeit simplistic versions to
great efficacy, yet to understand why propaganda had to be virtually re-discovered during the
inter-war years we must look at what happened to the propaganda structures of both Allied and
Axis powers prior to World War II.

The inter-war years are a study in contrast between the victors and the vanquished. The
United States did nothing with psychological warfare or propaganda. Part of this stemmed from a
real public concern about propaganda. It was a bad word in the United States. It also ran counter
to what was going on socially. The 1920’s were about forgetting war and amassing luxury. The
1930’s were about survival. Psychological warfare and propaganda were outdated. It had no
place in the social dialogue. This stood in stark contrast to the way Germany approached
psychological warfare during the inter-war years. Germany actively sought ways to extending
the use of psychology beyond anything previous seen. Major German universities conducted
tests to measure psychological responses to everything from advertising to books and news
coverage. Germany used the time between the World Wars to revamp propaganda practices.18
The United States did not. This would only increase the Allies’ learning curve.

At the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, filed away in the archives are
unpublished chapter drafts by Dr. Edward Lilly. After the war he worked in the history section of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Much of his work has never been published for public
consumption, and much of his work for the JCS after the war, which includes his work at the
OWI during the war remains redacted publicly. Save for a single report written by Lilly in 1951
and released by the CIA in 2006 in response to a Freedom of Information request, the
background documents and chapter drafts compiled and written by Lilly are all that remains in

18 Finch, 370
the public record of his work in the area of psychological warfare. Consequently, his papers are a very specific window into psychological warfare during World War II.

Edward Lilly was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1910 to a middle class Catholic family. His father owned the steamship line Norton Lilly & Company. After Lilly received his Ph.D. in 1936 from Catholic University, he taught at Loyola University in Chicago. He returned to his alma mater to teach in 1939. He continued to teach there until 1944. He entered into government work as part of the war effort-- not due to patriotic zeal, but a rather more pressing matter for a young father with five children; Lilly needed a bigger paycheck. According to Lilly a Catholic University alumnus Elmer Davis served as the Assistant to the Director of the Office of War Information Elmer Davis.19 It was serendipitous. Davis wanted someone to write the history of the OWI, so in 1944 Lilly went from academia to government work. It was Lilly’s job to write the history of a government wartime agency, one that very likely would not last past the war, though at the time Lilly was hired that remained to be seen. It was a position that many a historian could envy. He was recording history as it happened. After the OWI dissolved Lilly took a job in the history section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Much of the work in the Lilly Papers regarding the OWI stems from his time at the JCS. Much of what is known of the psychological warfare and propaganda efforts of the war are known as a result of Lilly’s writings, even though he never saw combat. He only ventured to Europe in May 1945, after Hitler had killed himself and Germany surrendered.20 The war-time efforts by the OWI and the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) by the late 1940’s and early 1950’s was considered valuable to the post-war effort and the newly burgeoning Cold War. It was during this time that Lilly wrote the chapter drafts of books never published, at least not publicly. Lilly noted in an


20 Johnson, 4
interview in 1988 for the Truman library that his work was used internally for the JCS, but was
heavily redacted publicly. Lilly’s chapter drafts are insight into how psychological warfare was
waged in one of the largest conflicts in human history.

World War I was the incubator for many propaganda practices. Yet Lilly made it clear
that propaganda was a key practice in the development of the United States. He wrote, “The
propagandistic histories of John Smith were the first in a long series of high pressure pamphlets
which ‘sold’ the European on emigrating to the New World.” Lilly was familiar with colonial
propaganda. His wrote his doctoral dissertation on the colonial agents who sold the dream of the
New World to English businessmen for investment and European emigrants. The American
dream, according to Lilly, is based on propaganda. “Advertising slogans were not a Twentieth
Century development,” Lilly tersely observed. The pamphleteering prior to and during the
American Revolution is an obvious example of psychological warfare in the military history of
the United States. The Civil War had many examples of psychological warfare. Lilly wrote,
“Uncle Tom’s Cabin is only the best known, contributed in both the North and the South to the
developing concept that the portending war was an ‘Irrepressible Conflict.’” This brings up a
telling point of propaganda and how information is used in armed conflict. Uncle Tom’s Cabin
was written as a novel; it has a very pointed perspective on slavery, but in reality was not written
as propaganda. However, both the Union and the Confederacy used the text to bolster their own
perspectives on tension within the country. It is worth noting that neither version of propaganda
is necessarily a lie or untruthful. That is one of the caveats of propaganda; it is that is very often
the truth, but a very selective presentation of the truth. Not a representation of truth, which could

21 Johnson, 13
Chap. 1, Folder 1, Edward Lilly Papers Box 48, Eisenhower Research Library, 3
23 Lilly, 1951, 4
24 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare- Chapter 1 (1), 5
be a lie from another perspective, but a presentation of the truth which, when questioned, holds up. In truth anything can be propagandized.

World War I was not the first time the United States used propaganda, however it was the scale to which the United States expanded psychological war efforts that the deserves attention. The practices of the Great War were to have a large impact on early psychological warfare techniques during World War II. It seems in the Lilly papers that the OWI and PWB gave great consideration to World War I practices. A notable practice in World War I was use of artillery for delivering leaflets to the other side. The leaflet shell was innovative during World War I and it’s use in World War II would be credited with some significant propaganda victories, such Allied victory in Sicily. Yet, such shells were only one area in which the art of delivering leaflets to the enemy was perfected. “Pamphlets and cartoons prepared especially for the soldier were dispersed across the enemy lines by grenades, special leaflet shells, airplanes, balloons and infrequently by agents.”25 These operations are in many ways a first in military history. This is the military use of resources as a direct assault on the enemy using ideas and information as the weapon. No matter the subtlety, this is warfare on the mind. Both the Allied and Central Powers worked to convince the men in trenches and behind the lines that their efforts were in vain. The concept of shifting the enemy’s morale off of center goes back as far as Sun Tzu, but this was a real full scale use of psychology to claim victory. This was also the war that expanded and indeed transformed the production of news, information, and entertainment into weapons of war. There had of course been pamphlets expounding why the other side was better throughout history, but this was information produced to shape minds, not merely change them. To that end both sides in World War I developed news services to provide their latest information on the war

25 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare- Chapter 1(1), 7
for both enemy consumption and, tellingly, domestic consumption. Negative news regarding discontent or even race and class tension was fair game among combatants.\footnote{Lilly, History of Psychological warfare- Chapter 1(1), 7}

The United States sat out most of the Great War. Germany had successful propaganda campaigns due to military victories.\footnote{Ibid, 9} The country was winning the propaganda war, as it is generally easier to have high morale when they are winning. This left the Allies to sing the praises of the American forces as counter point to low Allied morale.\footnote{Ibid} The United States was unprepared for war and in the time from entering the war in April 1917 to shipping out overseas, the U.S. government struggled with balancing information available against public demand for news. American newspapers openly discussed how American morale was low due to poor access to government information. On the other end of the spectrum, “government officials were worried that the press would make ‘premature or ill-advised announcements’ which ‘would constitute a source of danger.”\footnote{Ibid, 10} This was a classic problem of media and government relations during war. This was a problem during the World War II. To balance media needs with their usefulness for disseminating information, President Woodrow Wilson’s solution to this problem was to establish the Committee on Public Information (CPI) with the help of George Creel. Creel’s work served as a blueprint for many Psychological Warfare activities during the Second World War.

Creel makes multiple appearances throughout the Lilly papers. His success during World War I culminated in an encore performance by him at the PWB and OWI in 1941. The Creel Committee was a predecessor on many levels of the OWI, the least of which was CPI’s vague objectives, procedures and organization. In \textit{How We Advertised America} Creel went into detail
about why CPI was called into existence in the first place; he wrote, “The trial of strength was not only between massed bodies of armed men, but between opposed ideals, and morale verdicts took on all the value of military decisions.” Decades before Pearl Harbor the importance of psychological warfare emerged as a significant factor in modern military conflict. A number of Nazi propaganda officials applied their own version of Creel’s propaganda theories. Creel paid dearly for his work for CPI. The generally held belief that propaganda was largely un-American ruined his public reputation.

One of the big takeaways of Creel’s work was to provide propaganda to all media. It was a complete assault of ideas. Lilly described it as, “the information necessary to convince the American public, and to a lesser extent, the world, that America’s cause was just, that our victory was inevitable, that the postwar world proposed by America would be a better world.” In truth, very little was known of the United States by the Central Powers. America needed propaganda to sell their entry into the war on the home front and to bolster perceived military prowess abroad. Creel’s biggest effort was to preach the propaganda gospel of American military and industrial prowess to Germany and the Central Powers. The benefit to all of this was an increase in news of American throughout the world. As a result the United States increased the profile of American leaders during the peace process long after the propaganda machine that created the fascination was dismantled. A central tenet for the CPI was the truthfulness of the information released; CPI “never knowingly originated or disseminated, at home or abroad, a report or a statement which was false.” This was to have a significant impact on the OWI and PWB during

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30 Creel, George. 1920 How We Advertised America. Literary Licensing, Amazon Kindle Edition, location 184
32 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-Chapter 1(1), 12
33 Ibid, 13
34 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-Chapter 1(1), 14
the early part of World War II. Truthfulness in propaganda became a major premise for Elmer Davis and Colonel Charles B. Hazeltine under their leadership at OWI.

The overarching strategy of propaganda was to maintain Allied morale and attack German morale, focusing specifically on the moral compass of the German military. The efficacy of this was summed up by Lilly, “If either could be weakened and destroyed, the military war would undoubtedly be shortened and its staggering cost in man power and money reduced.”35 Lilly’s inclusion of so much of psychological warfare endeavors during World War I gives insight into the value placed on propaganda by the United States. It is worth noting that a history of psychological warfare or propaganda is that it is in and of itself a form of propaganda. There are common misconceptions that any propaganda is in fact lies disseminated to convince someone of a certain belief. Propaganda can be and very often is the truth as was seen with the mandates on propaganda by President Wilson and Creel during World War I. Lilly’s position with the JCS after World War II and also the lack of publishing on Lilly’s part, may indicate that Lilly’s writings were meant for JCS and military consumption almost exclusively. If Lilly wrote for post-war military complex, then it remains to look at the hypothesis of his work and as a result the propaganda nature of the work. A history of propaganda can be seen as a work of propaganda when the audience is considered. The military industrial complex is just as susceptible to psychological warfare as it is to any other weapon.

Many of the issues brought up by Lilly regarding World War I show conflict within propaganda activities. Specifically a recurring theme involved conflicts between the military and civilian responsibility for propaganda and competition over which branch had the final say. The topic would emerge again in World War II. Specifically the debate that emerged in 1942-1943

35 Ibid, 15
was the issue of which group would be responsible for combat propaganda. The conflict was between the CPI and Military Intelligence Branch (MIB). Lilly described the conflict as follows:

The military leaders took the position that such matters were the responsibility of the Army and the War Department. CPI argued that the civilian agency of the government should be responsible for the editorial content and production of propaganda, while it conceded that the combat distribution of such matter was entirely a military problem.  

One of the men involved in this debate was Captain Heber Blankenhorn. A journalist and sometimes publicist, his peacetime work was characterized by writing about and promoting unions. He did this by writing about the plight of factory workers. He was active for only a few years before the United States entry into World War I. He had a talent for using marketing and publicity as a form of social and political activism. His shifted his skill set to the American propaganda war against Germany. He was one of the few men to work in both world wars in propaganda services for the United States. His appearance throughout the Lilly papers speaks to his expertise in psychological warfare.

Psychological warfare was not considered a key component of the Allied offensive in World War I. Lilly makes it clear that the decision to integrate psychological warfare changed the war. The Allied push to end the war before the winter of 1918 meant, “Everything was to be thrown against the enemy and propaganda had to a part to play.” Propaganda was a part of the “everything” effort. There was perceived value in propaganda for the American military, but there is little proof of efficacy of propaganda. In truth, as Lilly admits, during World War I faith in propaganda was as much a belief in it’s capabilities then actual proof it worked. In other

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36 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare- Chapter 1(1), 23
38 Lilly, History of Psychological warfare- Chapter 1(1), 27
words propaganda had a placebo effect. As Lilly wrote in regards to pilots carrying leaflets over enemy territory:

The real reason that the propaganda campaign was carried on was that the propagandists by personal effort had ‘sold’ the pilots on its value and the pilots carried the ‘paper’ on their own initiative and authority. Approximately 95% of the American leaflets were distributed by plane, while 4% were distributed by balloons and about 1% by other means. In other words, propaganda worked because the military had been convinced it worked. It is interesting to note that Lilly cited a memo from Heber Blankenhorn on the percentages of successful leaflet drops. The military touted the innovation of leaflet shells, but the men who worked in the units like Blankenhorn credited not innovation but basic human resources to accomplish their task.

America was able to publish definitive pieces of propaganda. The United States and its Allies won the war. No matter how true it was, the propaganda work was a knife to the heart of enemy morale and to changed the minds of the defeated civilian population. The propaganda units were disbanded and their activities ended with Armistice. The United States made no attempt to influence German views in the post-war world. The units shifted their marketing prowess to selling peace to government agencies and the American people. The men were, “transformed into a special political reporting group which prepared for the American representatives to the Peace Conference a daily summary of German morale and political tendencies.” There was no considerable effort to continue to influence the perception of America or even the peace process on the local level in Germany. Lilly wrote about that fact in the aftermath of World War II. It is difficult to not assume some sort of hindsight bias on his part when he examined government indifference to propaganda efforts during the war and post-war

39 Ibid, 31
40 Lilly, History of Psychological warfare- Chapter 1, (2), 37
potential. Yet Lilly made it clear that the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) had no plans to keep propaganda in the post-war planning mix when he cited an AEF report:

We are not directly concerned with preparing the minds of people so that they will accept the peace terms, nor with influencing the local constitution of the country, nor with creating a center of Pro-Ally feeling, which would be likely to spread to interior Germany.

I therefore recommend, as far as the American Army is concerned, that a passive attitude be adopted, that permission be given to the French and to the British so that their agents may work among the civilian population in our zone. I do not favor an organized campaign of propaganda by the American Army either in its zone of occupation or other zones.41

This gives significant insight into the U.S. military’s mindset after the war towards maintaining the structure and operational know-how of the propaganda units. It is clear from the report that psychological warfare activities were not considered important enough to keep up in a post-war world. The AEF’s decision not to try to influence the hearts and minds of the German people led Lilly to analyze the balance between tangible warfare along the lines of mortar and artillery in contrast to the intangible warfare like propaganda. “With such propaganda activity undertaken to influence the mind of the German soldier, it is unfortunate that no effort was made after the Armistice to determine the effect and value of American propaganda,” wrote Lilly.42

Yet the lack of follow up was not simply a signature of World War I military values. A bluntly worded footnote by Lilly bemoaned the lack of any sort of survey, yet noted a similar lack of follow up after World War II.

Yet, Lilly extrapolated two conclusions that reappeared during World War II and would have directly impacted the success of Allied psychological warfare in that conflict. The first factor was German efforts to prevent their soldiers from reading leaflets or anything for that

41 Lilly, History of Psychological warfare- Chapter 1, (2), 39
42 Ibid
matter not approved by military. Indeed Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg was so concerned over the spread of Allied propaganda that he issued an official warning. He noted, “Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul. Remember nothing comes from the enemy which is not harmful to Germany.”43 This was one of the few ways the Allies knew that they were having any sort of impact. It was through the ripples caused in reaction to the propaganda that Allies knew the leaflet campaigns were working. Yet, it is interesting to note in Lilly’s writings, that the validation of Allied propaganda by Hindenburg was buried in a Blankenhorn AEF report on the program. The second conclusion was prisoner of war interrogations. Few prisoners willingly admitted a piece of paper led to their surrender, so propaganda influences were left to be derived through other answers given. Lilly concluded that if a soldier had a leaflet on him, or admitted to having them in their dugouts, when it was expressly forbidden, it meant the soldier had weighed the merits in surrendering in the first place.44 This was considered a win for propaganda units. Prisoner interrogations appeared again in World War II, yet in that conflict the OWI and PWB were ready with specifics guidelines on how to get and utilize potential information effectively. Propaganda units were given resources to cover their immediate needs, but the American military was dead set against investing anymore time or resources. It left hard won lessons of modern military psychological warfare to be relearned for the next war.

Interest in propaganda in the inter-war years waned dramatically. The military was subject to budget cuts that stymied any possibility of maintaining some sort of psychological warfare division within the Military Intelligence Division (MID). Essential operations garnered the lion’s share of military funding. Propaganda lacked hard science to backup perceived

43 Lilly, History of Psychological warfare- Chapter 1, (2), 41
44 Ibid, 42
accomplishments. Propaganda was still not recognized as a weapon of modern war. Lilly noted a limited interest in propaganda and psychological warfare in the United States during the 1920’s and 30’s. In fact Lilly noted a request for information from the magazine *Current History* for an article on propaganda during World War I. MID told the magazine that a search of its files failed to find any activity relating to World War I. This story begs the question had MID genuinely forgotten the propaganda work or when the program dissolved so did any recollection of it. Lilly attempted to address this discrepancy, “There are no records of such activity apparent in the files of MID and the material preserved certainly indicates that MID had lost interest in propaganda activity.”

As psychological warfare held little interest for the War Department, its popularity increased at the Army War College. Throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s a handful of papers and committees tackled the subject of psychological warfare. The recurrent theme according to Lilly was enemy propaganda’s impact on army morale. Influencing enemy morale seemed to be of little concern. Tellingly all of the reports and committees came to the same conclusion that, “some consideration to give propaganda organizations as developed by the belligerents during World War I and made some recommendations that the War Department should include propaganda planning in its general war planning activity.” One specific report even foreshadowed the medium that would be a game changer in psychological warfare: radio. Yet another one criticized that lack of consideration given to enemy propaganda influences. Given the psychological warfare talents of Nazi Germany, the report’s warnings proved to be prophetic, “Not only is the plan deficient in these respects but our current policies fail to provide desirable

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45 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-Chapter 1 (2),48
46 Ibid, 49
instructions in the tactics and techniques of propaganda as an enemy of modern warfare.”

These conclusions are all the more poignant considering the complete lack of preparation for psychological warfare on the part of the War Department in 1941.

Another area showing interest in propaganda was the Joint Board. The Joint Board was a precursor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the inter-war years the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans of Green and Orange integrated elements of the propaganda and psychological warfare. The Green plan relied heavily on publicity to influence the public to refrain from resistance and keep morale high. The Orange plan was more in depth calling for “cooperation with other government departments in relation to propaganda, economic warfare, public relations, and intelligence.” Again, the recommendations did not result in any sort of shift in plans to include publicity or propaganda. In fact a revised version of Green plan released in 1930 contained no mention of publicity, propaganda, or psychological warfare. The closest any committee came to dealing with propaganda in the inter-war years was a passing mention is a proposal to establish the Public Relations Administration. Among the proposed function of the organization were the following:

b. To act as a bureau of information to which the public and the world could look for proper and reliable information concerning the aims and activities of the Government.

c. To combat disaffection at home.

d. To combat enemy propaganda at home and abroad.

This was a valiant effort to consider propaganda when forming new organizations, but in reality it focused on domestic affairs alone. There was not a conscious effort to prepare the United States for psychological warfare or propaganda regardless of armed military conflict. In provisions for the Public Relations Administration there was nothing in the way for the

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47 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-Chapter 1 (2), 50
48 Ibid, 51
49 Ibid, 55
establishment of a foreign branch or section. This was considered folly by one of the committee members. After World War II, Major General John B. Wogan wrote to Lilly that there was no discussion of the rise of Nazi propaganda during that time, nor a review of World War I accomplishments. However, Wogan noted, “Attention was given to the spread of information abroad since we believed that any war we would fight would be fought in a foreign country.”

This shows that in the mid-1930’s military and government officials believed that there would be another war. Knowing this though, the Joint Board still debated the hazard of creating a policy of domestic propaganda for the proposed Public Relations Administration (PRA). It was not until October, 1939 that the Joint Board gave a tentative approval of the PRA proposal that the word propaganda be removed entirely. It waited for recommendations from President Franklin Roosevelt. His recommendations were not immediate. Foreign affairs occupied the President’s agenda. As national defense pushed to the forefront, a crucial question arose about the existing public relations proposed back in 1939. Censorship was a prickly topic for the American public. It ran counter to free speech and democracy as a whole. Censorship in the name of propaganda needed great care when government committees make recommendations regarding it. In truth little of the Joint Board plan addressed actual world events. There was little to address the growing propaganda power of Nazi Germany, much less the increasing strength of their military.

After the PRA voted on yet another proposal of propaganda policy that only focused on domestic propaganda Roosevelt sent it back to the Joint Board with a stinging rebuke; “Obviously none of the three of us can possibly approve a plan such as this one which was set up by the Joint Board. Equally obviously, the Joint Board knows nothing about what the American public- let alone the American press, would say to thing like this.”

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50 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-Chapter 1 (2), 56
51 Ibid, 60
Roosevelt was right. In February of 1941 alone articles on propaganda and censorship appeared in the *Washington Post, The Newark Evening News* and *Colliers Magazine*. The criticism by Roosevelt instead of unifying the Joint Board facing war on the horizon, lead to competition and rivalries between the Army and Navy and completely undercut any work to establish propaganda activities prior to Pearl Harbor. In reality the U.S. military was not prepared for World War II propaganda. They faced an enemy who learned the propaganda and psychological warfare lessons of World War I and used them with fierce efficiency against opponents. Lilly put it best reflecting on the pre-war situation, “The leaders of 1941 did not concern themselves with preparation for the use of this instrument of warfare. When civilians did organize such activities, the general reaction of the military leaders was an unsympathetic opposition and a belittling attitude of indifference, until civilians educated these leaders by proving the worth of psychological warfare and propaganda.”

In 1941 the United States was sure that war was coming. The government did not know when, but the tensions with the Axis powers were so taut, particularly following implementation of the Lend-Lease program, that most Americans considered war all but inevitable. Lilly notes with certainty that the “America was engaged in a psychological war with the Nazis long before the nation became militarily involved.” The general feeling was, in essence, that the Nazis started it. The U.S. was aware of at least vague reports of the Nazi research into psychology. The Nazis were undertaking propaganda and psychological warfare at a rate that concerned the Allies. The Nazis propaganda machine was known to have penetrated all the way into Latin America prior to the war. Nazi propaganda had echoes of the World War I era Zimmerman Telegram scandal. There were concerns that America was to again be a carrot on Nazi

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52 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-Chapter 1 (2), 62
53 Lilly, 1951, 7
54 Ibid
Germany’s stick to bring Latin America into the war on the Axis side. Moreover as the German army was rebuilding in the 1930’s, there were specific carve outs for propaganda units. From the ground up this new German military included propaganda units that were mobile and integrated parts of warfare. As Lilly notes in an unpublished chapter on the Office of War Information in the Eisenhower Library archives, “The staff plans provided for the establishment of propaganda units, whose equipment should be mobilized in order to provide frontline broadcast and loudspeaker announcements as well as pamphlets for plane dropping.”

This meant that Germany was at an advantage from before the war began. There was no need to retro-fit the military with psychological warfare units. It is worth noting that Lilly showed a hint of bias against Germany when he wrote in the footnotes that, “German(sic) enjoyed an advantage in psychological warfare inasmuch as all its policy was based on expediency and it was not hampered by the limitations of truth.”

The phrase “limitation of truth” stands out particularly as a dig at Nazi Germany. Lilly was noting the United States could have been more aggressive on the psychological warfare front, but had a little thing called truth holding them back. The ultimate National Socialist, Josef Goebbels, led this Nazi penetration of world propaganda with great skill. He not only proselytized the Nazi values; he himself was a true believer. The Americans were going to have to catch up if they were to win a war against an opponent who put a high price on the value of propaganda and psychological warfare.

The sheer scope of the success of the Nazi propaganda machine largely focused on social beliefs marketed by the Third Reich, but the military was a huge benefactor of Josef Goebbels’ work. In Chapter Two of Lilly’s *History of Psychological Warfare*, he lays out the success the German military had through propaganda. Lilly noted the value of psychological work for

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56 Ibid
Germany following the treaty of Versailles, “Psychological work was cheap and non-military, but potential military value.” Goebbels had total control over Nazi propaganda. He was the sole authority in his department that planned and executed propaganda both within Nazi Germany and for the rest of the world. Goebbels drew some of his most potent inspiration from the United States; “adapting on a national scale the American advertising techniques, Goebbels’ machine secured an effective and fascist control over existing German opinion.”

Very early on the German military benefitted directly from propaganda work. It was a propaganda victory that is best described as a paradox. As Lilly described it:

An even great and more significant propaganda success was the world apathy and disunity, which followed German entry into, and rearmament of, the Rhineland in 1936. This internationally important feat was accomplished with relatively little military power, but with an extensive, heavy and militant propaganda bombast. It was the propaganda rather than the German military which influence world opinion against military opposition to renewed German expansion.

The World War I model of psychological warfare meant victory equated to an action on the enemy’s part that benefitted the psychological aggressor. Yet, Nazi propaganda victories changed that, making complete apathy an unequivocal win. Convincing the world to do nothing as the German military expanded and rearmed was how Nazi officials learned that solid propaganda was a substitute for actual military power. It was a lesson the Allies would take the first half of a world war to learn. Yet, Lilly pointed out that the U.S. was at an innate disadvantage in learning and applying psychological warfare tactics because it was a democracy. “By captivating one’s opponents or by building up false issues, offensive activities could be hidden under the guise of national or racial self-protection, or as great humanitarian, liberalizing

57 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-chapter 2, 4
58 Ibid
59 Ibid, 5
movements.\textsuperscript{60} This means democracies with free speech and free thought were at an inherent disadvantage when it came to propaganda. Yet, the United States staring down another war two decades after “the war to end all wars” had to do something to counter a propaganda machine that was dictating to the world how to react to their actions.

The first steps toward building a propaganda machine was appointing someone to take charge of information that was or could be garnered to use against the enemy. It was Latin America that started American interest into propaganda. What started out as a concern that Nazi propaganda was influencing American interests in Latin America snow-balled into American formation of a de-facto propaganda unit. Nelson A. Rockefeller presented a study for President Roosevelt in which he suggested that the assistance be given to Latin American states so American businesses could compete against Axis power economic influences in the region.\textsuperscript{61} The economic impact of Nazi Germany business dealings was having a negative influence on the bottom line of American businesses. The debate between Rockefeller and the Roosevelt’s office triggered the formation of the Office of Coordinating Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics. The name would later be shortened to the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA).

The OIAA was the first official organization dedicated to psychological warfare activities established by the United States to counter Nazi propaganda. It raised an important question though: how did a study on the economic impact of Nazi influence in Latin America cause the formation of a propaganda unit? The answer according to Lilly is Roosevelt. Somehow in the process of discussing curbing Nazi economic impact the focus shifted to promoting American cultural interest in the region. This meant opening the door for American propaganda in the

\textsuperscript{60} Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-chapter 2, 7
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, 15
effort to promote American interests. The idea was considered to be a personal contribution of Roosevelt’s.\textsuperscript{62} The order establishing the group made Rockefeller the coordinator of the organization. It was the first major government position the New York businessman held.\textsuperscript{63}

It is ironic that the United States formed their first propaganda unit in reaction to economic interests ahead of World War II instead of military interests. However, the public’s deep concern over propaganda made Latin America an ideal place to start. There was a lot of rust on the American propaganda machine. There are also echoes of the Zimmerman Telegram in Roosevelt’s decisions to keep Latin America under American influence. The U.S. wanted to keep German influence in any form as far from their border as possible. However, formation of the OIAA was heavily influenced by the Monroe Doctrine\textsuperscript{64}, which the American public embraced.\textsuperscript{65} Propaganda as a result was a function of the OIAA and not a goal. It was established when the U.S. was still in an isolationist stance. Yet, November 1940 saw the first real mention of U.S. military setting up a bureau for propaganda purposes. The Creel Committee was referenced as a model, but John J. McCloy, special assistant to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, best laid out the underlying need:

\begin{quote}
We might better be short of other modern weapons than this one, for anti-tank guns cannot stop ideas…This department would furnish the offensive weapon to offset one of the effective weapons that Germany has utilized, and is continuing to utilize, in the war.\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{62} Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-chapter 2, 15
\item \textsuperscript{63} Rockefeller would later be Governor of New York and Vice-President of the United States under Gerald Ford.
\item \textsuperscript{64} The Monroe Doctrine was named for President James Monroe’s speech to Congress in 1823. In it he warned European nations against involvement in the Western Hemisphere. The doctrine was a cornerstone of American foreign policy.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-chapter 2, 17
\item \textsuperscript{66} Ibid, 20
\end{itemize}
The seeds of propaganda had been planted. Even before the U.S. was involved in any military conflict, there were distinct efforts to change the aim for the enemy’s heart and mind with something other than a bullet.

If Rockefeller brought America to accept the need for propaganda activities, then Colonel William J. Donovan gave the propaganda meaning. There is plenty of research into Donovan’s life and his involvement in clandestine affairs. However, his appearance in the Lilly Papers is pivotal. He took propaganda out of the realm of committees and studies and pulled it into the practical. It was through his influence that psychological warfare was brought to the forefront of areas to research prior to America’s entry into the war.

William Donovan was a famous man in the United States before World War II. A World War I hero, he received the Congressional Medal Honor for his service in France. An Irishman born into poverty, he worked his way up to the upper echelons of New York society. He married a wealthy heiress Ruth Rumsey and was regularly featured in society pages. He also went to Columbia University with FDR. A lawyer by trade, Donovan was fully capable of navigating tense negotiations and also investigating claims beyond those which were obvious. One of his first activities was to increase American news abroad. More to the point it was under his influence that the United States almost stopped using the word propaganda altogether. It was now psychological warfare nearly exclusively.

In 1940 the new Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox sent Donovan to Europe as his personal representative. Donovan went as a private citizen. Knox wanted him to observe British plans to handle the Nazi Germany, including but not limited to political and economic warfare. His trip triggered an issue that haunted psychological warfare operations throughout the war: infighting. “Commencing with the appointment, there appear the complications and difficulties
of interdepartmental rivalries which were to develop in the skein of psychological warfare, and which were to characterize the American effort throughout the war.**67** U.S. Ambassador to England at the time, Joseph Kennedy, objected to Donovan’s trip. He believed there were adequate channels to communicate the information Knox was looking for. Donovan shone in his role. His work garnered attention from the Allies. The British hired him to get some of their information directly to Roosevelt. Regardless, Donovan conferred with European leaders of the highest level. His report to Roosevelt’s cabinet about psychological warfare gave them insight into German practices that were up to that point unknown.**68**

In June 1940 Roosevelt undertook a very public decision to sell surplus military equipment to Britain. This was the Lend-Lease agreement. The publication of such a deal was itself an intelligent piece of propaganda. This was the U.S. making an ideological statement and one that Lilly points out “indicated an awareness not only of strategic concepts but also of the psychological aspects in relations to Allied and Axis opinion as well domestic opinion.”**69** Donovan’s success culminated with Roosevelt appointing Donovan, also known by his college moniker “Wild Bill” to be Coordinator of Information (COI). There was some political sensitivity to this appointment in June of 1941. Donovan had the uncomfortable task of gaining information on the Nazis, an enemy that was not technically an enemy yet. The administration conversely could not openly admit they had a propaganda agency looking to sway Europeans and particularly Germans.**70**

Donovan’s involvement brought two other men on board who had a significant impact on building the American propaganda machine. Robert E. Sherwood was a presidential

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**67** Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-chapter 2, 22  
**68** Ibid, 23  
**69** Ibid, 24  
**70** Lilly, “Words and Bullets,” 9
speechwriter, famous playwright and hated all things Nazi. Nelson Poynter was a wealthy newspaper publisher who worked for the Democrats in 1940. In footnotes at the bottom of the page Lilly described just what Poynter’s work entailed that made him a good catch for American propaganda:

Poynter developed a special press and radio service at the Democratic Headquarters, in September 1940, whereby a staff of special writers would immediately prepare official statements for release in the name of a leading government official whenever any Republican statement might attract extensive newspaper treatment. In this way, the later Democratic release, because it was an official statement by a more important individual, got greater news space and hence minimized the Republican statement. Many thought that the same technique could be employed to show up and weaken Nazi propaganda.\footnote{Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-chapter 2, 38}

The press got wind of the burgeoning propaganda work and voiced many complaints. It was not only the Press, but also the State Department requested a propaganda-monitoring group. As a result the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBIS) of the Federal Communications Commission was formed. Warnings about propaganda were in the mainstream. Lilly noted that the book *The Strategy of Terror* by Edmond Taylor was atop the best-seller booklists. *Strategy of Terror* undertook to look at the war in Europe through the prism of what Taylor calls “war of nerves.” The book is replete with ominous warnings of this new type of war, “In reality, the war of the mind, the war of nerves or whatever you choose to call it, is, like any war, and organized conflict of group-wills. It has its own battlefield, and these produce their victories and defeats but their own thrills and their peculiar horrors.”\footnote{Taylor, Edmond. 1940. *The Strategy of Terror*, Houghton Mifflin Company. Universal Digital Library. https://archive.org/stream/strategyofterror010789mbp#page/n15/mode/2up, 2}

Donovan and Sherwood worked to allay any fears about propaganda oozing into America’s newsrooms or censorship preventing journalists from doing their job. A number of meetings were held at Donovan’s Georgetown home. The breakfast meetings and late dinner

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\footnote{Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-chapter 2, 38}
conferences did much to persuade broadcasters that they were “horning in on their game.”\textsuperscript{73} In fact quite the opposite was true; the government was looking for the best and brightest of the broadcast and newspaper world to recruit into the war effort. Sherwood’s increased involvement meant Donovan slowly gave up input in organization of propaganda activities. The partnership between Donovan and Sherwood remained, but as Donovan had more and more on his plate as COI, particularly in the intelligence and subversive activities, Sherwood stepped forward. Once Sherwood took over Donovan made fewer appearances in the Lilly papers. Donovan was simply busy and was not going to stand in the way of Sherwood. He was not alone either. Elmer Davis and Col. Hazeltine worked tirelessly to organize propaganda efforts before the U.S. entered the war.

The wheels were slow to turn but in the meantime, Sherwood gathered the core of a potential radio communication division. The group was organized under the name of the Foreign Information Service (FIS). “The psychological warriors were recruited primarily from the fields of radio and journalism, in accordance with Sherwood’s previously determined desiderata.”\textsuperscript{74} The men, and they were mostly men, who flocked to the work were young, enthusiastic and very driven to defeat Nazi Germany with the weapon that the Axis had crafted so cunningly for their own purpose: words. As media members they were keenly aware of power of the written word. As a result according to Lilly they nearly all felt that no one, least of all the military or diplomats understood this new and largely untried weapon of war, except Hitler and themselves.\textsuperscript{75}

Sherwood recruits read like a who’s-who of the 1940’s media world. In fact some had very successful careers of their own prior to the war. Edmond Taylor who wrote \textit{The Strategy of Terror}, which so irked government brass for giving so much attention to propaganda signed on

\textsuperscript{73} Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-chapter 2, 38
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 41
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, 42
to create propaganda. Joseph Barnes was the foreign editor and former foreign correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune. Ed Johnson came from CBS and specialized in German propaganda. James P. Warburg was an international banker and well-regarded writer on international affairs. At the outset of FIS these men were the leaders of the longhaired media types that worked with the military to defeat Hitler. Lilly described the group thus, “From the start of the operation, the personnel were ‘doers’ even though they desired to consider themselves as thinkers. They were enthralled by the vision that words, which Hitler had used to defeat nations by mere threat of force, that these words could now be employed to bring that evil genius to his doom.”76 They were itching to their gospel of words as weapons to the world. On December 7th 1941 their chance came.

76 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare-chapter 2, 42
CHAPTER TWO
THOSE ARE FIGHTING WORDS

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor answered a long festering question in the United States; the question of when tensions with the United States and Axis nations would reach all-out war. Robert Sherwood was in the White House when rumors of the attack were confirmed to Roosevelt by Admiral Harold Stark. The White House, indeed the whole country, was in disbelief that Japan would attack Honolulu. Writing years later Sherwood crystallized the national war effort that began that day:

The American nation achieved its most massive effort: the fighting qualities of the individual men of the armed forces were at least equal to the most hallowed and possibly exaggerated traditions of our past, and so was the quality of military leadership; the mass production of arms, food, raw materials and everything else that was necessary was far beyond anything that had previously been imagined possible, and so was the expenditure of money; the scientific development was immeasurable.\(^7\)

When the United States declared war on Japan, Germany and Italy, the government lifted a lot of restrictions over FIS. It also meant that the time for committees to discuss propaganda and psychological warfare had gone. This was a time for action. However, before everyone could run off to war they needed an operational structure to make sure that objectives could be met. The geography of the United States, an ocean apart from their enemies would be both a blessing a curse. It was easier to control domestic propaganda. On the other hand it meant the COI was responsible for building resources near the enemy that was an ocean away. The focus now was on information. Sherwood determined that, “world public opinion is influence most by spot news…dynamic action and tough utterances backed by deeds are the most potent foreign propaganda today.”\(^8\) It was clear to many that the United States lacked an information

\(^{7}\) Sherwood, Robert E., 1950 *Roosevelt and Hopkins: an Intimate History*. Harper, New York City, APUS Library [http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.00749.0001.001], 437

\(^{8}\) Lilly, History of psychological warfare, chapter 2, 43
infrastructure. Facilities were run down and until new ones were built companies had to make do with the existing equipment. Staffers in Donovan’s COI office outlined in an unsigned memo from 1941 the ideal organization for news broadcasting, specifically on the radio. With the advent of 24-hour news TV channels decades after the war, the memo from 1941 seems particularly prophetic:

This division will operate on a 24-hour a day, 7-day a week basis, to survey the news of the world from the press associations, all foreign short wave broadcasts and other sources of intelligence. From this central pool of intelligence, the Radio Communications Division will undertake to make recommendations to U.S. short wave broadcasters whereby their backgrounding of news will be more effective than the present rather casual selection of short wave broadcasting news.80

The onset of World War II also precipitated a shift in the discussion of propaganda. An evolution in semantics from ‘propaganda’ to ‘psychological warfare’ happened during the war. This was put best by Lilly when he wrote:

Even after Pearl Harbor, American agencies refused to use the term ‘propaganda.’ Similarly, the term ‘political warfare’ was unacceptable to American agencies because it was a traditionally British instrument and hence suspected by many Americans. Therefore, American participants in overseas information activities became habituated to the phrase ‘psychological warfare, as a cover term which was only vaguely understood or appreciated.81

The debate over a suitable label for information agencies is particularly interesting, since no one really took the time to define what propaganda was in the first place and what it was meant to do for the Allies. Tellingly, Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, never used any term similar to psychological warfare, even though from the outset of Nazi propaganda work, there were military objectives for propaganda.82 Whether targeting schoolchildren or soldiers, it was all propaganda in Germany. In the Lilly papers there is an unsigned memo which

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79 Lilly, History of psychological warfare, chapter 2, 42
80 Ibid, 43
81 Ibid, 41
82 Doob, 1950, 424
reads like a State Department agent trying to explain the importance of psychological warfare and potential ways to work with the War Department; indeed the memo is titled “Implications in Psychological Warfare of Interest to the State Department.” The memo shows an understanding of the importance psychological warfare noting, “Words whether broadcast or in leaflets are not limited in their impact and influence as are shells and bombs.” The memo does note that the units committed to psychological warfare should be able to act with independence in the field similar to their counterparts in more traditional military outfits. This shows that the ideas of psychological warfare were shifting and gaining as a field of warfare in and of itself.

To make the news commercially viable, something people would actually want to listen to, the COI encouraged independent stations to report news from around the world. The government believed that these independent station broadcasts would inspire confidence due to the simple fact they were not associated with the COI. The perception was that government control would distort information unlike the same news given by well-known newsman like Edward R. Murrow. Truth was another element of American psychological warfare established by Sherwood and his lieutenants. Sherwood believed the truth gave the Americans an innate advantage of German propaganda. Lilly makes it clear the most potent weapon in the American war of words was the near fanatical belief that the truth was more helpful to the democratic American war effort than black propaganda of Nazi Germany which was riddled with outright falsehoods. “We cannot duck bad news. We cannot chisel on it. But we can use every legitimate factual answer to it.” Sherwood and his crew believed that coping with bad news was better in the long term than gaining a short-term advantage from denial or outright lying. It was not only

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83 “Implications in Psychological Warfare of Interest to the State Department.” History of Psychological warfare Chap. 1 & 2 folder 5, Edward Lilly Papers Box 48, Eisenhower Research Library.
84 Lilly, History of psychological warfare, chapter 2, 44
85 Ibid, 45
news and information that felt the impact of American psychological warfare efforts. The start of
the war signaled the marketing of American ideals worldwide. The FIS used movies, magazines
and picture layouts for potential soft power influences of the American perspective.

Although the U.S. was unready and unprepared to respond as a result of Pearl Harbor, the
propaganda work immediately impacted the war on the domestic front in small ways. In chapter
three draft of Lilly’s *History of Psychological Warfare*, he details the American reaction and
propaganda response to the attack. It was not a smooth road. The agencies both military and
civilian that dealt with psychological warfare prior to the war did not suddenly all get along. In
fact the war exacerbated the problems of competition, bureaucracy, and funding. “The war caused
each agency to broaden its objective and intensify its efforts.” 86 Yet, at the end of December
1941 the number of news broadcasts increased from just 42 programs in September to 252 only a
few months later. 87 The news broadcasts varied from daily to weekly productions. In the
immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor it was difficult to calm confusion that understandably arose
after an event of such magnitude. Stations reported a rumored enemy raid on New York City as
an actual raid. The resulting broadcasts, according to Lilly, were broadcast on Axis radio
stations. 88 False rumors gave the Axis powers a propaganda coup. The false rumor showcased a
chink in the propaganda armor in regards to domestic propaganda, which at the time was the only
type of propaganda the U.S. offered. The U.S. had no group monitoring what was going out over
her own airwaves. Lilly referenced a memo from a Major R.E. Danielson to Army Colonel Oscar
Solbert. The frustration is nearly palpable:

What goes out over the shortwave? Nobody knows. The Federal Communication
Commission which intercepts all broadcasts from foreign stations and publishes

86 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare chapter 3, 2
87 Ibid 2
88 Ibid, 4
excerpts daily, with weekly and monthly summaries makes no record of what our stations send abroad. The C.O.I is supposed to do something about this but what? 89

It was clear that psychological warfare needed a definitive strategy to be effective. The lack of coordination was detrimental, as it had no relationship to the development of military strategy, which started forming on December 8th. However the fact remained that the military was not concerned with propaganda for the simple reason that the American military in December 1941 was fighting to survive. The weakness of the U.S. and a deteriorating Allied position in Europe did not make the Allies militaries suddenly want to focus on the power of words. At that point survival was a basic necessity.

A shift in perspective or at least strategy took place with the start of the ARCADIA Conference, a meeting of British and American officials in Washington D.C. from December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942. The goal of the Conference was to develop Anglo-American strategy going forward. It emphasized traditional symmetrical approaches, but did leave the door open to psychological warfare activities. This was largely due to British recognition that propaganda was useful for militaries to apply where it was convenient and/or necessary. 90 A single sentence from the ARCADIA Conference, as told by Lilly, provided a foundation to all the American psychological warfare activities. Specifically it was noted as one of four essential parts of Allied strategy, “Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment, blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.” 91

This new strategy suddenly created a power vacuum for the COI and the military to fill. A memo from Colonel William P. Scobey, the staff executive to the Assistant Secretary of War, John Jay McCloy, addressed to the War Plans Division blasted American propaganda so far as it

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89 Lilly, Edward. 1950. “History of Psychological Warfare” chapter draft. History of Psychological warfare Chap. 3 folder 1, Edward Lilly Papers Box 48, Eisenhower Research Library, 6
90 Ibid, 12
91 Ibid, 11
“had concentrated on the negative aspects of surprising the enemy, had emphasized security and concealment in military planning, rather than positive press and radio activity to deceive the enemy as to our military activity.”92 It is not known if Donovan knew of this memo, but around the same time he convinced Roosevelt that psychological warfare activities did not need to wait for a military victory to go on the offensive. In essence Donovan advocated an American propaganda shift from reactionary and defensive to proactive and offensive in spite of the lack of military victories. Instead of negativity against Japan and Germany for unwarranted attacks at Pearl Harbor and declarations of war, propaganda should focus on positivity, notably that America’s enemies had not and would not attain a largely military objective. It was marketing America not as defensive, but undefeatable. The adoption of this philosophy underlined once and for all that American participation in the war meant ultimately an Allied victory.93

Sherwood viewed this philosophy as a way to spread democracy throughout the world. He expanded the FIS by bringing on John Houseman to lead the Overseas Radio Programming department. Houseman was a theatre and screen director who spoke many European languages. It was Houseman, Sherwood, Joseph Barnes and James Warburg who fussed over the first foreign scripts and shows. Sherwood’s insistence on the “unmistakable truth” was still on order. Yet, the group ran into an issue that bedevils newsrooms in peacetime: how to make it interesting. Houseman made a change in format that can still be seen on most news channels. The BBC format for radio news programs was a single newsreader. Houseman brought in multiple people to read the news to add variety and keep the listener engaged.94 Readers would change every paragraph with quotes being read by a single specific voice.

92 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare chapter 3, 12
93 Ibid, 14
94 Alonso, Harriet Hyman. 2007 Robert E. Sherwood: The Playwright in War and Peace. University of Massachusetts Press. Amherst, 244
In 1942 it became clear that psychological warfare practices were mushrooming far beyond a small group like FIS, and organizational issues between the COI and the military made a change necessary. As a result, Executive Order 9182 created the Office of War Information (OWI) on June 13, 1942. Prior to its creation the COI was technically in charge of providing information services. The creation of the OWI split information services between that organization and the newly created Office of Special Services (OSS). The OSS fell under the umbrella of the JCS. In truth the department changes were meant to halt organizational differences. Roosevelt appointed Elmer Davis to head the OWI and Sherwood the director of Overseas Branch of the OWI. Bill Donovan led the OSS. Donovan’s focus on clandestine activities and black propaganda curtailed his OWI influence. His was still influential in the OWI, but with the group now fully vested by Roosevelt, he stopped being involved in day-to-day activities. Whoever was in charge, the goal was the same. The OWI and OSS spent the war convincing everyone from soldiers to civilians on both sides of the Atlantic who the better country and soon-to-be-winner of the war was going to be.

The military looked down on the OWI as a pseudo-public relations firm and a frontline partner in reaching people behind enemy lines. There was much more to the OWI than met the eye. It was on the leading edge of psychological warfare. The group did this by simply poaching some of the best and brightest in the area of psychological warfare from the military from a special study group within the Military Intelligence Division (MID) that studied German methodologies of psychological warfare. This particular group grew to become the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB), which developed the first real methodologies and organization tables for American propaganda. Radio propaganda held the team’s focus.95 It was from this study group

that the OWI poached men and develop some of their top agents. Going forward the major advances in psychological warfare development were split between OWI, with input from the OSS and the PWB, with smaller groups and committees ranging across the government, including but not limited to the Army, Navy and State Department. It is ironic that so many people were focused on psychological warfare that even as late as 1951 there was in fact no legal definition of what psychological warfare entailed.  

Organizational disagreement remained an on-going frustration during the war. It was a fundamental weakness of the American war effort. “Policy and operational division of the same activity among several agencies meant duplication, weakened effort and potential divergencies in the expression of national policy which the enemy could exploit to its own advantage.”  

Ironically though, the argument is very American. The United States made allowances for each group, both military and civilian, to develop their own psychological warfare objectives, even in the midst of a war. This differed from the propaganda operations of Germany in which one department directed everything. Men involved bristled when discussing the lack of organization even after the war. Minutes of a meeting in 1950 to discuss a Lilly chapter manuscript with the JCS show that Colonel Black felt the White House’s job of settling the disputes should be given more credited by Lilly, even after Black admitted, “there is no detailed account of the psychological warfare operations of the White House.” Lilly noted it would be difficult to verify the White House’s influence because “two of the principal participants were dead,” meaning Roosevelt and one of his closest advisors Harry Hopkins. The OWI and OSS would each at times compete with the other for information and work together to achieve an objective.

96 Lilly, 1951, 10
97 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare chapter 2, 53
98 “Minutes of Seminar held in Room 2D879a” 6 June 1950. Folder History of Psychological Warfare, Chapter 1 & 2 (5), Lilly Papers Box 48, Eisenhower Research Library, 1
99 “Minutes of Seminar” 1950, 2
The organization loosely settled on recognition that the President framed the propaganda policy, which the COI executed, with a caveat that the theatre commander could change the provision. This gave theatre commanders flexibility in the face of an ever-shifting battlefield. There was a recognized disparity between the national propaganda and theatre propaganda.\(^{100}\) A theatre commander’s use of field propaganda units was allowed to operate outside of national policy, even though it could deeply impact morale and foreign civilian propaganda. There were attempts to take away a theatre commander’s ability to act independently and put propaganda solely under a higher authority. This would create coordination problems between grand strategy and local tactics throughout the war. Yet, this caveat allowed for a variety of tactical propaganda and was underlined by the fact that the military knew, as Lilly put it “the sputtering use of propaganda in World War I” was not going to work in a total war scenario.\(^{101}\) This viewpoint not only established combat propaganda going forward, which operated with success in North Africa and Europe, but it also gave a fundamental purpose to psychological warfare. It was to “supplement military warfare, to contribute to ultimate military success.”\(^{102}\) Organization and budget necessities to fund psychological warfare during the early part of the war were clearly of great significance to Lilly. The majority of at least two chapters focus on the finite detail of the organization and the large-scale philosophy as a result of the disorganization. In essence it illustrates how much the U.S. did not know what psychological warfare should look like, other than radio shows, or rather what the government thrust into a world war wanted into look like. Everyone agreed on the desired outcome but few agreed on how to get there.

\(^{100}\) Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare chapter 2, 63
\(^{101}\) Ibid, 63
\(^{102}\) Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare chapter 3, 21
The medium that held the focus of the OWI and PWB at the start of the war was radio.

Sherwood concluded that radio would be of vital importance after speaking with everyone from the leading broadcast companies, including CBS and NBC to psychology professors like Leonard Doob, a Harvard trained psychologist, to the Federal Communications Commission. In a letter to Donovan he explained why the radio waves where the wave of the future:

The short wave radio is a vital strategic weapon, political and military in character. Its use must be directed by the coordinated intelligence of all services and departments. The right programs must be directed from the right stations to the right regions at the right hours, with emphasis on the fact that the U.S.A. is speaking to the world with unanimity.103

An unsigned memo filed under the topic of Coordinator of Information in the Lilly papers detailed the organization of the news and information divisions. In essence this was the formula to create a news network. The memo laid out executive responsibilities and who got to make policy, but the tactical aspects of the memo shows the emphasis placed on radio for both foreign and domestic propaganda broadcasts. “The Washington news desk should have, in addition to competent copy desk and re-write men, a staff of reporters, each of whom will consider one of the regions in which we are operating as his special field.”104 The division between propaganda work in Washington D.C. and New York was the result of the division between OWI and OSS. Particularly Lilly noted that Davis wanted to keep propaganda activity both foreign and domestic away from the nosy bureaucrats in the Capitol.105 Having qualified radio talent in New York bolstered the division. This also increased the variety of programming to make it on the air. The Washington office sent scripts to the New York office already coded for foreign broadcast. The New York news desk prepared the master scripts for news and features. The master scripts where

103 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare chapter 2, 40
104 “News and Features division memo”, Edward Lilly Papers, Box 17, Folder Coordinator of Information(1), 2
105 Lilly, History of Psychological Warfare chapter 2, 47
then sent by wire service to the regional directors both at home and abroad to be reworked so as to better fit that region.  

106 The news and features division varied from the combat propaganda units in a number of ways but most notably in production. The News and Feature Division focus broke down into three categories, which did not change much during the war:

1. Finished products which we deliver to our own microphones in completed from.
2. Completely written and translated newscasts and features delivered to the stations in the required length over leased wires, with the voice to be added by the stations.
3. Occasional news or feature items of considerable importance, which are now covered by the wire services, and which we will want to deliver to the station newsrooms in English or in a foreign language.  

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The radio division of the News and Feature was in essence a radio network that appeared overnight. The pressure was put on the division to not only transmit the broadcast, write truthful copy for broadcast worldwide, but responsibilities also included, “conceiving and producing all special radio features such as one-minute spots, musical numbers, etc.; in the idiom and in the form best suited to the audience at which they are angled.”  

108 This was an important development. It was not just propaganda in straightforward manners, but utilizing propaganda in shows and programming that were expressly entertainment. Americans wanted to persuade the world even when relaxing listening to a radio drama or catching up on celebrity gossip that the U.S.A. was going to win the war.

Among the Lilly papers at the Eisenhower Library is one of many reports explaining a specific detail of the war effort as undertaken by a specific group. World War II may be remembered for the sacrifices of servicemen on the front lines, but it was also a mammoth

106 “News and Features division memo”, 2
107 Ibid
108 Ibid, 3
bureaucratic undertaking. In the age before computers a large army of civilians and military worked to record nearly every detail, even if an event was classified and the paper was never going to see the light of day. In Box 15 of the Lilly papers sits the Report on the Book and Magazine Bureau of the OWI by Genevieve Forbes Herrick. The title given Herrick is “acting chief.” Little is known about Herrick beyond the fact that she was a reporter at the *Chicago Tribune* in the 1930’s. She was appointed acting chief of the OWI shortly before the bureau was abolished by Executive Order 9608 on August 31, 1945. The report is undated but immediately lays out the importance of printed material when trying to win a war. An advantage of magazines and books is the ability to specifically tailor a piece of some length to a specific group. This was propaganda aimed at a specific demographic. Though World War II pre-dates the modern conception of marketing, the Magazine and Book Bureau saw the value of reaching demographics beyond that of the soldier or statesman. The groups Herrick mentions in the report are still targeted on the newsstands today: women, business, health and rural. When discussing psychological warfare a key example is leaflets dropped in enemy territory, yet Herrick makes the claim that books and magazines were probably more important. “Costing more than a newspaper, it is kept longer and frequently exerts considerable influence over its reader who have great loyalty for their favorites,” Herrick writes.109 The Magazine and Book Bureau worked with a variety of government and military groups to help them meet their needs for psychological warfare materials. The initial publication of a monthly Magazine War Guide was the first document of its kind according to Herrick. The group made a point of tapping underutilized writers or mediums. This led to collaboration with ‘pulp’ writers for the War Guide Supplement. Pulp stories were cheap to produce and known for lurid or sensationalized content. ‘Pulp’ writers

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garnered 70 million readers, but the ‘slick’ publishing houses looked down on them. Yet, ‘pulp’ readership far outstripped even the most established magazines and publishers. Herrick notes:

Considerable difficulty was at first encountered in the reluctance of the military and other authorities to extend to ‘pulp’ writers and editors the same opportunities for interviews and visits that they offered those connected to the ‘slick.’ Mr. Zagat (attorney turned pulp writer) had to assure these officials that the ‘pulp’ audience was important; that would not distort or overly dramatize the facts.¹¹⁰

Psychological warfare extended all the way into comic books. Comics in the 1940’s only had an estimated 35% adult readership, but still reached about 75 million people. The pages dedicated to promoting the American war effort and also waging psychological warfare against Nazi German almost did not come about due to existing government bureaucracy. The U.S. Post Office at the time required comic books to have at least two full pages of straight word-text in order to qualify for second-class mail privileges. Comic editors and publishers simply approached the OWI asking if they wanted that space, but the Post Office “refused to recognize government messages as fulfilling its requirement.”¹¹¹ The frustrated publishers then simply decided to write and distribute special issues for the OWI. This was even more commendable on their part due to paper allotments and rations that went on throughout the war.

Written material was important for American psychological warfare, but radio was king. The OWI placed radio outposts the world over. Working with a plethora of American news outlets, the Voice of America would be beamed throughout the world. The big offices focusing on war in Europe were in Washington and New York. The OWI radio service attempted to present themselves like any other news service and have content that could match them, but with a distinctly pro-American flavor. To say the Voice of America had a news bias is difficult, because the organization tried so hard not to. Ironically the radio service attempted to give the

¹¹⁰ Herrick, 2
¹¹¹ Ibid, 7
impression that there was not any news bias in order to garner listeners. On the other hand the OWI ran the Voice of America. The OWI was an organization founded on the principals of waging psychological warfare on their enemies and garnering supporters and intelligence from listeners. In essence, the propaganda machine was afraid of being seen as propaganda so they went out of their way to make their news seem unbiased.

One thing standing in the way of OWI radio dominance was geography. They could put out programming and formatting from New York to be beamed and used abroad, but they needed agents on the ground to make sure it was going out to listeners in an effective manner. They also needed to make sure that listeners enjoyed the content. Even during the war OWI worried about ratings. To this end outposts were set up around the world. This served a two-fold purpose. In yet another unpublished chapter by Edward Lilly, he examined the OWI outposts for their contribution to the war effort. He put forth the notion that the OWI was not waging psychological warfare in the sense that they were sending information out into the word, but conversely paying close attention to what comes back to them. The group was as much about securing intelligence as it was about disseminating information. Over the course of the war the OWI established 43 outposts. Lilly noted the responsibilities could include reporting, “that one transmitter was better received than another, that the timing of American programs was poor for its area, that the enemy was jamming or that other wave-lengths provided better reception.”

This goes against the romantic notions of espionage behind enemy lines. Psychological warfare was as much about something as mundane as getting a clear signal as facing off against an enemy. The outposts were considered to be just as vital to the war effort for intelligence as they were for getting the American psychological warfare effort coming out of any town speakers. In

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March of 1942, Poynter put his thoughts about the importance of outposts down in a memo to William Donovan. Poynter writes:

> We need eyes and ears specially trained to keep us informed daily and weekly on whether the United States’ propaganda effort is clicking in a particular area….We need people who know radio and can make arrangements for re-broadcasts, either official or non-official; men who can influence the domestic radio in certain areas; men who can arrange for special programs to be telephoned from the united States; men who can pick up and record United States broadcasts and arrange for special groups to listen to outstanding broadcasts; men who can keep an eye on films and arrange for distribution of special films from the United States through various channels.\(^{113}\)

Poynter made it clear, he was not just gathering information, but was assembling a communication structure that received information from those who needed it. OWI needed to reach everyone from the civilians on the home front to people behind enemy lines. It seems Poynter got his point across; even though there is no reply from Donovan in the archives, the operations increased in New York and London. The New York news division received access to a number of short wave radio stations in the United States.

Another memo from Poynter to Donovan laid out which stations were most important for domestic psychological warfare operations. It is not surprising that WNBC and WCBX, which would later be WCBS are on the list. David Sarnoff founder of NBC and William Paley founder of CBS participated in the war effort. Both served on Eisenhower’s communications staff. Paley served in the OWI to a degree, though there is no traceable information regarding his involvement with Eisenhower. The only paper connected to Paley in the archives at the Eisenhower Library is a copy of the eulogy Paley gave at Eisenhower’s funeral. This shows that the major radio stations and their founders were ready and willing to participate in waging

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psychological warfare on behalf of the United States. Poynter, in the memo to Donovan laid out four tangible benefits a reversible loop from WCBS and WNBC to the OWI offices in New York might garner. Poynter wrote, “Make recordings of all foreign broadcast for later analysis and comparison.” The work undertaken by foreign outposts was not just being sent out, but like any other weapon critiqued by powers at home for efficacy. The other reason for monitoring as laid out in point two, was to prevent sabotage of the American scripts. It was considered of critical importance to the war effort that the scripts, language and tone be approved by the OWI or the JCS. It was of such importance that even the President scrutinized the broadcasts. This was not just a war for territory and nations. This was also a war for hearts and minds. The third point from Poynter was simply to keep the President in the loop. The radio transmissions were just as much for the critical listening of those involved in the war effort as for those making the decisions about waging it.

Even though radio was the dominant medium, books and films also impacted the propaganda war. Despite the organizational issues between the OWI, the OSS and the military, a contribution by the OWI helped make combat propaganda possible: the organizational chart. A workable organization flow chart meant that radio propaganda units could put together, train and activate for combat propaganda. Yet, for all that was debated at the bureaucratic level in Washington regarding psychological warfare during the early phase of World War II, the general perception was that the American military leadership did not appreciate that propaganda could pay great dividends in a military offensive when it impacted an enemy’s morale. It was still largely unproven how psychological warfare contributed to the war effort from a military standpoint. This would change with Operation TORCH.

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114 Poynter, 1942
115 Lilly, Edward. N.D. OWI History, Chapter VI, Edward Lilly Papers, Box 26, Folder Chapter VI (1), Eisenhower Research Library, 5
According to Lilly, the fact that psychological warfare units were included in the operation seems completely coincidental.\textsuperscript{116} Combat propaganda teams taking part in an Allied invasion were more a case of right place at right time, rather than brilliant military foresight. TORCH was an Allied invasion of Northwest Africa ostensibly to capitalize on German preoccupation with Stalingrad. Conversely, as Supreme Allied Commander, Eisenhower wanted to work on the practical aspects of what an Allied invasion force would entail prior to attempting a beach landing on the European mainland. North African beaches were a good trial run for Allied forces, in addition to opening up an additional front against the Germans. TORCH scored many firsts for the Allied war effort, not least of which was the first land invasion of the Western Theatre by Allied forces. It was the first occasion that American psychological warfare units are noted to have been in combat. The OWI and PWB became involved in Torch through the work of a handful of men, none of whom had military backgrounds.

Davis and Sherwood, though not military men, joined together to push for psychological warfare units to be included in Allied military operations by using Archibald MacLeish and James Warburg. MacLeish was an award-winning poet, yet during the war he worked for both the OSS and OWI as a psychological warrior. Warburg had an eclectic background but was one of Sherwood’s early lieutenants. He served in World War I, became a wealthy banker and wrote the lyrics to hit song “Fine and Dandy” under a pseudonym.\textsuperscript{117} Yet it was Warburg’s connections within Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) that resulted in an invitation to organize a psychological warfare unit, which would accompany the landing forces. In 1942 MacLeish and Warburg traveled to London to pitch psychological warfare involvement to Eisenhower and the

\textsuperscript{116} Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 6
\textsuperscript{117} Ohl, 2008, 33
Allied military commanders. They accepted the pitch but there are no details of the agreement between Eisenhower and Warburg as a representative of the OWI.\footnote{Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 6}

On the night of November 8, 1942, President Roosevelt on OWI managed radio airwaves announced the Allied invasion of the north coast of Africa. Operation Torch had started. It was the first Allied invasion of Axis dominated territory. The London and New York OWI broadcast teams worked to strengthen the focus on the Casablanca and Tunisian listeners. The propaganda operations as decided prior to landing focused on prepared statements by Roosevelt and Eisenhower. They told the French people of their impending freedom with mentions of the coming liberation of other Allied nations, such as Norway, to keep Germany guessing. The directives specifically detailed the objective of the offensive: “to shorten the war by defeating the enemy in North Africa.”\footnote{Ibid, 9}

Details on the psychological warfare units, which participated in Operation TORCH, come from OWI employee Cole Donald Hall. He noted to Lilly that 49 people belonged to the psychological warfare unit, which took part in Operation TORCH. The unit did not seamlessly integrate with the military units. According to Lilly, “Much important radio equipment and informational material was lost and practically nothing was available to the operators during the early week of the invasion.”\footnote{Ibid, “Words and Bullets,” 12} Another pressing issue was that the psychological unit left London to take part in an Allied invasion with a professional military and the unit did not have the slightest military precision. This was trial by fire for the unit and underlined an existing problem with psychological warfare units. “Failure to appreciate the nature of a military operation and to realize that in a campaign, even a unit of civilians must be part of chain of command and must be part of the army organization, in order to avoid inevitable frictions and
even possible starvation.”121 There is no mention if any psychological warfare members were casualties as a result.

Whatever the shortcoming at the start, TORCH exemplified solid psychological warfare work. It was a game changer for the OWI and OSS. It was a first for both intelligence and psychological warfare capacities. Until that point psychological warfare units going ashore on landing craft was unheard of. Torch can be seen as a successful marriage of “special intelligence and strategic deception,” with the use of strategic intelligence through ULTRA, intelligence gained from espionage operations undertaken by the OSS and the OWI psychological warfare practices focusing on deception.122 This was the evolution of propaganda going beyond hearts-and-minds to using the communications to win a conflict as it is unfolding. According to Lilly, Operation TORCH, “had the ultimate aim of developing a propaganda instrument, which would be of real aid and direct help to the military in winning actual battles.”123 Some shortcomings were evident in after action analysis of the invasion. A lot of radio equipment and information materials were lost in the invasion and not resupplied for weeks.124 This left propaganda units to use their own creativity to accomplish their objective. A Lt. Alfred Donegan used a megaphone during the invasion to persuade some French speaking Axis forces to surrender.125 A radio unit on the U.S.S. Texas used a transmitter on board to broadcast into Casablanca and Gibraltar.

Another problem and one that clearly stemmed from the military versus civilian organization problems of psychological warfare was apparent after the invasion. The psychological warfare units were unquestionably skilled in the communication arts, but they lacked even the slightest military organization. As Lilly put it, “This failure to appreciate the

121 Lilly, “Words and Bullets,”, 13
122 Patch, 2008
123 Lilly, “Words and Bullets”, 3
124 Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 11
125 Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 16
nature of a military operation and to realize that, in a campaign, even a unit of civilians must be part of the chain of command and must be part of the army organization, in order to avoid inevitable frictions and even possible starvation, created most of the difficulties and problems which characterized this, the initial experiment.”126 Eisenhower quickly dealt with the shortcomings the psychological warfare units ran into. He appointed a military man, Colonel Charles B. Hazeltine, as Chief of Propaganda and Psychological Warfare Planning Section with the aim of giving psychological warfare units more of a footing in war.

Hazeltine was skeptical from the beginning over what the purpose of psychological warfare had in the war. A lifelong military man, he felt war should be won with bullets not words. Unfamiliar with the science behind it, he was not sure he could trust the psychological warfare units not try to manipulate him. The military appointment to what was in fact a civilian organization did bring the necessary changes. Hazeltine “Rectified the evident lack of organization and gradually shook down the operation so that it adopted military organization and accepted military procedures.”127 Direct participation in combat would change not only psychology warfare, but close the gap and add value to the “hearts-and-mind” campaigns by the military, aimed at demoralizing Germans and convincing other Europeans that the Allies were still very much involved in the war effort. To reach this end the OWI created a communications arm that would rival any newsroom in the United States at the time. Hazeltine worked with Percy Winner, a colleague of Warburg’s, to come up with a workable mandate for the Psychological Warfare Section (PWS). The group was a recognized part of the Civil Affairs Section of AFHQ. The group had five sub-sections:

- The Executive Section dealing with administration and relationships with other Army groups;

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126 Ibid, 12
127 Lilly, “Words and Bullets”, 3
b. A Policy planning and propaganda coordinating section;
c. A Special missions or operations section, which was the American equivalent of OSS activity;
d. A Collection and Evaluation section, which performed the duties of monitoring enemy and Allied broadcasts, of gathering intelligence materials and information and finally evaluating and properly reporting this material;
e. A Preparation and Distribution Section embraced the customary media activities through press, radio and movies.128

The changes were just as much about ensuring discipline and chain of command as they were about making sure there was no duplication of product. The charter of PWS also laid out a very clear objective for combat psychological warfare. “PWS was to manipulate the feeling and thoughts of enemy populations ‘likely to further purposes of military strategy’ and for these functions it was authorized to use all available media.”129

TORCH had examples of men using all available media to fulfill their mission. The combat propaganda units focused on and seized objectives the armed forces usually ignored, but were vital to fulfilling the purpose of psychological warfare. In Oran and Algiers, the two largest cities in Algeria, “PWS personnel immediately took possession of, and guarded newspaper plants, other printing establishments and most importantly the local radio transmitter and studio.”130 In the same vein newspapers were printed and distributed shortly after taking cities. Anti-Allied French films impounded at movie theatres and posters around towns were replaced with pro-American materials.131

After TORCH the propaganda units faced an unforeseen political reality. The hard won efforts of the PWS were shut down as a result of the Clark-Darlan agreement. U.S. General Mark Clark, who commanded the U.S. Fifth Army, coordinated the agreement. It ended hostilities in

128 Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 14
129 Ibid, 15
130 Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 18
131 Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 18
North Africa, but the agreement with Francois Darlan a known anti-Semite and Nazi collaborator was a morale hit for the Allies.\textsuperscript{132} Darlan was a star in the French Navy. After France’s defeat he served as a ranking official in Vichy France in league with Marshall Phillipe Petain and a rival of Pierre Laval, a known Nazi sympathizer, if not a Nazi himself. It was therefore a shock to the Allies and notably to the propaganda units when they recognized Darlan as chief French leader in French North Africa. There were a number of reasons the PWS was frustrated. First as a result of the agreement, all informational media in North Africa was handed over to the French. Secondly, The PWS lost all the ability to achieve their objective.\textsuperscript{133} The fruits of the first combat propaganda were gone with a handshake. The PWS was not happy with what they felt was a betrayal of American ideals. As Lilly wrote:

> Recognition of Darlan caused PWS people to consider that the Allies’ declaration in favor of democratic elements had been falsified and made absurd. PWS people watched what they considered the rise of reactionary groups and the imprisonment or threats against the democratic group, from which PWS had received the greatest amount of assistance. Due in part to the lack of adequate organization but mainly due to the unique conglomeration of personalities, journalist-linguistics-romanticists, civilian-military, British-American, which made up PWC, undercover and secret activity was undertaken by many PWS people against the spirit, if not the actual words of the Allies’ agreement with Darlan.\textsuperscript{134}

The frustration did little to solve the problem of propaganda units not communicating well with their military brethren. It was an issue Hazeltine tackled head on in December of 1942. Hazeltine’s changes led to the PWS to be renamed the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB).

In the Lilly Papers is a box labeled “Hazeltine.” It contains memos and papers attributed to the man who militarized information. A great example of how much Hazeltine influenced the


\textsuperscript{133} Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 19

\textsuperscript{134} Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 20
PWB and how he changed the perception of the group is a pamphlet published for the Armed Forces. The pamphlet has “Restricted” print on the title page. It was not allowed near the front lines. In a way the pamphlet is propaganda for propaganda. In the introduction Hazeltine details what PWB combat propaganda does. It is a nuts-and-bolts look and one of the most detailed examinations of the topic since the war began. It also served as a tactical manual for what propaganda looks like. Hazeltine defined the work of psychological warfare as, “anything that makes the enemy less confident in himself, his government, or cause he fights for, is psychological warfare.” There were no parsing words in the pamphlet. This leads us to consider the audience. The front matter contains references to Eisenhower’s directives on Psychological Warfare. It is addressed in bold letters “To All Concerned With Psychological Warfare,” yet contains a number of references to the military’s contribution. Hazeltine as a military man was speaking to his own. He outlined how propaganda was delivered,

The two main weapons of propaganda are leaflets and radio. Both can be, and are, used in two ways. One is a tactical weapon, close to the enemy in the field. It aims to bring about an immediate objective-such as the surrender of a particular group of enemy troops. The other is as a strategic weapon, long range from a rear base. This type of assault aims to weaken the enemy’s home morale or the productivity of his war industries.

This is the first time in the Lilly Papers that the strategic and tactical value of the PWB’s work is laid out. This was a marked shift from the early war years with varying degrees of input from the military. The combat units were unquestionably part of the military. In a paragraph header titled “It isn’t magic,” Hazeltine makes it clear there is no secret to the efficacy or mission of propaganda. He admitted there would be no single leaflet or radio broadcast that

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would win the war; it was a consistent long-term concerted effort. What is intriguing about the pamphlet is how Hazeltine laid out the operational nuances of the PWB and how the strategy and tactics meshed together. In essence, Hazeltine thought about the use of words in warfare with the operational know how in the same terms his colleagues would think about more traditional weapons. From Hazeltine’s perspective the PWB was now planning long-range and short range, in terms of reaching the enemy. The conclusion of a perfectly executed assault was, according to Hazeltine achieved when “a radio transmitter which has fallen into our hands can now be turned against the enemy.” Psychological Warfare was now an integrated part of the American war effort. The debate of how to integrate it more effectively continued throughout the war, but there was no longer a question of its relevancy on the front lines.”

137 Ibid, 7
138 Ibid, 9
CHAPTER THREE
SELLING UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

In 1943 the war turned to the advantage of the Allies as a result of Operation TORCH and German losses at Stalingrad. Psychological warfare would be a determining factor of if not when there would be an Allied victory. The organizational issues shifted from military versus civilian control, though that was an underlining factor, to a question of field office units running counter to home office dictums. \(^{139}\) Roosevelt issued an executive order on March 9, 1943 to clarify the issue. The order gave control over all phases of propaganda to OWI, but to relieve any questions about execution on the frontlines made it clear those theatre operations were under the purview of the theatre commander. \(^{140}\) Before going further into combat propaganda units and their success on the front lines, there should be some explanation of clandestine propaganda.

Propaganda at the beginning of the war was divided into three types. As Lilly explained in presentation notes white propaganda was 100% the truth, “each report is carefully screened to ascertain the full degree of reliability and truthfulness, and where it is definitely established as coming from a recognized source traceable to our establishment.” \(^{141}\) This was the majority of propaganda used by the Allies, both at home and abroad during the war. Gray propaganda was editorial or gossip; “used not from a standpoint of establishing a face, but to create dissatisfaction or dissension among the population at whom it is aimed.” \(^{142}\) Black propaganda was a lie made up to coerce belief in an agenda. It is often set up to look like it comes from a friendly source. Lilly viewed black propaganda as an insidious form, and one that was at risk of backfiring. \(^{143}\) The propaganda unit in foreign outposts like London, Algiers and even resistance in occupied territories undertook some cloak and dagger propaganda activities. Three agents were sent to

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139 Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 29
140 Ibid, 36
141 Lilly, Edward, February 8, 1944, “Psychological Warfare”, 12
142 Ibid
143 Lilly, Edward, February 8, 1944, “Psychological Warfare”, 12
areas near Nazi occupation and given the task of going into the Nazi held territory and smuggling out press clippings and any other media or information.\textsuperscript{144} The information could be useful for operations against the Nazis directly or for public consumption to feed the public desire to know what was going on behind enemy lines. The OWI considered all information useful to some degree; they just needed to find the right audience. One agent went to Istanbul, Turkey, one to Bern, Switzerland and the other to Stockholm, Sweden. The agents were also expected to place American approved news stories into neutral papers in these border countries.\textsuperscript{145} It was hoped that regular commercial activity or Resistance efforts would carry the American stories and potentially radio feeds into Nazi occupied countries. These OWI assignments were considered the juiciest. Due to the risk and distance the agents were largely autonomous. As Lilly put it, “Cut off from extensive communication with the home offices, the outpost chief necessarily had to be permitted a large amount of individual initiative, responsibility, and unvouchered funds.”\textsuperscript{146} This autonomy became a hallmark of American psychological warfare outfits during the war. An unattributed quote written down by Lilly in 1951 shows how loose that OWI and OSS could be in terms of a playbook. “The United States psychological warfare has a history of improvisation without central leadership, control or integration with the other methods of obtaining national objectives.”\textsuperscript{147} Though psychological warfare is undoubtedly useful, what were the objectives of those groups given large budgets and human resources to wage war on thought? The best answer to that question is in a memo without an author listed, but it is in a folder titled “Coordinator of Information,” which was William Donovan throughout the war. It would not be an unintelligent guess to attribute the memo to the head of the OSS. In the memo titled, “Recommendations on

\textsuperscript{144} Lilly, Edward. N.D. OWI History, Chapter VII, “Outposts”, Edward Lilly Papers, Box 26, Folder Chapter VI(1), Eisenhower Research Library, 7
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid, 8
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid
\textsuperscript{147} Lilly, 1951, 14
Psychological Warfare based on 1 year in OWI and 6 weeks in PWB,” the author lays out what the needs in the military and government are for psychological warfare operations. The memo reads:

G-1 (military personnel staff of U.S. Army) should immediately undertake to provide all Staff Schools, Officers’ Training Schools, and Instructor’s orientation courses, with proper materials and adequate time to explain the general principles, the possible accomplishments, and the definite limitations of psychological warfare. A general understanding and appreciation of this weapon of war is as necessary for the background of the soldier as lectures on supply, intelligence, security and strategy. 148

The clandestine work was just a part of the puzzle. If anything the clandestine work was a testament to just how “total” the war had become. Psychological warfare was waged both symmetrically from boats and planes and asymmetrically behind the lines in newspapers. Psychological warfare faced an issue that more traditional forms of warfare also faced. Even a war of words needed a supply line. How to get books, films, pamphlets and propaganda material into a freshly occupied territory without burdening combat troops was the responsibilities of the PWB with supplies from the OWI. If nothing more the OWI and PWB were credited with providing an occupational service that infantry and front line troops no longer needed to do. 149

The PWB also found a new type of propaganda in their hands in the aftermath of TORCH. The type of propaganda came to be known as “base propaganda.” It consisted of providing information and education for the people groups who had lived under informational blackout for years. 150 It was filling the information and entertainment vacuum left by invasion. This was not just propaganda for occupation. It was propaganda for the end of the war. The PWB set up documentation centers, but the shops were known by their nickname at the PWB as

148 “Recommendations on Psychological Warfare”, Edward Lilly Papers, Box 17, Folder Coordinator of Information (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library Archives, 1
149 Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 39
150 Ibid, 57
“propaganda shops.”151 The first prop shop came about in North Africa by accident. Allied Field Headquarters (AFHQ) received a large amount of British and American magazine. They were passed on to the PWB and after staff suggestions, they were offered for sale in a store in Algiers. So many people bought them that AFHQ ordered more and in a wider variety. As a result documentation centers opened throughout North Africa.152 The prop shops carried British and French newspapers and magazines. The shelves also stocked OWI and PWB special publications, a lending library and exhibits and displays, which on their own drew a crowd. At a time when Anglo-French relations were tense following the Clark-Darlan plan the exhibits were an effective way to bolster French morale while still keeping within the terms of the agreements.153 Maintaining morale in occupied areas whether through book, movie or radio broadcast was important, but not a job of pin point accuracy. It was a about shifting sentiments for the long term. Yet for combat propaganda units the short-term push to change hearts and minds for the Allied cause was underway.

In early 1943 the combat propaganda war in North Africa put more pressure on the leaflets as a way to persuade enemy soldiers to give up the fight. In a pamphlet titled Confetti, Hazeltine made a persuasive case regarding the importance of leaflet distribution. An interesting point in the pamphlet is how fast the leaflets fall, “A free-floating single-sheet, standard 5” x 8” uncalendared paper falls at the rate of 5 minutes per 100 feet….Thus if leaflets are dropped at 18,000 feet in an ordinary 10 mile breeze, they will drift 15miles to earth.”154 This goes to show the precision of the propaganda war. Hazeltine did concede that pilots did not really like their “paper bullets,” preferring the real ones. The point of a leaflet campaign was marketed as the

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151 Lilly, OWI History, Chapter VI, 58
152 Ibid, 60
153 Ibid, 60
154 Hazeltine, 1943, Confetti, 2
cutting edge of psychological warfare meant specifically for a war of attrition, “It rains on enemy troops until it bogs their fighting spirit and spoils their aim.” As the campaign in North Africa advanced the leaflets proved their worth. Interviews of German and Italian prisoners taken during the Tunis campaign told the PWB about the effectiveness of their leaflet campaign. Hazeltine wrote in a memo to AFHQ in 1943, “Enemy counter-measures include stiff penalties for keeping surrender leaflets to facilitate desertion.” This shows that Germany and Italy were aware of the efforts to undermine their morale. Hazeltine did not reference whether or not the Axis powers were directly aware of PWB and OWI activities or if it was all an assumption that the Allies would attempt to undermine morale. Perhaps an even more impressive compliment that is credited to the leaflets is that the leaflets gained monetary value. “Arabs from Tunis collected and sold leaflets to Italian soldiers who thought they required ‘passes’ to surrender,” wrote Hazeltine. This proves that the leaflets in North Africa where the Axis powers were themselves invaders, where effective in dampening morale enough to dislodge soldiers. Prisoners of war saw two versions of surrender leaflets that PWB put together. Many had copies on them, in spite of being banned in Axis camps. Another way Hazeltine knew the leaflets were doing the job was by the amount of counter-propaganda put out by the Italians. The Gazzeta del Popolo carried an article titled “Leaflets and Pencils” the writer attempted to downplay the Allied efforts since they, “had recourse to leaflets which incite the Italian people to demonstrate against the war.” An intriguing aspect about the memo is that Hazeltine saw fit to include names and sometimes direct quotes of the P.O.W.s. We know a Soldat Kohl-Larsen acknowledged the effect of the Allied leaflets when compared to the German position. He tellingly admitted to

155 Hazeltine, 1943, Confetti, 2
156 Hazeltine, Col. Charles B.1943, “Leaflet distribution to date”, Edward Lilly Papers, Hazeltine Box, P.W.B. Folder (2), Eisenhower Research Library, 1
157 Ibid
158 Hazeltine, 1943, “Leaflet distribution to date.”, 4
something that would make the planned invasion of Italy and Germany more difficult for the
PWB. Kohl-Larsen felt if things went wrong in Tunis campaign Germany would not be
immediately threatened.\textsuperscript{159} The PWB was able to take advantage of a cultural rift among the
Axis. Three Italian soldiers showed a tract titled “Germany will fight to the last Italian” to some
Germans. The Italians said something along the lines that Germany was responsible for Italy’s
present position. According to Hazeltine the discussion ended in a fight.\textsuperscript{160}

Another letter from Charles David Jackson, who everyone called C.D., to Sherwood was
an example of the long term planning the psychological warriors worked toward. C.D. Jackson
made a bigger impression on the psychological warfare front during the Cold War. He was a
close confidant of President Eisenhower and helped frame the President’s Cold War
psychological warfare policies. He was a vice-president at Time-Life before the war.\textsuperscript{161} In 1943
Jackson was Hazeltine’s deputy of the PWB. An off-handed comment showed the how the
military and civilian aspects of PWB were along in North Africa. “The long-haired boys have
had their hair cut, and the short-haired men of action have learned how to spell, and it is a great
combination,” wrote Jackson.\textsuperscript{162} Jackson worked closely to format propaganda better and tailor it
to the regions and nations they focused on. They were the prop shops for occupied towns, foreign
propaganda comprised of radio and leaflets, and combat propaganda. An unaccredited memo
among the Hazeltine papers noted the seriousness of the planned invasion going forward and one

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, 6
Sherwood.” Edward Lilly Papers, Hazeltine Box, Folder P.W.B.(2), 1, Unknown Author, June 21, 1943. “General
Outline of PWB Operations in the Light of Expansion of ‘Husky’”, Edward Lilly Papers, Hazeltine Box, Folder
P.W.B. (2), 1
For the first time in our psychological warfare, we are faced with combat and occupation propaganda problems against an enemy whose own country is about to be invaded, whose own army will be the soldiers fighting against us and whose political regime knows that defeat probably means not overthrow but death. In other words, this is bigger, more complicated, more serious, more important and quite different from anything PWB has tackled to date.  

The Allied invasion of Sicily was the push into Axis territory that PWB anticipated. Unlike planning for Operation TORCH, the military solicited PWB’s involvement early on in the planning stages. PWB accessed preliminary plans, which covered phases of operation, including pre-invasion deception and detailed programs for radio, leaflets and combat propaganda units during the invasion. The planned invasion of Sicily showed a marked growth in the sophistication of PWB operations. Hazeltine divided the activities in three areas of importance. The preliminary campaign focused on undermining immediate enemy morale. Radio programs and leaflets targeted enemy troops in Sicily before Allied boots hit the ground. Hazeltine noted it was hard to gauge the success of the program but, “in the case of the Italians, from their military and civil authorities that the leaflets especially had a considerable effect.”

The second phase was the Allied landing. Combat propaganda teams landed with the army. Their mission had multiple tactical goals all under the umbrella of effecting enemy morale. The units wrote leaflets based on frontline intelligence. These were sometimes printed just behind the frontline, but were also sent back by courier to Tunis. The group was so efficient that the turn-

165 Ibid
around time from producing to distributing frontline leaflets was cut to a mere 24 hours. The Combat Propaganda Units took over all media activities in occupied towns.

They distributed posters, photographs and flags, and took over printing presses and radio station. Under their supervision newspapers were rapidly produced at Syracuse, Palermo and Catania… At Palermo the radio station, which was found intact, was on the air with an Allied program the day the city was captured.

This pattern of Combat Propaganda organization was repeated over and over again with the invasion of the Italian mainland. Units landed with the U.S. Fifth Army at Salerno. Hazeltine credited those units with publishing a frontline newspaper while still under heavy gunfire. The output of words took on an importance equal to artillery. In Naples Underground groups prepared a newspaper in advance with anticipation of the invasion and handed it over to combat units ready for print. Ideas and words were the only way to fight the fascist regime in Italy for groups with little access to weapons. The third phase of frontline propaganda according to Hazeltine was an occupational propaganda unit. Propaganda was not a short term, frontline activity, but also held long-term consequences as well. Where combat units stressed immediate morale issues that coincided with invasion, occupational forces focused on maintaining a smooth transition of power. Responsibilities ran the gamut from making the occupation more acceptable to locals, to helping maintain lines of communication for the frontline forces, to preparing and disseminating intelligence for theatre commanders and AFHQ.

In essence the Italian campaign saw the maturing of the PWB and acceptance of the units viability in warfare. Nowhere was this seen more than at the bombardment and ultimate surrender of Panatellaria. Lt. General Carl Spaatz, commander of the North West Africa Air

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166 Hazeltine “The Psychological Warfare Branch of A.F.H.Q., From Its Inception to Nov. 1, 1943”, 4
167 Ibid
168 Ibid, 5
169 Ibid
170 Ibid, 4
Force, penned a letter to the Commandant of the island of Pantellaria. The letter was dropped over the island, but PWB units reproduced the letter in leaflet form and bombarded the island with Spaatz ultimatum for surrender. According to Hazeltine, “it informed the Commandant that unless he were to surrender, placing large white crosses on the air fields in token thereof, the air assault would recommence with even greater violence.” Ironically, the unnamed Commandant did not receive the official airdropped letter, but rather found out about the ultimatum through the leaflets. The Axis forces were perfectly aware of the imminent invasion, but instead of strengthening the fight forces, the leaflet raids undermined the morale of an island force with nowhere to evacuate. According to Hazeltine, the white crosses where laid out on the air fields, after the Allied landing forces had set foot on the island, “Allied forces landed before the Commandant had any knowledge that a landing force lay over the horizon.”

The PWB made a decision to focus on undermining in Italian morale. They couched the content of the leaflets as a German problem. They heavily embraced Italian-American immigration to the U.S. as a tactic. General George Patton in charge of the 7th Army wanted a leaflet distributed that made it clear surrendering to American was not a dishonorable thing to do. PWB worked up the leaflet in Italy, printed it in Tunis and 1 million were ready by nightfall. Patton credited PWB at the successful end of the campaign. An interesting episode among German prisoners showed the lengths to which German counter-propaganda went to convince soldiers to not surrender. Toward the end of the Sicily campaign a German machine gun crew was captured. The POW’s were not forthcoming under interrogation.

Finally one of the Germans asked: “When does the performance begin?” “What performance?” the interrogator asked. With trembling lip the German said,

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171 Hazeltine, Col. Charles, B., November 1943, “Report on PWB Activities, AFHQ, from November 42 to November 43, Edward Lilly Papers, Hazeltine Box, Folder PWB (3), 6
172 Ibid
173 Ibid, 7
“Castration.” The interrogator was at first amazed and then amused. On closer questioning it became apparent that the German soldiers actually had expected to be emasculated.\(^{174}\)

The interrogation provided information, which the PWB was able to use to their advantage immediately. The combat propaganda unit wrote a leaflet directly addressing the everyday life of a German POW. They even went so far as to include a sample menu of meals served in the camp on the reverse side.\(^ {175}\)

PWB work stretched from the front lines of the invasion of Italy to occupied territory in North Africa. The battle for the Italian mainland included PWB units at nearly every step. When Italy fell, the PWB was ready with a radio broadcast enticing the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean to make their way to Allied ports.\(^ {176}\) Fleeing German units in Bari destroyed the town’s radio transmitter, so PWB brought in an entirely new one.\(^ {177}\) These examples showed not only the tactical benefit of the PWB, but also the successful implication of the organizational structure that psychological warfare activities lacked for so long. Within a year of its founding, the PWB was “scattered geographically from Casablanca on the Atlantic coast of Morocco to somewhere north of Naples along the 5th and 8th Armies front.”\(^ {178}\) It was certainly a force within the U.S. military, but with the fall of Italy the push into Nazi Germany presented a challenge the PWB did not face before: selling unconditional surrender to a formidable enemy.

It was clear in 1944 that Nazi Germany was going to lose. The question remained about how long the war would continue. Yet the Foreign Information Service (FIS) back in 1942 floated ideas to combat German propaganda. An unsigned memo from the FIS made three points. “The only prospect of tolerable future for the German people is through a peace made

\(^{174}\) Hazeltine, “Report on PWB Activities, AFHQ, from November 42 to November 43, 8
\(^{175}\) Ibid
\(^{176}\) Ibid, 9
\(^{177}\) Ibid
\(^{178}\) Ibid, 10
after the destruction of Hitler and Hitlerism."  

Allied nations agreed early on in the war that unconditional surrender was the only acceptable outcome for Axis powers. How to sell that concept to German soldiers and civilians was a tricky matter. FIS addressed the assumption that Allied nations would make a point of exacting revenge. Yet, FIS maintained that a democratic outcome was the desired course of action:

A peace which guarantees to the German people, once they have cast aside their worship of brute force, the same freedom which Americans desire for themselves and for their children. We shall make a just peace- not because we are tenderhearted- but because we know that only a just peace can be permanent.

Some of the peoples of Europe whom Germany has conquered will wish to destroy Germany just as Germany has tried and is still trying to destroy them. We in America shall oppose that policy with all the force at our command because we know that he who seeks to destroy his neighbor only seeks to destroy himself, just as the Germans are destroying themselves today. 180

The memo showed that FIS considered unconditional surrender and total warfare not exclusive of total destruction of Germany, but rather a total peace was held to be a natural result of total war. The last point in the memo showed that America planned for the day of rebuilding Europe. Naturally, plans to feed Germans played into the Allied advantage. “The stories of such activities should be used as much as possible in order to create in the minds of the German people the definite expectation that the end of war will mean an immediate attack upon the problems of malnutrition and bad health.” 181 The memo also showed the belief that Germany undoubtedly brought the war on herself. Yet the question remained regardless of what FIS thought of German responsibility, was that going to get German soldiers to surrender and regular Germans to accept occupation?

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179 Unknown, March 4, 1943 “Plan for Political and Psychological Warfare Against Germany.” Edward Lilly Papers, Box 53, Folder-Unconditional Surrender (1),Eisenhower Research Library
180 Ibid
181 “Plan for Political and Psychological Warfare Against Germany.” March 4, 1943
Lilly made it clear that there were journalists and military men, though he does not name them, who did not agree with the unconditional surrender requirements put on the war by the Allies. They claimed that the policy only prolonged the war.\textsuperscript{182} Lilly answered this argument with the uncertain peace that prevailed after World War I. In another Lilly chapter draft he laid out the blunder of not requiring unconditional surrender of Germany in 1918. The failure to press Germany into a complete military loss, rather than a negotiated deferment of military aggression was a huge mistake. General John Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces made his final plea to the U.S. government in October 17, 1918, “I believe that complete victory can only be obtained by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany, but if the Allied Governments decide to grant armistice, the terms should be so rigid that under no circumstances could Germany again take up arms.”\textsuperscript{183} Twenty-six years after Pershing wrote that American forces landed on Normandy to fight a German military that rearmed. This time there was no armistice, but only unconditional surrender. This created a problem for propaganda agencies. The Allies from an information standpoint were not able to mollify Germans into surrender through hope of getting rid of Hitler, but it was not feasible to tow a hard line against Germans either. Germany thought that hard line aggression was still in cards when the country surrendered. There was the potential for mass executions, slave labor for rebuilding and the destruction of German families.\textsuperscript{184}

The position was so tenuous that for most of the war only America developed any sort of surrender propaganda and that did not happen until late 1943. As the war progressed the propaganda concept of the “Good German” emerged. The Foreign Information Service (FIS)
radio broadcasts to Germany were concerned about getting viewers. This led to the broadcast of soft playing the tone. It was not the hard line unconditional tone the government would have preferred, but the FIS needed viewers to tune in.\textsuperscript{185} Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, was aware of the attempt to different on the part of the Allies between the government’s aggression and the Good German listening at home. Ironically, the Allied insistence on unconditional surrender countered any confusion caused by the “Good German” soft tone by Germany’s own propaganda. Goebbels felt that the differentiation between government and the people was detrimental to the country, so he ordered propaganda that did not allow for the dishonoring of the country by any German.\textsuperscript{186} In essence he felt pandering to civilians undermined the totality of German national identity. The same support of the Deutschland was expected across the board. There was no division between national identity and the average German. Thus, “German defeat meant that the nation loses everything, this means that every individual German loses.”\textsuperscript{187} As a consequence this philosophy enforced the softer tone the good German to undermine the nationalistic tone of Goebbels. Specifically Wallace Duell, a former journalist and long-time confidante of Donovan’s at the OSS, wrote a memo to Sherwood and Donavan crystallizing the Good German propaganda tone against the demand for unconditional surrender, “In talking about air raids, present and future, the last note should be a suggestion of how the Germans themselves can bring an end to the destruction of their cities by bring about peace.”\textsuperscript{188} The perception was that it was difficult to sell a nation on hope and rebuilding while they suffered through bombing raids.

\textsuperscript{185} Lilly, \textit{Unconditional Surrender: A Case Study},(12) 17
\textsuperscript{186} Lochner, Louis P. 1948. \textit{The Goebbels Diary 1942-1943}, excerpt, Edward Lilly Papers, Box 53, Folder-Unconditional Surrender (2), Eisenhower Research Library
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid, 17
\textsuperscript{188} Lilly, Edward, N.D. \textit{Unconditional Surrender: A Case Study},(12), 19
In reality unconditional surrender was a long-term political policy that had military implications, but unconditional surrender was a vague term communicating little about how the military implications could impact civilian populations. At the Casablanca Conference in 1943 President Roosevelt used the term unconditional surrender quite a bit. He even went so far as to suggest that journalists should make the term their “lead.”

The term was not unfamiliar to American audiences. Union General Ulysses S. Grant used it during the Civil War to describe the required outcome for the Confederate Army and leadership. It was through Roosevelt’s use that the term gained definition. Roosevelt specified in Washington on February 12, 1943, that unconditional surrender “did not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy or Japan.”

Comments like this were perfect for the propaganda units. It was white propaganda from not only a credible source, but also probably the most credible source for Axis peoples. On the home front the term meant that no promises would be made to Axis powers.

The lack of unconditional surrender in modern war made the concept difficult to market. According to Lilly the only time the concept appeared in modern history where, “the end of the American Civil War and the end of the Boer War, wherein the vanquished belligerents completely disappeared as political entity, are the only known instances of such surrenders.”

A benefit for the Allies in suing for unconditional surrender was the commitment that Russia, Britain and America were not individually suing for peace with Germany or Italy. This was why the Clark-Darlan agreement was so controversial. Russia and Britain considered American actions as an individual peace. As unconditional surrender was the heading under which war and

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189 Ibid, 25a  
190 Ibid  
191 Ibid, 26
post-war policy fell, the concept served the OWI to make clear the potential post-war struggles that would strain the home front.\textsuperscript{192}

The Allies were slow to define what unconditional surrender could mean for Italy and Germany. This was a gift to Germany. It gave the nation a chance to define their downfall to their own people. “By continually interpreting unconditional surrender as the equivalent of annihilation and by building the propaganda line ‘Victory or Annihilation’ the enemy governments tied their peoples’ future to their own continued existence.”\textsuperscript{193} This put Allied propaganda on the defensive for the rest of war. They were combating another country’s definition of their surrender policy. In April 1943 “the OWI conceded that the German propaganda line would not lose its power ‘so long as Goebbels can continue to assure the German people that we intend to destroy them utterly and dismember their country.’”\textsuperscript{194} This meant Germans were willing to holdout and suffer devastating loses. The implications of unconditional surrender were evident from the time of Casablanca Conference, but it translated to propaganda tactics were not as obvious.

It was General Eisenhower who first raised the question of how propaganda units were going to tactically sell surrender during the preparations for Operation HUSKY, which was the invasion of Sicily. As had been seen during Operation TORCH, Italians surrendered more easily when persuaded their sacrifice was not worth keeping German in power. However, on national level, selling surrender to a nation instead of only the soldier demographic proved challenging. Propaganda units came up with a message that balanced the need for surrender but softened the hard tone of annihilation. Morale was so low in Italy that there was a good possibility the nation would withdraw from the war on her own, the fact remained the fascist government was still in

\textsuperscript{192} Lilly, Edward, N.D. 	extit{Unconditional Surrender: A Case Study},(12), 28
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid, 29
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid, 32
power. In regards to Italy, “Washington officials did not feel that the Italian people were yet ready to actively oppose the Fascist leaders, much less the German armed forces which were expected to take over Italy once HUSKY operation got under way.”Psychological warfare in Italy was also restricted to not encourage or entice any group to start a revolution. A plan for psychological warfare in Italy included the following:

Psychological warfare should abstain from any incitement of social revolution in Italy, as not yet feasible as a means of separating Italy from the Axis. The Vatican and Catholic Church in Italy, if not throughout the world, fear social revolution in Italy. Any such incitement might cost valuable Catholic goodwill and potential support within the Italian armed services. Besides, industrial, financial and, in fact, most middle-class sentiment in Italy would be alarmed and alienated.

The Italian question did not lie solely at the feet of the PWB or OWI. The theatre commander, who in this case was Eisenhower as the head of AFHQ, had the ultimate say into how Italy could surrender. Peace with honor was the phrase that kept coming up in dealing with Italy, notably as a suggestion from Eisenhower of what to call it, as long as it fell under the Allied umbrella of unconditional surrender. However, what to call an Italian surrender was not the job of the PWB, but the consequence of it was. Ironically, all the teeth gritting by AFHQ to come up with an acceptable surrender policy for Italy was a waste. Roosevelt with approval with the JCS decided to release a statement. Eisenhower received just enough heads up to release an official statement to troops about to land in Sicily. The proclamation made it clear that the Allies were, “attacking the enemies of the Italian people…their aim is to deliver the people of Italy from a Fascist regime which led them into this war.” The invasion triggered a flurry of other statements including joint Allied statements, words from Eisenhower and so on. This was diplomacy and policy as propaganda.

195 Lilly, Edward, N.D. Unconditional Surrender: A Case Study. (12), 40
196 Ibid, 41
197 Ibid, 44
198 Ibid, 58
It came as a surprise to Allied propaganda when on July 26, 1943 a coup d’etat deposed Mussolini. The PWB was not expecting the change and it caught the group unprepared. The group worked to undermine the Italian government and when that happened they did not know what to do next. “Neither politically, psychologically nor propagandistically were AFHQ or the home governments expecting such eventuality nor were they in position to take advantage.” 199

The U.S. military overestimated Mussolini’s grip on Italy. It was not known if the propaganda activities selling unconditional surrender helped to sweep Il Duce, Mussolini’s nickname, out of power. His fall signaled an information vacuum that PWB could fill, but they did not have good communication networks set up within Italy to better understand what was going on inside the country. PWB decided to maintain the work already under way, including combat propaganda, and offer any information needs for an occupation force. 200 The tone stayed hard; unconditional surrender was not undersold. OWI kept the mandate to expel all enemy forces from Italy including Germans. There was only one enemy to focus on, but that enemy was still present in Italy.

The Allied agreement of no country suing for peace individually from Axis powers was a fragile agreement toward the end of the war. The PWB took a propaganda hit from Russia that undermined the unconditional surrender line for Germany; “the Russians had organized and trained captured German officers under some exiled German Communists to form the equivalent of new German government.” 201 It was a breach in the Allied agreement and also an issue that PWB could not publicly acknowledge. The German communists manifesto made it clear they could end the war with Russia at any time in exchange for Russia’s help building a “free” and

199 Lilly, Edward, N.D. Unconditional Surrender: A Case Study, (13), 62
200 Ibid, 66
201 Ibid, 75
“democratic” Germany.\textsuperscript{202} The PWB faced a psychological war on two fronts over the same nation. They needed to convince Germans to overthrow Nazism and not to take up Communism. The German interpretation of unconditional surrender was hard for PWB to crack. Annihilation was the expected outcome for Germans. OWI countered this with a tactic that was meant for all Axis nations not just Germany; “the twofold inevitability of their defeat and the opportunity to participate in the postwar world if they would take proper action to shorten the war.”\textsuperscript{203} PWB hoped by telling Germany they would lose regardless of whether it was in he near future or later on, their unconditional surrender would take place regardless. Yet, some in the War Department were not about to placate German fears of annihilation. John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War, did not buy the “good German” philosophy. He felt it was ignorant and na"ive to view all Germans as good and all Nazis as bad. According to Lilly McCloy felt, “that if Germans had to fight, and suffer individually, in their own homeland there would be greater possibility that they would not try again to conquer the world.”\textsuperscript{204} Lilly made it clear he was not alone in his belief, but does not name any who shared his view.

It was not until before Operation OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of Normandy, that The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) floated a specific marketable definition of unconditional surrender. SHAEF launched it’s own psychological warfare unit the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD). The structure was the same as the PWB, but the name change signified a new Allied military focus. SHAEF Chief of Staff General Bedell Smith wanted unconditional surrender codified to help PWD take advantage of a German military in chaos. The stress was not on mollifying Germans regarding annihilation, but to erode the support of satellite nations. “American propaganda was to warn the satellite governments and peoples

\textsuperscript{202} Lilly, Edward, N.D. \textit{Unconditional Surrender: A Case Study}, (13), 75
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid, 79
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid, 85
that little time remained for them to cease their aid to Germany and thereby guarantee their national future.\textsuperscript{205} The confidence was a marked change from earlier in the war. The information from the Allies was no longer hoping for the enemy nations to listen. The Allies knew their words mattered and Europe was listening. Propaganda output shifted to say that these countries had choice, but since they were going to be defeated, they could either surrender or be defeated. Annihilation was a result of a forced military surrender, not an unconditional peaceful surrender.

The OVERLORD campaign included extensive activities from the PWD. Combat propaganda units had the same tasks as units during the invasion of Italy. Men stormed the beaches of Normandy with radio transmitters and printing presses, with the same importance as infantry counterparts taking towns. This did not dampen the German morale, as Lilly wrote;

\begin{quote}
In view of the previous established official interpretation that Unconditional Surrender meant the complete extinction of the German state and the enslavement and degradation of the German people, the individual German fought on until his alternatives were reduced to death or surrender. In this choice the decision most generally was surrender but until that actual crisis was reached the German, individually and collectively, continued to fight because of their belief that as bad as conditions then were, they would be far worse if the Allies defeated Germany.\textsuperscript{206}
\end{quote}

On September 22, 1944, a bombshell was dropped on the PWD when the \textit{Wall Street Journal} leaked details of the Morgenthau Plan. Named after U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr., It was a post-war plan of what to do with post-war German industry. Yet, the war was not over, so PWD units scrambled to offset the information; “The immediate understanding of the plan was that all the industrial power of Germany except that of the individual German homes

\textsuperscript{205} Lilly, Edward, N.D. \textit{Unconditional Surrender: A Case Study}, (13), 97
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid, 102
themselves should be stripped out of Germany and divided among her victims.”

Goebbels used the Morgenthau Plan as evidence that the Allies laid in wait just to plunder Germany. The OWI was in a difficult spot. As a news sources they needed to report on the plan, but it seriously hampered their propaganda plans for Germany. The Allies rejected the Morgenthau Plan, but the retraction did not gain enough attention to make up for the damage caused by the initial news. PWD and SHAEF pressed the advance of Allied troops by pushing the agenda that any attempt to slow the Allies by blowing bridges or uprooting railroad tracks would only hurt the individual towns and people in the long run.

It was a quality of life argument, predicated on the fact, as the PWD presented it, that since the Allies were coming it was up to the individual the comforts still around when they got there.

By October 1944, PWD entered what Lilly called the pre-surrender period. As the noose tightened Robert Murphy, a political advisor to SHAEF, recommended, “there should be a wall of complete silence on the Allied propaganda front to Germany.” The decision was triggered by the lack of a surrender plan. Unconditional surrender was a catch phrase with no real plan to back it up. There was the real problem that the Allies did not know what could be promised to the German people. There were promises that due to resources or politics were never going to be fulfilled. However, the wall of silence was deemed impractical by PWD. With no direct appeal to the Germans allowed by SHAEF, the PWD, “was directed to make clear that military government would eliminate the Gestapo, the SS, the Nazi Party and militarism, that the Allies would punish severely individual Germans guilty of war crimes.”

By this point in the war OWI operatives made it clear how determined the Allies were to defeat Germany. The tone

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207 Lilly, Edward, N.D. *Unconditional Surrender: A Case Study*, (13), 106
208 Ibid, 109
209 Ibid, 110
210 Ibid
211 Ibid, 113
was lightened when possible to highlight humane treatment of civilians, but the PWD did not shy from exploiting military victories over the Wehrmacht. The inevitability of a German defeat did not have any sort of counter point. Unlike earlier points during the war when Nazi positions were countered with Allied insight or perspective, by 1945 the only message was imminent German defeat.

Psychological warfare operations grew immensely during the war. The lack of organization undermined earlier outings, but the culminations of men and women sold the war to the home front and sold unconditional surrender to an enemy bent on destruction, though it was ultimately their own. At the end of the war every branch of government encouraged Congress to not cut funding for the OWI. A memo from Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew to President Truman went as follows:

The Department regards this work as an important and indeed, at the present time, indispensible to the most effective conduct of American foreign affairs. Its liquidation would silence the Voice of America abroad at the very time when it is most necessary to get the American story told and the American policies understood among foreign peoples.

Indeed, as the war ended, the free world swung into the Cold War and conflict that relied heavily on psychological warfare and propaganda in ways unheard of. Had the organization been liquidated as they were at the end of World War I, the United States would have been at much larger disadvantage. As it is psychological warfare operations were considered a success. Yet, Lilly put it best when he wrote, “Nobody could say precisely what psychological warfare had actually contributed…. Psychological warfare was an intangible concept whose value and effectiveness was practically a matter of faith.”

\[\text{212 Ibid, 116} \]
\[\text{213 “Recommendations on Psychological Warfare”, 14} \]
\[\text{214 Ibid, 15} \]
the war effort is largely unknown due to the fact that the seminal work on the topic of psychological warfare during World War II by Edward Lilly is still largely classified.

A key to understanding the impact of the Lilly papers and psychological warfare work during the is the minutes of a meeting after the war in the Lilly Papers. Lilly sent draft copies of a chapter to his colleagues in the JCS. A meeting was held as a result with everyone chiming in on the chapter. Men like Brigadier General Paul Robinett, who worked with combat propaganda units during Operation Torch and Colonel Percy Black, who was part of the Psychological Warfare Branch, spoke openly about their experiences in the war as Lilly presented them. The memo gives a unique perspective. It was a historian speaking with the people that appear in the work about the validity of the work. Robinett made it clear that the chapter did not cover, “the whole field of psychological warfare.” He was right. Lilly’s work was focused on the work at the OWI and the organizations that the OWI impacted. Much of what the FIS did at the beginning of the war laid the foundation for the OWI. As the war progressed, the OWI’s work put them in communication and cooperation with groups like the PWB and later the PWD. However Lilly made it clear that one of problems with psychological warfare was a lack of planning prior to the war. He noted, “Early psychological warfare was a complete waste of money…Much more could have been done had there been a developed policy.” Yet, perhaps the biggest testimony to psychological warfare work done during the war was that the men in meeting all agreed that the psychological warfare work should continue. The value of psychological warfare was proven as a result of the work undertaken by the soldiers and civilians spread out among many organizations. Perhaps, the best testament to how

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215 “Minutes of Seminar held in Room 2D879a” 6 June 1950, 2
216 Ibid, 5
groundbreaking the work in psychological warfare was is that some of the tactical works undertaken by the OSS and OWI are still classified.
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