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NATIONAL SECURITY BENEFITS FROM BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

has been read by the undersigned. It is hereby recommended for acceptance by the faculty with credit to the amount of 3 semester hours.

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NATIONAL SECURITY BENEFITS FROM BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A Master Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty

of

American Military University

by

Eric Wilson

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts in National Security Studies

April 2015

American Public University

Charles Town, WV
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my mother and my beautiful wife. To my mother for always reinforcing the importance of education when I was kid and more so how important education would be in my adult life. She was spot on! And to my beautiful wife who has supported me through the late nights and long weekends of my academic journey.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Donna Kenley, my thesis advisor, for her guidance and advice on this journey. Your guidance then and now has been very helpful in completing my capstone thesis. How fitting to have had you for my first AMU class and for my last class (capstone). Dr. Wiafe-Amoako you really challenged me while completing my papers in your class; and to all my professors each of you has guided and challenged me in different, yet positive ways, on my degree journey with AMU. To my classmates, over the past two years you were a valuable source of information and different perspectives on the topics of study; caused me to think deeply about the course material as it relates to the U.S. and the international system. And last, but not least, to the men and women in uniform and civilians, who support the ongoing efforts on a daily basis to defend and protect U.S. enduring national interests globally—THANK YOU!
This thesis examines a U.S. foreign policy strategy called Building Partner Capacity (BPC) used to support ongoing efforts to protect U.S. enduring national interests. BPC activities build/enhance the capacity of U.S. allies and international partners to empower them to provide for their countries’ own internal security or support operations for external security reasons regionally or internationally. This thesis uses the International Relations theory to examine four of six regional U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands (CENTCOM, AFRICOM, EUCOM and PACOM) with regards to the COCOMs regional mission, security threats, BPC activities, and identified the national security benefits from BPC activities. Dependent (Protecting U.S. national interests at home and abroad) and Independent (Peace, security and stability at the state, regional and international levels; power distribution) variables were used as part of the thesis framework. Research findings in terms of ends, ways, means and benefits proved that BPC activities support U.S. foreign policy efforts to bring security to the international system; and identified the security benefits, security assistance and cooperation programs related to building partner capacity to protect U.S. national security and interests.
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>TSC</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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DEFINITIONS

**Arms Export Control Act:** The basic U.S. law providing the authority and general rules for the conduct of foreign military sales and commercial sales of defense articles, defense services, and training. The AECA came into existence with the passage of the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) of 1968. An amendment in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 changed the name of FMSA to the AECA (Security Assistance management Manual, Glossary).

**Building Partner Capacity:** Security cooperation and security assistance activities that are funded with USG appropriations and administered as cases within the FMS infrastructure. These programs provide defense articles and/or services to other USG departments and agencies under the authority of the Economy Act or other transfer authorities for the purpose of building the capacity of partner nation security forces and enhancing their capability to conduct counterterrorism, counter drug, and counterinsurgency operations, or to support U.S. military and stability operations, multilateral peace operations, and other programs (Security Assistance management Manual, Glossary).

**Capability:** The ability of a state, regional organization or international organization to “achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through a combination of means and ways” (DoDD 7045.20, 2008) to complete assigned tasks related to established mission objectives in an area of operation (Wilson 2014).

**Capacity:** The collective power/capabilities a state, regional organization or international organization possesses to execute missions during peace operations related to (but not limited to) countering or deterring an attack, protecting and defending civilians, deploying troops (air, sea, etc.), rapid reaction to a crisis, providing a reserve/back-up force, information gathering and analysis of information, humanitarian response, planning and managing an operation, early warning system, etc. (Wilson 2014).

**Foreign Assistance Act of 1961:** The law providing the authority and the general rules for the conduct of USG foreign assistance grant activities/programs (Security Assistance management Manual, Glossary).

**Foreign Military Sales:** Foreign Military Sales is the U.S. Government’s program for transferring defense articles, services, and training to our international partners and international organizations. The U.S. government uses DoD’s acquisition system to procure defense articles and services on behalf of its partners. Eligible countries may purchase defense articles and services with their own funds or with funds provided through U.S. government-sponsored assistance programs. In certain cases, defense articles may be obtained through grants or leases (DSCA Frequently Asked Questions).

**National Policy:** A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives (Joint Pub 1).
**National Security:** A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relations position; or c. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert (Joint Pub 1).

**National Security Interests:** The foundation for the development of valid national objectives that define United States goals or purposes (Joint Pub 1).

**National Security Strategy:** A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security (Joint Pub 1).

**National Security Strategy:** In accordance with Joint Publication 1-02, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, national security strategy is a document signed by the President, addresses the tasks that, as a Nation, are necessary to provide enduring security for the American people and shape the global environment. It provides a broad strategic context for employing military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power. In the ends, ways, and means construct, the NSS provides the ends (Joint Pub 1).

**Security Assistance:** A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, cash sale, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives [JP 1-02, as amended through 14 April 2006] (DISAM – The Management of Security Cooperation, 33rd Edition).

**Security Cooperation:** The full continuum of activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It encompasses all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered security assistance programs, that build defense and security relationships promoting specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; that develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and that provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations (DISAM – The Management of Security Cooperation, 33rd Edition).
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Our closest partners and allies will remain the cornerstone of our international engagement. Yet, we will continuously expand the scope of cooperation to encompass other state partners, non-state and private actors, and international institutions—particularly the United Nations (U.N.), international financial institutions, and key regional organizations. These partnerships can deliver essential capacity to share the burdens of maintaining global security and prosperity and to uphold the norms that govern responsible international behavior.

2015 National Security Strategy

Overview

It is interesting to note from the creation of the United States of America to the current condition of international affairs, the U.S. has moved from being an isolated nation to a world super power engaged in a complex system of international affairs; and U.S. national security is increasingly dependent on the security and stability or lack of in states and regions in the system. The security environment of the 21st century is unlike no other time in human history. It is complex and plagued by not only threats from multiple state actors but also by threats from a host of non-state actors ranging from international terrorists organizations, transnational criminal organizations, religious fanatics, etc.; creating a world that “is more dangerous and vulnerable than at any anytime in recent history” (Rollins 2011).

From the end of World War II, through the Cold War and part of the Post-Cold War, the U.S. was looked upon as the single nation that could project its power to probably anywhere in the world to deal with situations threatening the stability and security of the international community. This status has not changed, but, due to the increased number, various types and locations of security threats and challenges facing the U.S., its allies and partners, the U.S. has come to realize that a unilateral approach to solving international security problems should not be the first course of action especially with the limited amount of resources.
As a result, the U.S. over the past decade has continued to build U.S. capabilities and capacity to deal with 21st century security threats. At the same time, increasing its use of building partner capacity activities/programs to assist others by providing equipment, training, construction projects, and advising nations considered U.S. international partners. Achieving national objectives by reaping the political and strategic benefits from investing in building “new and deeper partnerships in every region” (2010 National Security Strategy) in this complex 21st century security environment.

**Research Question and Hypothesis**

This thesis will examine U.S. and some international building partner capacity activities to provide a better understanding of the benefits and support the U.S. and international community derives from assisting other nation-states in the areas of constructing, equipping, training, and advising by utilizing security cooperation programs. To do so the research for this thesis will answer the research question: What security benefits/support does security assistance and security cooperation programs provide to protect U.S. national security and interests? The events of 9/11 make this topic an important issue of research. The 9/11 event proved to the U.S. and international community that many nation-states, big or small—rich or poor, were not prepared to wage the future and long war on terrorism; nor the capabilities or capacity to effectively combat other threats causing insecurity and instability in the international system such as failed/failing states, transnational criminal activity, weapons of mass destruction, insecure borders, drug trafficking, etc. The U.S. increased the use of and types of security cooperation programs in an attempt to build capacity among states with similar security interests in an attempt to bring peace, security and stability to the international community; which is closely linked to protecting U.S. national security.
The focus of the research will be to examine the 21st century global security environment, security cooperation programs related to Building Partner Capacity activities, states and regions the programs have been used in, and attempt to identify the security benefits the U.S. and international system derive from building partner capacity using the U.S. security programs. This research is expected to prove or disprove the thesis hypothesis: Building Partner Capacity supports U.S. foreign policy efforts to bring security to the international system related to protecting U.S. national interests.

**Purpose Statement**

The purpose of this research is to determine the types of security benefits and support the U.S. derives from assisting nation-states with constructing, equipping, training, and advising the state’s defense forces through security assistance and security cooperation programs. Events of 9/11 and the War on Terrorism caused the U.S. to increase the use of these programs in an attempt to build capacity among states with similar interests with regards to combating international terrorism and transnational criminal activity. The focus will be on examining security assistance/cooperation programs focusing on those programs that Build Partner Capacity.

**Research Method and Variables**

Through the study of international relations and foreign policy the research will examine the relationships/partnerships the U.S. believes is critical to protecting U.S. national security through engagements with state and regional partners. Many of the relationships established started from government to government engagements through security cooperation programs; which have become critical foreign policy activities to include key partners and allies in dealing with the multiple complex security issues the international community must deal with to bring
peace, safety and stability on a regional and international level. It will be necessary to examine the security programs used to build partner capacity, and how the programs contribute to create a balance of power among state actors and non-state actors across the various regions around the globe; which ultimately support efforts to protect U.S. and international national security interests. There are a sizeable number of U.S. security programs so for the purpose of this research the primary focus will be on the Security Cooperation Programs managed by the Department of Defense (DoD) under Title 10 authority.

The thesis will use qualitative methods such as case studies, observation of program reports, research data, national and international security strategies, and foreign policy to examine the research topic. The focus will be on the U.S. using Building Partner Capacity (BCP) activities/programs managed by the DoD (security cooperation) as a way to achieve U.S. national objectives. In doing so, Arthur F. Lykke Jr’s (2001) ends, ways and means model in *Toward Understanding of Military Strategy* will be used to structure the research to identify and examine U.S. national interests formed to deal with a very complex security environment in the 21st century (ends), the strategic concepts/courses of action (ways – BPC programs) used to build partner capacity and capabilities, and the capabilities and capacity generated among U.S. allies and partners in various regions from security cooperation programs (means – capable allies and partners) to contribute to U.S. efforts to protect U.S. national interests (home and abroad;) and bring peace, security and stability to the international community. In order to prove or disprove the hypothesis for this research a dependent variable (*Protecting U.S. national interests at home and abroad*) and an independent variable (*International security and stability*) will be used to examine multiple areas related to U.S. and international security, security cooperation and
security assistance, building partner capacity activities, security threats/challenges, and organizations that support build partner capacity activities.

**Limitations**

There are those in government and the private sector who believe building partner capacity programs are working and worth the effort, time and money to pursue; and there those who believe the programs/activities are a waste of time and money. The limitations discovered are related to using an unbiased view when sorting through the multitude of research material related to building partner capacity to answer the research question.

**Summary**

This thesis will narrow the focus of research related to U.S. strategic objectives to the critical strategic objective called Building Partner Capacity and the programs which support building partner capacity activities ranging from activities under Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing Program, International Military Education and Training, Global peace Operations Initiative, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Excess Defense Articles, and Global Train and Equip activities. The results of the research will lead to the end state of proving or disproving the hypothesis: *Building Partner Capacity supports U.S. foreign policy efforts to bring security to the international system related to protecting U.S. national interests.* Chapter 2 will provide the results from the literature review that will be used to form the basis for an examination of building partner capacity activities/programs; Chapter 3 shapes how the thesis research will be conducted. Including the methodology, framework and data collection methods; Chapter 4 discusses the results from the research which will answer the research question and will prove or
disprove the hypothesis; Chapter 5 provides a synopsis of the thesis, conclusions, and recommends future research.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Our sustained attention and engagement will be important in shaping emerging global trends, both positive and negative. Unprecedented levels of global connectedness provide common incentives for international cooperation and shared norms of behavior, and the growing capacity of some regional partners provides an opportunity for countries to play greater and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests in their respective regions.

2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (Executive Summary)

Overview

The literature reviewed in this chapter highlights trends/threats impacting U.S. and international security; identifies U.S. enduring national interests, national security objectives (ends); identifies the government agencies/organizations that will provide the resources (means) and strategies (ways) to protect U.S. national interest and achieve U.S. national security objectives; identifies security assistance and security cooperation programs related to building partner capacity; examines cases to identify situations where assisting a partner build its capacity contributed to protecting U.S. and international security; evaluates a report from a combatant command (CENTCOM) that will be used with other combatant command reports to assess the role of geographic combatant commands in building the capacity of U.S. partners across the globe; and the importance of building and using the capacity of regional organizations in various types of operations.

Global Security Environment

The JOE (Joint Operating Environment) 2010 by the United States Joint Forces Command provides a speculative view of trends impacting international security ranging from conventional and unconventional powers to weak and failing states, to radical ideology and weapons of mass destruction, to war in the 21st century. The 2010 JOE gives the joint fighting
force an understanding of the environment forces (U.S., its partners and allies) may be required
to operate in to stop the state actors and non-state actors with agendas that undermine
international activities to bring security and stability to the U.S. and international security.

*American Grand Strategy after November 2012* by William C. Martel highlights how the
international system looked after the 2012 presidential election. Martel highlights that the world
is in trouble, and the need for the U.S. to develop a grand strategy to assist with guiding foreign
policy. He identifies events that have occurred from the conflict in Syria, to a shift in Russia
possibly back to the “era of Stalin”, economic crisis experienced by several European countries,
Iran, Syria, North Korea relationships with China and Russia, etc.

*Understanding Global Security* by Peter Hough identifies security threats and those who
may promote or put such threats into action such as state actors and non-state actors, failed and
failing states, natural and manmade disasters, etc.

**U.S. National Security Strategy**

The 2002 and 2006 *National Security Strategies* set the tone for dealing with national
security threats at the start of the 21st century. President Bush emphasizes in the opening of the
2002 *National Security Strategy* that the U.S. has the influence and strength militarily,
economically and politically that cannot be matched. But that is not the goal of the US. The
focus is instead to seek a “balance of power” (2002 NSS) in the international system. The U.S.
planned to use an international strategy involving and cooperating with old allies and partners;
and establishing relationship with new ones to stop regional conflicts, defeat international
terrorism, stop potential threats from actors with weapons of mass destruction, and other security
threats waged by state or non-state actors. This network of cooperation included nation-states,
regional organizations and international organizations; and will assist with resources where needed (2002 NSS, 5-7).

The 2010 National Security Strategy as the previous two U.S. national security strategies provides both realist and liberal perspectives with regards to the security condition of the U.S. and international security; and strategies from the realist and liberal perspectives on how to deal with the multitude of threats the U.S., its allies and partners, and the international community are faced with moving further into the 21st century. President Obama as is predecessor emphasizes the strength of the U.S. but also recognizes the need to “build new and deeper partnerships in every region, and strengthen international standards and institutions” so the U.S. does not have to solve international problems alone (2010 NSS). Building the capacity of states with weak governments and security structures is recognized as an investment in protecting the national security of the United States.

The 2015 National Security Strategy picks up from where the 2010 National Security Strategy left off and continues to focus on the idea that the U.S. must and lead the international community against multiple and complex security threats and challenges. Focus is placed on several areas including leading with capable partners—“these partnerships can deliver essential capacity to share the burdens of maintaining global security and prosperity and to uphold the norms that govern responsible international behavior” (2015 NSS, 3).

The Partner Predicament: US Building Partnership Capacity, the War on Terrorism and What the US Cannot Overlook by LT Col Michael C. Venri raises points related to the issue of building partner capacity as a U.S. strategy to deter and defeat terrorist threats. Venri also raises the point that this strategy is different than multilateral security strategies the U.S. has been use to partnering within. He examines arguments from G.J. Inkenberry for multilateral relationships
and TPM Barnett who believes the international system because of globalizations requires both multilateral and bilateral relationships to deal with security threats/challenges. Venri further highlights challenges with which the U.S. calls a partner and assists with building capacity; and factors that should be reviewed in the decision process to partner with a nation. He concludes that building partner capacity will remain a key U.S. strategy to combat terrorist threats. One main reason raised is the “terrorist threat is too diffuse geographically and ideologically for the US to handle alone” (Venri, 15).

_Toward Understanding of Military Strategy_ by Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. develops a model that was introduced at the U. S. Army War College in 1981 by General Maxwell D. Taylor, which depicted strategic interests in terms of objectives, ways and means. This model is important because as Lykke points out “this general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strategy—military, political, economic, etc., depending upon the element of national power employed” (Lykke, 179). This model can be used to examine building partner capacity programs and to show how the various programs are used as courses of action (ways) to generate the resources (means) to support/protect national interests (ends).

**Department of Defense Security Strategy and Concepts**

_2014 Quadrennial Defense Review_ addresses key strategies to mitigate cuts to defense spending by focusing on near term solutions to protecting U.S. security and interests by remaining “actively engaged in building partnerships and enhancing stability in key regions” (QDR 2014, XIII). It places the U.S. in a position to advance U.S. leadership in the international community and work with states and regions to gain and maintain secure, stable and peaceful regions in the international system by looking across the international community and focusing
on efforts build partner capacity from the Asia Pacific to the Middle East, Europe and Africa, and Latin America. This is accomplished in a resource restricted environment (QDR 2014).

*Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* by the Department of Defense provides strategic guidance and priorities which the Joint Force will use to identify the strategies and resources to support the U.S. national security strategy. One of the missions of the U.S. military is to “help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence” (DoD 2012, 5). This document will assist with examining the guidance provided to the U.S. military to partner with other nations defense departments to build capabilities and capacity.

*2011 National Military Strategy of the United States of America* by the Department of Defense highlights the ways (strategies) and means (resources) the U.S. military will advance the US’s “enduring national interests as articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy and to accomplish the defense objectives” (2011 NMS); and the objectives defense objectives in the new 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. This document recognizes an ever changing security environment which may require the Joint Force to continue relationships with current partners and allies; but also pursue “partnerships with new and diverse group of actors” (2011 NMS).

*Building Partner Capacity Functional Report* by the U.S. Central Command Assessment Team provides an assessment of a Combatant Commands role in using DoD programs to build cooperation and partner capacity of 18 nations in the assigned area of operation. The overarching intent of building partner capacity in the CENTCOM area of responsibility is to “build and develop partner nation capacities to support and advance those national and regional security objectives that protect U.S. strategic interests and increase regional and partner stability”
(CENTCOM 2009, 8). During the research of this thesis paper the other six geographical combatant commands will be reviewed to understand their roles in building partner capacity in their assigned areas of responsibility.

**Security Cooperation and Security Assistance / Building Partner Capacity**

*Department of Defense Security Cooperation Agency Vision 2020* by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is a key document that will guide the Security Cooperation community through a “whole of government approach” to build the capabilities and capacities of U.S. partners (DSCA, 4). This document reinforces the importance of security cooperation programs and the relationships that evolve with regards to achieving U.S. national security objectives; and U.S. intention to continue using and improving security programs to build key relationships and a network of security partnerships globally.


*Statement for the Record Security of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict* from the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, Assistant, provides remarks from his appearance before the House of Representative Committee on Armed Services. The purpose is to discuss the subject and efforts of the Department of Defense to build partner capacity “as a fundamental aspect of our strategy” (Sheehan 2013) and the importance of building capacity activities to protect and achieve national interests of the U.S. and nations involved. Sheehan acknowledges that there is some risk in helping a nation build its capabilities and capacity for example a nation engaging in activities against accepted international norms and behavior.
For Building Partner Capacity, Choose Wisely by Christopher Paul addresses building partner capacity in terms of the activities that occur to stabilize a partner nation. One of the multiple activities described is “developing the security organs of partner states” which defense ministries, armed services, maritime forces, peacekeeping forces, national police agencies, or local defense forces” (Paul 2013).

For Nation Building Missions, Modest Costs Yield Meaningful Benefits by James Dobbins and Laurel E. Miller provide analysis of nation-building missions which were important in building up key areas critical to bringing some kind of security and stability to nations during approximately 20 post-Cold War missions lead by the U.S. or international community. Not all missions were complete success stories but even in those cases there are some examples of improvements that were made.

Regional Security-The Capacity of international Organizations Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations by Rodrigo Tavares provides a critical view with regards to the importance of regional security organizations to combat the multitude of security threats impacting the international system at the state, region and international levels. Tavares provides key examples to show the importance of regional organizations being employed to conduct missions related to conflict resolution/ prevention, peacekeeping/peace operations or post-war construction. He examines regional organizations in Africa, Europe, Americas, Asia, and Europe looking at various organizations organizational capacity and operational experience.

Summary

The review of literature highlights several key themes for this thesis: 1) the U.S. and international system will continue to be plagued by security threats from state and non-state actors throughout the 21st century 2) no one nation, not even the US, processes an unlimited
amount of national power to deal with the threats/challenges to security 3) bi-lateral and multi-lateral partnerships are key to bring peace, security and stability to the international system 4) the capabilities and capacity of partner nations must be increased and used effectively achieve security objectives. While none of the literature concretely proves or disproves the importance of building partner capacity activities related to U.S. national security, it will assist with properly shaping the research and forming the methodology in Chapter 3 further structuring this thesis.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Overview

The research methodology was framed based on the study of International Relations using the Balance of Power and Collective Security approaches to examine U.S. security relationships in the international system related to how the U.S. perceives threats to U.S. national interests and security; and identifies the ends, ways and means to defeat those threats. These perceptions of the international system drive U.S. national security and foreign policy decisions; shaping strategies such as building partner capacity to achieve national security objectives internally and externally (O’Connor 2012, 2) to protect U.S. enduring interests. A hybrid model of Lykke’s Model of ends, ways and means (see figure 3.1) was developed adding a fourth leg to the stool called ‘benefits’ (see figure 3.2). The purpose of adding the leg was to complete the research design to answer the research question and prove or disprove the hypothesis.

Data was collected from multiple sources including U.S. strategic documents, reports and studies by various U.S. government and private sponsored organizations, international organizations like the United Nations, regional organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations, and U.S. Combatant Commands. These sources focused on identifying U.S. national interests and objectives, the domestic and international security environment these objectives must be achieved, and how these objectives can bring peace, security and stability to the international system with the ultimate goal of protect U.S. enduring national interests.

This chapter explains the thesis methodology, research framework, data collection methods, and will finish with a summary of the results from the analysis methods that were used.
Methodology

For the purpose of this thesis qualitative research methods such as content analysis and collection and analysis were primarily used to collect and review data; quantitative research was used to display numbers/statistics related to building partner capacity. Sources to support research for this thesis included books, peer-reviewed articles, academic journals and reports by authors with backgrounds in U.S. national and international security studies; 2002 – 2015 U.S. National Security Strategies; Department of State, Department of Defense and Congressional documents and reports related to U.S. national security; reports and studies by various other U.S. government and private sponsored organizations and United Nation’s organizations related to building partner capacity programs and activities. These sources are relevant to assist with identifying and understanding: U.S. national security objectives that must be achieved to protect U.S. enduring interests; the international security environment the US, its partners and allies must operate in; the security threats and challenges that impact the international security environment; and the importance of building partner capacity in the international system and the benefits to U.S. and international national security interests in the 21st century.

Research Framework

This thesis used International Relations to explain the security relationships between the US, its allies, partners and other state and non-state actors in the international system; and how these interactions drive U.S. national security and foreign policy decisions to develop strategies such as building partner capacity to support national security objectives (internally and externally) to protect U.S. enduring interests (O’Connor 2012, 2). Balance of Power and Collective Security are two approaches O’Connor (2012) highlights in Theoretical Frameworks in National Security and this thesis used to sort and analyze the research data collected. Balance of power assisted
with examining why the U.S. assists others to “balance internally” to maintain stability within their borders; or to be prepared to join in “external balancing” to “pool resources against a common enemy” (O’Connor 2012, 4) using building partner capacity programs. Collective security was used to examine the importance of working within or leading alliances and coalitions, international and regional organizations to protect the interests of the US, its allies and partners around the globe; to bring peace, security and stability to the international system. U.S. partners and allies having the right capabilities and capacity to defeat common enemies globally is a critical component of U.S. national security objectives to protect U.S. national and international security interests as a collective international community. The fight against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) is a recent example of the use of programs to build the capacity of state and non-state actors to defeat a common enemy.

Figure 3.1 Lykke’s (2001) End, Ways and Means Model from the U.S. Army War College was selected as the model to shape and display the results from the collection and analysis of the research data in terms of identifying national security and foreign policy objectives to be achieved (ends), concepts/courses of action and strategic plans developed (ways) and means (resources) used to execute the strategic plans to achieve security objectives.

Figure 3.1 The Lykke Model

Lykke’s Model was an important starting point because it could “be used as a basis for the formulation of any strategy—military, political, economic, etc.” (Lykke 2001, 179). Similar to Yarger (2012) this thesis looked at other ways to use Lykke’s Model to depict strategy and
focused the theory on examining building partner capacity activities and programs as a national strategy. As a result, this thesis took Lykke’s model one step further by adding a fourth leg to the model called ‘benefits’. The model in Figure 3.2 Building Partner Capacity was critical to develop because during the research it was found that by only identifying and confirming there are effective ways and means to achieve the ends the research methodology was incomplete.

![Building Partner Capacity Model](image)

*Figure 3.2 Building Partner Capacity Model (Hybrid of Lykke’s Model)*

As Yarger states “Lykke’s theory, like all good theory, does not necessarily provide a strategy. It is a paradigm that describes the questions to ask and rules to follow” (Yarger 2012, 49). The hybrid of Lykke’s Model focused on building partner capacity will complete the framework to assist with identifying what national objectives are to be accomplished related to building partner capacity (ends); how they will be accomplished—building partner capacity programs (ways); what resources are to be used—security assistance/security cooperation organizations (means); and identify what the benefits are with regards to U.S. national security—short and long term. This model will further assist with answering the research question, test the hypothesis against the dependent and independent variables, and prove or disprove the hypothesis:

**Research Question:** What security benefits/support does security assistance and security cooperation programs related to building partner capacity provide to protect U.S. national security and interests?

**Hypothesis:** Building Partner Capacity supports U.S. foreign policy efforts to bring security to the international system related to protecting U.S. national interests.
**Dependent Variable**: Protecting U.S. national interests at home and abroad.

**Independent Variables**: Peace, security and stability at the state, regional and international levels; power distribution.

The hypothesis will be tested by analyzing and comparing research data to identify past and present cases involving states and regions where building partner capacity activities were/are used to bring some sort of resemblance of peace, security and stability within a state or region contributing to international security and ultimately support U.S. national security objectives at home and abroad. Again, understanding that the benefits from these types of activities and programs may be reaped in the long term meaning there may not always be instant or short-term benefits achieved; and the benefits may be tangible or intangible. In any case, the goal remains to prove or disprove there is value in using building partner capacity activities as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy to protect the national interests of the US, its partners and allies.

**Data Collection Methods**

The primary qualitative research methods used were content analysis of government and military strategic, operational and tactical documents, private sponsored studies, international organizations documents, websites, etc. related to national and international security. Collection and analysis of historical documents, statistics (quantities, dollar figures, periods of time, etc.) and case studies to examine and understand how building partner capacity programs worked in the past to assist with measuring/comparing the success or failure of such programs in the 21st century.

**Summary**

The research highlighted the importance of building partner capacity activities and how critical these various activities and programs are to achieving U.S. national security objectives; and the additional capacity it provides the US, its partners and allies in regions across the globe.
Additionally, the research data provided examples and explained how, why and what benefits building partner capacity programs provide the U.S. and its partners weather unilaterally, bi-laterally or multi-laterally to deal with the multiple and complex security threats and challenges in the international system.

Chapter 4 provides the results from the research and analysis of data; and answers the research question and lays out the results for proving the hypothesis.
Future Joint Force commanders will not make grand strategy, but they must fully understand the ends it seeks to achieve. They will have a role to play suggesting how the Joint Force might be used and the means necessary for the effective use of joint forces to protect the interests of the United States. Thus, their professional, nuanced advice as military leaders is essential to cast effective responses to strategic challenges.

The Joint Operating Environment 2010

Overview

This chapter will discuss the results of the thesis research that was conducted using the framework and methodology outlined in Chapter 3. The purpose of the research was to fill the gaps with regards to identifying the security benefits building partner capacity activities/programs provide to achieve U.S. national objectives to protect U.S. national interests. The research data and hybrid of the Lykke Model (see figure 3.1) called Building Partner Capacity Model (see figure 3.2) supported efforts to answer the research question: What security benefits/support does security assistance and security cooperation programs related to building partner capacity provide to protect U.S. national security and interests? And proved the research hypothesis (Building Partner Capacity supports U.S. foreign policy efforts to bring security and stability to the international system related to protecting U.S. national interests) is true.

What is Building Partner Capacity?

Before moving forward it is critical to understand the U.S. Government’s definition of building partner capacity. By no means is this section meant to make anyone an expert on the subject of building partner capacity. It is only meant to provide a simple yet thorough understanding of BPC from various perspectives (national, DoD and Combatant Commands); identify BPC authorities and programs DoD, DoS and other government agencies can use to take
action on the ground to accomplish their missions with partner nations; and to show the magnitude and importance the U.S. places in using BPC programs as tools to support U.S. national security and foreign policy efforts to protect U.S. national interests around the world.

BPC in the 21st century, is a “multi-agency, multinational initiative that draws on the elements of security cooperation and security assistance programs to achieve U.S. strategic objectives” which includes “defeating terrorist networks; preventing hostile states and nonstate actors from acquiring or using WMD; conducting irregular warfare and stability operations; and enabling host countries to provide good governance” (Marquis 2010). BPC programs are funded under U.S. appropriations or authorizations and administered/managed under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. FMS is the acquisition process by which the U.S. Government procures and transfers defense articles, services, and training to U.S. international partners and organizations. The goal is to give partner nations’ defense and security forces the capacity to conduct counterterrorism, counter drug, and counterinsurgency operations; or to support U.S. military and stability operations, multilateral peace operations, and other programs; leading to partner nations that can assist or on their own maintain regional and national security (Security Assistance management Manual, Glossary/Scott 2012). For the DoD BPC activities “reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence” (DoD 2012); and from the COCOM perspective “building partner capacity is an essential military mission and an important component of the U.S. governments approach to preventing and responding to crisis, conflict, and instability” (Hooper 2012).

James Q. Roberts (2009), during a keynote speech at the Special Operations Command’s Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School, made several key points to the
foreign students in attendance related to the importance the U.S. places in using BPC activities to protect U.S. national interests. The speech was related to maritime security but it can be applied across the full spectrum of available BPC programs: 1) the U.S. wants to help states build partner capacity because nations are sovereign, have laws, and have the responsibility and right to police up their own space (land, water, and air) from illegal and terrorist activity 2) their own actions fall within international and local laws 3) states and regional organizations “bring to the problem all of the regional and cultural understanding” and cultural dynamics that a foreign force may not 3) the actions of state or regional organizations is better accepted by the local population than those of foreign forces 4) the U.S. does not want to undermine “the legitimacy and sovereignty” of a nation (Roberts 2009).

The data in tables 4.1 – 4.7 were extracted from DISAMs Security Cooperation Program Guide (2015) and organized into the several tables by category (Defense Trade & Arms Transfers; Train, Advise and Equip; Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief & Mine Action; Education & Training (Civil & Military Institutions; Combined Exercises; Contact Programs; and International Armaments Cooperation) to identify the BPC programs available to commanders and government organizations to support the activities they use on the ground, and more often collectively (whole of government approach), to protect the national interests of the U.S. worldwide. Additionally, it highlights the investment the U.S. makes in creating and sustaining BPC programs to be used as tools by DoD, DoS and other agencies to support U.S. national security and foreign policy efforts to achieve national objectives around the world.

A review of tables 4.1 – 4.7 will be helpful during discussions later in the chapter with regards to the role and missions of COCOMs and the programs each uses in the applicable AOR.
to assist others with building capacity to defend, govern and bring stability regionally and internationally.

**Table 4.1 Defense Trade & Arms Transfer Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Value of Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excess Defense Articles (EDA)</td>
<td>Transfers excess defense equipment to foreign governments or international organizations. Typically used for modernization of partner forces.</td>
<td>$122,000+ awarded by U.S. to support defense programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing (FMF)</td>
<td>The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) authorizes the President to freeze procurement of defense articles and services for foreign countries and international organizations. Excess military equipment remains available for purchase.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Sales (FMS)</td>
<td>Provides a form of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and a fundamental tool of U.S. foreign policy. Under Section 3, Title 22, U.S.C., U.S. may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote world peace.</td>
<td>$122,000+ awarded by U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.2 International Armaments Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Value of Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Research, Development, and Production</td>
<td>Bilateral or multinational agreement to co-develop and produce a weapon system required for all participants. Examples include: 1. Development of a U.S. weapons system, 2. Collaboration on R&amp;D, and production of a new weapons system, 3. Standardization of weapon systems with allied and friendly countries.</td>
<td>$122,000+ awarded by U.S. to support research programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program</td>
<td>1. Reduce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 2. Support regional efforts to limit the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.</td>
<td>$122,000+ awarded by U.S. to support threat reduction programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel Cooperation Programs</td>
<td>Support of Israeli anti-missile defense capabilities. Fund the development and acquisition of Israeli anti-missile programs.</td>
<td>$122,000+ awarded by U.S. to support Israeli programs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.3 Combined Exercises Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Value of Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff-Sponsored Exercise Program</td>
<td>Conduct periodic or one-time combined command post or field exercises with one or more countries. Examples include: Joint Combined Operations in the Mediterranean (JCOPMED), Exercise African Lion.</td>
<td>$122,000+ awarded by U.S. to support joint exercises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange-Train (J22X)</td>
<td>Deployment of U.S. special operations forces (SOF) for the dual purposes of self-exercise and training partner nation forces. Examples include: 1. Operation Atlantic Resolve in Eastern Europe, 2. Exercise African Lion with Morocco.</td>
<td>$122,000+ awarded by U.S. to support exchange programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Country Combined Exercise Programs (DCCP)</td>
<td>Authorized use of DoD funding to support a subscribing country participating in a combined exercise with U.S. forces. Examples include: Exercise African Lion.</td>
<td>$122,000+ awarded by U.S. to support combined exercises.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table 4.4 Education & Training Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value of Prg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“LISOM” Training of Security Forces and Associated Security Ministries of Foreign Countries to增强 Capacities for Peaceful Coexistence</td>
<td>Provides enhanced training to security forces prohibited from receiving such training under any provision of law only if: 1. The training is conducted on the country’s own territory. 2. Such training is withheld from any individual or entity under any provision of law only if it can be shown that such individual or entity has committed or is likely to commit a war crime. 3. Such training is withheld from an entity under any provision of law only if it can be shown that such entity has committed or is likely to commit a war crime.</td>
<td>Any funding authorized by the FY2022 NSCA, FY2023 NSCA, or any other laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Cooperation</td>
<td>Committed to the expansion of security cooperation programs in Africa.</td>
<td>DoD and MMSD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance at Military Academies</td>
<td>Provides opportunities to serve in higher-education programs for students interested in attending a military academy.</td>
<td>DoD and MMSD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Leadership Program (ALP)</td>
<td>Provides education for aviation leadership programs for DoD personnel.</td>
<td>DoD and MMSD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD Regional Centers</td>
<td>Provides education for aviation leadership programs for DoD personnel.</td>
<td>DoD and MMSD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Military Education &amp; Training (MIET)</td>
<td>The centers utilize unique academic forums to build strong, sustainable, and enduring security relationships.</td>
<td>DoD and MMSD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Military Education &amp; Training (MIET) Expanded</td>
<td>Provides education for aviation leadership programs for DoD personnel.</td>
<td>DoD and MMSD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of Foreign and U.S. Military and Civilian Defense Personnel at an Armed Forces Undergraduate and Graduate Programs</td>
<td>Provides education for aviation leadership programs for DoD personnel.</td>
<td>DoD and MMSD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Defense combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (RDT FP)</td>
<td>Provides education for aviation leadership programs for DoD personnel.</td>
<td>DoD and MMSD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.5 Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, & Mine Action Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Value of Prg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>LCCG</em> Authorities to Conduct Activities to Enhance the Capability of Foreign Countries to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear Weapon Impact</td>
<td>Provides assistance to the military and civilian first-responders organizations of countries that share a border with NTC training the capability of such countries to respond effectively to terrorist threats involving WMD.</td>
<td>As determined and notified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CEDMA)</td>
<td>The center conducts training, and research in civil-military operations, particularly those that require international disaster management and humanitarian assistance.</td>
<td>DoD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>SLI</em> Reintegration Activities in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Provides reintegration activities for Afghan refugees.</td>
<td>DoD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>SDF</em> Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIIF)</td>
<td>Provides assistance for the construction of infrastructure projects in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>DoD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Emergency Assistance (OHDA)</td>
<td>Provides assistance for the construction of infrastructure projects in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>DoD O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25
### Table 4.6 Train, Advise, Assist & Equip Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programs</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value of Prog</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAR</strong> Civil Assistance for C/N Activities for Certain Countries</td>
<td>Provides defense articles and services to selected countries for counternarcotics (C/N) and countertransnational organized crime purposes. Types of assistance include: a. Interim patrol boats b. Non-lethal protective and utility personal equipment c. Non-lethal equipment, such as night-vision systems, navigation, communications, photos, and video equipment d. Non-lethal components, accessories, parts, hardware, and software for repair or replacement of parts, and related repair equipment e. Maintenance and repair equipment that is used for counterdrug activities</td>
<td>Same as Section 1004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TACOM</strong> Attorney General’s Office-Overseas Military Operations</td>
<td>Assistance to the government of Colombia to support for U.S. Counterdrug Operations and to support military operations against the Sinaloa Cartel in Colombia.</td>
<td>Currently authorized $155 million annually through FY2031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LM-14</strong> Enhancement of the U.S. Military’s Counterdrug Operations</td>
<td>Support foreign forces, interagency, and allies in support of U.S. special forces.</td>
<td>Not more than $75,000,000 annually through FY2031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/RE</strong> 22140 Mission Support Services Support</td>
<td>Provides support services, supplies, logistics support, and non-reimbursable loans to equipment for the U.S. military in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Up to $150 million annually through FY2027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/RE</strong> 22350 Logistics Support for U.S. Military Operations</td>
<td>Provides support services, transportation, medical supplies, and other logistical support to support U.S. military operations.</td>
<td>Not to exceed $100 million annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/RE</strong> 22350 Assistance to the Government of Jordan for Border Security Operations</td>
<td>Provides support to the government of Jordan for border security operations.</td>
<td>Not to exceed $100 million annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/RE</strong> 22350 Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)</td>
<td>Provides assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to support the government of Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Up to $2.3 billion annually through FY2027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/RE</strong> 22350 Build Counterculture Foreign Military Logistics</td>
<td>Provides support for security forces to support military operations in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>Up to $10 million annually through FY2027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/RE</strong> 22350 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INL)</td>
<td>Provides support for the stability of the region in Eastern, South Asia, and Latin America, as well as support for other security operations.</td>
<td>Up to $10 million annually through FY2027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/RE</strong> 22350 Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF)</td>
<td>Provides support for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.</td>
<td>Up to $10 million annually through FY2027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/RE</strong> 22350 Non-Lend-lease Military Equipment</td>
<td>Provides support for equipment and supplies to support military operations.</td>
<td>Up to $10 million annually through FY2027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A/RE</strong> 22350 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF)</td>
<td>Provides support for counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan.</td>
<td>Up to $10 million annually through FY2027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The President’s 2016 Defense Budget Request for $585 billion includes $50.9 billion to fund Overseas Contingency Operations some of which are listed throughout tables 4.1-4.7 as figure 4.1 depicts.

**Overseas Contingency Operations**

- Included with this Budget Request
  - $50.9 billion
  - Continues decline since FY 2010
  - Reflects continued operational demands on U.S. forces
  - Continues responsible transition in Afghanistan
    - Includes training and equipping of Afghan security forces ($3.8 billion)
  - Funds Counter-ISIL Operations ($5.3 billion)
    - Includes training and equipping of Iraqi forces and vetted moderate Syrian opposition ($1.3 billion)
  - Includes Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund ($2.1 billion)
  - Continues European Reassurance Initiative ($789 million)
  - Funds International support ($1.7 billion)
  - Coalition Support Fund
  - Resets/regrades equipment ($7.8 billion)
  - If sequestration lifted, plan to transition enduring costs currently funded in the OCO budget to the base budget beginning in 2017 and ending by 2020

**Table 4.7 Contacts Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contacts Programs</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Value of Eff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combatant Command Initiative Fund (CPIF)</td>
<td>Provide DoD funding to support generally emergent CCO/CSC program proposals.</td>
<td>$5B - $55B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of Expenses to attend Bilateral or Regional Conferences</td>
<td>Authorizes the use of DOD funding for country participation at bilateral or multilateral regional DOD conferences</td>
<td>DoD/OAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Personal Exchange Program</td>
<td>DOD organizations exchange military or civilian personnel with other countries. Required overall authority for the exchange of DoD personnel with allied and friendly countries and international organizations.</td>
<td>DoD, defense agency, or O&amp;M funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard State Partnership Exchange Program (NPP)</td>
<td>Authorizes National Guard personnel exchanges with military forces, disaster or other government organizations of a country whose primary function includes disaster response or emergency response. Use of unique civil military nature of the National Guard to interact with both civil and defense personnel in partner countries.</td>
<td>DoD/CISR funding, to include funds appropriated to the Air and Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Participation in Headquarters Interforce</td>
<td>U.S. staff support of NATO activities of the NATO Rapid Deployment Corps Corps</td>
<td>$12.4M annually at a FY13 level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assignment of DoD Civilians as Advisors (NCOM) to Multi National and Regional Organizations</td>
<td>Temporary assignment of DoD civilians to serve as advisors to the DoD, security agencies, or regional organizations serving in a similar defense function</td>
<td>FY2012 - FY2015, no end date, funded by DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI)</td>
<td>Enables the execution of USNOMAD AOR C activities already authorized by 10 U.S.C.</td>
<td>FY2003 - FY2005, no end date, funded by DOD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Complex Operations</td>
<td>Establishment of the Center for Complex Operations</td>
<td>DoD/OSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USO Warsaw Initiative Fund (USW)</td>
<td>Support the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program established in 1994</td>
<td>FY12 $38M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.1 Funding Request for Overseas Contingency Operations**
This section provided the definition of building partner capacity from national, DoD and COCOM perspectives; highlighted reasons why the U.S. pursues BPC activities related to U.S. national security; and provided several categories of BPC programs that can be used to execute a multitude of activities with partner nations globally depending on the threat, state and/or region. The next section will discuss the analysis and findings from examining the security environment the US, its partners, allies and other actors must operate within together in the 21st century; and highlight threats and challenges that make BPC activities important to U.S. and international security, peace, stability, and the pursuit of economic prosperity.

**The 21st Century Security Environment**

Many experts, theorists and states arguably agree, in one way or another, the security environment in the 21st century is unlike no other time in human history; and has/will present the U.S. and the international community with many security challenges which can threaten security and stability across the globe. A taskforce report by Goldgeier and Volker (2013) (with participation from ~30 national security and foreign policy experts) provides an idea of how U.S. policy makers and experts view the world and the US’s role in it. Even though “more people today live in free or partially free societies, market driven economies, and security than any previous era” (Goldgeier and Volker 2013) the reality about the international security environment is:

The world is not a passive and neutral playing field, but one in which competing views and interests are constantly being pressed. US interests are continually being challenged. The United States is often a principal target of other nations’ and groups’ grievances and a global reference point around which some organize their own actions. In other cases, events are driven purely by local and regional dynamics having nothing to do with the United States, yet nonetheless, have a significant impact on US values and interests (Goldgeier and Volker 2013, 1).
The international system is complex and plagued not only by threats from multiple state actors, but in the 21st century, also by threats from non-state actors ranging from transnational terrorist/extremist organizations and criminal organizations, religious fanatics, etc. Creating a world that “is more dangerous and vulnerable than at any anytime in recent history” (Rollins 2011).

A report by the National Intelligence Agency (2008) identified key global trends and factors that are meant to “stimulate strategic thinking about the future” and may shape future events well into the 21st century (National Intelligence Agency 2008). Three of the trends from the report are critical to this thesis and are highlighted below:

1) The potential for conflict will increase owing to rapid changes in parts of the greater Middle East and the spread of lethal capabilities

2) A global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India, and others. The relative power of nonstate actors—businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and even criminal networks—also will increase. [One addition to this statement is the rise of Africa highlighted in the 2015 NSS.]

3) The need for the U.S. to act as regional balancer in the Middle East will increase, although other outside powers—Russia, China and India—will play greater roles than today (National Intelligence Agency 2008).

Martel (2012) introduces a term called “flash points” to identify locations where conflict and crisis can occur at any moment. Martel’s paper was published in 2012 but still remains relevant in 2015 and quite possibly beyond when examining the international security environment:

There are several global flash points that can fuel dangerous escalatory conflicts beyond their localized origins. Despite the general yearning for peace, the potential for armed clashes is very high, as states have unchecked areas of fragility could provoke crises. In Asia, an India-Pakistan conflict could involve the United States and China as see by a crisis between China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait. A crisis with North Korea could draw in China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. In the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear and missile programs constitute a flashpoint that could involve the United States, Israel,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The same logic applies to crises involving Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, and Syria.

These trends and perspectives are critical points because similarities can be found in the several national security strategies (NSS 2002-2015) and other government documents. Additionally, the U.S. national security strategies provide a national-level view of the threats, challenges and potential opportunities in the international system, with regards to protecting U.S. enduring national interests and the formulation and achievement of national security and foreign policy objectives.

There is little argument among national security and foreign policy experts that weak, failing and failed states; non-state actors (terrorists and extremists) and transnational criminal organizations pose serious threats to the US’s national security and interests domestically and internationally. The 2015 NSS includes climate change and pandemics like Ebola to the list as well. These threats are not necessarily new but were highlighted after the Post-Cold War, particularly after 9/11, and emphasized almost a quarter through the 21st century as real threats that require collective action from the international community. Based on a survey Hough (2013) identifies the “biggest fears in the world”: crime, terrorism, health/ economic insecurity, accidents/ natural disasters, and war.

Most of the countries surveyed are considered developed so the fears are different than developing countries. Africa for example fears economic insecurity, disease, corruption, illiteracy, war, political conflict, and environmental destruction. These issues are considered security issues in many regions whether military in nature or not.

Hough (2013) makes a statement regarding global criminal networks that can be applied to other non-state actors as well such as violent-non state actors (VNSA) and extremist organizations who thrive at the cost of weak, failing or failed states: “They will corrupt leaders
of unstable, economically fragile, or failing states, insinuate themselves into troubled banks and
businesses, and cooperate with insurgent political movements to control substantial geographic
networks” (Hough 2013).

The categories below can be considered some of the causes of instability in the international
system:

**Regional or Civil Conflicts:** Nation (2008) states “unchecked regional conflict and civil
conflicts risk escalation with broadening consequences; threaten the creditability of the U.S., its
allies, and major international instances as guarantors of world order; and confront decision
makers with horrendous and morally intolerable humanitarian abuses”. The Middle East is an
example of this statement. An unstable Middle East impacts U.S. vital national interests with
regards to the free flow of oil, support of Israel and threats on the homeland. The U.S. can resort
to a combination of strategies to maintain regional stability around the world: selective
engagement in the regions that need the most attention or cooperative strategy to share the
burdens with the international community. Walt (1989) used a quote from Robert Gates to sum
up the US role by stating “instead of trying to be the indispensable nation nearly everywhere, the
United States will need to figure out how to be the decisive power in places that matter”. But if
the U.S. is to lead the international system it must figure out how to employ its limited resources
to be prepared to project its power or the power of others anywhere when needed and promote
activities to bring stability to multiple regions across the globe. One answer that becomes
obvious during research of this thesis is for the U.S. to assist other like-minded nations to build,
improve and sustain defense, security and government capacity to support local, regional and
international efforts to deter and defeat common enemies and common challenges/threats to
international security and stability.
**Weak, Failing or Failed States:** This is an increasingly serious security threat that impacts U.S. national interests and security in many ways (safety and security of U.S. citizens and protection of its partners and allies). Nation (2008) states “the threat of global terrorism, in particular, driven forward by widely dispersed terror networks, is rooted in failed states and marginalized regions denied the benefits of balanced modernization and development”. A failure to address this issue may lead to a cluster of states like Somalia with the symptoms of lawlessness, ineffective government, terrorism/insurgency, crime/corruption, human rights violations, poverty, etc. Hough (2013) states “failed states are significant in international relations because they stand in contrary to conventional notions of the sovereign state system”.

**Global Poverty:** President Bush acknowledged in the *2002 National Security Strategy* that poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders. United Nations Secretary-General BAN Ki-moon framed poverty in the poorest countries as “extreme poverty”; and as a global problem requiring a global solution by stating: “eradicating extreme poverty continues to be one of the main challenges of our time, and is a major concern of the international community. Ending this scourge will require the combined efforts of all, governments, civil society organizations and the private sector, in the context of a stronger and more effective global partnership for development” (UN Website – Millennium Development Goals).

Failure of the international community collectively to address extreme poverty will continue to motivate terrorist organizations to use these poor countries as safe-havens. The U.S. must pursue a cooperative security strategy for example assisting the UN with its programs to help developing countries “eradicate extreme poverty”. The UN “Millennium Development Goals” developed by the UN during the September 2000, Millennium Summit where ~149 heads of State/Government gathered and “committed their nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty, and set out a series of time-bound targets, with a deadline of 2015” (UN Millennium Summit 2000). The MDG Goals provided the framework towards eradicating
extreme poverty/hunger; improving universal education; promoting gender equality and empowerment women; reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainability; and developing a global partnership for development. The MNG goals adopted by the UN are similar/support U.S. national objectives. There appears to be progress but it is work in progress by all—and the threats that thrive due to poverty must still be defeated globally.

**Transnational Threats:** The U.S. and many nations around the world are increasingly impacted by multiple complex transnational security challenges/threats. These challenges/threats are, although not exclusively, a result of international terrorism, transnational organized criminal networks, an increasing number of ‘cyber’ attacks on public and private networks, and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. The perpetrators involved are non-state actors but can include state actors who pursue criminal objectives by exploiting and disrupting successful governments in their regions. They seek to maximize their gains (whether for financial or extremist ideological gains) at any cost. Hough (2013) highlights the 10 costliest forms of transnational crime (in annual economic cost in dollars—and annual human cost) are corruption ($1.6T), cyber-crime ($1T), drug trafficking ($400B/200,000 deaths), counterfeits ($250B), environmental crime ($33.6B), human trafficking ($31.6B/27M victims), stolen goods ($20B), maritime piracy ($9.5B/11 deaths), human organ trafficking ($9B/7K victims), and arms trafficking ($6B). These ten areas cost approximately $2.1 and 450K homicides. These lucrative criminal activities have and will continue to drive organizations to do whatever is necessary to protect their operations; which includes violating human rights violations and murder. Also, includes recruiting individuals to operate in legal institutions (government,
financial or commercial) to provide invaluable information and protection for money (Williams 2001).

**Pandemics & Natural Disasters:** In addition to dealing with the security threats created by state and non-state actors, there are natural disasters and pandemics that can hit anywhere and at any time globally. And if left unchecked for even a short amount of time the results could rapidly spread globally; from infected citizens to an increased number of refugees. An example is the deadly outbreak of Ebola approximately one year ago in parts of West Africa. The outbreak started in three countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) and through human carriers was spread outside the region and across international borders within weeks.

The reality of the international system is the U.S. and the international community have/will face threats from violent extremists, terrorist threats, infectious diseases, failing/failed states, cyber-attacks; and more recently threats involving Russian aggression against Ukraine (Europe); the devastation by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Middle East); China’s continued military modernization (Asia-Pacific); and the challenge of assisting a rising African region which includes dealing with Boko Haram (West Africa), Al Shabaab (East Africa) and Al Qaida (North Africa). This strategic calculus demands that the U.S. government focus on building partner capacity activities to help other countries with developing the tools for their own security and governance, to defend themselves and the U.S. by extension (Roberts 2011).

The next section will discuss U.S. national security strategy, identify U.S. national objectives, partnering with state and non-state actors, and regional organizations to build and use U.S. partners’ capacity as one of the cornerstones of U.S. national security strategy and foreign policy.
National Security Policy, Strategy and Objectives – Ends

U.S. Administrations develop national and foreign policy objectives based on perceived threats, challenges and opportunities to protect U.S. enduring (also called core) national interests from actors and hazards of all types and parts of the world. U.S. government departments, agencies and other organizations execute activities globally in support of U.S. national security policy in order to be and remain prepared to engage in the international system to achieve objectives to protect U.S. vital interests.

The U.S. has four enduring or core interests that drive how the president and decision makers develop policy to employ U.S. national elements of power (diplomacy, information/intelligence, military, and economic). The enduring/core national interests are important because from the national policy level the interests focus policy makers and “are essential to establishing the objectives or ends that serve as the goals for policy and strategy” (Stolberg 2010, 3). The U.S. enduring interests are: 1) security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; 2) a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; 3) respect for universal values at home and around the world; 4) and a rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. In a “changing global environment, these national interests will continue to guide all we do in the world” (National Security Strategy 2015, 2).

The national objectives (ends) identified in several national security documents and more recently in the 2015 National Security Strategy focus on the U.S. engaging and leading the international system with purpose, strength, by example, with capable partners, with all U.S. instruments of power, and based on a long-term perspective; and assist others to build partner
capacity so the collective efforts of the willing and like-minded states will provide the capacity whether unilaterally, bi-laterally, tri-laterally or multilaterally to deal with common enemies or threats to security and stability across the globe.

It is clear that more and more at the state and regional levels U.S. and international security are threatened when state and non-state actors do not share the vision of a secure “rules-based international order” and not necessarily one that is “advanced by U.S. leadership” but more importantly a system that “promotes peace, security, stability, opportunity and prosperity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges” no matter who is in the lead (NSS 2015).

During the first quarter of the 21st century the administrations of U.S. Presidents Bush and Obama have produced several U.S. National Security Strategies (2002, 2006, 2010, and 2015) that highlight four relevant points driving the need to build partner capacity and lead efforts to pursue collective security activities through the 21st century: 1) the U.S. will continue to lead the international community to defeat global threats and challenges 2) “Resources and influence are not infinite” even though it is predicted that the U.S. will remain as a premiere power through the 21st century 3) achieving U.S. national objectives will remain vital to combating current and emerging security threats 4) no nation can truly defeat current/emerging threats to international security alone; “there are no global problems than can be solved without the United States, and few that can be solved by the United States alone” (NSS 2010 & 2015, 3).

The national security strategies identify critical national-level strategic objectives focused on leveraging US capacity and the capacity of like-minded actors to defeat common enemies and threats thereby working together collectively to improve the international system in a way the U.S., its allies and partners in most cases desire (2010 NSS, pgs. 7-16).
From examining the latest 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy and other documents/reports, the following are overarching U.S. national objectives, although not inclusive, related to protecting U.S. national interests that require strong BPC programs and execution on the ground in order to combat threats and hazards collectively as an international community:

**Obj 1 Defeat Terrorism/Extremism:** This U.S. national security objective is to “help build the capacity of the most vulnerable states and communities to defeat terrorists locally” (2015 NSS, 9). The events of 9/11 shocked the U.S. and world. And showed how vulnerable a nation like the U.S. could be against the actions of transnational extremists. Likewise, the despicable act highlighted the fact that weak states, like Afghanistan, could pose threats to U.S. national security and interests abroad as well as at home. Further, the capability of these organizations to gain access to Weapons of Mass Destruction, conduct attacks on U.S. soil again, operate criminal operations, set up safe havens in failed or failing states, and conduct operations internationally remains a significant threat to the U.S. and international community. Examples are the intent of American Al Shabaab fighters to plan and execute attacks in the U.S. (as highlighted in Toni Johnson’s 2011 article) and against U.S. interests abroad (Committee on Homeland Security 2011); and Hezbollah placing sleeper cells in the US. A more recent and violent threat to regional and international security is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria. From South Asia through the Middle East and into Africa—ISIL, other diffused networks of al-Qaida and affiliated organizations are a constant threat to U.S. citizens, interests, allies, and partners in the Middle East and around the globe (2015 NSS). Additionally, “mobilize allies and partners to strengthen our collective efforts to prevent and respond to mass atrocities using all our instruments of national power” (NSS 2015, 22).
**Obj 2 Prevent State/Regional Conflict:** This second U.S. national security objective is to “continue to bolster the capacity of the U.N. and regional organizations to help resolve disputes, build resilience to crises and shocks” and respond to mass atrocities (2015 NSS, 11). Whether in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, Africa, Americas, etc. emerging crises at the state level if left unchecked have the strong probability of impacting not only the citizens of the state; but also spilling across borders into neighboring states, across regions and quite possibly internationally. Failed/failing states are a major challenge to regional and international security and stability. Where instability and conflict exists there is the possibility of international insecurity, conflict and war. The U.S. with the international community is trying to address the political and economic issues that bring instability to a state or region (2010 NSS, 26-27).

**Obj 3 Enhance Cyber Security:** The third U.S. national security objective is to “assist other countries to develop laws that enable strong action against threats that originate from their infrastructure” (2015 NSS, 13). Cyber security has become “one of the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges we face as a nation”. The threat can come from individuals, criminal or terrorist organizations, and even state actors. This will be a never ending battle as technologies and tactics continue to evolve (2010 NSS, 27-28).

**Obj 4 Enhance Maritime Security:** The fourth U.S. national security objective seeks to “build on the unprecedented international cooperation of the last few years, especially in the Arctic as well as in combating piracy off the Horn of Africa and drug-smuggling in the Caribbean Sea and across Southeast Asia” (2015 NSS, 13).

**Obj 5 Deter/Defeat Aggression:** This fifth U.S. national security objective focuses our military power to continue efforts to “defend the homeland, conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement. If
deterrence fails, U.S. forces will be ready to project power globally to defeat and deny aggression in multiple theaters”. The DoD and COCOMs are a critical resource by which the U.S. to executes regional engagement and BPC activities to work with others to deter and defeat those actors that would cause instability and insecurity at the state, region and international levels (2015 NSS, 8).

**Obj 6 Build Security Globally:** The sixth U.S. national security objective focuses efforts to “work vigorously both within the U.N. and other multilateral institutions, and with member states, to strengthen and modernize capacities—from peacekeeping to humanitarian relief—so they endure to provide protection, stability, and support for future generations” (NSS 2015, 23).

**Obj 7 Enhance Global Health Security:** The seventh U.S. national security objective “save lives by strengthening regulatory frameworks for food safety and developing a global system to prevent avoidable epidemics, detect and report disease outbreaks in real time, and respond more rapidly and effectively” (NSS 2015, 14).

This section discussed the U.S. national security strategy in terms of identifying U.S. enduring national interests that must be protected to guarantee the security of the US, its partners and allies; identified the national objectives that must be achieved to protect U.S. national interests—thereby bringing security and stability to the international system—and protecting U.S. vital interests at home and abroad; and why partnering with state and non-state actors to build and use partner capacity as a corner stone of U.S. national strategy and foreign policy important.

Table 4.8 serves as an overview with regards to the U.S. government’s mission to provide for the common defense of the nation, national objectives to defeat threats and highlights the importance of the U.S. using BPC activities as a national and foreign policy strategy to cooperate
and empower others with increased capacity to act in the international system collectively with and for other partner nations or unilaterally on their own behalf.

### Table 4.8 U.S. National Security Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>National Security Threats/Outcomes (Human and Political)</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Rules-Based International Order</th>
<th>Universal Values</th>
<th>Opportunity &amp; Prosperity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 2</td>
<td>Enhance economic security and prosperity</td>
<td>Build partnerships with key regional actors</td>
<td>Protect U.S. and international economic interests</td>
<td>Universal Values</td>
<td>Objective 2: Promote Global Prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective 3</td>
<td>Strengthen political stability and security</td>
<td>Enhance regional stability and security</td>
<td>Promote stability and security in the region</td>
<td>Universal Values</td>
<td>Objective 3: Promote Global Prosperity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next section will discuss the BPC programs (means) DoD, DoS and Combatant Commands use to turn policy into BPC activities (ways) on the ground at the regional level to execute multiple and collective missions with U.S. government and partner nations to achieve U.S. national objectives to protect U.S. national and international interests.

**Regional Security Cooperation to Build Partner Capacity – Ways & Means**

The regional level operations of the DoD, DoS, and other U.S. departments/agencies are critical to achieving national strategic objectives across the globe by working with state and non-state actors to collectively deal with the multitude of threats and challenges that face the U.S. and its international partners on a daily basis. For the purpose of this thesis the results of the research will focus on Geographic Combatant Commands (COCOM) because of the ‘whole of government approach’ each COCOM uses to jointly plan and execute BPC activities with U.S. government departments and agencies in the COCOMs’ regional areas of responsibility.
The COCOMs are essential to U.S. engagement at the regional level. COCOMs are where U.S. national policy, approved and funded BPC programs, and DoD level strategic objectives and concepts are translated into executable regional security cooperation plans and activities used where COCOMs are “postured globally to protect our citizens and interests, preserve regional stability, render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting security challenges” (2015 NSS, 7).

There are a total of nine COCOMs: “(6) with responsibilities for a geographic region or area of responsibility (AOR) and (3) in support of U.S. strategic objectives” DoD Website – Unified Combatant Commands). Figure 4.2 depicts the international system in terms of COCOMs AORs where each COCOM engages unique and different actors and under unique and different, although sometimes similar, threats and challenges. Their engagement with regional actors and partners in the AOR can be bilateral, trilateral or multilateral to manage/maintain peace, security and stability to achieve national and regional strategic objectives. Or the COCOM can act unilaterally if the situation requires, and if directed; the main goal being to work with or through regional partners.

Figure 4.2 COCOMs’ Areas of Responsibility (DoD 2015)
The COCOMs’ mission is to “maintain command and control of U.S. military forces around the world in peacetime as well as in conflict” (DoD Website – Unified Combatant Commands) based on theater plans supporting the QDR, NMS and NSS. COCOMs are strategic military organizations charged with protecting and defending U.S. national security and taking necessary actions to achieve core national security objectives. What makes each COCOM unique is their regional missions could employ all the elements of national power (diplomacy, intelligence, military and economic) and include collaboration and support from multiple U.S. departments, government agencies and international partners (whole of government approach), depending on the situation and mission, to execute regional activities to stabilize a state or region in the international system; and ultimately the protect U.S. national interests.

The missions of the COCOMs subordinate organizations can range from military to military engagements (training exercises, training missions, advisory roles, provide approved defense equip, etc.) with international partners, humanitarian assistance activities, to assisting partner nations under disaster assistance response programs, to preparing and executing combat operations. Table 4.9 provides a synopsis of the DoD strategic objectives and concepts from the DSG, QDR and NMS COCOM Commanders use to develop regional level security cooperation plans to integrate and execute funded BPC programs in support of their missions to protect U.S. national interests.
Integrating and executing security cooperation activities based on the particular threats and challenges in each COCOMs’ AOR is strategically beneficial since the U.S. has limited resources and must determine what and where resources are best applied; while continuing to prepare for the next big crisis somewhere in the world. Additionally, it is clear that states, regional security organizations and non-state actors across the globe have their own: national interests, perceived local and regional security threats and challenges, and possess capabilities and capacity at varying levels. These unique circumstances across each COCOMs’ AOR requires a unique mix of BPC activities specially designed to support international partners and key allies (Middle East/ North Africa, Africa, Europe, Asia, and Americas) to bring security and
stability to the regions as part of U.S. strategy to ensure international security and stability; and
U.S. national security.

After examining the six geographic COCOMs and identifying the threats and challenges in the various AORs, several common themes were identified, which are related, and in many cases are similar, to each COCOMs regional level security cooperation activities: 1) Each AOR is unique with regards to size, actors (state and non-state), cultures, sub-cultures, literacy, languages, religions, national interests, economic condition, defense and security capacity, etc. which demands a unique set of security activities/ programs to build partner capacity to deal with the multitude of equally unique threats and challenges to security and stability in each AOR. 2) At the state and regional levels, at any time, there could be multiple ongoing operations to defeat terrorists and extremist organizations, prevent state/regional conflicts, deter/defeat aggression, enhance maritime security, and enhance global health security; stressing the requirement to assist others with building capacity as a foreign policy strategy to build security globally with and through others capacity. 3) Although the AORs are somewhat different because terrorist organizations and extremist organizations are “becoming more diffuse and decentralized as compared to 9/11”, there is a rising concern, as seen with Al Qaida, its allies and affiliates, these organizations will seek to broaden their operations into “more areas and increasingly collaborating and coordinating with one another as a transnational loosely-confederated syndicate” (CENTCOM 2015, 18). This can be applied to transnational criminal organizations as well.

Each COCOM and its regional partners are plagued by one or more actors/threats identified in U.S. national security documents that pose serious security challenges to protect U.S. national interests and bring stability into the international system.
Below are the results of analysis of four of the six geographic COCOMs (CENTCOM, AFRICOM, EUCOM, and PACOM) with regards to their missions and areas of responsibility; regional trends and threats; regional security cooperation activities (BPC); and the benefits reaped from their regional engagements and BPC activities. Information was extracted from each COCOM Commander’s 2015 or 2014 Annual Posture Statement.

These COCOMs were selected because they each face some, if not all, the threats and challenges identified in U.S. national security documents that impact U.S. national interests; use similar yet a unique set of engagement and BPC activities to achieve U.S. national objectives; and as figure 4.3 depicts these AORs are where the majority of the hot spots are with regards to conflict and instability.

Figure 4.3 Regional Hot Spots of Instability and Conflict
**U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)**

**Mission Statement:** The mission of CENTCOM role the Central Region is to “With national and international partners, USCENTCOM promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and non-state aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability and prosperity” (CENTCOM Website and Posture Statement).

**Area of Responsibilities:** There are 20 countries are in the CENTCOM AOR as illustrated in Figure 4.4. This does not include the approximately 50 countries that make up the ‘coalition of the willing’ from the AORs of CENTCOM, AFRICOM, EUCOM, SOUTHCOM and PACOM contributing to the war against terrorism.

Centcom attributes coalition partners with “particular contributions include, but are not limited to, providing vital intelligence, personnel, equipment and assets for use on the ground, air and sea. Coalition members also have provided liaison teams, participated in planning, provided bases and granted over-flight permissions - as well as sizable contributions of humanitarian
assistance” (CENTCOM 2015 Website – Coalition Countries and AOR Countries). It is safe to say that many of these countries through BPC activities received training and equipment from CENTCOM or the COCOM in the AOR they deployed from.

**Regional Trends and Threats**: In the CENTCOM 2015 Posture Statement, General Austin, CENTCOM Commander, identified several “underlying currents” that are causes for much of the “tension and conflict that is present today” in the CENTCOM AOR: 1) increasing divide between ethno-sectarian; 2) moderates and extremists (particularly Islamist based) are in a struggle; 3) citizens in the CENTCOM AOR are rejecting corrupt and oppressive governments and regimes; 4) and what he refers to as the “youth bulge”. The situation with the world’s youth provides extremist organizations with a source of recruits from the youth in the region to carry out their agendas. And they have become tired of being educated, yet still unemployed or underemployed (CENTCOM 2015). This is an extremely critical issue because they are the next generation to become potential leaders either to govern nations or lead extremist organizations.

Currently, the main threats to the countries in the CENTCOM AOR are from violent extremist organizations (VEO) and terrorism. The latest crisis is related to Iraq and Syria and the organization called ISIL. This organization is using “ungoverned and under-governed spaces” across the borders of Syria and Iraq to operate by instilling fear in the populace, seizing key territory, and using unconventional and traditional tactics to push its campaign. The U.S. gained commitments from 62 U.S. allies and partners in the region and from other regions to support what is being called Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat and destroy ISIL (CENTCOM 2015, 10). The flow of foreign fighters should be alarming to the region and world as well. CENTCOM estimates the number of “jihadist foreign fighters” to be over 15,000 coming from Africa, Europe, Asia, and North America. Although not all have joined ISIL—it is believed
some may “have joined the ANF or other Syrian opposition groups”. Of grave concern is what will happen when these individuals return home with the deadly skills they learned in combat. Afghanistan still remains a critical area of concern and top priority for the U.S. and CENTCOM. In December 2014, the U.S. and its partners moved from combat operations to stability operations (Operation Freedoms Sentinel) in support of efforts to train, advise and equip the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), comprised of approximately 326,000 Afghans, to continue to improve their capacity to effectively lead and execute security operations (CENTCOM 2015, 14). Iran, although in nuclear negotiations with the US, is still considered a regional threat through the pursuit of “policies that threaten U.S. strategic interests and goals throughout the Middle East” related to its cyber and ballistic missile arsenal reported to be the largest in the Middle East (CENTCOM 2015, 20). This in no way means the threats from a failing Yemen are any less important. Recently, Saudi Arabia organized a Saudi-led coalition called Operation Decisive Storm to conduct operations against the Yemen Houthi rebels. All this, and more, places a significant burden on the individual resources of CENTCOM and its regional partners.

One of the strategies CENTCOM is using in the AOR to deal with these threats and challenges, with partner nations and selected non-state actors, is the use of BPC programs to actively assist regional partners through train, advise, assist, and equip activities to build the capacity needed to share in the necessary burden to stabilize the region.

**CENTCOM BPC Activities/Strategies:** CENTCOM emphasizes the importance of empowering “partners to meet security challenges and work collectively to counter common threats”; which can also “lessen the need for costly U.S. intervention” (CENTCOM 2015, 37).
In the CENTCOM 2015 Posture Statement FMS and FMF programs are identified as “key pillars of” CENTOM BPC strategy—followed by Global Train & Equip Authority, Counter Terrorism Partnerships, Section 1208 programs, and Joint Training Exercises from the 2016 President’s Budget (2105 CENTCOM, 37-38).

**Benefits from CENTCOM BPC Activities:** Through its BPC activities CENTCOM credits itself with increasing U.S. access and influence in the region, enhanced inoperability among U.S. partners, and the security for “forward deployed forces, diplomatic sites, and other U.S. interests” has improved (CENTCOM 2015, 37). The recent and ongoing Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat and destroy ISIL is a key indicator that CENTCOM’s BPC activity, with assistance from the whole of government, has/is achieving much of what is credited above. This is especially true among the Gulf States of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Qatar where the U.S. has been afforded “access, basing and overflight privileges that are critical to the conduct of operations in the region”; and have supported directly or indirectly in coalition operations against ISIL (CENTCOM 2015, 21).

The KSA, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan and the UAE have been directly involved in the fight against ISIL. Of the five, Jordan, the KSA and UAE have assisted with air operations with the KSA supporting the BPC Syria Train & Equip BPC program and Qatar offering to provide a site for the program. The UAE has offered to support advise and assist missions on the ground in Iraq. Over the past several years, Qatar, the KSA and UAE have made multi-billion dollar FMS purchases of defense equipment and services to support efforts to support their own internal security and to bring stability back to the region; and continuing and expanding cooperation with “the U.S. defense industry” and “greater interoperability with the United States” (CENTCOM 2015, 25). Three U.S. forward deployed headquarters in the region are located in Qatar:
CENTCOM, U.S. Air Forces Central Command and Special Operations Command Central. Kuwait provides critical support for U.S. and coalition troops and equipment in support of OIR. In addition, Kuwait provides key basing and access for deployed U.S. forces under current operations and future operations. The Kuwaitis are “committed to advancing regional cooperative defense efforts” as well (CENTCOM 2015, 23). Bahrain is the location of the headquarters for the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces based in Manama. Oman permits the U.S. to use its air and sea ports for access to the region. Jordan provides basing support in support of OIR. To fill capability gaps identified within the Jordanian Armed Forces the U.S. is working to quickly fill Jordan’s FMS requests to ensure Jordan can continue its support of OIR (CENTCOM 2015, 25-30). FMF, IMET and the Coalition Support Fund are considered “key contributing factors” to the continuously improving U.S.-Pakistan military-to-military relationship. Priority is placed on building additional Pakistani capacity to support common interests, counter-insurgency counter-terrorist operations. Operations in North Waziristan and other regions are believed to have been successful in terms of operations to remove and prevent militants from returning to their strongholds (CENTCOM 2015, 34).

The Saudi-led coalition Operation Decisive Storm may be an indicator that U.S. Middle East partners may become more willing to lead future stability operations; and have the capacity to share the security burdens in the AOR. Saudi is leading on-going efforts to deter Yemen Houthi rebels on its border with participation from approximately eight countries in the Middle East (Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and UAE) and logistical support from the U.S. (Thompson and Torre 2015).
A vibrant Joint Exercise and Training Program is attributed to providing OIR Coalition members with the capacity to effectively “conduct unhearsed and short-notice strike operations” against ISIL (CENTCOM 2015, 38).

U.S. African Command (AFRICOM)

Mission Statement: AFRICOM’s mission and security cooperation role in Africa is clearly about continuous U.S. engagement in the region: “United States Africa Command, with national and international partners, disrupts transnational threats, protects U.S. personnel and facilities, prevents and mitigates conflicts, and builds defense capabilities in order to promote regional stability and prosperity” (2015 AFRICOM).

Area of Responsibility: There are 53 countries are in the AFRICOM AOR as illustrated in Figure 4.5.

![AFRICOM Area of Responsibility](image)

**Figure 4.5 AFRICOM Area of Responsibility**

Note: Egypt is a part of the CENTCOM AOR

Arguably the countries in the AFRICOM AOR are vastly different from each other in the several sub-regions in the North, South, East, West and Central; and in many cases there are differences
among nations next door to one another in the same sub-region. This makes for a very complex security environment with threats coming from multiple actors.

**Regional Trends & Threats:** In the CENTCOM 2015 Posture Statement, General Rodriguez, AFRICOM Commander, identified several causes to instability and conflict in the region. Corruption and crime were identified as the main causes across most of Africa because both “impede the development of democratic institutions, reduce security and stability, and constrain economic development”; additionally, “terrorist, insurgent, and criminal groups exploit corruption, regional instability, and popular grievances to mobilize people and resources, expand their networks, and establish safe havens. Figure 4.6 provides a snapshot of the hotspots on the continent of Africa with regards to conflict and instability and the transnational nature of the challenges and threats extending to the other regions/COCOM AORs’.

**Africa: Conflict and Instability**

![Africa: Conflict and Instability](image)

**Figure 4.6 AFRICOM Conflict & Instability (Source AFRICOM Briefing)**

**North and West Africa:** The surge in security challenges in Libya and Nigeria impacts regional stability and threaten U.S. interests. Threats come from multiple non-state actors such as Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Murabitum, Boko Haram,
ISIL, and various other VEOs who are “exploiting weak governance, corrupt leadership, and porous borders across the Sahel and Maghreb to train and move fighters and distribute resources” (2015 AFRICOM, 4). The results of spillover from instability and conflict are transcending borders in and through Africa from Europe, the Middle East, North and South America which severely impact U.S. interests.

**East Africa:** Al-Shabaab continues to be of great threat to U.S. and its partners’ interests in the sub-region. Although the Africa Union (AU) has made progress in defeating al-Shabaab, the VEO is evolving its tactics to deal with the progress of the AU mission in Somalia by extending its attacks to include those countries that contribute troops to the mission. The situation in East Africa enforces key points with regards the need to continue “improving the effectiveness of the African Mission in Somalia 2) and “taking a regional approach that counters al-Shabaab’s expanding operational approach” (AFRICOM 2015, 3).

**Central Africa:** The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from northern Uganda still operates on the borders of the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Although the organization is smaller and less deadly than in other times of its history, the LRA preys on populaces in isolated areas/communities and has started poaching as its main source of income. The impact of insurgent groups and ethnic tensions (Great Lakes region) across the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo can destabilize and potentially “boil over violently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (AFRICOM 2015, 5).

**South Africa:** Compared to the other sub-regions of Africa, South Africa is stable. Countries from the sub-region are credited with having “the most professional and capable military forces on the continent and is a net exporter of security”. South Africa, Angola, and
Tanzania were involved in regional and continental security operations, and participated in United Nations (UN) lead peacekeeping operations in Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo. This is great news compared to the rest of the continent. However, social challenges (poverty, crime, and social inequality), together with challenges from government leadership in some countries has the potential to bring about regional instability (AFRICOM 2015, 5-6).

AFRICOM’s strategy to deal with regional and transnational threats is based on the command’s presence, programs and exercises (BPC activities), engagements (military-to-military relationships), and operations with national and international partners, and other COCOMs focused on “advancing our mutual interests, and promoting shared values” by strengthening partnerships, building defense capacities, and efforts by civilian agencies to advance democracy, good governance, and security sector reform (AFRICOM 2015, 7).

**AFRICOM BPC Activities/Strategies:** AFRICOM is executing multiple activities/programs with its African partner nations to promote maritime security; partnership to grow nations’ capabilities, security solutions, etc. (AFRICOM Website). AFRICOM supported the State Department to help African states deal with violent extremism in the DoS initiative called the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON). The mission of AFRICOM in support of the AMISON initiative is to provide “mentors and teams with its State Department counterparts to prepare soldiers assigned to the AMISOM mission, and to share “intelligence to increase its AMISOM partners’ effectiveness, and is helping the Somali government in improving the Somali national army’s capacity” (Miles 2013). AFRICOM has expanded its disaster response program to include assisting U.S. African partners with “a full range of natural and man-made disasters, should one occur, to reduce the associated pain, suffering and loss”.
AFRICOM works not only with their military counterparts, the command also works with civilian organizations in the partner nation to develop strategies (Miles 2013).

AFRICOM leverages security cooperation programs to execute its regional mission which includes DoS managed programs such as IMET, Peacekeeping Operations, FMF, FMS, but are executed by DoD, and are very important to AFRICOMs engagement in the AOR; and with other programs supported by Congress such as the Security Governance Initiative, Counter-terrorism Partnership Fund, and Africa Peacekeeping Response Partnership “which will facilitate more comprehensive U.S. Government security engagement in Africa” (AFRICOM 2015, 7).

**Benefits from AFRICOM BPC Activity:** Over the past several years, through U.S. support, the AU’s capacity to deal with regional threats has continued to grow. Permitting the AU to conduct peacekeeping operations and counter VEOs such as al-Shabaab in and near Somalia. Unilateral missions such as Operation Indian Ocean and AU Mission in Somalia are indicators of AU’s increased capacity and improved operational planning and battlefield proficiency to disrupt al-Shabaab’s operations. Although al-Shabaab continues to threaten region stability and security, U.S. BPC efforts to build regional partners and organizations capacity can be attributed to a weaker al-Shabaab; and reinforces the importance of AFRICOM using BPC activities to support partners in East Africa to further weaken and defeat al-Shabaab (AFRICOM 2015, 8).

In North and West Africa, AFRICOM’s BPC activities were critical in providing partners the capacity to address security threats across the Maghreb, Sahel, and Lake Chad Basin regions. To some degree of success, U.S. partners were able to disrupt terrorist and criminal networks. AFRICOM “provided training and expanded information-sharing with the Nigerian military and other regional partners, such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, to disrupt and ultimately defeat Boko
Haram. This security threat in the sub-region is leading to efforts to create a Lake Chad Basin Multinational Joint Task Force with support from AFRICOM (AFRICOM 2015, 9).

In the Gulf of Guinea, U.S. programs and combined operations like the Africa Partnership Station and African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership are helping regional partners build their capacity to deal with maritime security threats. Examples are: 1) Jan 15, the Ghanaian Navy “interdicted a hijacked tanker and arrested eight pirates” 2) AFRICOM had expanded participation in its regional maritime exercise from the Naval forces of Africa, Europe, and South America (AFRICOM 2015, 10).

The African Union Task Force is leading efforts against the Lord’s Resistance Army “to reduce the group’s safe havens, capture key leaders, and promote defections”. With advice and assistance from deployed U.S. forces the task force mounted Operation Observant Compass, and is credited with making progress in “weakening the Lord’s Resistance Army and reducing its ability to threaten civilian populations”. It is estimated that “fewer than 200 fighters remain, the group no longer threatens regional stability, and local communities have greater capacity to receive defectors and communicate warnings about attacks from armed groups” (AFRICOM 2015, 10). As in other AORs, AFRICOM is “contributing to progress in regional security through modest and sustained investments in building partner capacity (AFRICOM 2015, 11).

**EUCOM:**

**Mission Statement:** “U.S. European Command conducts military operations, international military partnering, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States forward. It does this by establishing an agile security organization able to conduct full spectrum activities as part of whole of government solutions to secure enduring stability in Europe and Eurasia” (EUCOM Homepage).
Area of Responsibility: There are 51 countries are in the EUCOM AOR as illustrated in Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7 EUCOM Area of Responsibility

What makes Europe unique is that “for more than 60 years, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has worked with NATO and other partner nations to address regional issues and keep the peace in Europe and parts of the Middle East and Eurasia. From the Cold War to more recent conflicts in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, EUCOM has prospered in its actions by being inextricably linked with its diplomatic partners. Forging and maintaining ongoing solid, trusted relationships with countries in EUCOM’s region helps expand everyone’s military capacity” (EUCOM Homepage).

Regional Trends and Threats: In support of efforts to protect U.S. national interests EUCOM focuses its resources on three primary security threats by countering: 1) Russian aggression 2) flow of foreign fighters between Europe and the Levant 3) and transnational threats merging from North Africa. General Breedlove, EUCOM Commander, explains the significance of Europe by stating “maintaining our strategic Alliance with Europe is vital to maintaining U.S. national security and is not to be taken for granted” (EUCOM 2015, 2). EUCOM supports missions in AFRICOM and CENTCOM AORs which border the EUCOM AOR to “address
issues crossing geographic boundaries, supporting CENTCOM and AFRICOM operations to protect U.S. national interests” (EUCOM 2015, 2).

**Russia:** In 2006, a bipartisan Independent Task Force, led by John Edwards, Jack Kemp and Stephen Sestanovich released a report titled *Russia’s Wrong Direction.* The Task Force noted that although democracy was a goal of U.S. foreign policy, “Russia’s political system is becoming steadily authoritarian”. This was believed to mean President Putin, Russian president, was/is moving the country backwards to an era when extreme communist views opposed democracy (pre-Cold War); a time when Russia had little regards for working collectively to achieve a secure and stable regional and international system. EUCOM reports since early 2014, “President Putin’s Russia has abandoned all pretense of participating in collaborative security process with neighbors and the international community” and “instead has employed hybrid warfare (which includes regular, irregular, and cyber forms of war as well as political and economic intimidations) to illegally seize Crimea, foment separatist fever in several sovereign nations, and maintain frozen conflicts within its so-called sphere of influence or near abroad” (EUCOM 2015, 4). This issue is causing concern among Russia’s neighbors and in much of the AOR.

**Flow of Foreign Fighters:** There is growing concern over ISIL’s tactics to recruit and train “foreign fighters destined to return to their countries of origin” with new skillsets to potentially wage war from within the borders of Europe, the US, and other countries. It is believed this “problem will grow in scope as the flow of returning individuals increases over time” and increases risks of “lone wolf attacks” as well (EUCOM 2015, 8).

**Transnational Threats:** Instability and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa are creating the conditions for “illicit trafficking, to include the smuggling of narcotics,
humans, and weapons into Southern Europe and beyond” by transnational criminal organizations who “continue to take hold and further destabilize the region, posing a growing economic and security risk to countries on Europe’s Southern Flank”. And the threat of the spread of contagious diseases such as the recent outbreak of Ebola through illicit trafficking channels is another security threat (EUCOM 2015, 8).

**EUCOM BPC Activities/Strategies:** The security of Israel remains an enduring national objective for the US. EUCOM continues its engagement with Israel through several key programs to assist Israel with building and sustaining its capacity to defend itself in the region. The programs include the Strategic Cooperative Initiative Program; bilateral and semi-annual conferences (address planning, logistics, exercises, and interoperability) and Joint Staff’s engagements; and exercises include five major and recurring events. Additionally, the U.S. provides Israel with $3.1B of FMF funding annually, supports the countries layered-missile defense program (Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems), and has the approval to “release advanced military capabilities, including F-35 and the V-22 aircraft” (EUCOM 2015, 16).

EUCOM led interagency efforts to build the capacity of partners in order to prepare them to assist with efforts to counter transnational threats (human trafficking and illicit substances) and to stop the “flow of foreign fighters going to and from Syria and the Levant, dismantle extremist facilitation networks, and build partner nation capacity to counter the flow of foreign fighters on their own” (EUCOM 2015, 17).

Combat operations in Afghanistan are over for U.S. and NATO forces. The new mission called Resolution Support calls for the US, its allies and partners to deploy forces to support the mission to train, advise and assist Afghan forces. In order to do so, EUCOM will continue to assist allies and partners with preparing for deployments. The 2015 EUCOM Posture Statement
identified several programs/authorities to assist with preparing troops for U.S. allies and partners by providing operational logistics, lift and sustain support (inter-theater lift, sustainment and equipment loans); Coalition Readiness Support Program for pre-deployment training; procurement of critical equipment for partners and allies deployed to Afghanistan; “this much needed equipment includes interoperable communications gear, counter-IED and explosive ordnance disposal equipment, medical equipment, and night vision devices” (EUCOM 2015, 17).

Benefits from EUCOM BPC Activities: As a result of continuous engagements and BPC activity, EUCOM, DoD and Israeli “leaders and staff maintain uniquely strong, frequent, personal, and direct relationships”; and “U.S.-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation relationships have never been closer or joint exercises more robust”.

EUCOM with assistance from allies and partners supported DoD, DoS and CENTCOM objectives/operations to provide “lethal aid to Kurdish Peshmerga security forces in northern Iraq. EUCOM solicited, received and transferred arms, ammunition and material from EUCOM Allies and partners totaling “over two million pounds of donated lethal aid” to posture the Kurdish Regional Government to assist with efforts to stop and defeat ISIL (EUCOM 2015, 17).

In support of AFRICOM’s Ebola operations, EUCOM received approval from “European nations to secure permissions for U.S. Forces to use facilities and infrastructure for DoD-directed 21-day controlled monitoring in Europe and to relay the protocols necessary to prevent the inadvertent transmission of the Ebola disease onto the European continent” EUCOM 2015, 18).

To support operations to protect U.S. Embassies and Facilities in North Africa and the Middle East, European nations (Spain, Italy, Romania, Germany, etc.) support efforts “through strategically located facilities and access agreements within Europe. The protection mission is
vital, albeit costly, as a large number of embassies and consulates are at risk on the Africa
continent and AFRICOM has no bases in Africa that can support forces assigned to the mission”
(EUCOM 2015, 18).

EUCOM utilizes the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) as “an overall
strategy designed to enhance theater stability and influence the development of Partner nation
military capabilities”; the program now includes “22 partnership programs and accounts for 20%
of EUCOM’s theater security cooperation and military-to-military activities” (EUCOM 2014,
21).

Through great working relationships, EUCOM has convinced allies and partners in the
region to “invest in their own air and missile defense capabilities that are interoperable” with
U.S. forces. The benefit is a network of systems that will “leverage cost sharing and help spread
the commitment among willing participants” and allies such as the Netherlands, Denmark and
Germany “are also making investments in Ballistic Missile Defense” (EUCOM 2015, 22).

EUCOM will continue its efforts to build and sustain partner capacity among European
Allies and partners which is considered a “keystone to countering threats like Russian
aggression” and current and future threats that may impact EUCOM’s AOR and the transnational
threats that emerge from the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs (EUCOM 2015, 26).

**PACOM**

**Mission Statement:** PACOM’s vision statement actually captures the mission of the
COCOM “USPACOM protects and defends, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies,
the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and partners,
USPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting security
cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring
aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness” (PACOM Homepage).

**Area of Responsibility:** There are 36 countries are in the PACOM AOR as illustrated in Figure 4.8. PACOM is a unique AOR encompassing “52% of the earth’s surface and is composed of 83% water and 17% land. Over half of the people on the planet reside on that 17% of land, and by the middle of the century, the Indo-Asia-Pacific will potentially contain 70% of the world’s population” (PACOM 2015, 1).

![Figure 4.8 PACOM Area of Responsibility](image)

**Regional Trends and Threats:** The PACOM AOR in its own way is a very complex security environment. Regional governments are faced with multiple challenges that have the
potential to destabilize states and the region ranging from natural disasters and climate change to ideological radicalism and population migration. Additionally, in the AOR are the: second and third largest world economies (China and Japan) largest economies and five smallest economies; largest Muslim-majority (Indonesia); China with the largest world population; India the largest democracy; and Narau the smallest republic. Additionally, PACOM “contains seven of the ten largest militaries, five nuclear nations, and five of the US’s seven mutual defense treaty alliances”—all with the potential to “create strategic long-term challenges” (PACOM 2015, 2).

**North Korea** in all likelihood will remain the most dangerous and unpredictable security threat in the AOT as the government continues with “advancing its nuclear capability and ballistic missile programs”. As well using cyber space to attack nations and companies alike; demonstrated during suspected attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment; and attacks against South Korea’s networks both military and civilian (PACOM 2015, 3).

**Territorial and maritime** issues could create instability in the region—especially in East and South China Seas where there are six claimants who have overlapping claims in the area which could escalate to military conflict if left unchecked. The U.S. will not take sides but does insist all follow the Law of the Sea Convention and that all disputes be handled in a peaceful manner. China has refused to follow provisions in the Law of the Sea Convention (PACOM 2015).

**Natural Disasters** “accounted for over 40% (1,690 incidences) of the world’s natural disasters during the period between 2004 and 2013, claiming more than 700,000 lives”. Conditions in the AOR also pose threats from “the rapid spread of human-or animal-borne diseases” (PACOM 2015, 5).
Like CENTCOM, AFRICOM and EUCOM the impact of the conflict in Syria and Iraq is cause for alarm in the Indo-Asia-Pacific for several reasons: 1) it is estimated that “approximately 1,300 foreign personnel fighting alongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” 2) those returning home with combat skillsets and experience could “enhance the capability of regional extremist networks in the most densely populated areas of the world” 3) these groups are linked to global extremist groups and therefore there activity can be transnational 4) A Qaida announced there is a new affiliate in the AOR called Al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent 5) extremist groups will continue to exploit conditions in the region to secure safe havens, hubs and prime locations for operations (PACOM 2015, 6).

**Transnational criminal organizations** are continuing to display the capacity to operate globally to expand their criminal operations. This pave the way for increased human and drug trafficking which impact the security of the regions citizens (estimated two-thirds of approximately 21 million victims of human trafficking are from the AOR); and provides a revenue stream for terrorists and VEOs (PACOM 2015, 7).

**Russia and China** are positioning both militarily and politically in the region. Both nations are modernizing militarily in one way or another. It is believed “Russia aims to demonstrate militarily capabilities commensurate with its Pacific interests; and China is a pursuing a vision “for an alternative security architecture in Asia that affords Beijing increased influence in the region and diminishes the role of the United States” (PACOM 2015, 8).

**EUCOM BPC Activities/Strategies:** PACOM uses security cooperation and capacity building activities as an approach to build partner readiness, identify shortfalls/gaps, fill capability gaps, and finds ways to mitigate the most critical capacity.
Australia is procuring several “high tech platforms” from the U.S. including F-35s Lightning II aircraft, P-8 Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, EA-18 Growler aircraft, Global Hawk UAVs and MH-60R helicopters. The intent is to increase interoperability. Japan is procuring F-35s Lightning II aircraft Global Hawk UAVs and as well in addition to MV-22 Ospreys, and AEGIS destroyers (existing and new). India benefits from U.S. military modernization and defense trade for C-130Js, P-8Is and other equipment. Indonesia procured AH-64E helicopters and initial buy of F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. PACOM continues to hold bi-lateral, tri-lateral and multi-lateral engagements, exercises, meetings, conferences and training events with partners in the region (PACOM 2015).

**Benefits from PACOM BPC Activities:** PACOMs actions are “designed to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize alliances and partnerships, maintain access to areas of common interest, counter aggression, prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defeat extremism” (PACOM 2015, 1).

To remain prepared to deal with crisis from natural disasters PACOM focuses efforts on “pre-crisis preparedness with training and exercises” with regional partners related to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. A positive outcome was the lessons learned from 2013 Operation Haiyan (Typhoon Haiyan) were implemented resulting “less damage and loss of life when Typhoon Hagupit” hit the Philippines in December 2014.

Shipments of dual use proliferation items is being mitigated by building the capacity of regional partners to “improve export controls and interdiction capabilities” across the AOR. As part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), PACOM initiated in 2014 Exercise Fortune Guard (31 nations attended) starting a series of exercises over the next six-years hosted by regional partners with subject matter expertise. The intent is to bring together regional partners
to share “best practices against proliferators, emphasizing a whole-of-government approach to confront this complex challenge” (PACOM 2015, 7).

In support of regional peace and stability initiatives Australia has assumed a lead role in addressing “regional security and capacity-building issues, including lead roles in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief events”. And the nation contributed to operations to defeat ISIL and Resolute Support in Afghanistan (PACOM 2015, 9-10).

The U.S.-Japan alliance continues to endure. U.S. Forces Japan engages with the Japanese Joint Staff “to enhance interoperability and information sharing through realistic training exercises, and bilateral planning”; and positioning PACOM to maintain a presence in Japan “to meet future security challenges and encourage greater trilateral military engagements with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia”. There are positive signs that Japan is positioned and willing to taken-on a “greater role in the regional security architecture”. In December 2014, the Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement was signed by the US-Japan-ROK for “greater information sharing on North Korean missile and nuclear threats” (PACOM 2015, 10-11).

The Philippines is a good example of the long-term commitment needed to reap the benefits of BPC activities. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has grown in capacity to deal with the country’s domestic threats. Now, The Joint Special Operations Task Force created to counter VEOs in the country is ready to inactivate and allow the AFP to assume the mission. PACOM will maintain a small presence to assist and advise the AFP.

India is on the rise and U.S. engagement remains critical to positive US-Indian relationships. US and India’s military are credited with conducting “69 major exercises in the past five years” and “the U.S. remains India’s largest defense trading partner”. There are signs from India that it is ready to commit to being a regional security provider (PACOM 2015, 13).
Continued engagement and defense in Oceania in accordance with the Compacts of Free Association (Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Marshall Islands, and Republic of Micronesia) yields the benefits of access to “their associated 5.5 million square kilometers of Pacific in contingency situation”, gives “U.S. authority to grant or deny access to another nation’s military forces” and “allows the maintenance of a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific”; and “reinforces U.S. commitment to the Pacific Rebalance” addressed in the 2015 NSS.

Engagements with China’s military have presented positive benefits with regards to increasing cooperation and identifying mutual national objectives and threats. Of significant note are agreed upon Confidence Building Measures reference Notification of Major Military Activities and Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters with the intent of “improving transparency, building trust, and reducing risk of unintended incidents”; both nations have worked together to deal with common interests such as counter piracy, military medicine, and disaster relief and humanitarian aid. In December 2014, both nations conducted “counter piracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. With China, PACOM led Joint Interagency Task Force is building capacity to counter drug trafficking. PACOM has received authorization to conduct “anti-money laundering training linked to counterdrug efforts” with China (PACOM 2015, 15-17). These engagements have been beneficial to pursuing conflict resolution between both nations and for the region as a whole.

National Security Benefits From Building Partner Capacity

The previous section titled ‘Regional Security Cooperation to Build Partner Capacity – Ways & Means’ laid out how the DoD through U.S. geographic combatant commands uses regional engagements and BPC activities as realistic approaches to deal with the multitude of threats and actors causing instability virtually in every region of the world. Several points came
from the analysis of CENTCOM, AFRICOM, EUCOM and PACOM COCOMs: 1) the threats
to U.S. enduring/core national interests are very real, complex, and deadly 2) those involved are
violent actors, both state and non-state 3) who have the capacity to reach beyond borders
regionally to locations globally to execute their agendas 4) the threats both directly and indirectly
threatens the US, its allies and partners; and continue to destabilize regions and the international
community 5) creating the need for continuous U.S. leadership and engagement regionally and
globally with allies and partners using BPC activities to build others capacity and empower them
to get in the fight for the short and long-haul 6) building partner capacity activities supports U.S.
foreign policy efforts to bring security to the international system related to protecting U.S.
national interests.

Through BPC activities, military and government engagements, the U.S. is afforded the
benefits of: being granted permission to use bases and facilities in partner nations’ to provide a
presence in regions and project power or assist with humanitarian crisis from those same
locations if needed; storage of preposition stocks of equipment in support of on-going or future
operations like in Kuwait in the Middle East; having regional partners and organizations that are
increasingly capable of dealing with local issues unilaterally or as part of a coalition as is the
case with Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat ISIL, deter Russian aggression, conduct counter-
terrorism and counter-narcotics operations, and deter and disrupt networks of transnational
criminal organizations.

Building partner capacity activities have advanced U.S. national security objectives
among allies and partners; provided creditability for the US’s commitment to regional security
goals, promoted combined command, control, and communications, and enhanced inoperability
among U.S. and foreign forces during operations (CENTCOM 2015).
Another way to view the issue of BPC is from the question of what would be the security dilemma across the six AORs if there was limited to no BPC activity? The answer although speculative appears to be quite obvious. Violent extremist organizations like ISIL could very well have secured more land than it already has in Syria and Iraq; Boko Haram could quite possibly be even bolder in its acts of aggression in Nigeria and surrounding border states; al-Shabaab would be further along in its agenda in East Africa; and the Lord’s Resistance Army may still be a serious security threat in Central Africa; al Qaida and its other affiliates would be unchecked and would have grown in size and power; without regional engagements would the U.S. have had the opportunity to kill Bin Laden or other high value targets. As for state actors, Russia would have continued to illegally seize more territory and be a further threat to its neighbors and the region without any repercussions from Europe and the international community. Iran would already have a full nuclear capability (may be they do now) but probably would not have entertained the idea of negotiating with the U.S. further upsetting the balance of power in the Middle East; a rising China would have thrown its weight around more in Asia—possibly becoming more threatening in the region; North Korea may very well have moved on South Korea; and the 9/11 attack on U.S. soil could be the norm versus the exception.

By using the Building Partner Capacity Model (see figure 3.2) this thesis examined the 21st Century Security Environment to identify the threats and actors that pose threats to U.S. enduring national/core interests; the national policies that provide the national objectives (ends) that must be achieved to protect U.S. national interests; provided the results of analysis of four COCOMs (CENTCOM, AFRICOM, EUCOM, and PACOM) with regards to their regional missions, engagements with regional partners through BPC activities, and the results/benefits
from each COCOMs activities; which in several cases were overlapping to combat security threats that are transnational.

The conclusion is without bilateral, trilateral and multilateral BPC activity and engagements, the security dilemmas the U.S. and its international partners face would be far worse. Therefore, BPC activities are effective tools and contribute to ongoing and short/long-term efforts to achieve vital national and foreign policy objectives to protect U.S. enduring national interests.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to provide the findings and analysis to answer the research question: *What security benefits/support does security assistance and security cooperation programs related to building partner capacity provide to protect U.S. national security and interests?* And prove or disprove the hypothesis: *Building Partner Capacity supports U.S. foreign policy efforts to bring security to the international system related to protecting U.S. national interests.* Chapter 5 focuses on a synopsis of the thesis, draws conclusions, and recommends future research.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

Overview

The first quarter of the 21st century, has increasingly shown the U.S. and the international community, that no nation can entirely face the multitude of security challenges and threats from various actors around the globe alone. Just as critical, as this research has highlighted, is the fact that many of the security problems causing instability around the globe “are primarily regional rather than local, national, or global” (Tavares 2010, 3). Keeping in mind, the impact of the security threats can be and have been transnational.

The international relations theory was used to explore the international system in which the U.S. has taken an active and leadership role in. Overall causes of international instability were identified. Then this thesis examined a critical component and strategy of U.S. national security and foreign policy called Building Partner Capacity used to deal with the causes of security instability. The research identified approved and authorized U.S. BPC programs in relationship to the complex 21st century security environment. Further research was conducted on four of six regional U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands (CENTCOM, AFRICOM, EUCOM and PACOM) with regards to each COCOMs mission, AOR, regional security threats, regional BPC activities to defeat or deter threats, and to identify the benefits as related to achieving U.S. national security objectives. This was not meant to say that SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM are any less important to protecting U.S. enduring national interests. The four COCOMs provided enough information to answer the research question and prove the hypothesis which is addressed in the following section.
Synopsis of the Thesis

Chapter 1 Introduction set the stage for this thesis by identifying building partner capacity as a critical U.S. national security strategy in the 21st century. The deadly attack of 9/11 was a wake-up call for the U.S. and international community that no one nation was prepared to effectively deal with the threats and causes of instability around the globe such as terrorist attacks and threats, weak and failed/failing states, transnational criminal activity, weapons of mass destruction, insecure borders, drug trafficking, etc. As a result, the U.S. is continuing its efforts to improve and increase its own capabilities and capacity, at the same time, using BPC activities to improve and increase the capabilities and capacity of its international partners in terms of training, advising, assisting, and equipping foreign military and security forces through U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs. Identified was a missing component of the BPC process which is a document that discusses BPC programs and identifies: What security benefits/support does security assistance and security cooperation programs related to building partner capacity provide to protect U.S. national security and interests? At the same time, using dependent (protecting U.S. national interests at home and abroad) and independent (peace, security and stability at the state, regional and international levels; power distribution) variables to prove the hypothesis: Building Partner Capacity supports U.S. foreign policy efforts to bring security to the international system related to protecting U.S. national interests. Qualitative methods (case studies, program reports, existing research data, national and DoD security strategies, etc.) were used for research of the thesis topic.

Chapter 2 Literature Review provided a synopsis of the initial research material found which discussed the global security environment, national and DoD security strategies, security cooperation/assistance related to BPC initiatives. And it identified trends/threats impacting U.S.
and international security, U.S. enduring national interests, national security objectives (ends); government agencies/organizations that will provide the resources (means) and strategies (ways) to protect U.S. national interest and achieve U.S. national security objectives. Additionally, three themes were identified during the literature review: 1) the U.S. and international system will continue to be plagued by security threats from state and non-state actors 2) no one nation, not even the US, processes an unlimited amount of national power to deal with the threats/challenges to security alone 3) bi-lateral, and multi-lateral partnerships are key to bring peace, security and stability to the international system 4) the capabilities and capacity of partner nations must be increased and used effectively achieve security objectives. During the research no document was found that could be used as a stand-alone document to prove or disprove the hypothesis discussed in Chapter 1. This left a research gap which caused the need for further research on the thesis topic to prove or disprove the hypothesis and answer the research question.

Chapter 3 Methodology explained the thesis research framework and data collection methods. The International Relations theory was used to examine the security relationships among the U.S. and other actors (state and non-state) in the international system; how they interact with one another to bring stability or cause instability in the system; and how in a globalized world the security and prosperity is increasing dependent on many instead only a few select actors and regions. The hybrid of Lykke’s Model (see figure 3.1) called Building Partner Capacity (see figure 3.2) was developed to examine building partner capacity activities related to U.S. national security objectives to be achieved (ends), the strategies to achieve the ends by executing regional BPC activities/engagements (ways), and focused on the COCOMs as the military national power used to execute approved and funded BPC at the regional level. The addition of the 4th leg to the model called benefits was critical to the thesis research to identify
the benefits the U.S. gained in relationship to achieving national security objectives through BPC activities. The hypothesis was tested and proved using independent and dependent variables related to protecting U.S. national interests; and a stable, peaceful and secure international community at the state, regional and international levels by working to balance the power in the COCOMs regions of responsibility. Content Analysis was the primary qualitative research method used to collect data from government and military strategic, operational and tactical documents, private sponsored studies, international organizations documents, websites, and historical documents related to national and international security.

Chapter 4 Finding and Analysis discussed the results of the thesis research using the framework and methodology outlined in Chapter 3 which proved the hypothesis and answered the research question discussed in Chapter 1. The chapter provided the U.S. Government’s definition of building partner capacity from national, DoD and COCOM perspectives; identified the reasons why the U.S. pursues BPC activities related to U.S. national security; and presented several tables identifying BPC programs that can be used to execute BPC activities with partner nations globally, regionally or with a state depending on the nature of the threat. The 21st century security environment was examined, and it was found most experts and policy makers agree the environment is complex and filled with many security challenges/threats, emerging at any given time, from almost any region in the world. Martel (2012) introduced a term to identify the potential for a crisis worldwide as “flash points”—meaning “there are several global flash points that can fuel dangerous escalatory conflicts beyond their localized origins”. Several causes of instability were identified: regional and civil conflicts; weak, failing or failed states; global poverty; pandemics & natural disasters; and transnational threats which appeared to be a common theme among all threats—the capability to impact security trans-nationally.
U.S. national security strategy and objectives (ends) were identified which are developed based on known and perceived threats to U.S. enduring national interests (security, opportunity and prosperity, universal values, and rules-based international order) from actors and natural disasters/hazards of all kinds. For the purpose of this thesis, seven national objectives were identified in the 2015 NSS: defeat terrorism/extremism, prevent state/regional conflict, enhance cyber security, enhance maritime security, deter/defeat aggression, enhance global health security, and build security globally (building partner capacity). The ways and means by which the U.S. Government builds security globally, which is critical to achieving other national objectives, was examined by using a regional approach. The thesis research narrowed the focus to the regional security cooperation activity of four of the six U.S. combatant commands (CENTCOM, AFRICOM, EUCOM and PACOM). It was found that each has a unique mission, but all contribute to protecting the interests of the U.S. through regional level plans, that include utilizing BPC activities as a core strategy to address security threats and challenges with U.S. regional partners.

From the thesis research critical benefits from building partner capacity and regional engagements were identified. BPC activities afford the U.S. the benefits of permission from regional partners to use bases and facilities to provide a presence in the regions, project power, or assist with humanitarian crisis; storage of preposition stocks of equipment; regional partners that are capable of unilaterally, bi-laterally, tri-laterally or multilaterally dealing with regional or international crisis, deterring Russian aggression, conducting counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics operations, and/or deterring and disrupting networks of transnational criminal organizations. Additionally, building partner capacity activities have advanced U.S. national security objectives among allies and partners, provided creditability for the US’s commitment to
regional security goals, promoted combined command, control, and communications, and enhanced inoperability among U.S. and foreign forces during operations (CENTCOM 2015).

**Summary of Findings**

Building partner capacity is not new, nor the use of it as a U.S. national security strategy and foreign policy imperative. What is new and more complicated are the actors and threats to U.S. national interests in the 21st century—requiring the U.S. to constantly update and add to its list of BPC programs to deal with changing and emerging threats to security. BPC programs are not perfect, the development of new and the updating of legacy BPC programs is a must to combat current and emerging threats across the globe on a regional basis to achieve U.S. national objectives.

The U.S. must lead the international community in the 21st century. But also, the U.S. must have support from regional allies, partners, organizations and other like-minded actors to collectively take action. Individual state capabilities and capacity are not unlimited; this includes the U.S. and other advanced actors. State and non-state actors must realize that their security and prosperity are linked and the threats to international security impacts all in this globalized and interconnected world.

Building partner capacity appears to be the right strategy for now to ensure U.S. allies and partners, with capability gaps or no true capacity, receive support to increase and improve capacity to be better prepared to contribute unilaterally, bilaterally, trilaterally or multilaterally to stabilize their own nations, region or another region if required. Tavares (2010) emphasizes the importance of using regional partners and organizations due to the fact that not only is resources limited in nation states; international organizations like the “UN has neither enough resources nor political will to engage with all security problem” (Tavares 2010, 2) giving way for the need
to assist less robust regional organizations with building their organizational capacity and operational experience like the African Union and sub-regional organizations like Economic Community of West African States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Southern African Development Community, Organization of America States, Association of Southwest Asian Nations, Commonwealth of Independent States, League of Arab States, Pacific Island Forum; and assist in sustaining more robust organizations like NATO capable now of executing missions outside of Europe as well (Tavares 2010).

The White House Fact Sheet (2013) reference U.S. Security Sector Assistance offers the following statement to provide an understanding with regards to the importance the U.S. places in pursuing BPC activities as part of its foreign policy strategy to stabilize regions and protect U.S. national interests:

The United States has long recognized that the diversity and complexity of the threats to our national interest require a collaborative approach, both within the United States Government and among allies, partners, and multilateral organizations. More than ever before, we share security responsibilities with other nations and groups to help address security challenges in their countries and regions, whether it is fighting alongside our forces, countering terrorist and international criminal networks, participating in international peacekeeping operations, or building institutions capable of maintaining security, law, and order, and applying justice. U.S. assistance to build capabilities to meet these challenges can yield critical benefits, including reducing the possibility that the United States or partner nations may be required to intervene abroad in response to instability.

It is difficult to say in all cases if BPC activities result in positive benefits to support U.S. national and foreign policy to protect U.S. national interests. Sheehan (2013), before the Committee on Armed Services, identified another key point supporting BPC programs by stating “by enabling partners to achieve our shared national interests, we ultimately create a more cost-effective model for stability that is less reliant on direct U.S. military engagement”.

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Future Research

During the research for this thesis two articles were examined related to building partner capacity programs used to assist what could be called some of the US’s more questionable international partners. If international partners do not have the same long-term objectives and vision of a stable, peaceful and prosperous international system the U.S. BPC activities may not work (Paul 2013). Jett (2012) raised several key points also related to the topic of BPC: 1) the U.S. is setting itself up for future attacks by governments like those in the Middle East and other places in the world through security programs 2) the U.S. is less secure 3) the policies for security programs places the U.S. “in the position to support the world’s most repressive regimes” and “might create more terrorists than it eliminates 4) the results from using security programs to build others capacity is “unnecessary and a waste of money” and “they are unsustainable 5) Jett uses an argument from an article by Stewart Patrick, Council on Foreign Relations, who argued “most fragile states do not present significant security risks, except to their own people”. Veneri (2011) provided examples of BPC activities with international partners that may not have yielded expected results by examining Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Today, Iraq is in a battle with ISIS supported by a U.S. led coalition; in December 2014, the Afghan Government assumed responsibility for the security of Afghanistan. With continued BPC support from the U.S. and NATO; and it appears Pakistan is willing to assist the U.S. with counterinsurgency efforts in the area.

Although the articles were written in 2011 and 2012, further research should be conducted to examine the authors’ comments and arguments in relationship to the 2015 security environment and the BPC activities which are critical to achieving U.S. national security objectives.
REFERENCE LIST


http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/185613.htm

CURRICULUM VITAE

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