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PRELUDE TO TREASON: THE MOTIVATION TO SPY

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PRELUDE TO TREASON: THE MOTIVATION TO SPY

A Master Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of the

School of Security and Global Studies

American Military University

by

Dr. Frank C. Danesy

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts in Intelligence Studies

July 2017

American Public University

Charles Town, West Virginia
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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the men and women of the FVEY Intelligence Community whose untiring commitment makes our world a safer place and to my family which is and always has been my inspiration.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my former executive director, General (Dr.) Thomas Reiter, whose untiring drive for excellence and unwavering support of matters related to organizational security have been an inspiration. I also wish to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Paul Medhurst for his guidance throughout the thesis project. His substantial experience in the field of intelligence and his depth of knowledge of literature related to the field has made our exchanges invaluable, both with respect to the research project and to my greater understanding of the field. I would like to thank the faculty members of American Military University’s Intelligence Studies program, who have made working towards the degree of Master of Arts in Intelligence Studies a rich and rewarding experience. Finally, last but surely not least, I would like to thank Dorothea Danesy for her unwavering support throughout this master’s program.
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

PRELUDE TO TREASON: THE MOTIVATION TO SPY

by

Frank C. Danesy

American Military University, July 23, 2017

Charles Town, West Virginia

Professor Paul Medhurst, Thesis Professor

Insider espionage is a sinister crime and individuals guilty of it can face stiff penalties. Nevertheless, there have been 180 cases of insider espionage or comparable acts against the United States during the period 1975 to 2008 alone. In the Intelligence Community, the acronym MICE (money, ideology, compromise, and ego) is often used to explain why someone becomes a spy. Thrill-seeking, divided loyalties, disgruntlement, ingratiating and recognition have also been cited as motives. The purpose of this study is to determine whether such motives consistently precede acts of insider espionage and whether these motives exclusively apply to insider spies. The study reports findings suggesting that such motives do consistently apply to individuals who have committed espionage but they also apply to individuals who have not. It can therefore be concluded that these motives are necessary but not sufficient to explain why someone becomes a spy and that other contributing factors (i.e. impaired judgment and triggers) must be considered.
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1. Introduction

1.1. The Research Question

Espionage is regarded as one of the severest of all crimes against one’s country and individuals convicted of this offense can either face long prison sentences or in some countries even the death penalty. While one might assume that such stiff penalties would deter individuals from committing espionage, the reality is that there have been numerous instances of espionage in recent history. During the years 1975 to 2008 alone, there were 180 cases of espionage most of which led to convictions in the United States (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009). This clearly shows that there was something that weighed more heavily than the risk of a stiff penalty that motivated these spies to commit treason. With this backdrop, the research question of this study is: “Can the motivational profile of an individual be reliably used to predict the risk of that individual committing insider espionage?”

1.2. Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this study is to determine whether motives like money, ideology, compromise, or ego consistently precede acts of insider espionage and whether these motives exclusively apply to insider spies. Addressing this is interesting from various points of view. If, for instance, it was to come to light that certain motives exclusively appear in individuals who commit espionage, these motives could be used to determine the risk of an individual becoming an insider spy. If, however, these motives can not only be associated with insider spies but also with other individuals, that is to say ones who are above reproach, then this would suggest that other factors in addition to motivation also play a role. Either way, the outcome of this study may prove useful for recruiters, investigators, as well as researchers in the field of counterintelligence.
1.3. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 covers two types of literature. The first type relates to factors believed play a role prompting individuals to commit insider espionage. While the focus in this context is on the various motivations attributed to espionage, this section also addresses other factors that have been suggested as being contributors to the act of insider espionage (e.g., personality structure and critical events). The second type of literature covered in this chapter is related to the cases and motivations of insider spies as well as the personal histories of individuals who are not guilty of espionage but serve as a control group with respect to the motivational profiles. Chapter 3 addresses the theoretical framework with which the literature in Chapter 2 is reviewed. Motivation theory provides a useful foundation and point of departure. The chapter also outlines the research design and methodology that has been used in the research for this thesis. Bringing the material from Chapters 2 and 3 together, Chapter 4 focusses on the analysis of the data and the generation of findings with respect to the research question. Finally, Chapter 5 contains the conclusions based on the research conducted for this thesis.
2. Literature Review

2.1. Determining Factors

2.1.1. Motivation to Commit Insider Espionage

Whenever a case of insider espionage occurs, one of the first questions to be raised is what motivated the perpetrator to commit espionage. In the Intelligence Community, this phenomenon is often attributed to four motives that can be used to turn someone into a traitor: Money, Ideology, Compromise (as having been compromised) or Coercion and Ego (acronym MICE) (W. T. Smith 2003, 170). This acronym was originally suggested as an explanation for espionage by KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko who was a KGB officer until his defection to the United States in 1979 (Charney and Irvin Spring 2016, 74). According to Levchenko, the acronym MICE offers a means to “measure a person’s vulnerability, a way to assess whether a person can be seduced into becoming an agent of a foreign power…” (Levchenko 1988, 106).

While the MICE mnemonic is probably the most frequently used in the Intelligence Community to answer the question why someone becomes a spy, it is overly simplistic (Pincher 1987, 89; Smith 2017, 14). It does not consider other important motives for insider espionage (Eoyang 1994, 72). Based on data maintained by PERSERE, Herbig and Wiskoff extended this concept by adding several more motives that have emerged over years of analysis: disgruntlement, ingratiation and recognition (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002, 39; Herbig 2008, 32).

2.1.1.1. Money

The fact that money can be a motive to prompt someone to commit treason is not a new finding. Ephialtes of Trachis betrayed the Greeks to the Persians showing them a narrow
mountain path that gave them access to an area behind Greek lines during the Battle of Thermopylae in the year 480 B.C. (Bray 2012). Judas Iscariot betrayed Jesus of Nazareth for an amount of 30 pieces of silver in 33 A.D. Benedict Arnold sold West Point to the British for 20,000 pounds in 1780 (Pegg 2014). Throughout history, there have been instances in which individuals committed treason for money. The reasons that they did so, however, could be twofold. Some were driven by pure greed while others faced financial hardship and had to pay off debts or get themselves out of some other financial predicament. Herbig and Wiskoff therefore differentiated between “greed” and “need” suggesting that some spies were driven by their wish to purchase luxury items while others were reacting to actual or perceived financial pressures (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002, 40).

2.1.1.2. Ideology and Divided Loyalties

Ideologues can be described as individuals who are “committed to a particular political doctrine – an ideology – and who [approach] political and social problems from an unshakably dogmatic standpoint” (Pincher 1987). When Levchenko defected to the West in 1979, the ideological contest between communism and capitalism, dictatorship and democracy was still at its highest level of activity. This “Cold War”, however, came to an end and the communist dictatorships in the Soviet bloc failed. Nevertheless, ideologies (“isms”) can be quite varied and still play a role (Hastedt 2003, 46). Communist die-hards continue to promote their agendas. Nationalism and supremacism continue to exist and terrorism has taken center stage in the media. However, not all instances in which shifts in an individual’s loyalty are related to an ideology. They might also be attributable to an emotional or intellectual affinity to another country, its culture or its way of life. The concept of ideology as a motive for espionage is
therefore sometimes replaced by the broader term “divided loyalties” (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002, 42).

2.1.1.1. Coercion and Compromise

In the MICE acronym, the “C” stands for compromise (sometimes also coercion) and typically relates to some sort of blackmail. This phenomenon can come to bear in three different ways: “heterosexual compromise, homosexual compromise and compromise … of a non-sexual nature” (Pincher 1987, 89). Although compromise and coercion are not a common pattern among cases of espionage, they have occurred. In their analysis, however, Herbig and Wiskoff point out that “Most of these instances date from the 1950s and 60s, the latest occurring in 1978” (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002, 43).

2.1.1.1. Thrill Seeking and Ego-Boosting

Some spies are driven by the need to feed their egos and find espionage precisely the thrilling sort of enterprise with which they can do so. It might, for instance, give them the opportunity to feel a sense of superiority over their peers who are unable to detect their double lives (Pincher 1987, 49). Espionage may give them the possibility to “enact fantasies of secret lives and heroic deeds they have read about in spy novels” (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002, 44). Sometimes these are also individuals who feel that spying abilities have not been recognized and wish to prove that they possess them. In some instances, they may even break their silence and brag about their exploits to others (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 19 & 27).

2.1.1.2. Disgruntlement

As a motive, disgruntlement typically relates to the workplace of the spy. Fueled by such factors as alienation, frustration, anger or disappointment, the spy may resort to revenge against
his or her employer or the government as a whole to settle the score over a dispute (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002, 42). This could, for instance, be triggered by lacking career perspectives or an unexpectedly early termination (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1994; Lardner 1983; Sneiderman, Slater and Gllonna 1995).

2.1.1.3. **Ingratiation**

Ingratiation implies that an individual has the wish to gain a desirable standing with another person. It can be defined as “a class of strategic behaviors illicitly designed to influence a particular other person concerning the attractiveness of one's personal qualities” (Jones 1964, 11). Such behaviors are not always consciously enacted but they are typically used to achieve personal goals (Inesi 2014, 21). Ingratiation may be associated with a range of goals related to the individual’s attractiveness, which may but need not be sexual in nature.

2.1.1.4. **Recognition**

As a motive for espionage, recognition is related to the individual’s desire to achieve “approval or ego-enhancing attention from those to whom they provided information” (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002, 44). This is distinctly different from the thrill seeking and ego-boosting motive, which may overtly or covertly aim to establish a certain sense of superiority over the individual’s peers. It is also different from ingratiation, since it aims to achieve approval rather than attractiveness.

2.1.2. **Personality Structure as a Contributing Factor**

While the impetus to commit insider espionage may be attributed to an individual’s motivation, such motivation is, in fact, the result of a “complex interaction between personality characteristics and situational factors” Kramer and Heuer Jr. 2007, 50; Eoyang 1994, 71-76).
Heuer (2001), cites the “ability to overcome natural inhibitions to criminal behaviour, such as moral values, loyalty to employer or coworkers, or fear of being caught” as a precondition to committing insider espionage (Heuer 2001). There are various psychological conditions that may account for a loss of natural inhibitions including personality disorders (e.g. antisocial personality disorder, narcissism) as well as substance abuse (e.g. alcoholism, drug use) (American Psychiatric Association 2013) (Bennett, Holloway and Maguire 2007, 71).

Maasberg and Beebe (2014) review antecedents to addiction, which have a direct bearing on whether someone poses an insider threat. They postulate that addiction is a function of abnormal physiology and trauma (see Figure 1). Intervening variables like Dark Triad

Source: Maasberg and Beebe 2014, 68

Figure 2: Maasberg and Beebe Model

Maasberg and Beebe (2014) review antecedents to addiction, which have a direct bearing on whether someone poses an insider threat. They postulate that addiction is a function of abnormal physiology and trauma (see Figure 1). Intervening variables like Dark Triad
personality traits, behavioral deterrents, social support and resilience determine whether the individual is prone to becoming a spy (Maasberg and Beebe 2014, 68). Dark Triad personality traits increase the risk and include “offensive yet non-pathological’ types of Machiavellianism, subclinical narcissism, and subclinical psychopathy” (Maasberg and Beebe 2014, 65). Behavioral deterrents, social support and resilience reduce it (Maasberg and Beebe 2014, 68).

Pincher points out that “character is a factor in treachery” (Pincher 1987, 158). Character changes over time but when they begin their careers in espionage, spies are often in their early twenties (ibid.). In order to survive as traitors, individuals involved in espionage must be fundamentally dishonest. They lead lives of deception, which often includes a “degree of self-deception”, which may manifest itself in the form of arrogance (Pincher 1987, 166). Personality defects may also be exacerbated by the abuse of alcohol, which may reduce the general efficiency of one’s mental functions. The first mental function to be impaired through its abuse is the power of judgment (Pincher 1987, 175)

2.1.3. Critical Events as Contributing Factors

Kramer and Heuer (2007) suggest that America is increasingly vulnerable to insider espionage due to a variety of developments. These include: 1) an expanding market for protected U.S. information, 2) commerce and scientific research that are increasingly internationalized, 3) an increased frequency of international travel and 4) a continuously expanding internet at a global scale (Kramer and Heuer 2007, 51-53). In addition, Kramer and Heuer argue that there are various factors that have a direct bearing on the motivation of insider spies: 1) growing incidence of personal financial problems, 2) growing incidence of compulsive gambling, 3) diminishing organizational loyalty, 4) ethnic diversification of the American workforce and 5) an increasing allegiance to a worldwide community (Kramer and Heuer 2007, 54-58).
Apart from the individual’s motivation and ability to overcome natural inhibitions, Heuer (2010) suggests that the “opportunity to commit the crime” and “a trigger that sets the betrayal in motion” are necessary preconditions for insider espionage (Heuer 2001). Charney (2014, 10) postulates that the motivation to commit espionage is the result of a series of events (e.g. sensitizing stage, stress/spiral stage, crises/climax/resolution stage, post-recruitment stage etc.) that are common to individuals who engage in espionage. Reflecting on the variety of variables suggested by these and other others (e.g. Heuer 2001, Band et al. 2006, Taylor et al. 2013), it difficult to determine whether these motivational factors (variables) are, in fact, sufficient or even necessary conditions for an individual to become a spy.

Reflecting on the findings of Project Slammer, Shumate and Borum (2006) suggest that specific events create a pathway to espionage: “(a) predisposing personal traits, (b) an acute situational stressor, (c) emotional fallout, (d) biased decision making or judgment failures, and (e) failure of peers and supervisors to intervene effectively” (Shumate and Borum 2006, 291). Similarly, Shaw and Seller (2015) suggest that insider risks are preceded by a critical path consisting of personal predispositions, stressors, concerning behaviors and problematic organizational responses. According to their analysis personal predispositions include medical and psychiatric conditions, issues related to the individual’s personality or social skills, prior rule of law violations on the part of the individual and risks with respect to their social network. The stressors may be related to personal, professional or financial issues. Aspects that may give rise to concern include: “interpersonal, technical, security, financial, personnel, mental health, addictions, social network and travel” (Shaw and Sellers 2015, 2). Finally, there are typically also organizational responses that feed into an insider risk. These include: “inattention, no risk
assessment process, inadequate investigation, summary dismissal or other actions that escalate risk” (Shaw and Sellers 2015, 2).

2.2. Analysis of Individual Profiles

2.2.1. Espionage Cases

2.2.1.1. Aldrich Hazen Ames

Aldrich Hazen Ames was a CIA intelligence officer arrested in February 1994, after a nine-year search for a mole in the CIA. During his years at the CIA, Ames’ duties involved the analysis of operations conducted by the Soviets. His position gave him access to intelligence related to penetrations of the KGB or the Soviet military. Because of his espionage activities, the Soviets were able to “close down at least 100 intelligence operations” (Arana-Ward 1995; Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 2). No fewer than 12 of the top agents operating for the United States were betrayed by Ames during the 1980s. Due to his actions, these agents were jailed and most were executed (Weiner, Why I Spied; Aldrich Ames 1994).

Overall, Ames’ performance reports oscillated between "superior" and "invariably exceeding work standards" and that of a "lackluster, ‘middleweight’ case officer [who had become a] terminal GS-14” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1994). Reflecting on his assignment in Turkey, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reported that he was rated as a "strong" performer during his first year. This lead to his promotion to the grade GS-11 in 1970. However, during his second and third year in Turkey, his superiors noted a gradual decline in his performance. “At the end of the second year, he was rated as ‘proficient’, and by the end of the third year, Ames's superiors considered him unsuited for field work and expressed the view that perhaps he should spend the remainder of his career at CIA Headquarters in Langley” (Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence 1994). Although his overall evaluation was "satisfactory", this assessment was devastating for an operations officer. He was deeply disturbed and discouraged by this appraisal of his job performance. Speaking with colleagues, Ames described his tour in Turkey as an "unhappy" and "unsuccessful" one subsequent to which he seriously considered leaving the CIA (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1994).

Throughout his employment with the CIA, there had been “reports of alcohol abuse, sexual misconduct, and repeated security violations”. He was, nevertheless, appointed to various posts enabling him to steal increasingly sensitive information and sell it to Moscow (Weiner, Why I Spied; Aldrich Ames 1994). Ames separated from his first wife in October 1983. His divorce and the resulting financial pressures maneuvered him into a vulnerable situation. Ames was regarded as an “an alcoholic underachiever [who was] going through a financially ruinous divorce” (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 2; Weiner 1994).

From 1987, when Ames volunteered to spy for the Russians, until 1994 when his spy activities were uncovered, he had amassed up to $2.5 million in exchange for his betrayal. Ames led a “high-rolling life style [that] included the cash purchase of a half million dollar home, credit card bills of $455,000, and a new Jaguar sports car”. (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009). The Director of Central Intelligence at the time, R. James Woolsey, stated that the U.S. agents who were executed “… died because this warped, murdering traitor wanted a bigger house and a Jaguar" (Weiner, Why I Spied; Aldrich Ames 1994). Ames received a life sentence in a high-security federal prison for his crime of providing Russia with classified information (ibid.).
2.2.1.2. Leandro Aragoncillo

Leandro Aragoncillo was a Philippine-borne naturalized U.S. citizen who immigrated to the U.S. in 1982. He joined the Marine Corps in 1983 and was assigned to the White House in 1999. Aragoncillo was introduced to Philippine president Joseph Estrada by President Clinton in 2000 while Estrada was on a state visit to the White House. Aragoncillo gave the Philippine president his card. Aragoncillo was later approached by one of Estrada’s associates who asked Aragoncillo to provide American intelligence that could be useful to Estrada. Aragoncillo began stealing information about the U.S. policy towards the Philippines and about Filipino politicians in 2001 while working for Vice President Cheney. Aragoncillo passed classified intelligence reports to Michael Ray Aquino, who was a Filipino national and resident of New York. Aquino, in turn, passed this material to opposition politicians in the Philippines. Aragoncillo’s White House assignment came to an end in 2002, retiring from the Marine Corps with the rank of sergeant. In 2004, he became an analyst in the Information Technology Center of the FBI. From that position, he again stole classified information, which he sent to the Philippines through his contact in the United States (Honan 2007) (Smothers 2005). According to prosecutors, Aragoncillo may have compromised up to 800 classified documents (Honan 2007). Aragoncillo’s actions were eventually unveiled by the FBI leading to his arrest in 2005 and his sentencing to 10 years in prison in 2007 (Honan 2007) (Smothers 2005). In court, Aragoncillo “stated that he ‘never intended to cause harm or injury to the United States, its government or its people’”. He went on to explain that his “… only wish and intent was to help the poor Philippine people" (Honan 2007). The prosecutor stated that in his view, "This wasn't compassion, this was his ego. Mr. Aragoncillo very much liked his access" (Honan 2007), which suggests that integration also played a role in his actions.
2.2.1.3. **David Sheldon Boone**

On 10 October 1998, David Sheldon Boone, a former Army cryptologist with the NSA, who was alleged to have provided the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, with top secret documents from 1988 to 1991. The documents Boone passed to the Russians included details of U.S nuclear targets in the Soviet Union as well as information about what the United States knew about Russian military secrets (Kilian 1998) (Moreno and Loeb 1998). Boone also handed the Russians a 600-page document outlining reconnaissance programs of the United States (Mickolus 2015, 131).

Boone retired from the Army in 1991 and remained in Germany where he had been stationed. He was lured back to the United States in a step-step “false flag” counterintelligence operation conducted by the FBI. In the first step, in September 1997, Boone met an FBI agent in London who claimed to be a Russian spy and the successor of Igor who was Boone’s past contact. Boone received $9,000 from the FBI agent to resume his espionage activities for the Russians. Boone agreed and a second meeting was scheduled to take place in a hotel in the United States. Boone was waiting for the “new Igor” in his suburban Virginia hotel room. When there was a knock on the door, it was not Igor’s successor who had come to meet him but rather FBI agents who had come to arrest him (Kilian 1998). In December 1998, Boone pleaded guilty to conspiracy. He subsequently received a sentence of 25 years and four months. The plea bargain included his forfeiture of $52,000, which included his retirement annuity as well as the hand-held scanner he utilized to duplicate the classified documents (Mickolus 2015, 131).

When Boone began spying, he was faced with “severe financial and personal difficulties”. His Army sergeant’s pay had been garnished by his wife leaving him with just $250 per month to cover all of his other expenses (Thompson 1998). Under the weight of these
difficulties, he walked into a Soviet embassy the same month he was divorced and offered his services to spy against the United States. In exchange for the first classified document he delivered to the Soviets, Boone merely received $300. He eventually received payments of more than $60,000 from the KGB for the documents he provided (Ostrow and Jackson 1998). According to an affidavit Boone was quoted as saying to the undercover FBI operative: "I needed money. Plus, well, plus I was extremely angry" (Ostrow and Jackson, Retired Army Analyst Charged as Soviet Spy 1998).

2.2.1.4. Edward Owen Buchanan

Edward Owen Buchanan was an Airman based at Lowry AFB. In April 1985, he sent a letter to the East German Embassy in Washington D.C. offering to spy for the East German government. When he was not successful at establishing a link with the East Germans, Buchanan turned his efforts to the Soviet Union. This time he wrote to the Soviet Embassy offering scientific and technical information and indicating his will to work with the Soviets on a regular basis if the interest was reciprocal. The Air Force Office of Operations (AFOSI) was already aware of Buchanan’s earlier efforts with East Germany and decided to set up a sting operation together with the FBI. Agents assigned to AFOSI posed as Soviet agents when they contacted Buchanan. Buchanan eventually provided them with documents that he claimed were classified secret in exchange for which he received $1,000 from the agents. During a later examination of the documents, it came to light that he had, in fact, provided the agents with publicly distributed articles from an electronics magazine. During his interrogation, Buchanan confessed being in contact with both the East German and Soviet Embassy with the intention of committing espionage. He did not yet have a security clearance at the time of his arrest because of his student status. His intention, however, was to steal and sell classified information once his clearance had
come through. (Mickolus 2015, 98) (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 7). He explained that he had approached the East Germans and Russians in order “to get a foot in the door” (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 7). If successful, he intended to “sell as much classified material as he could until he made enough money to live comfortably” (ibid.). Buchanan received a 30-month confinement sentence, was demoted to Airman Basic, had to forfeit his “pay and allowances and received a dishonorable discharge” (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 7).

2.2.1.5. John Douglas Charlton

At the time of his arrest on 25 May 1995, John Douglas Charlton was retired from the Lockheed Corporation where he had been working as an engineer from 1980 to 1989. At the time of his retirement, the 62 year old had removed secret documents related to Lockheed’s Sea Shadow project and the Captor project. The Sea Shadow is a ship, 160 feet in length that is shaped like a stealth fighter in order to avoid radar (Sneiderman, Slater and Glionna 1995). The Captor project was an anti-submarine project. During the court hearings, the prosecutor stated that "The documents would have enabled any nation to discover some of the workings of the program" (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009). Charlton had repeatedly tried selling the information to an FBI agent who was posing as a representative of a foreign government. Charlton was asking $100,000 in exchange for the documents. Charlton left Lockheed under an early retirement program. The circumstances of his departure evidently caused him to be disgruntled (Sneiderman, Slater and Glionna 1995). If he had been convicted, Charlton could have faced up to 105 years in prison and $2.75 million in fines (Sneiderman 1995). However, following a plea bargain, Charlton received a sentence of two years in Federal prison and a fine of $50,000 (Chu 1996). The lower sentence was attributed not only to Charlton’s
guilty plea, but also to psychiatric tests, which, according to Assistant U.S. Attorney, George B. Newhouse Jr. “concluded that the Lancaster resident suffered from a schizoid personality--delusions of grandeur [and] some paranoia" (Chu 1996).

2.2.1.6. Larry Wu-Tai Chin

Larry Wu-Tai Chin was assigned to the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service as an intelligence officer. He retired in 1981 at age 63. He was arrested on 22 November 1985 following accusations that he had been committing espionage for the People’s Republic of China for 33 years (New York Times 1986). Chin was born in Peking. While he was a college student in the early 1940s, he “was recruited by [Chinese] intelligence. Chin began working in a U.S. Army Liaison Office in China in 1943” (Shaw 1985). He eventually “moved to the United States [in 1943, where] he became a naturalized U.S. citizen” (G. Shaw 1985). This made it possible for Chin to join the CIA in 1952 (G. Shaw 1985). “Mr. Chin's motivation and character set him apart from others charged in the recent spate of spy cases. His CIA personnel files show that "his supervisors were highly impressed with his abilities as a linguist and interpreter of Chinese political developments” (New York Times 1986). According to the FBI, Chin provided Top Secret CIA reports to the PRC for at least 20 years. From 1976 to 1982, he provided photographs of classified documents to Chinese couriers who he frequently met in Toronto. Chin admitted to having received $180,000 but authorities thought the amount to be as much as $1 million for his services to the PRC (G. Shaw 1985) (Marcus and Pichirallo 1985). Chin was indicted on 17 counts of espionage for which he was convicted by a Federal jury. His sentencing was scheduled for 17 March 1986. However, it never came to that because he committed suicide in his cell on 21 February (Engelberg 1986).
2.2.1.7. Wilfredo Garcia

Wilfredo Garcia was a Navy Master-at-Arms 1st Class who had been with the Navy for 15 years when he was tried and found guilty of espionage in 1988. He was court-martialed after two years of investigation conducted jointly by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and the FBI. The investigation was initiated late in 1985 when officials learned of a Vallejo, California businessman undertaking to sell classified documents to a foreign government (Mickolus 2015, 108). At the time, Garcia was stationed at Mare Island Naval Shipyard where he was able to gain access to documents related to submarine activities. He sold these documents to the businessman and in exchange received $800,000 and a promise to receive more when the documents were actually sold to the foreign government (ibid.). According to one report, the buyer of the documents was the Soviet Union (Select Committee on Intelligence 1989, 13). The documents were taken to a residence in Manila, Philippines, where they were to be handed over to representatives of the foreign government. This plan, however, was thwarted when agents of the Naval Investigative Service entered the residence with a search warrant. During their operation, they were able to recover the documents before the sale could take place. Garcia was found guilty of “espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, larceny, conspiracy to commit larceny, sale of government property, and violations of military regulations” in January 1988, (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 16) suggesting sociopathic tendencies (American Psychiatric Association 2013). He was motivated by the considerable payments he had received and was still to receive. In the end, however, his crime cost him a confinement sentence of 12 years and a demotion to E-1. He had all pay and allowances forfeited and was dishonorably discharged from the Navy (ibid).
2.2.1.8. *James Hall III*

James Hall III was a U.S. Army Warrant Officer who was arrested on charges of espionage in December 1988 (Wines 1988). Hall began supplying Top Secret documents to East Germany in 1982 while he was based in West Berlin. The documents he provided contained information about East Bloc cable traffic that was being monitored by the Army. In order to supply the East Germans and Soviets with the intelligence data, Hall made use of a Turkish national, Huseyin Yildirim, who was employed as a civilian automobile mechanic at a U.S. Army car shop at Andrew’s Barracks in West Berlin. Yildirim served as a courier delivering the documentation Hall provided to the East German intelligence service (Stasi) and the Soviets and returning with money (Wines 1988). Hall was later reassigned to Frankfurt from where he went on passing large amounts of Top Secret information on communications intelligence (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 18).

According to official U.S. sources, the damage Hall inflicted on the U.S. electronic intelligence operations in Europe was substantial. Hall provided a substantial amount of documentation, intercepts and encryption codes. His most damaging action was to provide the Soviets insight into Project Trojan. In case of a war in the European theater, the Soviets would have had a clear advantage in terms of their ability to wage armored warfare. Project Trojan would have enabled U.S. and allied forces “to target Russian armored vehicles, missiles, and planes by tracking their communication signals” (Nye 2015).

Hall is believed to have received something in access of $300,000 from East Germany and the Soviet Union in exchange for the material he provided to them. He was also presented with the distinguished service medal of the German Democratic Republic by the Stasi chief Erich Mielke (Sulick 2013, 154).
Hall’s life style was far above what his pay as an Army Warrant Officer would have allowed (Sulick 2013, 151). He came under investigation following his transfer from Frankfurt to Savannah, Georgia in July 1987. In a false flag operation, an FBI agent took up contact with Hall posing as a Soviet agent. Hall was arrested after having bragged to the undercover agent that he had been providing Top Secret intelligence data to East Germany and the Soviet Union for six years (Sulick 2013, 152).

While speaking to the agent, Hall stated that he had only been motivated by the money. He was quoted as telling the agent “I wasn't terribly short of money. I just decided I didn't ever want to worry where my next dollar was coming from. I'm not anti-American. I wave the flag as much as anybody else” (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009). During a recent interview, Hall told a journalist of “Der Spiegel” that it was his “‘greed for money’ rather than a belief in the Communist cause” that prompted him to commit espionage (Patterson 2014). However, Hall’s bragging to the undercover FBI agent shows that there was also a considerable degree of ego involved in Hall’s actions (Sulick 2013, 152). On 20 July 1989, Hall received a 40 year prison sentence. In addition, he received a fine of $50,000 and a dishonorable discharge (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 19).

2.2.1.9. **Robert Philip Hanssen**

Robert Philip Hanssen was an FBI agent for 27 years when he was arrested for espionage and conspiracy to commit espionage on 20 February 2001. Hanssen had been spying for the Soviet Union for 15 years. The arrest occurred in a park near to his Vienna, Virginia home while he was delivering a bag that contained several secret documents at a dead drop (Johnston 2001).
Hanssen joined the FBI in 1976. After his initial training, he served on a White-Collar Crime squad in Gary, Indiana. From 1979 on, Hanssen spent most of his career working in intelligence and counterintelligence (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 2001).

For many years, his professional background and experience proved to be an asset in his own career as a spy. Hanssen’s involvement with spying for the Russians began in 1979. He discontinued the relationship in 1980, but rekindled it in 1985 with a letter that he sent to a KGB officer at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. In the letter, he offered his services as a spy. Hanssen later continued spying for the Russian Federation. All in all, he provided the Russians more than 6,000 pages of classified documents. He also provided the Russians with the identities of three Russian agents who had been working for the United States (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 2001).

Three of these agents were subsequently arrested in Russia where they were tried. Two were executed (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 2001). The information Hanssen provided to the Russians included specifics of the US nuclear war defenses as well as “some of the most sensitive and highly compartmented projects in the US Intelligence Community” (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 20).

In exchange for the information he provided, Hanssen received a total of $1.4 million, which included more than $600,000 in cash and diamonds and a deposit of $800,000 in a Russian bank account (Johnston 2001). Hanssen had a large family with six children, which he and his wife struggled to support on an FBI officer’s salary. By 1992, the Hanssens had amassed debt in access of $275,000 (Masters and Pincus 2001). When asked in court why he had
committed espionage, he answered that he had been driven by "Fear of being a failure and fear of not being able to provide for my family" (Vise 2002). Never realizing that his career progress at the FBI was stunted by his character, his “rage” at the FBI flared up every time he failed to be promoted. “He fought back by attempting grand, daring feats of espionage” (Vise 2002). Ultimately, he was driven by a need to gratify his ego, his disgruntlement due to the development of his career at the FBI and his need for money.

Hanssen’s friends and coworkers could not reconcile the fact that someone who was supposedly deeply religious and a passionate anti-communist could lead such a double life (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009). According to a psychiatrist who had spent thirty hours talking with Hanssen after his arrest, “Hanssen suffered from a ‘very severe’, multifaceted mental illness that was biological in origin and triggered by a stormy childhood” (Vise 2002).

Hanssen’s hidden psychological issues did not only manifest themselves in the betrayal of his country. They also manifested themselves in the betrayal of his wife. A large part of Hanssen’s illegal income was apparently used to buy costly presents and an automobile for a local stripper (Eggen and Loeb 2001). Moreover, he secretly took nude photographs of his wife and posted them online and also regularly gave them to a friend of the Hanssen couple. Hanssen rigged his bedroom with a video camera with a lead to the television screen in the den. Whenever the same friend was in town, he could watch Hanssen and his wife having sex while the friend was seated in the den of the Hanssen home (Wise 2003, 252-253). Hanssen also suggested to his friend that he purchase a certain date-rape drug in Europe, which they would then slip into the wife’s drink. The friend was then to have sex with Hanssen’s wife and impregnate her (Wise, Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert Hanssen Betrayed America 2003, 259).
In order to avoid the death penalty, Hanssen pleaded guilty to espionage and agreed to cooperate fully with investigators. Hanssen was sentenced to life in prison on 11 May 2002 (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009).

2.2.1.10. William Kampiles

William Kampiles was a clerical employee at the CIA Operations Center from March to November 1977 who was arrested on espionage charges in August 1978. Kampiles held a number of mundane and mediocre jobs before joining the CIA in March 1977. At the time, the 23-year-old was assigned to the CIA Operations Center as a watch officer. This position was equally mundane and Kampiles hoped to be allowed to transfer into a field agent assignment. He was, however, told that he was not qualified for this type of work. Disappointed, he resigned from the CIA in November 1977 and smuggled a technical manual on the KH-11 (“Big Bird”) out of the building (Lardner 1983; O'Toole and Babcock 1978). In February 1978, Kampiles traveled to Greece where he contacted a Soviet military attaché. Kampiles sold the manual to the Soviet agent for $3,000 (New York Times 1978).

KH-11 was a U.S. reconnaissance satellite used to observe missile installations, troop movements in the Soviet Union. The manual provided the Soviets with a description of the satellite's remote sensing capabilities. While the manual would not have shown the Soviets how to build such a satellite (they had no such capacity at the time), or provide them with knowledge how to prevent the satellite from gathering imagery, it could have enabled them to “identify weaknesses in the satellite and protect their secret installations accordingly” (O'Toole and Babcock 1978). About this time, the CIA had begun investigations into a possible leak related to KH-11 operations because the Soviets had started putting countermeasures against this collection platform into place (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 27).
Kampiles, who had hoped to be rehired by the CIA, “wrote a letter to a CIA employee in which he mentioned [having had] frequent meetings with a Soviet officer in Athens” (O'Toole and Babcock 1978). During a job interview, he admitted his actions explaining that they had been intended to be part of a self-designed disinformation operation with which he hoped to “prove his abilities as a first-rate agent” (O'Toole and Babcock 1978).Alerted by his statements, the CIA alerted the FBI, which lead to him being questioned and confessing that he had stolen the manual and sold it to the Soviets (O'Toole and Babcock 1978).

Speaking to friends about his exploits, Kampiles claimed that he managed to con the Russians out of a $3,000 advance for the promise to provide them with the classified documentation. He “maintained that his objective had been to become a double agent” (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 27).

“Kampiles also illustrates the effect of fantasy in some espionage. In fact, the number of traitors who wanted to play out a fantasy with espionage is surprising. PERSEREC lists 18 of their 153 traitors who were fulfilling some sort of fantasy. Taylor and Snow call this motive the “James Mitty” syndrome because it “combines the allure of a James Bond life style with a Walter Mitty sense of fantasy.” (Taylor 2006). While the Walter Mitty Syndrome is not a psychological diagnosis in the strict sense, delusional disorders are. According to the American Psychiatric Association, individuals who are affected by the grandiosity type of delusional disorder “believe that they possess some great and unrecognized talent” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, 90), which is precisely what appears to have driven Kampiles to the actions he took. In addition, he was known to have had a drug problem despite which he was still allowed access to the top-secret manual in 1977 (Kessler 1994). William Kampiles was sentenced to 40 years in prison on 22 December 1978 (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 27).
2.2.1.11. Robert Chaegun Kim

Robert Chaegun Kim was a 57 year-old civilian computer specialist who was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence in Suitland, Maryland. He was charged with “passing classified information to a foreign country” on 25 September 1996 (Hall and Priest 1996). At the time of his arrest, he was in the company of a South Korean Embassy naval attaché, Capt. Baek Dong-Il, who was alleged to have been the recipient of the classified documentation (Hall and Priest 1996). Kim was born in South Korea. He had been living in the United States for 30 years and became US citizen in 1974. As from 1979, Kim had access to classified information and over a five-month period, he passed a considerable amount of documentation to the South Koreans (Hall and Priest 1996).

The information Kim leaked to the South Koreans contained “information about China and North Korea, inside information on a computer sale to South Korea and potentially embarrassing U.S. analyses of South Korea's leadership” (Hall and Priest, Navy Worker Is Accused Of Passing Secrets 1996). It also may have contained information about U.S. information gathering techniques (ibid.). In terms of damage to the United States on a scale of one to ten, a high-ranking Navy official suggested that this case was a five (ibid.).

The Naval Investigative Service first became suspicious of Kim and began putting him under surveillance after it had been learned of his contact with Baek. Investigators conducted a court-approved search of Kim’s office, through which they were able to secure a list of classified documents Kim had illegally passed on. Investigators were able to intercept more than 40
documents that Kim had sent to Baek by mail (Hall and Priest, Navy Worker Is Accused Of Passing Secrets 1996).

Although Kim had credit card debt totaling $100,000, there is no evidence that he ever received any payment for the documents he provided to the South Koreans. According to his own accounts, he “only wanted to assist South Korea, a U.S. ally”, and had no intention of harming the United States (Jackson 1997). In effect, he was passing the material out of loyalty to the country of his birth (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 29). Kim was hoping to land an intelligence job in South Korea after retiring from his job with the Navy (Hall 1996). Kim was found guilty of conspiracy to commit espionage and received a sentence of 9 years in prison (Jackson 1997).

2.2.1.12. Steven John Lalas

Steven John Lalas was a communications officer working for the State Department at the embassy of the United States. He was arrested in Northern Virginia on 3 May 1993 on charges of having passed sensitive military information to a foreign government official in Greece (Jehl 1993). Hired by the State Department in 1983, Lalas assignments prior to the one in Athens included similar postings in Belgrade, Istanbul, and in Taiwan (Jehl 1993).

While in Athens, Lalas earned a steady income stealing and then selling DIA reports to the Greeks. These reports contained information on “troop strength, political analyses and military discussions” between the US Embassy in Athens and the White House as well as “FBI communications about counterterrorism efforts, and the names and job descriptions of CIA agents stationed overseas” (Miller 1993). The papers Lalas passed on also dealt with “plans and readiness for US military strategy in the Balkans and a US assessment of Greece's intentions
toward the former Yugoslavia” (Jehl 1993). In exchange for this documentation, Lalas is believed to have received $20,000 for 240 documents from 1991 to 1993 (Bates 1993). All in all, it was estimated that Lalas passed 700 highly classified documents to Greece during his ten-year espionage career (Miller 1993).

This matter first came to light when an official of the Greek Embassy in Washington conveyed to a member of the U.S. State Department that he had knowledge of the contents of a secret communication between the U.S. Embassy in Athens and the State Department. This incident set an investigation into action at the end of which Lalas was identified as the source through a video monitoring system (Ostrow, Embassy Officer Said to Admit to Spying 1993).

Lalas claimed that he had been recruited by a Greek military official in 1991. Lalas who is of Greek descent, but born in the United States agreed to provide information because he feared that if he did not cooperate, his relatives living in Greece would suffer reprisals. This would suggest that he was coerced into espionage. It is, however, not certain that this was the true reason, or that this coercion only occurred with regard to the material he could gain access to through his State Department posting. During the investigations, it came to light that Lalas had already started spying for Greece in 1977 while he was serving in the U.S. Army (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 32). According to the Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark Hullkower, Lalas actions were attributable to “one of the basest of motives – greed” (Miller 1993). In June 1993 Lalas pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage on June 1993 and was sentenced to 14 years in a Federal prison in September of the same year (Miller 1993).
2.2.1.13. Peter H. Lee

Peter H. Lee was a Manhattan Beach nuclear physicist who had been working at key research facilities in excess of 30 years. He turned himself in voluntarily to enter a guilty plea on 8 December 1997. According to his own accounts, he had committed two felonies: he had passed national defense information to foreign recipients and he had provided false statements about his foreign contacts to the government” (Lichtblau 1997).

While working at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1985, Lee travelled to the People’s Republic of China where he met with a group of approximately 30 Chinese scientists. During the meeting, he discussed hohlraums, which are “devices used to simulate nuclear detonations in a process called Inertial Confinement Fusion, or ICF” (Specter 2001). Lee conceded that he knew that the information was classified (Specter 2001).

The second charge related to the fact that while working on classified projects for TRW, Lee was due to travel to China on vacation. He was required to sign a security form stating that he will not be delivering any lectures in China. Upon his return, he was required to sign a second form stating that he had not given any lectures. He lied on both forms and did, in fact, deliver lectures on microwave backscattering from the sea surface to Chinese scientists (Schmidt 2003) (Congress 2006, 27683). The ICF data provided to the group of PRC scientists by Lee was of “significant material assistance to the PRC in their nuclear weapons development program” and presumably helped enhance “the PRC nuclear weapons program to the detriment of U.S. national security” (Specter 2001).

Lee told the FBI that he had provided information to the Chinese scientists to enhance his own reputation there. The only compensation he received for his lectures was in the form of
travel expenses and hotel accommodations (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 33). According to authorities, Lee’s motive was not money, but national loyalties (Lichtblau 1997).

On 26 March 1998, Lee received a one-year sentence to a community corrections facility and a probation of three years. In addition, he was ordered to provide 3,000 hours of community service and he was fined $20,000 (Specter 2001).

2.2.1.14. Clayton John Lonetree

Clayton John Lonetree was a Marine Corps sergeant assigned to a security detail at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1984 to 1986. He was later assigned to a similar posting in Vienna. He was detained after turning himself in to U.S. authorities at the embassy in Vienna (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 30). He acknowledged having committed espionage and being involved with a female KGB agent by the name of Violette Seina. Seina was a translator and telephone operator at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (Taubman 1987).

Soon after Lonetree and Seina began their relationship, Seina introduced Lonetree to someone she introduced as her “Uncle Sascha”. Like Seina, he was also a KGB agent. Lonetree and Seina were believed to have had a sexual liaison (Sulick 2013, 125-126). Lonetree was tried on charges that he conspired with Soviet agents to collect the names, photographs and personal data of U.S. agents, as well as information on the floor plans of the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Vienna. It was alleged that Lonetree also gave Soviet agents access to the U.S. Embassy after hours (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 30-31). Lonetree was not interested in money. His actions were driven by his romantic involvement with Seina (Sulick 2013, 129).
On 21 August 1987, Lonetree was sentenced to 30 years in prison, forfeiture of all pay and allowances. He was fined $5,000 and received a dishonorable discharge. His prison sentence was reduced to 20 years and later to 15 years (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 31). He was released in February 1996 (Time 1987).

2.2.1.15. Lee Eugene Madsen

Lee Eugene Madsen was a Navy Yeoman who was assigned to the Strategic Warning Staff at the Pentagon. Madsen was arrested in 1979 after having stolen classified material, which he offered to sell to an FBI undercover agent (New York Times 1979) (Mansfield 1979).

All in all, Madsen stole 22 classified documents. According to a Justice Department spokesman, however, it was considered unlikely that he had had the opportunity to pass any classified documents to a foreign government before the FBI had become aware of Madsen's activities (New York Times 1979).

Investigations against Madsen began when the FBI was contacted by Richard Noble after he had been contacted by Madsen who offered to sell documents “indicating the location of Drug Enforcement Agency personnel and international movement of drugs” and asking Noble if he knew of anyone who might be interested in buying them (Chicago Tribune 1979). Richard Noble, a friend of Madsen’s roommate, was subsequently enlisted by the FBI as an undercover agent in a sting operation against Madsen (Mansfield 1979). The agent offered Madsen $700 in exchange for the documents (New York Times 1979).

Madsen, a homosexual, reportedly stated that he had stolen the Top Secret documents “to prove…I can be a man and still be gay” (Mickolus 2015, 84). According to an acquaintance, Gary Miller, Madsen had confided in him and told him of his intentions. Madsen told Miller that
he “wanted money…to but things”. Although Miller warned Madsen not to go forward with his plan, Madsen told Miller that he was “very confident that he would not get caught” (Mansfield 1979). Madsen received an eight-year in prison sentence in 1979 (Mickolus 2015, 84).

2.2.1.16. Richard W. Miller

Richard W. Miller was a 20-year veteran agent with the FBI. On 3 October 1984, he and his two Russian émigré accomplices, a pro-Soviet couple, were arrested on charges of espionage (Thornton 1984). Miller’s work gave him easy access to classified documents which he passed to his two pro-Soviet Russian accomplices. According to an FBI affidavit, the documents "would give the KGB Soviet security police a detailed picture of FBI and U.S. intelligence activities, techniques and requirements." (Thornton 1984)

In exchange for the classified documents he provided, Miller was promised $50,000 in gold and $15,000 cash. (Mathews and Thornton 1984) During a search of Miller’s residence, FBI agents discovered further classified documents. Miller was faced with considerable financial difficulties, which made him vulnerable. Moreover, he was sexually involved with one of the two accomplices, Svetlana Ogorodnikov. Justice department sources states that Miller’s motivation to commit espionage was “money and sex” (Thornton 1984).

After a lengthy mistrial, a second trial and overruled verdict, Miller was finally convicted on all counts of espionage. On 4 February 1991, he received a 20-year sentence to a Federal prison. His sentence was eventually reduced to 13 years (Soble 1991).

2.2.1.17. Tommaso Mortati

Tommaso Mortati, an Italian-born retired sergeant and U.S. Army paratrooper, was arrested at his home in Vicenza, Italy in August 1988 on charges of espionage (West 2007, 234).
He had retired from the Army in Italy in 1987 but remained there because his wife, who was American, was still working at a U.S. Army base in Vicenza (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 40). Following his arrest, Mortati confessed to having been recruited by the Hungarian agent Zoltan Szabo in 1981. Following Mortati’s recruitment, Zoltan arranged for Mortati to go to Budapest for two weeks of training with the Hungarian intelligence service AVH. Mortati was a member of the Conrad spy ring and had passed secret to Hungary (Herrington 1999, ii). The material he provided included information about U.S. bases and American citizens in Vicenza, Italy. Between 1984 and 1985, he had also tried to bribe members of the Italian military to provide classified information (La Repubblica 1989 b). Mortati received a steady stream of $500 per month from the Hungarian intelligence service AVH, as well as bonuses for additional information depending on its importance (West 2007). Mortati’s espionage activity was reported to the Italian military secret service by German and Austrian counterintelligence after the Conrad spy ring began unraveling. Italian investigators found a Sony radio hidden in Mortati’s kitchen, which he was able to use to transmit his reports as coded messages to his Hungarian handler (La Repubblica 1989 b).

Mortati was found guilty of espionage and received a 20-month prison sentence in Italy. His attorney stated that Mortati was in need of a psychiatric assessment (La Repubblica 1989 a).

**2.2.1.18. Harold James Nicholson**

Harold James Nicholson joined the CIA in 1980 and agreed to spy for the Russians as from 1994 (Risen 1997). At the time of his indictment, he was the highest-ranking U.S. intelligence officer ever to be charged with espionage (Times Staff 1997). The information he sold included information on all CIA case officers who had been trained by the CIA between 1994 and 1996. It was also believed that he had given the Russians the identities of U.S. and
foreign business people who had been providing helpful information to the CIA (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009). For his betrayal, Nicholson received $300,000 from the Russians (Risen 1997). He received a 23 ½ years prison sentence.

Nicholson was a highly-recognized intelligence officer who “had risen steadily through the ranks throughout his career, and so was likely to advance into the highest echelons of the CIA over the next few years” (Risen 1996). His actions could therefore not be explained with a lack of recognition or disgruntlement. He was, however, facing financial issues after having come out of a bitter divorce and child custody battle in 1994. Nicholson had inadvertently drawn the attention of his CIA superiors by spending considerable amounts of money on automobiles and vacations in Hawaii (Risen 1996). Further FBI investigations revealed that Nicholson had a pattern of extravagant spending as well as unusual patterns of foreign travel. These trips were “followed by large, unexplained bank deposits” (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009).

2.2.1.19. Michael Stephan Schwartz

On 23 May 1995, US Navy Lieutenant Commander Michael Stephen Schwartz was charged with four counts espionage. A naval surface warfare officer, Schwarz had been deployed to the Gulf during the war. While assigned to a training mission in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Schwartz provided officers of the Saudi navy classified computer diskettes and documents from November 1992 to September 1994. Schwartz had also violated Federal regulations by taking classified material to home. The documents included “classified messages to foreign countries, military intelligence digests, intelligence advisories, and tactical intelligence summaries classified up to the Secret (Noforn) level” (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 50-51) (JTA 1995). Schwartz evidently did not receive any money in exchange for the material
he provided to the Saudis. He provided the material to them to be helpful to the Saudis because they were cooperating with the United States during the Gulf war. Schwartz entered a plea bargain which was to allow him to avoid the possibility of being imprisoned. Schwartz was released from the military with an "other than honorable" discharge. He also had to forfeit his retirement and other military benefits (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 50-51).

2.2.1.20. Albert T. Sombolay

Albert T. Sombolay was an artillery soldier who was found guilty of espionage and aiding the enemy in July 1991. Sombolay, who was born in Zaire, became an American citizen in 1978. Seven years later, in 1985, he joined the U.S. Army as a cannon crewman. While based in Baumholder, Germany in 1990, Sombolay contacted the embassies of Iraq and Jordan in Belgium and Germany offering his services in support of the “Arab cause”. While the Iraqi embassy did not respond, the Jordanian embassy did. Sombolay provided the Jordanians information about the combat readiness of U.S. troops (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 55). In addition, he promised to provide the Jordanians videotapes containing information about U.S. military equipment and U.S. positions in Saudi Arabia. He informed the Jordanians that he was due to be deployed to Saudi Arabia from where he would be able to provide more information. However, when his unit was deployed to Saudi Arabia as a component of Operation Desert Shield, Sombolay was not deployed (Healy 1991). While in Germany, Sombolay passed various pieces of equipment to the Jordanians, which included chemical decontamination gear, a chemical suit, gloves and boots. Upon his arrest, Sombolay admitted that he also provided the Jordanians information about the Desert Shield deployment and military identity cards (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 55). He received
approximately $1300 for his services (Healy 1991). His motive was reported to have been greed. Sombolay received a sentence of 34 years’ hard labor. He was demoted to E-1 and received a dishonorable discharge. In addition, all his pay and allowances were forfeited (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 55).

2.2.2. Control Group

2.2.2.1. Richard Craig Smith

Richard Craig Smith was an Army counterintelligence officer who was indicted in 1984 for committing espionage. Smith had been with the Army from 1967 to 1980. After his retirement from the military, Smith tried his hand at various ways to support his family: “filming genealogies for members of the large Mormon community in Salt Lake City, working on a program on the artificial heart for presentation in the Far East, producing a weekly sports show for a Utah television station” (Sun 1984). Interviews with friends and acquaintances of Smith, described him as deeply religious and a Mormon (Sun 1984). They considered him to be “a bright, talented man who left intelligence work to spend more time with his family, started a company and then became involved in multimillion-dollar business deals that never got off the ground” (Sun 1984). In fact, none of Smith’s business prospects succeeded. Smith was faced with considerable financial difficulties and eventually had to file for company bankruptcy in July 1982. Four months later, in November of 1982, Smith is alleged to have met with a Soviet agent, by the name of Viktor Okunev in Tokyo. Smith was alleged to have told Okunev, who was the first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Tokyo, the identities of six purported U.S. double agents in exchange for $11,000 (Murphy 1986; Sun 1984). The FBI arrested Craig at Washington’s Dulles Airport and brought him to trial.
The case took an unexpected turn during the court trial when conflicting explanations emerged for events that both the prosecution and the defense, in fact, agreed had taken place. The prosecution claimed that Smith had sold the information because he needed the money after his business endeavors had failed. Smith’s defense stated that Smith “acted only after he was contacted by two men who said they worked for the CIA and who asked him to pass the information to the Soviets as part of an operation to infiltrate Soviet intelligence” (Murphy, Ex-Army Man's Spy Trial Set After Two-Year Delay 1986). “Smith said he was instructed to pose as an American businessman with terminal cancer who wanted to secure financial help for his family. He was warned, he said, that the CIA would disavow him if he was discovered” (Murphy, Ex-Army Man's Spy Trial Set After Two-Year Delay 1986). He could well have been an obvious choice because he was involved with double-agent operations for his last seven years in the Army. On 11 April 1986, following months of deliberation over the admissibility of certain evidence, Richard Craig Smith was finally acquitted (Murphy 1986).

2.2.2.2. **Brian J. Kelley**

Brian Joseph Kelley was born in Waterbury, Conn. His bachelor’s degree in political science was awarded to him by St. Michael’s College in Colchester. He went on to complete a master’s degree in East Asian studies, which he received from Florida State University. He joined the Air Force in the mid-1960s working in the Office of Special Investigations until the mid-1980s. He then went on to join the CIA, where he worked in the field of counterintelligence. Starting in the 1990s, while still employed by the CIA, Kelley was falsely accused, both by the CIA and the FBI, of being a KGB mole and supplying classified information to Moscow. He was put under 24-hour surveillance and was followed for several years. His telephone was tapped and he was subjected to rigorous interrogation. The FBI also questioned his family and colleagues.
“They threatened him with capital offenses,” adding, “His sisters, his daughter, his friends, his colleagues were all told, to the exclusion of all others, ‘Brian Kelley is an agent of the Russian government.’” (Fox 2011).

Kelley ended up being suspended from his work at the CIA for more than a year. However, in 2000, the FBI was able to procure a secret KGB file for $7 million, which contained an audiotape recording of a conversation between the American mole and his Russian handler. It was through this recording that investigators discovered that the mole was not Brian Kelley, whom they suspected, but Robert Hanssen. Brian Kelley was subsequently reinstated at the CIA. Both the FBI and the CIA eventually apologized to him for the false accusations. A year after his retirement, in 2007, Kelley received the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal from the CIA (Fox 2011).

Kelley had long been divorced in his first marriage. He had an adult daughter who was also working for the CIA, as well as two adult sons (Wise 2003). There was no evidence that came to light suggesting that he was faced with any sort of acute financial difficulty or that he was given to greed. In fact, systematic web browser searches combining the terms associated with the espionage motives (i.e. money, divided loyalties, disgruntlement, ingratiation, ideology, coercion / compromise) with the name of Brian J. Kelley did not bear out a single instance in which Kelley could be connected with such motives.

Kelley was described as an intelligence professional who was dedicated to his work. While he apparently never felt that he was fully accepted in the Agency because he had been a military man and not a CIA employee from the start of his career, he was widely recognized in the counterintelligence community, where he was known for his skills as a specialist in detecting
foreign agents who have not been equipped with an official cover (i.e. non-official cover, NOC). The detection of NOCs is considered as an “arcane and difficult specialty”. Nevertheless, it was Kelly who was able to unmask Reino Gikman, a KGB NOC (Wise, Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert Hanssen Betrayed America 2003). He was described as “balding, nondescript, very serious, not outgoing, not joking, always cautious, always protective” (Wise 2003, 205).

2.2.2.3. James Jesus Angleton

James Jesus Angleton was arguably one of the most fascinating figures in the history of the American Intelligence Community. Angleton served as the CIA’s counterintelligence chief for 20 years. During the last 11 years of his appointment, Angleton focused much of his attention on determining the identity of a KGB mole inside the U.S. Intelligence Community. “The great mole hunt, a drama of epic proportions, all but crippled the agency at the height of the cold war” (Finder 1991). “Loyal Agency employees had come under suspicion of treachery solely on the basis of coincidence and flimsy circumstantial evidence” (Weiner 2007, 318). In a memo to DCI Richard Helms, Leonard McCoy, a senior Soviet division officer stated that “Rather than being disinfomed by the enemy, we are deluding ourselves” (Weiner 2007, 318). Nevertheless, Helms never lost his confidence in Angleton. Angleton ran counterintelligence for the CIA for twenty years and throughout that period, there was not a single case of a penetration to anyone’s knowledge (Weiner 2007, 319).

Descriptions of Angleton were often contradictory and riddled with unverifiable information and assertions including that he was a paranoiac (Robarge 2013). While there is no evidence of a psychiatrist or psychologist having gone on record stating that Angleton was “clinically paranoid or psychologically unfit for duty” (Robarge 2003, 24), his “implausible
theories were perceived as serious liabilities” (W. T. Smith 2003, 13). Admiral Stansfield Turner, for instance, considered Angleton a “madman” and could not “understand a system under which he gained so much power” (Talbot 2016, 602). Angleton was characterized as being obsessive with whatever interested him. He was also described as being intellectually rigid, sometimes displaying aberrant behavior (Robarge 2003, 24). He was also known to have been increasingly affected by alcohol. He “would go to lunch about twelve-thirty, and have plenty to drink,” and he then returned to the office “very voluble. He never did any work after lunch.” (Wise 1992, 35). Angleton resigned in on Christmas Eve 1974 (Finder 1991).
3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. Theory of Motivation

The study of motivation essentially focusses on understanding why individuals behave as they do (Mullins 2002, 418). Motivation determines the direction and the persistence of action and explains why individuals choose one course of action over another. It also explains why they continue with their chosen course of action, often over extended periods of time, even despite problems or difficulties (Mullins 2002, 418). Ultimately, the “the purpose of motivational theories is to predict behavior. Motivation is concerned with action and the internal and external forces that influence one's choice of action” (Mitchell 1982, 81). The purpose of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of what motivates an individual to commit espionage and particularly to determine whether motives can be viewed as predictors to assess the risk of an individual turning to espionage.

(Mullins 2002, 418)

Figure 2: Basic Motivational Model
The concept underlying theories motivation suggests that individuals have specific motives (needs or expectations), which result in a driving force (behavior or action). They behave or act with certain desirable goals in mind, which they aspire to fulfill. The extent to which their needs or expectations are fulfilled determines whether the driving force continues to prevail (see Figure 2) (Mullins 2002, 418).

Motivation theories thus suggest that there is a causal relationship between a motive and a behavior or action, wherein it is the motive that causes the behavior or action to occur. Putting these elements into the perspective of a causal relationship, an independent variable is “a variable thought to influence or affect another variable. This other variable is sometimes referred to as a dependent variable as its values are thought to depend on the corresponding value of the independent variable” (Cramer and Howitt 2004, 78). A dependent variable is “a variable that is assumed to ‘depend’ on, be affected by, or related to the value of one or more independent variables” (Cramer and Howitt 2004, 50). Given the theoretical relationship between motives and behaviors/actions, motives can, on the basis of these definitions, be interpreted as independent variables and behaviors and actions can be regarded as dependent variables.

3.2. Research Design and Methodology

3.2.1. Research Question and Hypothesis Statement

The question to be answered through this research is: “Can the motivational profile of an individual be reliably used to predict the risk of that individual committing insider espionage?” For this purpose, the hypothesis (H₁) is that the independent variables (motives) only relate to individuals who have committed espionage. The null hypothesis (H₀) is that the independent
variables do not only relate to individuals who have committed espionage but may also relate to individuals who have not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjects of Interest</th>
<th>Control Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H1:</strong> The independent variables only relate to individuals who have committed espionage.</td>
<td>The independent variables (M1 – Mn) coincide with individuals who have committed espionage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>H0:</strong> The independent variables do not only relate to individuals who have committed espionage.</td>
<td>The independent variables (M1 – Mn) do not exclusively coincide with individuals who have committed espionage. They also coincide with at least some individuals who have not committed espionage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Hypothesis Matrix**

In order remain consistent with the hypothesis (H1), the variables (M1 – Mn) must exclusively coincide with individuals who have committed espionage (see Table 1). They may not coincide with instances defining the control group. This would suggest a strong predictive power associated with the independent variable. If, however, the independent variables (M1 – Mn) do not exclusively coincide with individuals who have committed espionage, but also coincide with individuals who have not committed espionage, then this would suggest that the independent variable would have a limited predictive power or perhaps even none at all.

### 3.2.2. Case-Control Study

In order to determine whether the seven motives outlined above actually correlate with espionage, cases have been selected in which individuals have been convicted of espionage. The control group consists of individuals who have not committed espionage. This group could include individuals who may have been suspected of, accused of and possibly also charged with having committed espionage but who were later exonerated as well as individuals who were never suspected of espionage.

Given this as a background, this research has been conducted as a case-control study because such studies allow a retrospective comparison of two groups: Individuals who match the “outcome of interest [i.e. spies] are matched with a control group who do not” (Mann 2003).
Case-control studies have the purpose of identifying predictors of an outcome (*ibid*). They are also useful for hypothesis generation and “assessment of the influence of predictors on outcome via calculation of an odds ratio” (*ibid*).

### 3.2.3. Identification and Operationalization of the Variables

For the purpose of this research, the seven motives\(^1\) outlined above have been treated as a consolidated construct constituting the independent variable. If one or more of the motives applied to a given case, the independent variable was considered present in a binary sense regardless of the number of motives that apply (independent variable = 1). If none of the motives applied to the case, the independent variable was considered absent in the same sense (independent variable = 0). The dependent variable reflected whether an individual was convicted of espionage or not. This, too, was evaluated in a binary sense. If the individual has been convicted, the dependent variable was considered to be present (dependent variable = 1). However, if the individual has not been convicted of espionage, the dependent variable would be absent (dependent variable = 0). In the latter case, this could apply for a variety of reasons: 1) the individual may never have been suspected of espionage, 2) the individual may have been suspected but was later exonerated or 3) the individual as charged and prosecuted but later acquitted (and perhaps also exonerated).

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\(^1\) The motives are: a) money, b) ideology/divided loyalties, c) coercion / compromise, d) ego / thrill, e) disgruntlement, f) ingratiation and g) recognition.
3.2.4. Data Sources

Documentary sources used in this sort of study can be divided into primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are those which “came into existence in the period under research” whereas secondary sources are interpretations of events of that period derived from primary sources” (Bell and Waters 2014, 129). In order to collect data for this study, both primary and secondary sources were used. The primary sources consist of affidavits, newspaper and journal reports published at the time as well as reported quotes by defendants and other individuals directly involved in the judicial process. The secondary sources include summaries and analyses based on such primary sources.

Deliberate sources are “produced for the attention of future researchers. … They involve a deliberate attempt to preserve evidence for the future…” (Bell and Waters 2014, 129). In contrast, inadvertent sources “are used by researchers for some purpose other than that for which they were originally intended” (ibid.). The sources used for these analyses were exclusively deliberate.

3.2.5. Survey Typology

With a view to composing a case group and a control group, researchers may choose among four selection methods: cross-sectional, cross-sequential, and longitudinal or cohort. In cross-sectional surveys, data is collected from a representative cross-section of a larger population at one point in time. A longitudinal survey involves a repetition of observations of a given period of time. A cohort survey gathers data following a certain experience or event common to the members of the cohort (Jalil 2013, 16). Given that the samples in this study were taken from a variety of espionage cases that have occurred over the period 1975 to 2008, this study has been conducted as a cohort study.
3.2.6. Sampling Plan

There is a considerable difference in the availability of data related to the private lives of convicted spies and other members of the Intelligence Community. Material related to the former is far more abundant. It is therefore necessary to use different approaches in selecting samples from the two groups.

For the sample from the population of convicted spies, names were selected from a publication of the Defense Personnel Security Research Center which lists the names of 180 individuals who have been convicted on the grounds of espionage in the United States between 1975 and 2008 (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009). With the help of an online list randomizer (Random 2017), the list of 180 individuals was randomized and the first 20 from this list were selected for review. The two lists are attached as in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. If, during the analysis, it came to light that any of these 20 individuals do not match the profile of an insider spy or if there should prove to be insufficient data available regarding the individual’s motives, the name of the individual will be taken from the list and replaced with the next name on the list. This process was applied so as to ensure a sample of 20 individuals in total.

The sampling method with respect to the control group was far more direct. The amount of available material addressing characteristics relevant to this study is extremely limited. This, of course, does not come as a surprise because individuals working in the Intelligence Community tend to refrain from publicizing information about their private lives. There are some cases, however, that have for one reason or another found their way into the public domain and could therefore be included in the control group analysis for this study.
3.2.7. Limitation of the Study and Possible Biases

The primary limitation for this study is related to the lack of material on individuals who were either wrongly accused of espionage and later exonerated or who were never indicted for such a crime in the first place. This shortcoming, however, can be offset through the research design of the study and by the fact that one case alone in support of the null hypothesis (i.e. motives also coinciding with exonerated suspect or individuals who have never been indicted) would suffice to reach a conclusion.

When conducting this sort of study, the greatest risk of bias could result from searching for, interpreting and focusing on information that confirms one’s preconceptions. Oswald and Grosjean report on an experiment in which test subjects were required to review two studies: one supporting their individual point of view and the other questioning it. The researchers found that “participants gave higher ratings to the study that supported their own opinion, while pointing to the shortcomings in the research that questioned their point of view. This pattern was observed even when both studies had supposedly been carried out using the same method.” (Oswald and Grosjean 2004, 80). To counteract this bias, it would be important, not only to ask many questions but also to reflect on the hypothesis with at least one alternative explanation (Oswald and Grosjean 2004, 94).

4. Analysis and Findings

4.1. The Motive to Spy

Stanislav Levchenko is a former KGB major who defected to the West in 1979 bringing with him a variety of insights that have proven to be useful to the U.S. Intelligence Community. Among them were his reflections on what motivates individuals to become insider spies: money,
ideology, compromise (or coercion) and ego (abbreviated MICE) (Levchenko 1988). This concept has become a widely-accepted doctrine in the Intelligence Community (W. T. Smith 2003, 170). It was, however, soon posited that this concept is overly simplistic and fails to recognize a number of motives that are equally or perhaps even more important (Pincher 1987, 89; Smith 2017, 14).

The research of Herbig and Wiskoff (2002) and Herbig (2008) has been instrumental in capturing what appears to be the full range of motives that prompt individuals to become insider spies. In addition to money, ideology, compromise and ego, the authors found that thrill-seeking and divided loyalties are closely associated with but also distinct enough to be explicitly addressed in conjunction with ego and ideology respectively. In addition, disgruntlement, ingratiatation and seeking recognition have also played a role in a considerable number of insider espionage cases (Herbig and Wiskoff 2002, 39; Herbig 2008, 32). Based on their research, the motives, which were therefore considered to be key and were thus used in the present study are a) money, b) ideology/divided loyalties, c) coercion / compromise, d) ego / thrill-seeking, e) disgruntlement, f) ingratiatation and g) recognition.

Reflecting on the cases reviewed in this research, the motive that emerged as the most frequent by far was money. This motive accounted for 70% of all cases examined (see Figure 3). The majority of those who were motivated by money were driven by their greed (also 70%) rather than by financial difficulties (30%) (See Table 2).
The motives disgruntlement, ingratiation and recognition each accounted for one in five cases. Hanssen was disgruntled because he was repeatedly passed over for promotion (Vise 2002). Kampiles was told that he does not have what it takes to become a field agent (Lardner 1983; O'Toole and Babcock 1978). Ames was told that he was not suitable for field service after having been a field agent (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1994). Charlton was pushed out of Lockheed under an early retirement program (Sneiderman, Slater and Glionna 1995).

Ingratiation played a role in the cases of Aragoncillo, Lonetree, Miller and Schwartz. Aragoncillo sought to gain favor and approval by providing classified information to representatives of the former president of his native country the Philippines (Honan 2007). Lonetree wanted to appear attractive to the KGB agent Violette Seina, who was working as a translator and telephone operator at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (Sulick 2013, 125-126). Miller was sexually involved with Svetlana Ogorodnikov who was a Soviet agent (Thornton 1984).
Schwartz wanted to be helpful to the Saudis because he regarded them as friends cooperating with the United States (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 50-51).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spy</th>
<th>Greed</th>
<th>Financial Difficulties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aragoncillo, Leandro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boone, David Sheldon</td>
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<td>Chin, Larry Wu-Tai</td>
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<td>Garcia, Wilfredo</td>
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<td>Hall, James III</td>
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<td>Hanssen, Robert Philip</td>
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<td>Kampiles, William</td>
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<td>Kim, Robert Chaegun</td>
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<td>Lee, Peter H.</td>
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<td>Lonetree, Clayton John</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madsen, Lee Eugene</td>
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<td>Miller, Richard W.</td>
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<td>Mortati, Tommaso</td>
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<td>Nicholson, Harold James</td>
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<td>Schwartz, Michael Stephen</td>
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<td>Sombolay, Albert T.</td>
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</table>

Table 2: Differentiated View on the Money Motive

Recognition was a motive in the cases of Kim, Kampiles, Madsen and Lee. Kim was hoping to be recognized as a good prospective agent by South Korean intelligence after his retirement from the Navy (Hall 1996). Kampiles wanted to be recognized as a high potential for CIA field work (Lardner 1983; O'Toole and Babcock 1978). Lee wanted to be recognized as a great scientist by his peers in the People’s Republic of China (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 33). Madsen felt compelled to prove that he was a “real man” despite his homosexual orientation (Mickolus 2015, 84).

The motive Ego and Thrill-Seeking accounted for 15% of the motives. Hall was arrested because his ego got the better of him. While meeting with an undercover FBI agent, Hall bragged about his exploits providing Top Secret information to the East Germans and Russians (Sulick 2013, 152). Similarly, Kampiles bragged to his friends and even to members of the CIA about the contact he had with a Soviet agent in Athens and the sale of a KH-11 satellite manual.
Hanssen got into espionage because he did not want to be seen as a failure (Vise 2002).

Table 3: Motives to Spy

The number of those who became involved in insider espionage for ideological reasons or because of divided loyalties was quite small (10%). Aragoncillo disclosed secrets to the former President of the Philippines (his country of birth) in support of his ideology and in
allegiance to the Philippines (Honan 2007). Similarly, Kim was torn by divided loyalties wanting to help his country of birth (Jackson 1997).

It is interesting to note that, despite Lalas’ initial claim to the contrary (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 32), none of the individuals studied in this sample became spies for reasons of coercion or compromise. Moreover, none of them became spies for reasons of ego/thrill, divided loyalties, disgruntlement and recognition alone. There was always at least one other motive. In contrast, money and ingratiating were, in some cases, singular motives for espionage.

Table 3 summarizes the findings related to the motives of the spies discussed in Section 2.2.1. of this paper. There are a number of interesting findings related to this summary: Firstly, there was no case of insider espionage without at least one motive. That is to say that every one of the insider spies in the sample had at least one motive to commit espionage. Secondly, apart from the seven motives used for the analysis of this research, (i.e. money, ideology/divided loyalties, coercion / compromise, ego / thrill, disgruntlement, ingratiating and recognition), there were no additional motives that emerged as possible explanations for committing espionage. There were no motives in any of the cases that were not included in this list. Thirdly, there is one motive in this list that could not be associated with a specific espionage case (i.e. compromise / coercion). However, while there was no evidence of compromise or coercion in any of the cases, Lalas did initially attempt to defend his actions on this basis. In any case, it is plausible that compromise or coercion might under certain circumstances be a motive. Fourthly, the suggestion that the MICE concept is oversimplified (Pincher 1987, 89; Smith 2017, 14), appears valid for two reasons. Approximately one in three spies were also motivated by factors not included in the MICE acronym: In addition to being motivated by money, Miller was also driven by ingratiating
and Ames, Charlton and Hanssen also became spies because they were disgruntled. Moreover, the motives of Lonetree and Schwartz (10% of the sample) could not be explained with the MICE concept at all. They were both driven by motives outside of the MICE framework.

4.2. Motive as a Predictor

As outlined in Section 3.2. above, motivational structure might serve as a predictor of espionage if and only if it were to apply exclusively to individuals who have committed espionage. It would otherwise at best only serve as a means to provide an explanation why someone became an insider spy after the fact.

The survey of the spy cases reviewed in Section 4.1. brought to light that all spy cases in the sample could be associated with one or more of the motives. However, the control group review in Section 4.2. illustrates that such motives could also be insinuated in instances in which the individuals were never found to be insider spies despite being under considerable scrutiny. James Jesus Angleton was responsible for Counterintelligence in the CIA for approximately twenty years. He was known to have become increasingly obsessive and displayed unusual behaviors over the years. He was known to be a heavy drinker who appeared to have been an alcoholic towards the end of his career. He had also been described as an egomaniac (Weiner 2007, 319) (Wise 1992, 35). Nevertheless, he was always found to be above reproach. Smith has worked in Army counterintelligence. Upon his retirement, he had tried his hand at various business enterprises all of which failed. He was faced with considerable financial difficulties and eventually had to file for company bankruptcy (Murphy 1986; Sun 1984). He was accused of espionage but was eventually acquitted because the charges appeared to be unfounded (Murphy 1986). These two cases illustrate that despite the presence of a possible motive (ego in one case and financial need in the other), it does not necessarily follow that an individual will become an
insider spy even if the opportunity were to exist. This suggests that motive does not have positive predictive value.

The case of Kelley is an interesting one from a different point of view. It illustrates that the absence of a motive suggests the absence of a crime. Kelley was accused of espionage although no motive could be identified despite a lengthy in-depth investigation. Kelley was evidently in a stable situation with a loving family. Kelley was finally exonerated when the FBI discovered that it was Hanssen and not Kelley who was the mole that the FBI and CIA had been trying to find for years (Wise 2003; Fox 2011). This case supports the assertion that all cases of espionage are associated with a motive. If the individuals do not have a motive to commit espionage, they will probably not commit it. In this sense, motives may be considered to have negative predictive value.

4.3. Factors beyond the Motive to Spy

4.3.1. Mental Disposition

As discussed above, Heuer suggests that espionage is not just attributable to an individual’s motivational structure. He suggests that insider espionage is typically also preceded by other factors which impair judgment and reduce natural inhibitions (Heuer 2001). Table 4 summarizes the findings related to the samples discussed in Section 2.2.1. in this regard. In two cases, sexual attraction played a role. Both Miller and Lonetree were caught up in classic “honey trap” scenarios with woman who were later identified as KGB spies (Thornton 1984; Sulick 2013, 125-126). Two others were known to have had substance abuse issues. Ames was an alcoholic and Kampiles had drug problems (Weiner 1994; Kessler 1994).
Table 4: Contributing Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spy</th>
<th>Sex (&quot;Honey Trap&quot;)</th>
<th>Personality Disorder</th>
<th>Substance Abuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ames, Aldrich Hazen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aragoncillo, Leandro</td>
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<td>Boone, David Sheldon</td>
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<td>Buchanan, Edward Owen</td>
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<td>Charlton, John Douglas</td>
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<td>Chin, Larry Wu-Tai</td>
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<td>Garcia, Wilfredo</td>
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<td>Hall, James III</td>
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<td>Hanssen, Robert Philip</td>
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<td>Kim, Robert Chaegun</td>
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<td>Lee, Peter H.</td>
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<td>Miller, Richard W.</td>
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<td>Schwartz, Michael Stephen</td>
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<td>Sombolay, Albert</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage</strong></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 also suggests that at least thirty percent of the individuals convicted of espionage had personality disorders of one sort or another. Charleton had a schizoid personality disorder accompanied by delusions of grandeur and paranoia (Chu 1996). Kampiles appears to have been affected by a delusional disorder (grandiosity type) (Taylor 2006). Garcia evidently had sociopathic tendencies displaying difficulties fitting into the military environment and obeying regulations (one of the markers for a possible security risk) (Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009, 16), Hanssen was a sexual deviant sharing pictures of his naked wife with a friend and suggesting they drug her so that his friend could have non-consensual sex with her.
He also profoundly dissociated his actions (spying for the Soviet Union) from his claimed convictions (staunch anti-communism) (Wise 2003, 252-253). Madsen appears to have had some internal struggle finding it necessary to prove that he could “be a man and still be gay” (Mickolus 2015, 84) the point here not being his sexual orientation *per se* but the fact that he felt so driven and compelled to prove that he was on an equal footing with other (non-gay) men.

Forty-five percent of the individuals convicted of espionage who were reviewed in this study had issues that could impair an individual’s judgment2. This is a significant figure, which raises the question whether the other cases might also have been associated with similar factors that were simply not reported.

4.3.2. Triggers

As outline in Section 2.1.3., Heuer suggests that it is “a trigger that sets the betrayal [of insider spies] in motion” (Heuer 2001) - a single event that prompts the individual to take the step. Ames was found unfit for field work, which deeply affected him (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 1994). Boone was infuriated by a ruinous divorce settlement and offered his spy services to the Soviets the same month (Ostrow and Jackson 1998). Hanssen was enraged at the FBI for failing to be promoted (Vise 2002). Kampiles was told that he was not qualified to be a field agent (Lardner 1983; O'Toole and Babcock 1978). Charlton was forced to leave Lockheed under early (Sneiderman, Slater and Glionna 1995). As discussed above, these events certainly

2 There were two factors contributing in the Kampiles case. The figure is therefore 45% and not 50%.
triggered considerable negative emotions like anger, infuriation and rage on the part of the individuals concerned. They may have also been triggers that pushed these individuals over the edge. However, since these accounts are only anecdotal and there is little actual evidence that the event actually caused the individual to become involved in espionage, there is enough data to suggest that this relationship should be further explored.
5. Conclusion

This paper sets out to answer the question “Can the motivational profile of an individual be reliably used to predict the risk of that individual committing insider espionage?” In order to answer this, it was necessary to work with a complete set of possible motives. While money, ideology, compromise / coercion and ego are widely accepted in the Intelligence Community as the key motives for insider espionage, it came to light that there are other motives that are as important or perhaps even more so. The motives a) money, b) ideology/divided loyalties, c) coercion / compromise, d) ego / thrill-seeking, e) disgruntlement, f) ingratiation and g) recognition defined the perimeter of this set.

During the period 1947 to 2007, 180 individuals were tried on charges of espionage (Herbig 2008). For the purpose of the currently discussed research, 20 individual convicted spies were selected randomly. Their case histories were studied and key information was extracted from publicly available sources. Through this process, it was possible to establish that each of the espionage cases in this sample could be associated with at least one of the aforementioned motives. Moreover, it was possible to determine that there were no other motives beyond those included in this set. In this sense, the set of motives appears to be exhaustive.

In order to determine whether the set of motives would also be useful while attempting to predict possible future instances of espionage, it has been necessary to compose a control group consisting of individuals who were not guilty of espionage with a high degree of certainty. The supposition is that if none of the individuals in the control group can be linked to any of the motives outlined above, this would support the hypothesis that the motives (i.e. independent variables) exclusively relate to individuals who have committed espionage and can therefore be used as predictors. However, two of the individuals had certain motivational elements that were
aligned with the motives from the motive set (i.e. Angleton with respect to ego and Smith with respect to money). This falsifies the hypothesis.

There was, however, another aspect that came to light during the research. Brian Kelley was long suspected of being the much sought after Soviet mole in the U.S. Intelligence Community. He and his family were therefore under intense scrutiny for an extended period of time. Despite the very thorough investigation into his case, there did not appear to be anything suggesting that he would have had a motive. Eventually, it was discovered that Robert Hanssen was the mole and Kelley was exonerated. His case suggests that the absence of a motive implies the absence of a crime. In this sense, motive may serve as a predictor but only in the negative sense: If individuals have no motive to commit espionage, they will not do so.

Since all espionage cases in this sample could be associated with at least one motive from the given set, but similar motives could also be insinuated in other instances (i.e. individuals who innocent with a high degree of certainty), the question to further consider is what other factors might play a role in prompting an individual to become an insider spy. The research of Heuer (2001) offers an interesting lead in this context. Setting the opportunity to commit espionage aside, Heuer suggests that factors that contribute to an individual becoming involved in espionage are motive, impaired judgment and a trigger. Motive has already been considered at length. Judgment can be impaired in various ways. Sexual attraction and the classic “honey trap” scenario can have this effect. A number of mental disorders as well alcohol and drug abuse can too. It is important to note that such factors accounted for almost half of the cases reviewed in this sample. It is uncertain whether this is because these factors only applied to the cited cases or if they applied to more but were simply not reported. Future research in the field of
counterespionage should therefore be focused on systematically reporting and gathering and correlating data related to impaired judgment with instances of insider espionage.

The notion that espionage is necessarily preceded by a trigger seems plausible. There were several cases in this sample suggesting that some defining event prompted the individual to go down the path of insider espionage. This, however, would have to be examined more carefully.

While the motives of insider spies are usually reported in the public domain, issues related to impaired judgment and triggers are typically not. It is typically only in the highly visible cases that detailed background stories are provided. These cases typically generate a storm of journalistic investigation in which every possible angle is exploited. It is in these cases that the broader context of the spy’s background is explored, which may include reports on triggers, addictions, personality disorders and liaisons. However, if we are to learn about the full scope of antecedents and possibly also the predictors of insider espionage, it is imperative that these aspects be explored in the less spectacular cases and not just in those that make front page news.
Appendix 1: Espionage and Other Compromise Cases 1975 - 2008

Source: Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009
Appendix 2: Randomized List of Convicted Spies

| 1. 116. Oppedisano, Scotta * | 2. 4. Adams, Aldrich Hazen 2 |
| 6. 72. Kammel, William 27 |
| 10. 111. Nichols, Harold James 42 |
| 13. 3. Atwood, Harry 10 |
| 19. 107. Van Dorn, John 10 |
| 22. 9. Ambrose, Donald W. 7 |
| 25. 75. Wormsley, John 12 |
| 28. 104. Thomas, Charles 51 |
| 31. 103. Van Dorn, John 10 |
| 34. 102. Green, William F. 6 |
| 37. 100. Jeffries, Karen 24 |
| 40. 99. King, Robert E. 31 |
| 43. 98. Kline, John F. 28 |
| 46. 97. Lee, Henry 39 |
| 49. 96. Loomis, Henry 40 |
| 52. 95. Long, Thomas 32 |
| 55. 94. Lewis, Jack 33 |
| 58. 93. Lewis, John 34 |
| 61. 92. LePage, Donald 24 |
| 64. 91. Loomis, Henry 40 |
| 67. 90. Long, Thomas 32 |
| 70. 89. Lewis, John 34 |
| 73. 88. Loomis, Henry 40 |
| 76. 87. LePage, Donald 24 |
| 79. 86. Lewis, John 34 |
| 82. 85. Long, Thomas 32 |
| 85. 84. Loomis, Henry 40 |
| 88. 83. Lewis, John 34 |
| 91. 82. LePage, Donald 24 |
| 94. 81. Long, Thomas 32 |
| 97. 79. Loomis, Henry 40 |
| 100. 78. Lewis, John 34 |
| 103. 77. LePage, Donald 24 |
| 106. 76. Long, Thomas 32 |
| 109. 75. Loomis, Henry 40 |
| 112. 74. Lewis, John 34 |
| 115. 73. LePage, Donald 24 |
| 118. 72. Long, Thomas 32 |
| 121. 71. Loomis, Henry 40 |
| 124. 70. Lewis, John 34 |

Based on Defense Personnel Security Research Center 2009
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