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REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON KOREA

Covering the period from 15 December 1949 to 4 September 1950

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NOTE

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Letter dated 4 September 1950 from the Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Korea addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the report of the Commission to the General Assembly

Pusan, Korea, 4 September 1950

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 2 (f) of General Assembly resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949, I have the honour, on behalf of the United Nations Commission on Korea, to transmit to you the attached report of the Commission, for submission to the fifth regular session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Anup Singh
Chairman
Representative of India
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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Commission on Korea was initially established by General Assembly resolution 195 (III) adopted on 12 December 1948. It was continued in being by General Assembly resolution 293 (IV) adopted on 21 October 1949.

The Commission reconvened in Seoul on 15 December 1949. Since that date the Commission has held sixty-nine meetings. Thirty-four were held in Seoul, one in Suwon, three in Camp Hakata (Japan), one in Tokyo, one in Taegon and the remainder in Pusan.

At its 4th meeting on 1 February 1950, the Commission adopted the principle that it should have a permanent chairman and elected Mr. Kasim Gulek, then representative of Turkey, to that office. Mr. A. B. Jamieson, representative of Australia, was at the same time chosen as Rapporteur. At the 26th meeting on 24 May 1950, the permanent Chairman having been absent from Korea since the end of March, the Commission decided to revert to the system of a rotating chairmanship employed by the Commission in 1949. Henceforth members of the Commission were to hold office as chairman for three weeks at a time in the English alphabetical order of names of the Member States.

The Commission has somewhat modified, as unsuitable to this emergency, the customary form of report of a United Nations Commission. Such a report, presenting a lengthy account, with full documentation, of the proceedings and day-to-day activities of the Commission and its sub-committees under the terms of reference of the resolution of the General Assembly of 21 October 1949, would have contained much material that is now of minor importance.

The present report consists of four parts. It covers the period from 15 December 1949 to 4 September 1950, the date when the report was signed at Pusan. Part One deals with the aggression. Chapter I presents the story of the fact of aggression on 25 June 1950 and the finding of the Commission. An account of the origin and nature of the struggle is given in chapter II, and the Commission explains in chapter III what it believes to have been the policy of aggression of the North Korean authorities.

Part Two gives as detailed a survey of the situation in Korea prior to the aggression as the Commission considers necessary for an understanding of the policies and activities of the Government of the Republic of Korea during that period, and for an appreciation of the major problems that may arise on the cessation of hostilities. Chapter IV concerns itself with the task of the Commission; the problem of unification is discussed in chapter V; in chapter VI are treated certain economic and political problems affecting the development of representative government in the Republic of Korea; the chapter also includes an account of the observation of the elections of 30 May 1950. Chapter VII surveys the measures taken by the Republic of Korea to meet the threat from the North.

Part Three covers the activities of the Commission after the aggression; Part Four contains an analysis of the issues involved, together with the conclusions of the Commission.
A. Events of 25 and 26 June 1950

1. On Sunday, 25 June 1950, at 1.30 p.m.,¹ the Commission was officially informed by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea that the territory of the Republic had been invaded early that morning by the armed forces of the North Korean authorities, and was still under attack all along the 38th parallel. The towns of Ongjin, Kangnung, Chunmunjin, Kaesong, and some others, had been reported as already occupied by these forces, and street fighting was in progress in Chunchon. The Foreign Minister stated that the ground that had been lost to the Northern forces had been conceded according to plan, as it lay in advance of the Republic’s main defence lines.

2. The Commission assembled shortly afterwards and examined detailed reports which had been received from the Ministry of Home Affairs, of fighting in towns and villages south of the 38th parallel, indicating that South Korean army and police units were engaging superior North Korean forces and giving ground in many places. A decision was made to issue a broadcast appeal to both armies to order a cease-fire. It was also agreed that the Chairman, the Rapporteur and the Principal Secretary should consult with the President of the Republic of Korea regarding this emergency.

3. At the invitation of the Commission Mr. John J. Muccio, Ambassador of the United States of America to the Government of the Republic of Korea, appeared before the Commission at about 3 p.m., and stated that the Republic of Korea had been made the object of a sudden attack from the North, launched at dawn all along the 38th parallel. The attack had been well organized and the defence had been taken by surprise. The Government was not alarmed, however, since its forces were yielding indefensible territory and were withdrawing to defensive positions that had been prepared in advance.

4. At 5 p.m. the Commission’s field observers reported that Northern armed forces had that morning taken the Southern defences completely by surprise in a well-mounted attack all along the 38th parallel. The situation along the parallel running from west to east was as follows: The Ongjin peninsula was to be evacuated by the South Korean forces by sea and any other means that could be devised. The United States Korean Military Advisory Group detachment had already been evacuated from Ongjin by air. In the Chongdan area Northern forces had driven a salient six kilometres [nearly four miles] deep across the parallel. Paekchon had been shelled and burned at 10.10 a.m., and later occupied. There had been no report on the situation in Kaesong since 7 a.m., when street fighting had been reported there. In the centre a total of twenty-one tanks had been observed at various places moving toward Uijongbu, on the shortest route to Seoul. However, the attack in the centre was lighter than elsewhere. Further east there had been an attack in regimental strength with two battalions of artillery, totalling 3,100 men. The main attack in the east had been by sea. Troops had been landed from twenty ships, and Northern forces had succeeded in establishing a bridgehead north of Kangnung with a perimeter of five miles. The strategic plan of the Northern forces appeared to be to draw off Southern defensive reserves by launching heavy attacks on the east and west, and then to make the main attack through the centre along the shortest route to Seoul. Although most of the places that had been yielded by the Southern forces had been conceded in accordance with defence plans, the principal defence line had already been pierced along the Imjin River.

   At 5.15 p.m., four Yak-type aircraft strafed civilian and military airfields outside Seoul, destroying planes, firing gasoline tanks and attacking jeeps. Yongdungpo railway station on the outskirts of Seoul was also strafed.

5. The Chairman, the Rapporteur and the Principal Secretary then reported on their meeting with the President of the Republic and the Foreign Minister. The President had branded as an absolute lie the Northern charge that the Republic of Korea had provoked the invasion by attacking first. The President said that although the Republic lacked air and naval strength, the people were united and determined to defeat the invaders. He had no objection to a broadcast by the United Nations Commission on Korea calling for a cease-fire, although he doubted strongly whether it would have any influence upon the Northern authorities. The Government had not made any plans to appeal to the Security Council, and there would be no objection on his part if the Commission, or the Government of the United States, brought the new turn of events in Korea to the attention of the Security Council. Reports of a declaration of war by the Northern authorities over Radio Pyongyang had not been confirmed, and the President was not considering this as official notice.

6. The Commission immediately drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the situation, which in the opinion of the Commission was serious and was assum-

¹ Korean time is used throughout this report.
ing the character of a full-scale war which might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The Commission suggested that the Secretary-General might consider the possibility of bringing the matter to the notice of the Security Council.  

7. The Commission then approved the text of a broadcast to be made by the Chairman to North Korea, in which the Commission deplored the tragic outbreak of military conflict on a large scale in Korea. The Commission appealed for an immediate cessation of hostilities, believing that "these hostilities constitute a breach of the most fundamental principle on which the United Nations is based, namely, that armed force shall not be used save in the common interest". The Commission declared that it was "ready to meet representatives of the North and the South, at any time, at a place to be agreed upon to review the situation which is now developing, in order to arrange for a cease-fire so as to prevent an aggravation of the situation. Once this has been attained, the Commission is also anxious to begin discussions and negotiations with unification as its final goal. The Commission wishes to repeat to the people of North Korea, in the North and in the South, that the United Nations stands for peaceful negotiations on the basis of justice and equity" (A/AC.26/II/SR.32). This broadcast was carried over Radio Seoul immediately after the meeting and the text was repeated at short intervals.

8. On the morning of Monday, 26 June 1950, the Commission was informed of the adoption by the Security Council, at its 473rd meeting on 25, June 1950, of the resolution which termed the armed invasion of the Republic of Korea a breach of the peace, and called upon the authorities in North Korea to cease hostilities forthwith and to withdraw their armed forces to the 38th parallel. Sitting in almost continuous session throughout the day, the Commission received from its observers frequent reports of the progress of hostilities. The Commission also considered evidence that had been gathered by its field observers during a tour of the 38th parallel which had recently been concluded. The observers reported that they had been impressed during their tour by the fact that the South Korean Army was organized entirely for defence. They had noted that in all sectors it was disposed in depth; that armour, air support and heavy artillery were absent; that there were visible no military or other supplies necessary for a large-scale attack, and that they had encountered no concentrations of transport. The observers had returned to Seoul less than thirty-six hours before the attack from the North began.

9. On the basis of this evidence the Commission sent the following cablegram [S/1507] to the Secretary-General:

"Commission met this morning 1000 hours and considered latest reports on hostilities and results direct observation along parallel by UNCOF military observers over period ending forty-eight hours before hostilities began. Commission's present view on basis this evidence is first that judging from actual progress of operations Northern régime is carrying out well-planned concerted and full-scale invasion of South Korea, second that South Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive basis in all sectors of the parallel and third, that they were taken completely by surprise as they had no reason to believe from intelligence sources that invasion was imminent. Commission is following events and will report further developments."

10. In a radio broadcast delivered at 9.20 a.m. on 26 June 1950, General Kim Il Sung reiterated the North Korean claim first heard the previous afternoon at 1.20 p.m. that South Korea, having rejected every Northern proposal for peaceful unification, had crowned its iniquity by launching an invasion force across the parallel in the section of Haeju, thus precipitating North Korean counter-attacks for which South Korea would have to assume the consequences.

11. In the afternoon the Commission approved a background report on events leading to the outbreak of hostilities [S/1505] and forwarded the report to the Secretary-General. The field observers reported that a divisional counter-attack in the Uijongbu area had collapsed completely in the face of Northern artillery fire. There were no longer any forces capable of defending the capital. The headquarters of the United States Korean Military Advisory Group was in process of being disbanded and all American military advisers had been recalled from the units to which they had been attached. The bursts of fire that had been heard over Duk Soo Palace during the meeting were explained by the fact that there had been an encounter between two North Korean Yak fighters and two Mustangs of the United States Air Force, the latter probably en route to Inchon to provide air protection for the evacuation by sea of dependent personnel. The fusillades that had been audi-
ble from time to time during the day were rifle fire directed at Northern planes strafing certain streets in Seoul.

12. Later that afternoon the Commission considered the resolution of the Security Council referred to above requesting the Commission:

“(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;

“(b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel; and

“(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution”.

The Commission, considering the situation dangerous, with every possibility of rapid deterioration, approved the following reply [S/1503]:

“North Korean advances have created dangerous situation with possibilities of rapid deterioration. Impossible estimate situation which will exist tomorrow in Seoul. In view Commission's past experience and existing situation Commission convinced North Korea will not heed Council resolution nor accept UNOK good offices. Commission suggests have Security Council give consideration either invitation both parties agree to execution of this resolution”.

13. The events now taking place in Korea did not break out on 25 June as the result of a provocative attack by the troops of the Republic of Korea, much less as the result of the launching of an invasion force across the parallel by the Republic of Korea, as has been alleged. The Commission, having had free access to all areas in South Korea, has been at all times aware of the military situation in the South. Particularly regarding the period immediately preceding the invasion, the Commission had before it the report, referred to in paragraph 8 above, which was submitted by the Commission's field observers on 24 June 1950. The team was composed of two observers, Squadron Leader R. J. Rankin, RAAF, and Major F. S. B. Peach, RAI. They left Seoul on 9 June 1950 and after completing their trips along the 38th parallel, returned to Seoul on the evening of 23 June 1950, a few hours before the invasion. Throughout the tour the team was afforded every opportunity of examining conditions along the parallel and was freely admitted to all sections of divisional and regimental headquarters, including operations rooms. They gradually obtained a clear picture of the deployment on a defensive basis of the South Korean forces.

14. The report of the observers was completed on 24 June 1950, the eve of the invasion from the North. The events of the following day conferred upon the observations regarding the defensive positions of the South Korean forces a significance of which the observers when they drafted their report could not have been aware. This very unawareness gives to their observations a special value, which the Commission has taken into due consideration.


16. On the basis of this report and of its knowledge of the general military situation, the Commission is unanimously of the opinion that no offensive could possibly have been launched across the parallel by the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950.

17. The invasion launched by the North Korean forces on 25 June cannot have been the result of a decision taken suddenly in order to repel a mere border attack or in retaliation for such an attack. Such an invasion, involving amphibious landings and the use of considerable numbers of troops carefully trained for aggressive action and, in relation to the area, of great quantities of weapons and other war material, presupposes a long-premeditated, well-prepared and well-timed plan of aggression. The subsequent steady advance of the North Korean forces supplies further evidence, if further evidence is needed, of the extensive nature of the planning and preparation for the aggression.

18. It is the considered opinion of the Commission that this planning and preparation were deliberate, and an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities. The objective of this policy was to secure by force what could not be gained by any other means. In furtherance of this policy the North Korean authorities, on 25 June 1950, initiated a war of aggression, without provocation and without warning.

Chapter II. The Origin and Nature of the Struggle in Korea

A. The artificial division of Korea

19. By the end of 1945 an international agreement had come into existence concerning the objective of immediate independence for Korea, making provision for the procedure to be followed in attaining that objective. The first step toward this agreement had been taken in December 1943 at the Cairo Conference between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and China, when the following declaration was issued:

“The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”

20. This declaration regarding Korean independence was reaffirmed by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and China in the Potsdam declaration of 26 July 1945, which set out the terms for Japan's surrender as follows:

“The terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the
islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”

In its declaration of war against Japan on 8 August 1945, the Soviet Government expressed its adherence to the Potsdam declaration, stating that:

“True to its duty to the Allies, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposals and has associated itself with the Allied declaration of 26 July.”

21. After receipt of the Japanese offer of surrender, with the nearest United States troops at Okinawa and with Soviet Union troops already in Korea, the United States Government, in providing for the surrender of Japanese troops, proposed that Soviet Union troops should accept the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea north of the 38th parallel and that Japanese troops in Korea south of that line should surrender to United States forces. This proposal was accepted, and the 38th parallel became the line of demarcation of the zones of military occupation of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

22. Finally, at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December 1945, a more detailed agreement was arrived at between the Governments of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, to which the Chinese Government subsequently adhered.*

23. However, the United States-USSR Joint Commission on Korea, which was established in conformity with the Moscow declaration, soon reached a deadlock on the procedure to be followed in consulting with “Korean democratic parties and social organizations”, as provided for by paragraph 2 of the Moscow Declaration. The reasons for disagreement were described in the following terms by United States Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring: 

“... the United States assumed the position that representatives of all political parties should be consulted. The Soviets contended that all Koreans who had opposed in any way the terms of the Moscow agreement should be excluded. In as much as most of the vocal sections of the Korean population, with the exception of members of the Communist Party, had been active in expressing disagreement with one aspect or another of the agreement, the Soviet criterion would have effectively limited the Commission to consultation with one minority group.”

The Soviet explanation, as described by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, claimed that the United States delegation to the Joint Commission had proposed the inclusion for consultation of “seven political parties and social groups of Southern Korea which opposed the Moscow agreement, and only three democratic parties which supported the agreement”, and further claimed that certain important democratic parties and social organizations had been debarred for purposes of consultation by the United States proposals.  

24. There can be no doubt that this disagreement constitutes the root of the present conflict. Behind this disagreement lay differences in outlook and policy. These differences did not spring from local causes, or from anything inherent in the Korean situation itself. They were a manifestation of those wider differences which have become so marked a feature of the international scene.

25. It can now be inferred, in the light of all that has happened in Korea since the initial disagreement, that the United States policy had no other objective than the creation of an independent and democratic Korea, democratic in the commonly accepted sense. However, it may also be inferred that, had the policy of the United States prevailed, it would hardly have resulted in the retention by popular vote of the Kim II Sung régime in North Korea, the régime established by the Soviet military command after the liberation, which is still ruling in the North of Korea and which carries the responsibility for the aggression.

26. Failure to agree upon a procedure for implementation of the Moscow declaration caused the United States of America on 17 September 1947 to bring the matter before the second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

27. During the debate in the General Assembly, the delegation of the Soviet Union objected to the consideration of the question by the General Assembly. When, however, the General Assembly, decided to include the item in its agenda, the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted to the First Committee two proposals. The first proposal (A/C.1/229) suggested that the First Committee should invite elected representatives of the Korean people from North and South Korea to take part in the discussion of the question. The second proposal (A/C.1/232) recommended to the occupying Powers in Korea the simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from southern and northern Korea in the beginning of 1948, “thereby leaving to the Korean people itself the establishment of a national government of Korea”.  

28. The proposals of the USSR delegation revived in a different form the disagreement regarding the method of electing democratic representatives which had made it impossible for the Joint Commission to arrive at a solution. In the view of the United States representative, the problem for the Soviet Union was one of how to obtain, amenable to themselves, representatives of the indigenous population who would either be military appointees or persons appointed in accordance with external pressure in mock elections; whereas the problem for the United States of America was one of ensuring that the Korean representatives were, in fact, freely elected by the Korean people, on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot.

29. The General Assembly, taking the view that the USSR proposals did not offer the same opportunity as that provided by the United States proposals for the people of Korea to express their preferences freely and...
to establish their own form of government, adopted pro-
possals submitted by the United States of America for
securing representatives (A/C.1/230). The General
Assembly resolved [resolution 112 (II)] that elected
representatives of the Korean people should be invited
to take part in the consideration of the Korean question,
which, it was recognized, was primarily a matter for the
Korean people itself and concerned its freedom and
independence. In order to observe that the Korean rep­
resentatives were in fact duly elected by the Korean
people, and not mere appointees by military authorities
in Korea, the General Assembly also resolved to estab­
lish a United Nations Temporary Commission “to be
present in Korea, with right to travel, observe and
consult throughout Korea”. Further, the General Assem­
bly recommended that elections should be held not later
than 31 March 1948, to choose representatives with­
whom the Commission might consult regarding prompt
attainment of the freedom and independence of the Ko­
orean people; that the representatives, constituting a
national assembly, might establish a national govern­
ment of Korea; that the number of representatives should
be proportionate to the population; and that the elec­
tions should be on the basis of adult suffrage, by secret
ballot, and under the observation of the Commission.

30. When the USSR proposals, referred to in para­
graph 27 of this report, were defeated in the First Com­
mittee, the representative of the Soviet Union stated
that if a United Nations Temporary Commission on
Korea were to be set up after the General Assembly
had considered the question without the participation in
that body’s discussion of representatives of the Korean
people, the Soviet Union would not be able to take part
in the work of the Commission.

31. In 1945 the Korean people were not divided into
two hostile camps, nor were there inherent in the Ko­
orean people qualities that might be expected of them­
selves to create two hostile camps. The division of the
country is, in the opinion of the Commission, artificial
and unnatural, running counter to the fervent desire of
the whole Korean people for unification. A frontier was
set up for reasons of military expediency and maintained
as the result of external pressure. Its existence is re­
ponsible for the creation of two separate and antago­
nistic political entities, each imbued with a desire for
unification, but each insisting on its own methods for
achieving that goal.

32. The division was consolidated by the exclusion
from North Korea of the United Nations Temporary
Commission on Korea, which had been charged by the
General Assembly to observe the holding of elections on
a democratic basis in the whole of Korea.

B. The resulting deadlock

33. The people of Korea have consistently favoured
the earliest possible attainment of Korean unity and
independence. Forty years under Japanese domina­tion
developed a spirit of patriotism in the Korean people,
and a determination to regain their freedom and inde­
pendence. Thirty-three Korean leaders, who in 1919
voiced the ideal of national self-determination in a

"Proclamation of Korean Independence", touched off
mass demonstrations which were suppressed with great
violence. These men became national heroes. However
remote this goal may have appeared, the earliest pos­
sible attainment of independence remained the one com­
mon goal dear to the hearts and minds of the Korean
people.

34. The occupying forces of the USSR in August,
and of the United States in September 1945, were con­
sequently greeted as deliverers bringing independence.
To the people of Korea, the Cairo declaration had meant
that victory by the Allied Powers would bring immediate
independence and an opportunity to establish their own
national government. When it became apparent that the
occupying Powers had not agreed on any detailed pro­
gramme to implement the promise of the Cairo declara­
tion, disillusion spread.

35. It was therefore not surprising that there was
intense and general opposition to the clause in the Mos­
cow declaration proposing a “trusteeship” for Korea.
The Korean people interpreted the proposal to mean a
protectorate and the renewal in another form of the
bondage from which they had just been delivered.

36. It was, on the contrary, surprising when, in De­
cember 1945, the South Korean Labour (Communist)
Party and affiliated organizations suddenly changed
their position and gave unqualified support to the Mos­
cow declaration. All other parties and organizations re­
mained strongly against trusteeship in any form, and
maintained their opposition to the implementation of the
Moscow declaration. These opposite views on the ques­
ition of trusteeship contributed very largely to the failure
of the Joint Commission in 1946 and 1947. The Soviet
Union would not agree to consultation with political
parties and social organizations expressing active hos­
tility to trusteeship. The United States, on the other
hand, believed that to deny consultation to such parties
and organizations would be to deny freedom of speech
and opinion.

37. The exclusion from North Korea of the Tem­
porary Commission and its inability to go forward with
the supervision of general elections in accordance with
the resolution 112 (II) of the General Assembly made
the proposal for holding elections in South Korea alone
a serious issue, and provoked a storm of bitter con­
trovery. A constant stream of criticism at the idea of
holding such elections came from North Korea. It would
appear that behind the refusal of the North Korean
authorities to accept internationally-supervised elections
lay a fear that, by doing so, they would promote the
realization of a free democracy in Korea. It would also
appear that behind their criticism of such elections in
South Korea alone lay their intention to obstruct in
every way possible the realization of such a democracy
in a part of Korea. Given that elections for all Korea
were impracticable, some of the more important political
groups of the South, notably the Hankook Democratic
Party and the National Association for the Rapid Reali­
zation of Korean Independence, were strongly in favour
of holding elections in South Korea alone. They were
confident that this would lead to the establishment of a
national government, which in time, given the support
of the United Nations and world opinion, would lead to
the unification of Korea. Groups under the leadership
of Kim Koo and Kimm Kiuse, as well as the leftists,
did not, however, share this view, as they considered that such an election would perpetuate the division of Korea rather than lead to eventual unification.

38. When the question was laid before the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, the view was taken that elections in South Korea alone should be held [A/AC.18/SR.9]. It was expected that the representatives constituting the National Assembly would consult with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, and would carry on such negotiations as they might wish with any other Korean group which might not have participated in the elections, regarding the form of government to be established. The Interim Committee thus entertained the hope that, by going forward with separate elections and the establishment of a sovereign government in South Korea, the full cooperation of all Koreans would ultimately be secured. The Interim Committee also hoped that all peaceful methods of persuasion would be used to the greatest possible extent for the attainment of Korean unity.

39. Elections were accordingly held in South Korea on 10 May 1948. They were regarded by all who participated as a step towards the independence of Korea; all candidates were in favour of this method of securing the unity and independence of Korea. For this reason no fundamentally conflicting views were placed before the electorate. Opposition to this thesis took the form of a complete boycott of the elections, and the opposition parties, in effect, now withdrew from public life in South Korea. Two years later, however, the division between South and North Korea had so hardened that all but the extreme leftists, who were in any case outlawed, resumed an active political role in the Republic of Korea by participating in the elections of 30 May 1950.

40. On 12 June 1948 the National Assembly adopted a resolution, addressed to their compatriots in the North, in which they expressed their hope that general elections similar to those already held in South Korea would soon be held in North Korea in a free atmosphere, in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly; and that true representatives of the people would be elected and sent to sit in the National Assembly, where 100 seats had been left vacant for them.

41. After the Government of the Republic of Korea had shouldered the burden of administration, however, it made no serious endeavour to negotiate the holding of elections in North Korea. The organization of the new Republic demanded all its attention. The Government’s attitude gradually hardened towards those who still desired to enter into negotiation with their fellow countrymen across the parallel. The futility of attempting to negotiate with the authorities in North Korea had, in the Government’s opinion, been conclusively demonstrated by past experience. After recognition of the Republic of Korea by the General Assembly on 12 December 1948 [resolution 195 (III)], the Government came gradually to the view that unification was possible only through the abolition of the North Korean régime and the disbanding of its security forces, which would permit the Government of the Republic to extend its jurisdiction over the whole of Korea. It considered that the North Korean régime had been imposed on the people, who would readily join hands with the Republic once that régime had been abolished.

42. In its report to the fourth session of the General Assembly in September 1949, the Commission recognized the passionate longing of all Koreans for unity and independence and their profound desire for peaceful unification. It stated, however, that the division of Korea and the gradual consolidation of rival political régimes had caused bitterness, frustration and mutual distrust, and had increasingly prejudiced the problem of Korean independence and unification. The Commission was therefore of opinion that “The embittered propaganda and hostile activities which now mark the relations between the two parts of Korea render the prospect of unification more and more remote”.

43. Propaganda and hostile activities on the part of North Korea increased rather than diminished during the first six months of 1950. In fact, on the eve of aggression there was no sign that the day of unification by peaceful means was any nearer.

44. The Commission has already expressed its opinion that deliberate planning and preparation for the aggression of 25 June 1950 were an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities. This act of aggression, initiated without provocation and without warning, has made it clear to the Commission that the objective of these authorities has all along been to secure by force what could not be gained by other means. This act of aggression was preceded by sustained efforts to undermine and weaken the Republic of Korea. It was part of the plan of the North Korean authorities to encompass by these efforts the downfall of the Republic or, failing that, so to enfeeble the Government that it could not long resist their ultimate onslaught.

45. While an invading force adequate for their purpose was being trained and equipped, everything was done by the North Korean authorities to spread confusion and discontent in South Korea. They endeavored to foster and promote conditions favourable to a general upheaval. In furtherance of their policy of aggression it was necessary to exclude from North Korea any kind of international observation. It was part of their plan of aggression to spread inflammatory propaganda calculated to create dissension in South Korea, to give aid to armed bands sent to invade South Korea after having been formed and trained on North Korean territory, and to incite the population of South Korea to side with and support these guerrilla bands. It was also part of their policy to maintain a state of tension along the 38th parallel and to create confusion in the

Chapter III. The Policy of Aggression of the North Korean Authorities

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minds of the South Korean population on the eve of the aggression by false offers of unification by peaceful means.

A. Exclusion of international observation

46. It will be recalled that when the USSR proposals, referred to in paragraph 27 of this report, were defeated in the First Committee, the representatives of the Soviet Union stated that the Soviet Union would not be able to take part in the work of the Commission. From that day onward, it has been impossible for a Commission of the United Nations to cross the parallel to supervise or to assist in the holding of free and independent elections in North Korea, or even to ascertain whether the frequently vaunted claims of the North Korean authorities to possess already a more truly democratic form of government are borne out by facts.

47. Both in 1949 and in 1950, the United Nations Commission on Korea endeavoured, through every channel available to it, to make contact with the North Korean authorities. As was reaffirmed in a broadcast directed to the North on 11 May 1950, the Commission was motivated by one desire only, to confer with those in the North in order to arrive at a peaceful solution to the problem of unification of Korea. No response was ever made to these overtures.

48. The Commission has found it hard to understand the reason for this reluctance to meet an international commission acting in conformity with the mandate of the General Assembly of the United Nations. An indication of the reasons for this reluctance was given in the text of the appeal issued on 7 June 1950 by the Central Committee of the "Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland". From this appeal, it would appear that the Commission was unwelcome in North Korea as having been dispatched to Korea by the "hand-raising" majority subservient to the United States Government within the General Assembly of the United Nations; and also because "The United Nations Commission on Korea is publicly supporting brutal oppression against progressive persons, democratic political parties and social organizations, terrorism against the people, indiscriminate mass killing, and the suppression of the people's movement—all these carried out by the Syngman Rhee puppet gang. All the Korean people, therefore, are indignant over the activities of the United Nations Commission and are struggling in opposition to it and requesting its immediate withdrawal from Korea".

49. Part of the policy of aggression of the North Korean authorities was to use Radio Pyongyang extensively to broadcast inflammatory propaganda to South Korea. This propaganda was calculated to create political diversion and strife and to confuse the mind of the population on the issues involved. Typical of this propaganda are the following extracts from a "Letter of Appeal" broadcast on 13 January 1950 from Radio Pyongyang by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland (A/AC.26/II/ Monitor 3):

"In the southern half of our Fatherland under the rule of American imperialists and their running dogs, the Syngman Rhee country-selling traitors, there have been created unbearable, miserable and grim conditions unheard of in our national history. Under the aegis of the guns and bayonets of American imperialists, the Syngman Rhee country-selling traitors have established a fascist police rule in the southern half of our Fatherland, suppressing, exterminating, and slaughtering everything that is superior in our Fatherland, as well as the most patriotic, progressive and democratic part of our people, looting and wrecking the economy of the southern half of the Fatherland and ruining the rural areas.

"It is clear that if democratic elections were held, free from the interference of the American imperialists and the United Nations Commission on Korea, the Korean people surely would denounce in concert the Syngman Rhee country-selling traitor gang, which is their enemy, mop up its rule of South Korea and drive it into the swamps of ruin..."

"The Syngman Rhee country-selling traitor gang is wrecking more viciously than ever the industries of the southern half of our Fatherland, ruining rural areas more than ever and driving masses of people still deeper into the swamps of misery and privation.

"Except for one-fifth of them, all the factories and establishments of the southern half have been wrecked completely. Ninety per cent of the mines are closed down. Three million unemployed and bankrupt people are roaming the streets. Millions of the destitute are shivering in the cold, ill-clad, cowering in air raid shelters. The young, without food, are wasting away to their death as prices skyrocket."

"In spite of the grim plight of the people, the traitors are selling out the economy of the Fatherland, just as they please, in order to fatten their own dirty pockets. They are auctioning off the so-called vested properties. The so-called vested properties are the property of all the people, built up by the blood and sweat of the people. Syngman Rhee is stealing and selling factories, establishments and mines..."

"Dear brothers and sisters: with whose support is the Syngman Rhee country-selling traitor gang perpetrating the massacre of the people and these acts of brigandage? To Syngman Rhee there is no Fatherland, nation or people. Every move Syngman Rhee makes he makes under the direction of his master, American imperialism, and on orders from Washington."
50. Such diatribes were dinned incessantly into listeners' ears by Radio Pyongyang. They were often very cleverly designed to play upon the prejudices or difficulties of special population groups.

(2) Guerrilla warfare in support of communist elements

51. The main part of the aggressive policy of the North Korean régime was the invasion of South Korea by armed bands formed in North Korea and trained in guerrilla warfare. The Commission received information of this guerrilla activity immediately upon its arrival in Seoul, and directed its best efforts towards ascertaining the extent of this activity. The Commission members paid visits to outlying areas, examined reports from the Republic of Korea, and conducted hearings of important witnesses. In addition, information was received that indicated the existence of large guerrilla training schools in North Korea, and of a carefully-planned campaign to infiltrate thousands of guerrillas and political agents through the north-south mountain chain with a view to attacking the Republic's military and police forces and to subverting the people by propaganda. Many of the guerrillas and agents were South Koreans trained in North Korea and sent back as combatants to areas where local knowledge would facilitate recruitment of local dissidents as well as their conduct of operations. These agents had to live off the land, but were supplied with arms and ammunition by the North Korean authorities. Members of the Commission inspected a large assortment of captured equipment and interrogated guerrilla prisoners. Analysis of this evidence has satisfied the Commission that the North Korean authorities were in fact carrying on a carefully-planned guerrilla campaign against the Republic of Korea.

(3) Attempts to foster insurrection

52. Intimately linked with this guerrilla campaign were the positive exhortations made by the North Korean authorities to the citizens and soldiers of South Korea. These exhortations were made in many of the broadcasts from Radio Pyongyang, and were repeated in leaflets of North Korean origin distributed in the South. Their purpose was to foster insurrection within the territory of the Republic of Korea. The people of South Korea were exhorted to fight more vigorously than ever for the peaceful unification of the Fatherland; to join the guerrillas or assist them with all their might. The guerrillas for their part were enjoined to extend the scope of their activities and cement their ties with the people. Civil servants were urged to commit sabotage. Radio Pyongyang exhorted the members of the armed forces to go over to the side of the guerrillas, carrying their guns with them. The leaflets distributed in the South pleaded with the soldiers to shoot their officers and then either to cross over to the North or to join guerrilla units.

53. Typical examples of these efforts to provoke mutiny and rebellion are to be found in the following further extract from the "Letter of Appeal" broadcast to all the Korean people on 13 January 1950 by the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the

Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland (A/AC.26/II/Monitor 3):

"Dear brothers and sisters: Let us concentrate all our patriotic might around the Democratic Front for the Attainment of the Unification of the Fatherland! Let us fight more vigorously than ever for the peaceful unification of the Fatherland. United we are strong and divided we are weak.

"Dear South Korean people! Assist with all your might the partisans, who are the most excellent sons and daughters of the Korean people. Support and defend them with love and respect! Give them more food and clothes.

"Dear patriotic people: Let every one of you join the partisans. If you love the Fatherland and do not want to become slaves to foreign aggressors, then every one of you must join the partisans.

"Dear heroic partisans, fight the enemies harder and more mercilessly than ever. Bolster your columns. Cement your ties with the people, overcome all difficulties and hardships and extend the scope of guerrilla activities. Launch your guerrilla activities everywhere and constantly. Create liberated areas wherever possible.

"No matter in what branch of the organs they may be serving, we call on those conscientious patriotic persons who are serving in the puppet organs of the traitor gang in spite of themselves, to sabotage, in opposition to the Syngman Rhee traitor gang, for the sake of the Fatherland and the people and to join the fighting column for the peaceful unification of the Fatherland.

"Dear men and officers of the National Defence Army, Dear Navy personnel, Dear Youth Defence Corps personnel:

"Your vicious enemy is none other than the traitor Syngman Rhee, who is biding his efforts to make out of you traitors whose crimes could not be purified for thousands of autumns to come, by cheating you into directing your guns of injustice at the bosoms of the people.

"Then for whom must you use your guns and your military arts and to crush whom? Certainly you must use them to crush the Syngman Rhee traitor gang, the vicious enemy of the people, for the sake of your beloved fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters. Go over to the side of the partisans, carrying guns with you, at the earliest possible moment. Join the patriotic struggle to crush the traitors. Officers, take your men and go over to the side of the partisans, and wipe off your names from the roll of traitors for thousands of autumns to come. Be heroes fighting for the sake of the Fatherland and the people. Be the loved sons and daughters of the people."

54. Another example of the effort to provoke mutiny and rebellion is contained in a North Korean leaflet picked up near Kangnung by troops of the Republic of Korea (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/R.6), in which the following exhortation occurs:

"Shoot your officers whenever you find them. Then, come to the North with this 'Pass to North Korea'. Even hundreds can enter the North with one pass. We will welcome you even if you have no pass at all.

"Come over to the North as soon as possible and let us fight for our Fatherland and people."
“If not, join the people’s guerrilla units with the arms you have in your hands.

“They will welcome you, too.”

(4) MAINTENANCE OF TENSION ON THE 38TH PARALLEL

55. In its report of July 1949 to the fourth session of the General Assembly, the Commission noted that the border was becoming the scene of increasingly frequent exchanges of fire of armed raids across the 38th parallel. It took account of information that some of the raids were set on foot for the purpose of introducing groups of trained saboteurs into the territory of the Republic of Korea. The Commission gave warning that there was serious danger of open military conflict being provoked.17

56. This state of tension continued. The Commission is of the opinion that the objective of this activity of the North Korean authorities along the parallel was to play upon the apprehensions of the Government of the Republic of Korea and at the same time to test the strength of the forces arrayed against them.

57. The Commission took note of the increase, since last year, in the number of pillboxes and gun emplacements, the elaboration of the trench systems and frontline positions facing each other across a no-man’s-land. Although it was well known that there was serious friction along the 38th parallel, it was difficult for the Commission to assess accurately the number and importance of the incidents that occurred. Reports for the year 1949 of the Republic of Korea and of a North Korean investigation committee appointed by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland made remarkably similar allegations: each charged the other party with hundreds of violations of the frontier. Tens of thousands of men were said to have been involved. The incidents alleged varied greatly in importance. Some involved farmers in search of stray animals or the firing of random shots. Others concerned small raids across the parallel to reconnoitre or test the strength of opposing units, to seize persons for interrogation or to wipe out a pillbox. Others had to do with violation of the frontier by attacks in battlefield strength.

58. On the eastern sector, in north-eastern Kangwon Province, the Republic of Korea commander informed the Commission’s Committee of the Whole in mid-March that in the last six months of 1949, forty-nine attacks involving 2,369 men had been launched from North Korea and, during the last ten weeks, thirteen attacks involving 289 men. All raids had been repulsed, and in the case of the largest raid, in September 1949, by a specially-trained guerrilla band, the entire group had been annihilated in an October operation when 256 were killed and fifty-nine taken prisoner. Enemy losses in the last six months of 1949 were stated (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/R.6) to have included: 333 killed, sixty-three prisoners captured, three surrendered and twelve wounded. Among the material taken had been four machine-guns, twenty-one US M-1 rifles and nine US carbines, twenty-four USSR rifles and sixty-four Japanese-made weapons. The losses of the Korean Army in this period had included thirty-six soldiers and twenty-eight police killed, and fifty-seven soldiers and nine police wounded. In January and February 1950, enemy losses included twenty-one killed, thirty-two captured and four wounded.18

59. Analysis by the Commission of Republic of Korea intelligence reports suggested that most of these numerous incidents involved no more than the exchange of a few shots by border troops. Military authorities assured the Commission that, where raids had occurred, they had been reconnaissance raids and designed to test the opposing forces rather than to be the prelude of an invasion in force into the territory of the Republic of Korea. There was no evidence to suggest that any raids heralded a large-scale offensive.

60. At the beginning of the year 1950 the Foreign Minister informed the Commission that raids along the parallel had decreased from 527 in August to twenty-five in December 1949 (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/SR.3). Brigadier General W. L. Roberts, Chief of the United States Korean Military Advisory Group, also estimated that the number of border incidents had declined. He did not regard the incidents along the parallel as particularly serious, and pointed out the inevitability of friction and minor outbreaks between two hostile forces arrayed so close to one another, under commanders anxious to maintain the alertness and fighting morale of their troops. The Commission noted, however, that raids were taking place, shots were being fired, and soldiers and civilians were being wounded, taken prisoner or killed.

61. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Commission firmly believed that the large majority of the incidents along the 38th parallel were deliberately provoked by the North Korean forces. All Republic of Korea officers questioned by the Commission stated they were under strict orders not to raid across the parallel. The Commission was the more inclined to believe that these orders were substantially obeyed when it was made aware by General Roberts of the attitude taken by the United States Government in this matter. In January 1950, he stated to members of the Commission that the Government of the United States had informed the Government of the Republic that the launching of any attack from South Korea would be immediately followed by the termination of all aid, both military and economic, from the United States. Further, he stated that the armament left to the Army of the Republic of Korea by the United States forces when they withdrew had been limited to defensive weapons, including small calibre artillery, but without tanks and without air-planes, and that this had been done in order to make it impossible for South Korea even to contemplate launching a war for the unification of the country.

(5) THE DECEPTIVE APPEAL FOR UNIFICATION BY PEACEFUL MEANS

62. Part of the policy of aggression was the initiation of a deceptive drive for unification by peaceful means. This drive began, early in June 1950, with an appeal for a joint conference of delegates from democratic political parties and from social organizations of South and North Korea. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification by peaceful means. The appeal was initially launched by the Democratic Front for the Attainment of


18 See also A/AC.26/II/CW.1/R.5, pages 8 et seq., for a description of similar conditions along another sector of the parallel north of Chunchon, also in Kangwon Province.
of Unification of the Fatherland and would appear to have had more aims than one.19

63. The appeal was addressed to all democratic political parties and social organizations of both southern and northern halves of the Fatherland and "to all the people of Korea". It was to be distributed to a number of political parties, social organizations and individuals listed in an annex to the appeal. The "United Nations Commission" was included amongst those to whom the appeal was to be distributed. It contained the following proposals:

"(1) That general elections be held between 5 and 8 August to establish a unified supreme legislative organ;

"(2) That the supreme legislative organ thus elected should be convoked at Seoul on 15 August, the fifth anniversary of Korea's liberation from the yoke of the Japanese régime;

"(3) That a Consultative Council of representatives of all democratic political parties and social organizations of both the North and South should be held from 15 June through 17 June either at Haeju or Kaesong to discuss and decide the following matters:

"(a) The various conditions for peaceful unification of the fatherland;

"(b) The procedure for holding the general elections to the supreme legislative organ of Korea;

"(c) The creation of a central election committee to direct the holding of the elections.

"(4) The Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland proposes the following conditions for participation in the above-mentioned Consultative Council of representatives of all democratic political parties and social organizations of both the South and the North;

"(a) That such traitors as Syngman Rhee, Lee Bum Suk, Kim Sung-Soo, Shin Sung Mo, Chough Pyong Ok, Chai Pyung Duk, Paek Sung Wook, Yoon Chi Young, and Cynn Heung Woo should not be allowed to participate in the Consultative Council;

"(b) That the United Nations Commission on Korea should not be permitted to interfere in the task of unification of the fatherland; the Korean people should solve the question of the unification of the fatherland by their own efforts and without foreign intervention.

"(5) That the present authorities of the two régimes in the South and North should assume the responsibility for guaranteeing public order during the period of the meeting of the proposed Consultative Council and the period of the elections."

64. This appeal was repeated in similar terms on 19 June, six days before the aggression, by the "Praesidium of the People's Supreme Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea".

65. Taking into account the fact that the aggression occurred on 25 June, it becomes obvious that an appeal issued on 7 June, repeated on 19 June, and providing for a general election to be held between 5 and 8 August for "the peaceful unification of the fatherland", had no other purpose than to divert the attention of the Government of the Republic of Korea from all thought of aggression from the North. The Commission has already informed the Security Council that in the light of the "utterly unexpected invasion on 25 June the radio propaganda offensive calling for early unification by peaceful means seems to have been intended solely for its screening effect" (S/1505).
A. Terms of reference

66. Under paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 293 (IV), the Commission, having in mind the objectives set forth in the General Assembly resolutions of 14 November 1947 and 12 December 1948, and also the status of the Government of the Republic of Korea, as defined in the latter resolution, should:

“(a) Observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea;

“(b) Seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea; and make available its good offices and be prepared to assist, whenever in its judgment a favourable opportunity arises, in bringing about the unification of Korea in accordance with the principles laid down by the General Assembly in the resolution of 14 November 1947;

“(c) Have authority, in order to accomplish the aims defined under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the present paragraph, in its discretion to appoint observers, and to utilize the services and good offices of one or more persons whether or not representatives on the Commission;

“(d) Be available for observation and consultation throughout Korea in the continuing development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people, including elections of national scope;

“(e) Verify the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces in so far as it is in a position to do so”.

67. Further, in accordance with paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Commission should render a report to the fifth session of the General Assembly, and should remain in existence pending a new decision by the General Assembly.

68. Because unification and the promotion of representative government remained the fundamental aims of the General Assembly, the Commission’s terms of reference were substantially similar to those of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in 1949. However, out of concern for the situation in Korea as described by the Commission in 1949, resolution 293 (IV) added a new task: observing and reporting developments likely to “lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea”. In order to accomplish this task, the Commission was authorized “in its discretion to appoint observers”. Regarding this function, it had been stated in the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly that in the event conflict should occur, the United Nations would have at hand testimony from a duly constituted agency of its own regarding the nature and origin of such conflict and regarding the responsibility for its occurrence.20

B. Attitudes towards the Commission

(1) Attitude of the Republic of Korea

69. The Republic of Korea has continued to regard the Commission as an important symbol of the United Nations interest in Korea. The Republic, recognizing that it is in some sense a creation of the United Nations, looks upon it for assistance in solving many of its problems. Generous co-operation has been extended to the Commission by the Government, which has willingly acceded to all requests made for investigatory facilities and has helped arrange for conferences with all persons designated by the Commission. The Government has also provided, upon request, such information as was within its capacity to supply. The general attitude of the Government was to regard the Commission as a moral force constituting a stabilizing factor and a deterrent to external aggression. There were only two instances of the Commission’s being called upon by the Government of the Republic to offer practical assistance. In late April the Commission was invited in a letter from the Foreign Minister to observe national elections on 30 May 1950, as a “continuing development of representative government in Korea”. In mid-June the Government suggested that the Commission should offer to take part in an exchange of political prisoners.21

(2) North Korean attitude

70. Immediately upon convening in Seoul in December 1949, the Commission was made aware by broadcasts over Radio Pyongyang that hostility similar to that encountered by the United Nations Commissions in 1948 and 1949 would make it impossible for it to cross the parallel or to establish contact with the North Korean authorities. How bitter and unrelenting this hostility of the Northern régime was can best be shown by quoting some broadcasts from this radio station.

71. A broadcast from Radio Pyongyang, sponsored by the “Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland”, had on 25 November 1949...
denounced as unlawful General Assembly resolution 293 (IV) which continued the Commission in being. It called "upon all the patriotic political parties and social organizations to boycott the United Nations Commission and frustrate, by all our means and resources, the activities of the Commission, which opposes the interests of the Korean people" (A/AC.26/II/L.5). Another talk on 19 December 1949 (A/AC.26/II/L.8) characterized the resumption of the Commission's activities as "a brazen expression of the bandit colonization policy of the American imperialists in Korea", and asserted that the United Nations Commission on Korea "divided our fatherland, fabricated the anti-popular Syngman Rhee puppet Government and covered up the massacre policy of the Syngman Rhee gang". "A three-foot high child", said the speaker, "knows that the United Nations Commission on Korea has been engaged in reactionary plotting from the beginning to the end". The Americans who needed the Commission as a suitable "smoke-screen" to realize their plans of "converting Korea into a colony and a military base, enslaving the Korean people and seizing Korea's natural resources", were abusing "the sacred name of the United Nations General Assembly". "The beggars of the so-called United Nations Commission on Korea cannot and do not intend to solve the Korean issue... They will attempt to cheat the just opinion of the world by launching a campaign of distortion and try to find an excuse to dispatch American forces to Korea". Concluding with the reminder that the Korean people have strong forces in the North which constitute "armed security for the peaceful unification of our fatherland", the speaker prophesied that the Commission "will meet a miserable plight... If it is wise, it will pack up and leave immediately."

72. On 24 December 1949, a broadcast entitled "Let us smash the United Nations Commission on Korea, a tool of aggression of the American imperialists" (A/AC.26/II/L.8) singled out what was termed the "newly established Military Supervision Committee", which, it was alleged, was tacked on to the Commission because "the American imperialists cannot trust in the capacity of the South Korean army trained by them" and will thus possess a device "for dispatching a large United States Army to Korea". Concluding with the reminder that the Korean people have strong forces in the North which constitute "armed security for the peaceful unification of our fatherland", the speaker prophesied that the Commission "will meet a miserable plight... If it is wise, it will pack up and leave immediately."

C. Sources of the Commission's evidence

75. The denial by the North Korean authorities of opportunities for direct observation north of the 38th parallel restricted the Commission to observation within the territory of the Republic of Korea, and to analysis of evidence that could be collected only south of the parallel. The methods employed by the Commission in its task took the following forms:

(a) Hearing of evidence from qualified officials of the Republic of Korea and of the United States Korean Military Advisory Group;

(b) Visits by members of the Commission or of the secretariat to areas along the parallel and any other areas where the situation was considered critical;

(c) Examination of reports received from the Government of the Republic of Korea on the extent of guerrilla activities;

(d) Scrutiny of monitored broadcasts from Radio Pyongyang and examination of North Korean propaganda leaflets;

(e) Dispatch of field observers for the purpose of direct observation, particularly in areas lying adjacent to the 38th parallel.

D. The setting-up of the observation system

76. On 7 February 1950 the Commission established a Committee of the Whole to consider ways of implementing the Commission's task of observing and reporting any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea. The Committee of the Whole, in order to obtain first-hand evidence and the best opinion available, decided to hear the views of leading personalities in the Republic of Korea in regard to such
topics as the situation on the 38th parallel, guerrilla warfare and other subversive activities within the Republic. It also decided to undertake immediate field trips in the area of the 38th parallel and in the interior of South Korea. Consequently, in February 1950, the Committee of the Whole heard Colonel Ben C. Limb, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Captain Sihn Sung Mo, Minister of National Defence, Police Captain Song Pyung Sup, Deputy Director of National Security, and General W. L. Roberts, Chief, United States Korean Military Advisory Group.

77. Following upon these hearings, several field trips were undertaken by the Committee in order to gain practical understanding of conditions in critical areas. On 14 and 15 February local authorities were heard at Taegu in south-eastern Korea, and a visit was made to a nearby zone of operations against guerrillas. In the course of that visit a village was inspected which had only a few days previously been the scene of guerrilla outrages. On 24 and 25 February a second trip was undertaken, this time to Chuncheon, Kangwon Province, and to a nearby sector of the parallel, sixty miles north-east of Seoul, where military installations and entrenchments were visited. On 12 and 13 March a third trip took the Commission to Kangnung on the east coast of the peninsula and to the nearby sector of the 38th parallel. On another occasion several members of the Commission visited yet another sector of the 38th parallel, north of Kaesong. On all these trips the Committee took advantage of opportunities to question captured guerrillas and refugees from the North as well as the local military and civilian authorities.

78. On 2 March 1950 the Committee of the Whole submitted to the Commission a progress report (A/AC.26/II/L.23), which concluded by recommending the employment of trained observers who would be stationed where needed under the prevailing circumstances, and would enable the Commission to be in constant touch with the actual situation. The Korean authorities consulted by the Committee were of the opinion that, although the situation held no immediate danger, the presence of United Nations field observers to watch developments on the spot would help the Commission to present an accurate picture to the United Nations. They also believed that the very presence of field observers would have a strong deterrent effect upon North Korean activities along the 38th parallel.

79. The Commission, on 25 March 1950, decided to request the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with eight observers, and with the necessary ancillary staff and equipment. The task of the observers, it was decided, would include observation, investigation, and interrogation, in connexion with guerrilla activities in Korea and with military incidents in the region of the 38th parallel or in such other places as the Commission might decide.

80. Towards the end of May 1950, two United Nations field observers arrived in Seoul. As the arrival of the other six observers was delayed, the Committee of the Whole authorized the Principal Secretary to make arrangements for field trips to be carried out by these two observers, so that they might familiarize themselves with conditions in the regions along the 38th parallel. On the basis of this knowledge, they were to prepare a plan for the organization of the observers into teams in the field. It was also understood that the teams would bring to the notice of the Commission any important matters and any evidence they might be able to obtain during their field trips.

81. After a statement of the Acting Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, Captain Sihn Sung Mo, on 10 May that "North Korean troops were moving in force towards the 38th parallel and that there was imminent danger of invasion from the North", the Commission, desirous of obtaining from its own sources full corroboration in so grave a matter, requested the Secretary-General to send to Korea as quickly as possible the field observers already designated.

E. The verification of the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces

82. The Commission had been directed to verify the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces "in so far as it is in a position to do so". Not having been admitted by the North Korean authorities into their territory, the Commission has not been in a position to discharge this function.

Chapter V. The Question of Unification

83. To the United Nations Commissions on Korea in 1948 and 1949 had been assigned the primary mission of the unification of Korea. The wording in General Assembly resolution 293 (IV) recognized the almost insurmountable obstacles to unification. Paragraph 1 (b) of the resolution gave precedence to the question of facilitating "the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea". This suggested a belief on the part of the General Assembly that the removal of these barriers might constitute a step towards unification. The second clause of paragraph 1 (b) enjoined the Commission to "make available its good offices and be prepared to assist, whenever in its judgment a favourable opportunity arises, in bringing about the unification of Korea". This was interpreted by the Commission as meaning that its role was to be a passive one pending possible developments (A/AC.26/II/SR.5).

A. Establishment of Sub-Committee I

84. The Commission agreed that paragraph 1 (a) of its mandate, regarding the observation of developments likely to lead to or involve military conflict, must receive primary attention because of the urgency of the problem involved. The problem of unification, nevertheless, remained the fundamental objective towards which the Commission should work. Consequently on 7 Feb-
February 1950, Sub-Committee I, consisting of the representatives of Australia, China and India, was established to "concern itself with and report to the Commission on the implementation of section 1 (b) of the resolution" (A/AC.26/II/SR.7). The Sub-Committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. Anup Singh of India, decided to approach its task (1) by hearing the views of leading personalities in Korea in regard to the removal of existing barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse and in regard to the question of unification of Korea, and (2) by "informing the people of both South and North Korea" by means of broadcasts "of the objects and aims of the Commission with particular emphasis on the question of unification" (A/AC.26/II/L.21).

85. Lists of those to be heard were drawn up by the Sub-Committee with a view to obtaining the opinions of representative personalities in the Republic of Korea, some of whom would deal with the political aspect of the problem of unification while others would deal with its economic and social aspects. These lists were approved by the Commission as presented, but never at any time was it implied that the approval of a given list meant a closing of the Commission's door to other persons who might have useful views to put before it. The position of the Commission in this regard was made quite clear at a public meeting held on 13 February, when the Chairman of Sub-Committee I stated that "anyone wishing to submit his name for a hearing or to present suggestions for the Commission for bringing about the unification of Korea was free to do so" (A/AC.26/II/SR.9).

86. Between 10 February and 10 April 1950, Sub-Committee I heard the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Commerce and Industry, the Chairman of the National Assembly, the Chief of the Mission in Korea of the United Nations Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) and other leading figures.

87. The views expressed on unification and removal of barriers were almost identical with those expressed to the Commission in 1949. All those who appeared before the Sub-Committee were unanimous in their desire for unification. They emphasized the paramount urgency of this problem in the minds and hearts of all Koreans. Unification of Korea was stated to be primarily the concern of the Korean people. However, those heard stressed the fact that Koreans were not responsible for division of the country at the 38th parallel; they reiterated that the North Korean regime was under the influence of a great communist Power, and they stated their belief that the problem should be also the concern of the United Nations and, especially, that of all democratic nations. There was a clear consensus that the division of the country should be traced back to the decisions taken at the Moscow Conference and that, consequently, action to restore a unified and independent Korea must come from the two Powers concerned. The fundamental and most urgent issue, according to the Prime Minister, was the removal of the Soviet influence from North Korea. The Foreign Minister was certain that the people of North Korea, given an opportunity to express themselves freely, would align themselves with the Republic (A/AC.26/II/SC.1/SR.3).

88. With one solitary exception, all those who appeared before the Sub-Committee emphasized the principle of unification by peaceful means. The Commission, however, noted, from time to time, statements by the President, the Foreign Minister, and other leading and influential politicians, which suggested that time was running out, that in desperation unification by force might have to be restored as to the ultimate solution. Thus on the first anniversary of recognition of the Government of the Republic of Korea by the General Assembly the Foreign Minister expressed the "hope that the people will make every effort to remove the 38th parallel line so as to consummate the national unification of Korea by 12 December next year. With this end in view, it is requested that the people be firmly determined and prepared to shed their blood from now on". Similarly, at a Press conference on 30 December 1949 President Rhee stated: "We must obtain unification in the new year, and I believe we can... We have been maintaining a patient attitude with sincerity in order to co-operate with the United Nations. We will continue our efforts to obtain re-unification through mutual understanding of the Korean people. But, once the unavoidable time comes, we probably cannot avoid bloodshed and civil strife. If, unfortunately, we cannot gain unity this year, we shall be compelled to unify our territory by ourselves."

89. Again, on 10 February 1950 Captain Sihn, Minister of National Defence, told the Committee of the Whole that "Koreans could no longer endure the present situation in Korea. The division of the country into two had struck a mortal blow at its capacity to exist". He likened the situation "to that of a man with a dagger thrust in his body. Only on the dagger being removed could it be known whether or not the man would survive. If the United Nations could not succeed in removing that 'dagger' from Korea—which it had so far failed to do—then the Korean people themselves would have to use their own efforts and powers to do so." (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/SR.2)

90. When the Foreign Minister appeared before Sub-Committee I he was questioned regarding the statement by President Rhee quoted above. Referring to the homogeneity of the Korean people and the division of the country for the past five years, the Foreign Minister said it was natural that every patriotic Korean should have an impatient and fervent desire for reunification. It was even more natural, he continued, that, at the beginning of a new year, the opportunity should be taken to express the wish to see achievement of that desire within the coming year. Referring to the incursions across the 38th parallel into the territory of the Republic and to subversive guerrilla activities, he stated that the possibility of military action "would depend on the people of the North... No one in the Republic of Korea was willing to surrender the country to the communists without recourse to military force".

91. Although the Commission did not believe that government leaders had any actual intention of resorting to the desperate expedient of force, such statements by responsible persons served to emphasize the seriousness of the problem. Extravagant demands for an immediate invasion of the North to unify Korea and liberate the people of the North from their imposed control...
rulers were also occasionally made by private individuals. The domestic political appeal of such a rallying cry was an undeniable attraction, but on the other hand it did provide fuel for the propaganda machine across the parallel.

92. It must be stated that at no time did these occasional demands for resort to force assume a character of co-ordination, nor was the Commission able to find evidence of premeditated planning behind them. They did not in fact appear to have any connexion with reality. At the very same meeting of the Committee of the Whole, during which the Minister of Defence launched into rhetorical metaphor, the Acting Chief of Staff of the South Korean Army gave facts and figures regarding the growing superiority of the North Korean forces and stated his belief "that an attack would come whenever signs of weakness were shown by South Korea. The North Korean régime was hurrying to complete all necessary preparations, before the National Army could be considerably strengthened as a result of arms aid under the Korea-United States Arms Pact" (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/SR.2).

93. But if there was no intention to resort to force against the North Korean régime, the Commission was left in no doubt as to the views held regarding the status of that régime. All those who appeared before Sub-Committee I were in agreement that the Government of the Republic of Korea was the only lawful Government in Korea. Consequently it was held that the Government of the Republic of Korea had jurisdiction not only over South Korea but also over North Korea, where there existed an illegal régime. Any idea of formal negotiation with the Northern régime, either by the Republic or by the Commission, was rejected, as it was held to imply recognition of an illegal entity. The Foreign Minister felt certain that the United Nations would find a way to implement in a democratic fashion its resolutions of 1947 and 1948, by observing elections in North Korea as it had done in the South and by assuring that the jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea was extended over the North. That was, in his opinion, the only democratic and legal way of solving the Korean problem (A/AC.26/II/SC.1/SR.3).

94. One much-emphasized, though not exactly new, suggestion was that the Commission should make a determined effort to visit North Korea. This idea was seized on by a number of those heard, but the variety of opinions expressed convinced the Sub-Committee that no serious consideration had been given to what useful work in North Korea could be done by the Commission in the existing circumstances, even if it should succeed in getting there. It appeared originally that the visit was suggested chiefly for the propaganda value to South Korea that might accrue from it. The Foreign Minister went further in stating that even if the Commission accomplished nothing tangible during a visit to North Korea, its mere presence there would loom a wave of patriotic fervour throughout the whole of Korea and would raise to an even higher pitch the desire of the people of the North to rejoin their country (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/SR.3).

C. Removal of economic and other barriers

95. No constructive views were advanced, during the Sub-Committee's hearings, on ways and means to remove barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse. The majority of those heard opposed any attempt at resumption of trade between the two zones, for fear that, as in the past, these channels would be exploited for subversive purposes by the Northern régime. A minority in favour of reopening of trade relations stated that the Korean Government might consider the possibility of trade, but that such trade would have to be carefully supervised to avoid its use for subversive purposes. There was also another aspect, involving the question of the illegality of the North Korean régime. The impossibility of the Republic of Korea's dealing with this illegal régime appeared to stand squarely in the way of any fresh approach (A/AC.26/II/SC.1/SR.3).

96. A different view was taken by the Chief of the United States Economic Co-operation Administration in Korea. In surveying the problem, he stated that, political considerations apart, a resumption of trade between the North and South would be highly desirable because the economies of the two zones had been and would continue to be complementary, the North having steel, electric power and fertilizer plants and the South, consumer goods such as cotton and rubber products. The ECA programme for developing a viable economy in South Korea would not lead to excess production in the event that unification were effected. He also said that the proceeds of the sale of North Korean goods in South Korea had been largely used for advancing subversive communist activities and recalled that, on the one occasion (December 1948) when some official trade had been attempted, a South Korean ship had been confiscated in North Korea.

97. The suggestion that, in regard to the resumption of trade across the 38th parallel, there might be established under international control a trading organization on a small territory on the parallel, received some theoretical support.

98. On 10 April the Sub-Committee called a halt for the time being to its series of hearings and submitted a first progress report to the Commission (A/AC.26/II/L.28). The fact that no new substantive idea had been brought forward, that no note of confidence was sounded, served notice on the Commission, if notice were needed, that the forebodings of its predecessor, the Temporary Commission, were not to be ignored. The division along the parallel had hardened with the passage of time, making ever more difficult the finding of a solution to the basic Korean problem.

D. Broadcasts to North Korea

99. It was more than ever essential for Sub-Committee I to proceed with the second part of its task, namely “informing the people of both South and North Korea, by means of broadcasts, of the objects and aims of the Commission with particular emphasis on the question of unification”. The Commission was aware of the bitterly antagonistic broadcasts that Radio P'yongyang had continued to direct against it. It studied these diatribes, searching for some sign of a lessening in the campaign of slander, hostility and abuse. The fact that the search was a vain one did not deter the Commission from its task. It authorized a series of radio broadcasts and in the course of these extended the hand of friendship and co-operation to the North Korean authorities
and offered to visit North Korea whenever facilities were made available.

100. These appeals from the Commission were worded with the greatest care so as to avoid any hint of controversy or provocation. The constant abuse from Radio Pyongyang was perhaps intended to be answer enough, for there were no direct replies to the peaceful appeals of the Commission. The latest of these appeals was made on 11 May 1950, when the Chairman of Sub-Committee I concluded a broadcast (A/AC.26/II/L.37) with the following:

"Why do we persist in our desire to visit you? It is because we believe that you as much as your brethren in the South wish and long for unification. We believe that you too must like to see an end to the tragic happenings along the 38th parallel.

"We do not have to remind you of your bonds with the people in the South. They are your people, your kith and kin, and your blood. Who can feel the travail and agony of separation more poignantly than the people of this country?

"On behalf of the Commission, I extend to you once again in utter sincerity, our hand of friendship and repeat our offer to visit you in the North.

"We eagerly await your response." 24

No response came.

101. Meanwhile on 6 May 1950 a broadcast to the people of North Korea (A/AC.26/II/L.38) had been made by President Rhee. This broadcast emphasized how far the rift had developed since the early post-war faith that differences could be settled around a conference table. This broadcast made no appeal to force, but it did assume, as did the daily broadcasts from Radio Pyongyang, that unification of Korea could come not by any form of compromise, but only through the absorption of one régime by the other. The text was as follows:

"Fellow-countrymen in the North, for quite a long while, I have not addressed a word to you, not because I have forgotten even for a moment your distress or wrath, but because I would rather keep silent in the absence of fitting words to console you, while awaiting a favourable turn of the world trend that will make it possible to solve our problem by peaceful means. We are doing our best in this direction.

"I have, on a number of occasions, heard the desperate appeal from our countrymen in the North—an appeal for an order through the radio that the northern people should, on a certain date, stage an all-out uprising to eliminate the communist elements, and thus bring about the unification of North and South.

"Such action, however, could be decided upon and put into practice only when we in the South are ready in the first place to protect you in the North from danger, and in the second to fight. We are not in a position to advocate such bloodshed since we are unable to take unilateral action in defiance of international friendship and integrity.

"It has been our hope that those elements among the people of the North, which, misled by communist agitation, try to sell the country to a foreign Power and reduce the people to slavery, would repent and resolve to join us in the task of national unification, to enjoy freedom and happiness together.

"We are quite prepared to welcome all of you to the South and share alike hardships with you. In that event, however, the northern half of our beautiful peninsula would revert to a wilderness. Fellow-countrymen in the North, you should stick to your posts and wait for the opportunity to bring about unification through a joint struggle with us in the South. Be patient, even if it is trying. The longed-for day will come soon.

"The only solution to our problem would be for the Korean communists to repent and shake hands with us, resolving to enjoy freedom and happiness as the common descendants of a race which had kept its homogeneity for well-nigh 5,000 years, under the Government of the Republic. And it is the duty of the people of both North and South to convert them to that view. That is the only way.

"I am prepared to receive all the traitors, including Kim Il Sung, with open arms and to give them due positions and fair opportunity if they will repent and resolve to devote themselves to the establishment of a sound basis of the Republic for the benefit of future generations.

"If they repent now, the foreign influence, which aims to invade this country using them as its puppets, will be discouraged and withdrawn. We could then sit down together and solve all problems peacefully and methodically, strengthening the foundation of the nation in the course of four or five years. That would not only be to the supreme glory of the whole Korean race in the family of nations, but would also enable the merit of those who have hitherto been puppets to be praised forever. Further, it would mean that they would be contributing to the peace of the Orient."

102. This then was the position in May. The Commission had attempted to communicate with North Korea and the President of the Republic of Korea had, quite independently, directed an appeal of his own north of the 38th parallel. The record of the hearings of Sub-Committee I did not provide any basis for a judgment by the Commission that the "favourable opportunity" referred to in its terms of reference had arisen. The suggestion of an attempt at a resumption of trade between the two zones of Korea had either been opposed because of a fear of its exploitation for subversive purposes or favoured only on condition that this danger could be obviated. The Commission at this juncture had decided to observe the elections to be held in the Republic of Korea on 30 May, and was committed to a programme in this connexion that would tax all its available resources. For the time being the positive activities of Sub-Committee I were necessarily suspended. A watch was, however, kept on developments, and information was collected on two specific lines of approach that had been raised from the Commission side during the series of hearings. The first concerned the possibility of utilizing two humanitarian offices of the International Red Cross to promote contacts between members of the same family divided between the two zones and faced with personal tragedy. The second involved the establishment of an international trading organization referred to in paragraph 97 above.

24 See also A/AC.26/II/L.30 and A/AC.26/II/SC.1/R.4 for texts of other broadcasts to North Korea.
E. The North Korean appeal for peaceful unification of the fatherland

103. In early June, while the Commission was collating the reports of its election observation teams, Radio Pyongyang gave wide publicity to an article in the North Korean Press by Lee Yong of the Labouring People's Party calling for an intensification of measures aimed at unifying the country. Statements by political leaders in support of his proposal were broadcast daily. A commentator on 3 June 1950 stated that the signing by 5,300,000 people in the North of an appeal for peace and unification meant that a renewed struggle for national unification was beginning.

104. On 5 June 1950, the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland announced that agreement had been reached on a fundamental policy for expediting the peaceful unification of Korea on the basis of proposals arising out of Lee Yong's article (A/AC.26/II/Monitor 10). This was followed on 7 June 1950 by the broadcasting of an appeal outlining a detailed programme for unification. General elections were suggested for the period 5-8 August to establish a unified supreme legislative organ, and it was also suggested that that body should be convened at Seoul on 15 August to commemorate the fifth anniversary of Korea's liberation from the yoke of the Japanese régime by a unified fatherland. It was recommended that a consultative council of the representatives of all "democratic political parties and social organizations of both the North and the South" should be held from 15 June through 17 June at Haeju (North Korea) or Kaesong (South Korea) to discuss and decide conditions and procedures involved. Although certain fundamental conditions were suggested: namely, the exclusion of "such traitors" as the President and other important government figures and the exclusion of the United Nations Commission from interference, the tone of the appeal nevertheless appeared to indicate an ostensible change in the attitude of the North as expressed in a similar manifesto of the Democratic Front issued in the previous June.  

105. Broadcasts on the following days invited the representatives of almost all political parties and social organizations in the South to appear on 10 June 1950 at Yohyon station just north of the parallel to receive copies of the appeal. Included in the list of those invited was the United Nations Commission on Korea. Specifically excepted, however, were the Taiwan Nationalist Party and the Democratic Nationalist Party, the two strongest political parties, and nine leading personalities in the Government who were termed "criminals who have obstructed the peaceful unification of the fatherland" (A/AC.26/II/L.47). The Commission decided that it should seize this opportunity presented it to come into contact with the North. It appointed Mr. J. P. Gaillard, the Acting Deputy Principal Secretary of the Commission, as its representative to meet the three representatives from the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland who would be waiting to deliver the appeal. The Commission's representative was authorized to receive a copy of the appeal and to attempt at the same time to transmit to the Northern representatives copies of its previous broadcasts to North Korea. It was made quite clear in a public statement that the Commission, in taking this step, in no way associated itself with the terms of the appeal, which in its broadcast form already plainly laid down conditions that ran counter to the provisions of the General Assembly resolutions of 1948 and 1949.

106. The Commission's representative, who was the only person, among those invited, to cross the parallel, attempted to deliver copies of the Commission's broadcasts to the Northern representatives, but they were not accepted. These emissaries stated that they were mere agents and were without authority to enter into any discussions or accept any documents. They added that in any case the contents of the Commission's broadcasts were known to the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland.

107. The following day Radio Pyongyang announced that the three emissaries had been directed to cross the parallel and proceed to Seoul in order to deliver copies to the designated organizations. As soon as the three emissaries crossed the parallel they were placed under detention, and efforts were made to induce them to accept the point of view of the Republic of Korea. All three emissaries did in fact make broadcasts to the effect that they had been converted to the Republic's point of view. These developments were closely followed by the Commission and arrangements were made to hold a hearing of the three emissaries. At this hearing two of those who had broadcast stated that their scripts had been edited before the broadcast, while the third said that he had read from a script prepared for him. Two of them declared to the Commission that they would prefer to live in North Korea. One of these two admitted, however, that he had been impressed by what he had seen of conditions in the Republic and felt that it would be necessary to revise certain North Korean assumptions. All three stated that they had been well treated in the Republic of Korea.

108. This step of detaining "envoys of peace" touched off a violent chain of denunciation by Radio Pyongyang, and impassioned pleas were made for the "smashing of the Syngman Rhee gang" as the means of implementing the peace appeal (A/AC.26/II/Monitor 19, 21, 24).

109. Almost simultaneously there came a sudden proposal broadcast from the North to exchange the important political figure Cho Man Sik, Chairman of the Korean Democratic Party reportedly under house arrest in Pyongyang since 1945, and his son for two key underground leaders of the communist South Korea Labour Party, under sentence of death for subversive activities. Consequent upon a suggestion of the Government of the Republic of Korea, the Commission agreed to mediate, but only if its good offices were acceptable to both parties.

110. A variation in the terms of the "peace appeal" occurred on 19 June (A/AC.26/II/Monitor 18). The "Praesidium of the People's Supreme Assembly of the Republic" unanimously proposed that peaceful unification of Korea should be achieved by combining the People's Supreme Assembly and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea into a single legislative assembly of all Korea, which would adopt a republican con-
stitution and organize a republican government. In the future a general election of the whole Korean legislature was to be based on the adopted constitution. The new proposal contained unacceptable conditions similar to those noted in the earlier programme. Actually it suggested the arrest of the President and Acting Prime Minister "and all other traitors of the people" and the immediate departure from Korea of the United Nations Commission on Korea, the "American imperialist tool". The final date for peaceful unification was again set at 15 August.

111. This campaign for "unification by peaceful means" was denounced by the South Korean Press, political parties and leaders as sheer propaganda. President Rhee himself took the occasion to remind Koreans of what he had said in his broadcast of 6 May 1950 to North Korea, namely, that "the only solution to our problem would be for the Korean communists to repent and shake hands with us, resolving to enjoy freedom and happiness as the common descendants of a race which had kept its homogeneity for well-nigh 5,000 years, under the Government of the Republic... I am prepared to receive all the traitors, including Kim Il Sung, with open arms and to give them due positions and fair opportunity if they will repent and resolve to devote themselves to the establishment of a sound basis of the Republic for the benefit of future generations." (A/AC.26/II/L.38.)

112. In reply to the Commission's offer to mediate regarding the exchange of prisoners referred to in paragraph 109, Radio Pyongyang on 20 June rejected any Commission role in arrangements for the exchange. Negotiations on the subject, however, continued by means of radio broadcasts, and this marked in effect the first occasion on which the Republic of Korea Government and the Northern régime had even indirectly communicated with one another (A/AC.26/II/Moniter 16).

113. Arrangements for the exchange were still pending and the unification drive from Radio Pyongyang was still continuing on the eve of the invasion.

Chapter VI. Economic and Political Factors Affecting the Development of Representative Government in the Republic of Korea

A. The inheritance

114. Paragraph 1 (d) of General Assembly resolution 293 (IV) directed the Commission to "Be available for observation and consultation throughout Korea in the continuing development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people, including elections of national scope". The Commission has accordingly continued to study as in 1949 the development of representative government in the Republic and the weighty economic problems threatening its progress.

115. Basic to any discussion of the present problems of the Republic of Korea and the development there of representative government is the unhappy legacy to which the South Koreans fell heir upon the defeat of Japan. The feudal Korea of 1900 had, by 1945, acquired under Japanese rule a machinery of government, a system of communications and electric power, and an industrial and commercial machine. Nevertheless, Korea had been developed as a part of the Japanese economy and not as a self-sustaining unit. The Korean economy, geared to and complementary to Japan's, was entirely disrupted by the defeat of Japan. During the years of the Second World War, moreover, industrial plants had seriously deteriorated and agricultural output had been sharply reduced. Added to these handicaps was the fact that the Japanese had pursued a policy of deliberately excluding Koreans from governmental, engineering, technical and managerial positions in order to retain control of all key functions.

116. Within a few months after the liberation of Korea in September 1945, the Japanese population was completely repatriated. The unavoidable result was a dearth of qualified Korean personnel to fill governmental, technical and even workshop positions. In addition, it was necessary to develop a completely new educational system to replace that formerly controlled by Japan.

117. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel had possibly even more disastrous an effect on the Korean economy than the long Japanese domination and the consequence of Japanese defeat. Resources are not evenly distributed throughout the peninsula, and the economies of the northern and southern portions are complementary one to the other. Although both in the South and the North some 70 per cent of the population are dependent for their livelihood on agricultural pursuits, and produce almost equivalent per capita amounts, South Korea traditionally exchanged its surplus rice and barley for North Korean beans, millet, corn, wheat and fish. The South, lacking certain basic mineral resources, concentrated on lighter consumer goods and processing industries for which the raw material and the motive electric power came from the North. North Korea has valuable minerals, especially coal, and excellent hydro-electric plants and most of Korea's heavy industry. Since 1945 political disagreements have precluded economic relations between these naturally complementary economies. In April 1949 the Republic finally closed the border to all official trade on the ground that it was being used for subversive purposes.

118. A further burden on the Republic of Korea was an influx of more than two million refugees from Japan, China and Manchuria, as well as from North Korea, which, together with a high rate of natural population growth, increased South Korea's population by 25 per cent in the period from 1945 to the present, or from about 16 to over 20 million.
119. These are the underlying factors that have given form to South Korea's present problems. South Korea falls tragically short of being self-supporting, even at the present modest standard of living. Without a healthy economy there can be no hope of a healthy independent State. The diversity of Korean economic development makes the unifying of the country of utmost importance to the rational recovery of Korean agriculture and industry and the ultimate attainment of a satisfactory living standard for the Korean people.

B. Main economic problems before the Government in 1950

120. In its report to the fourth session of the General Assembly the Commission pointed out that events in Korea had not waited upon the achievement of unification. The very survival of the Republic depended on strenuous effort to create a healthy economy to nourish the young State. Early recognition by the United States Economic Co-operation Administration of the critical importance to the future of the Republic of creating a viable economy led to thorough study and the development of a comprehensive practical plan for rehabilitating and expanding Korean industry. The initiation of a creative programme of capital development to replace the sustaining relief work of the United States Military Government (1945-1948) was made possible by the negotiation of an Agreement on Aid between the Republic of Korea and the United States (ratified on 13 December 1948). It was hoped that a three-year $310 million programme would by 1952-1953 have reduced the need of the Republic of Korea for outside assistance to manageable proportions.

121. An approach to the goal of South Korean economic independence necessitates capital development in the three basic fields of coal, electric power and fertilizer. These three fields are mutually inter-dependent. South Korea's greatest import need is fertilizer, formerly manufactured in the North and vital to the food supply. But it is impracticable to undertake the construction of fertilizer plants until adequate electric power is available. Increased electric power is, in turn, dependent chiefly on increased coal production. Other important complementary objectives include extensive work on the Korean tungsten mines, rehabilitation of the fishing industry, railroad and communications systems and the construction of a large cement plant.

122. The record of 1950 prior to the aggression showed substantial achievement and improvement. The index of industrial activity rose almost 40 per cent in 1948, a further 25 per cent in 1949 and continued to rise in 1950. Although electric power production remained almost the same in the 1948-1950 period, coal output had increased steadily year by year and the growing output of many consumer goods was encouraging.  

123. However, the condition of the South Korean economy even before aggression from the North was not a healthy one, nor was there promise of easy or rapid improvement. The effects of the division of the country, the lack of technicians, and the loss to South Korea of its natural supplies of power, coal and fertilizer were everywhere evident. The unsatisfactory over-all condition of South Korean industry may be judged by the fact that in spite of the industrial activity increases between 1948 and 1950, the over-all production, estimated in 1947 to average not more than 20 per cent of capacity, had not yet reached 50 per cent of capacity.  

124. Encouraging progress in 1949 and 1950 was made possible in the field of agricultural production by the importation of ample supplies of fertilizer. The production of rice and other grains almost equalled pre-war totals in 1949 and, prior to the aggression, it was estimated that the 1950 crop would reach an all-time high. This important success permitted a planned export of 100,000 metric tons of rice to Japan to pay for necessary imports. The results of this accomplishment, however, must not be over-estimated in view of the population increase in South Korea from about 14 million in 1937 to 20 million today.

125. During 1949 the financial situation of the Republic steadily deteriorated in spite of increasing industrial and agricultural production. Inflationary pressures, resulting chiefly from heavy supplemental police and army expenditures, were intensified by a very large 1949 budgetary deficit and poor tax collections. The amount of currency in circulation increased from 38 billion won in March 1949 to 74 billion in January 1950. The index numbers of wholesale prices almost doubled between January 1949 and January 1950. Frightening and disturbing to the average citizen was the steady rise in the price of the basic food staple, rice, the price of which had almost doubled between December 1948 and December 1949, and continued to rise.

126. In recognition of these difficulties an economic stabilization programme was developed and applied with considerable success during the first half of 1950. Defence appropriations were sharply reduced. Government revenues were increased by tripling of taxes, improved collection of taxes and application of higher utility rates. Subsidies were decreased and credit policies tightened.

127. Renewed efforts were made to enforce a 1949 law restricting so-called “voluntary contributions”. These in fact are extra-legal extractions on the part of such groups as the police, the army, and local youth and school associations. Such taxes sometimes appeared necessary to supplement inadequate police or school budgets, but arbitrary assessment and lack of accountability led to grave abuses and a serious threat to the whole tax structure. Surveys in 1949 estimated that the collection of “voluntary contributions” exceeded the total of legitimate taxes collected.

128. Stringent application of orthodox financial practices resulted in the adoption in late March of a balanced budget. 

1950-1951 budget. The index number of wholesale prices levelled off in the early months of 1950. Currency in circulation declined from 73 billion won in early January to 55 billion in June. The Government failed, however, to control the price of rice, which by June 1950 had increased almost 300 per cent since December 1949.

129. Since the Japanese occupied almost every position of importance in government, finance, trade and industry in Korea until 1945, the repatriation left a vacuum. A new and inexperienced government inherited virtually the entire industrial and commercial establishment. A plan for technical training was initiated in order to train sufficient technicians to operate a modern industrial system. Development of more adequate labour policies and modern labour unions was also essential to provide incentives to raise the low production levels. Meanwhile industry suffered.

130. In 1949 the National Assembly had enacted a Land Reform Act to supplement the agrarian reform of 1948. The latter had reduced the rate of farm tenancy from 73 per cent to 40 per cent. The new Act provided in general for government purchase of all holdings not farmed by the owner and of all holdings of more than 7.5 acres, irrespective of whether they were cultivated by the owner or not. Administrative difficulties caused delay but in June 1950 implementation of this law was beginning. Qualified farmers were eligible to purchase on a deferred payment plan up to 7.5 acres at 125 per cent of the value of the annual crop.

131. This sketch of current conditions in South Korea indicates that substantial progress had been made and was being planned in early 1950. The problems outlined demonstrate the difficulties that lay ahead and the magnitude of the production problems that would have to be overcome if the Republic of Korea was to survive the division of the country. The Republic of Korea’s programme for developing its shaky economy was directly dependent upon the assistance of the United States Economic Co-operation Administration. It is difficult indeed to visualize the conditions under which Koreans would be living without that aid. The Republic was faced with excessive defence expenditures, deficiencies in plants, shortages of raw materials and consumer goods, serious inflation and general nervousness about the future. It had begun, though belatedly, to grapple with these difficulties through the medium of a careful economic stabilization programme, and the future appeared rather brighter on the eve of the invasion.

C. The Executive and the Legislature

132. In its report to the General Assembly in 1949 the Commission had pointed out the serious economic difficulties and had found that the development of representative government under the Constitution of the Republic had been both uneven and uneasy. Sarcely had the Constitution of the New Republic of Korea been adopted and the process of building a structure of government upon that framework begun when the Republic faced guerrilla uprisings within and was menaced by frequent clashes along the 38th parallel. The building of security forces absorbed energies and resources which were urgently needed to develop politically the new form of democratic representative government and carry out the economic and social programme necessary to nourish and keep healthy the infant State.

133. Up to the end of May 1950, the Executive and the Legislature were continually engaged in a bitter struggle for the recognition by the other of what each deemed its proper power and authority. The Executive possessed an advantage in that it already controlled the administration, and the Legislature felt that the Executive tended to ignore it in the transaction of day-to-day business. The latter, not willing to be thus ignored, and rather resentful of the treatment meted out to it by the Executive, tried again and again to assert its right of control. It had become clear, long before the act of aggression occurred, that the Legislature would not rest content until its relationship with the Executive was satisfactorily adjusted.

134. In December 1949 the National Assembly, believing that the two prime conditions for the creation of a firm national government were a high degree of civic responsibility and an efficient and honest administrative apparatus, decided to investigate the national administration. The findings, which were completed by the end of January 1950, provided the basis for criticism of the Government by members of the National Assembly and showed a healthy independence of spirit. The criticism concerned police methods, illegal arrests, judicial delays, and charges of corruption in some branches of the government and civil service. Uncovering of extra-budgetary police and army expenditures brought complaints that the Government was by-passing the constitutional requirement that expenditures must first be authorized by the National Assembly. The failure of the Government to enforce the Act prohibiting “voluntary contributions” was also censured. It was felt that the Government was not pushing recovery fast enough and was not implementing effectively three reform acts: the Land Reform, the Local Autonomy and the Vested Properties Acts. Finally, complete lack of confidence in the Government’s rice programme was expressed.

135. These criticisms placed the administration on the defensive. In reply, Ministers admitted many deficiencies but pleaded special circumstances which had made effective execution of certain measures impossible. The administration offered to investigate the charges.

136. The atmosphere of antagonism between Executive and Legislature created by these critical findings set the stage for a revival of the proposal to amend the Constitution in order to provide cabinet responsibility to the Legislature. The issue was essentially one of control of the processes of government. The chief arguments in favour of the existing presidential system were that a strong guiding hand was essential if the young Republic was to survive the strains and stresses of its early experience. The atmosphere of antagonism between Executive and Legislature created by these critical findings set the stage for a revival of the proposal to amend the Constitution in order to provide cabinet responsibility to the Legislature. The issue was essentially one of control of the processes of government. The chief arguments in favour of the existing presidential system were that a strong guiding hand was essential if the young Republic was to survive the strains and stresses of its early experience.
years and that the lack of strong political parties would mean continual government changes and weakness. The vote demonstrated clearly the temper of the Assembly. A large majority of those voting favoured the proposals to amend the Constitution; the amendments, however, were lost because the numerous abstentions among normal supporters of the administration prevented the concurrence of the necessary two-thirds of the duly elected and seated members of the National Assembly. Adoption of this method of defeating the amendments showed a certain sensitiveness to public opinion and a desire to avoid giving the impression of subservience to the Executive.

137. The legislative sessions up to June 1950 demonstrated that the conflict between the Executive and the Legislature was by no means ended. The administration was frequently harassed. It was not slow to take up the challenge and the chamber became the scene of numerous clashes between the two.

138. Expenditure of unappropriated funds, especially by the Ministry of Defence, and failure to budget for necessary items forced the submission to the National Assembly of four supplemental budgets for the fiscal year 1 April 1949 to 31 March 1950. The budgets were passed substantially intact, but the opportunity was seized to berate the Executive for neglect of the Constitution.

139. Acrimony was also provoked over the budget for the new year 1950-1951. Serious difficulties in preparing a balanced budget had resulted in the Government's failure to submit final estimates within the time specified by law. The Government at the last minute demanded not only the immediate passage of the budget but also heavy additional taxes. The Assembly, deprived of adequate opportunity for study, protested strongly but eventually yielded.

140. Although Executive and Legislature have normally been of one mind on the question of safeguarding national security, there was a clash even on this issue and an assertion of Assembly independence. The amended National Security Act of December 1949 was in question. In spite of its anxiety to suppress all communists, the Government, in deference to public opinion, had proposed an amendment to eliminate an unconstitutional clause applying penal provisions retroactively. The Government did not, however, agree to consider restoring the right of appeal under the Act in cases involving capital punishment. It pleaded that the courts would be unable to dispose of such appeals with adequate speed. Sharp objection was raised to the alleged encroachment on normal rights and, over administration protests, the Assembly finally successfully insisted on re-establishing the right of appeal.

141. Another controversy involving the National Security Act began in May and June 1949 with the arrest of fourteen members of the opposition in the National Assembly, on charges of violation of that act. Considerable excitement and indignation developed. When the arrests took place, many persons felt that the Executive had made the arrests at least partially in order to punish the independent critical spirit which had been demonstrated by the Legislature in numerous recent controversies and was therefore striking at the roots of representative government. The main charge against the Assembly members was that they had acted as instruments of the South Korea Labour (Communist) Party to undermine the Republic of Korea. It was also alleged that, in discharge of orders from the South Korea Labour Party, the Vice-President of the National Assembly and five others who were among those arrested had on 17 July 1949 submitted a petition to the United Nations Commission on Korea, requesting it to abolish military missions in Korea of both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The long-delayed trial of thirteen of those arrested took place in January and February 1950 and resulted in their conviction. The maximum sentence imposed was ten years. All defendants appealed and the cases were still pending in June. Public and Press interest in the charges and in the conduct of the trial was very great. There was a feeling that the evidence adduced did not fully sustain the charges. Several defendants repudiated confessions introduced as evidence by the prosecution, alleging they had been extorted by torture. Although the prosecution vehemently attacked the defendants for presenting, on behalf of the South Korea Labour Party, a petition whose alleged aim was to undermine the Republic, the judgment did not state that its mere presentation was part of the criminal act. The criminality lay in its alleged presentation on orders from the South Korea Labour Party. Whatever the ultimate disposition of the cases or the truth of the charges, the episode built up ill will and suspicion and acted as a hindrance to the development of the effective working relationship necessary between Executive and Legislature for the continuing development of representative government.

142. A fertile source of material for attacks on the Government was furnished by the difficult rice problem. The proper collection and rationing of rice has long been a cause of controversy in Korea, where the margin of surplus has usually been narrow. The National Assembly did not fail to press its opportunity. A Minister of Agriculture was forced to resign under fire and the Government was kept continually on the defensive.

143. The Assembly has been frequently critical of ministerial and other appointments. The resignation of the Prime Minister in April 1950 raised a constitutional issue. The Assembly took advantage of the President's nomination of a new Prime Minister to express its lack of confidence by refusing to confirm the appointment. Instead of submitting another nominee, the President nominated the existing Minister of Defence as Acting Prime Minister. The National Assembly protested that it was unconstitutional to follow this procedure while the Assembly was in session and demanded that the President appoint a Prime Minister for confirmation by the Assembly. The President stood his ground. Aggression by North Korea eliminated this controversy as an active issue.

144. An interesting act, in which neither the National Assembly nor the Executive showed much active interest, was the Local Autonomy Act which had provoked bitter controversy in 1949. It was designed to lay the foundations of popularly elected local governments and build the concept of citizenship in a people accustomed to centuries of completely centralized author-
ity. Administrative delays had occurred, but in the spring of 1950 it was understood that the first elections under this decentralizing Act would take place in the autumn.

145. The Commission would like to point out that, in the old Assembly, struggle for power took place between an Executive and Legislature of essentially similar economic and social views. The conflict of personalities tended to overshadow consideration of public affairs themselves, and the critical importance of facing current issues. There was little improvement in living conditions that the people could ascribe to the policy of the Government. It was perhaps for this reason that the electorate in May 1950 chose to return to office as many as 179 candidates who had not participated in the old Assembly, and were expected to concern themselves first with practical problems.

146. The Commission has carefully studied the positions taken up on these matters by the Executive and the Legislature and believes that the growing civic responsibility shown in these debates augurs well for the future of representative government in Korea. If these qualities persist in the new Assembly after the cessation of hostilities, they will lead to a mutually satisfactory solution.

D. The general elections of 30 May 1950

147. The first National Assembly of the Republic of Korea was elected on 10 May 1948, during the period of United States Military Government south of the 38th parallel and under the auspices of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. Its mandate ran for two years from the date of the constitution of the Assembly on 31 May 1948. New general elections, the first to be conducted by the Government of the Republic, were therefore due to take place before 31 May 1950, the date when the mandate of the first National Assembly would expire.

148. Early in 1950 considerable prominence was given to the question of the date on which these elections would be held, and it soon became evident that the Executive and the National Assembly were at odds on this issue. The Executive felt that an election campaign would prevent the National Assembly from approving a difficult budget for the fiscal year beginning 1 April 1950 and enacting consequential heavy tax increases. It stated its opinion that if elections were held in May, members of the National Assembly would tend to absent themselves from forthcoming sessions in order to tour their constituencies in preparation for the election campaign. Another element of controversy had arisen over proposals and discussions in the National Assembly concerning amendments to the Constitution which would have changed the system of government from the so-called "presidential system" on the American model to a parliamentary system with cabinet responsibility. Any amendment in this direction was strongly opposed by the President and the members of the Government and cabinet. Following the final defeat of the amendments, there became evident a desire on the part of the Executive to prolong the life of the existing National Assembly and thus avoid new elections which might favour the opposition. For more than two months the policy of the Government vacillated on the question of the date of the elections, and considerable unrest was created both in the National Assembly and among the people. The Press was unanimous in supporting immediate elections. There were several conflicting Presidential pronouncements on the date on which the elections were to be held; at one time postponement even to November was suggested. The National Assembly denied the President's right to postpone elections and insisted that elections should be held in accordance with the Constitution and the fundamental principles of democracy. There was danger of a serious constitutional crisis, and the Executive was accused of wanting to rule by decree for the period between the expiration of the mandate of the first National Assembly and the time when a new Assembly would have been elected.

149. The suggested postponement of the elections had important reactions not only in the domestic but also in the international field. The Commission, viewing with some apprehension the situation that was developing, took the opportunity on 2 April 1950 of informing the Executive that it viewed with concern a postponement of the elections until November, which would leave the Republic of Korea from June until November without a fully representative government. The Commission stated also that such postponement might lead to internal dissension, which in turn might be taken advantage of by elements disposed to provoking military conflict in Korea. On 3 April 1950 the United States Government also pointed out that United States aid, both military and economic, to the Republic of Korea had been predicated upon the existence and growth of democratic institutions within the Republic; that free popular elections in accordance with the Constitution and other basic laws of the Republic were the foundation of these democratic institutions, and that it was desirable for elections to be held as scheduled and provided for by the basic laws of the Republic (A/AC.26/II/L.26). Finally, the President fixed 30 May as the date for the election.

150. On 21 April 1950 the Foreign Minister, on behalf of the Government of the Republic, invited the Commission to observe the general elections as a continuing development of representative government in Korea (A/AC.26/II/L.29). On 4 May 1950 the Commission accepted the invitation, considering that it was, under its terms of reference, entitled to study carefully the course of events and duty-bound to report to the General Assembly on the nature of the elections on the basis of its observation and experience of those elections. There was, of course, no question of assuming responsibility in the sense of endorsing or passing negative judgment on the validity of the elections. In accepting the invitation, the Commission informed the Government of the Republic that it would itself decide on the best means of carrying out this observation, particularly in order to ascertain whether elections were held in a free atmosphere (A/AC.26/II/L.33).

151. Profiting by the experience gained by the United Nations Temporary Commission, the Commission was able to organize itself rapidly for the observation of the elections of 30 May 1950. This time the task was easier, as the responsibility for the proper
conduct of the elections rested with the Republic. It was the stated object of the Commission to ascertain whether the elections were carried on in a free and democratic atmosphere. Teams were organized to cover the whole of South Korea, their duties being to study the election law and regulations (A/AC.26/II/L.27 and L.32) and their application, the organization and arrangements for the elections, the ballotting and the subsequent counting of ballots and the declaration of the results. The teams were also to examine the attitude of the authorities, the platforms and activities of political parties and organizations, and the reaction of the people to the elections. They were further to study the nature and extent of freedom of expression and of assembly, freedom from intimidation, violence and threats of violence, and undue interference with or by voters, candidates and political parties and groups (A/AC.26/II/L.34, 35 and 41).

152. The observation teams carried out comprehensive tours both before and during the elections, and were able to complete their reports to the Commission during the first part of June. All teams agreed on the following observations. The central, provincial and local election committees played, on the whole, a very active and successful role in assuring strict obedience to the election law and regulations. In general candidates conducted very active campaigns. Joint speech meetings of all rival candidates, held under election committee auspices, were attended by large crowds. Speeches were devoted chiefly to general statements and did not propose specific remedies for concrete political, economic and social problems. All candidates urged early unification by peaceful means. Corrupt and inefficient administration was attacked; honest, efficient government was promised. The Administration was belaboured for mismanagement of the rice collection and rationing programme. The difficulties of living under inflation conditions were emphasized. Many criticized the previous National Assembly for its failure; some criticized the Administration and proposed a cabinet system of government. These were the usual themes. Understanding of complex issues and programmes was beyond the comprehension of the average voter. The personality and reputation of the candidate were the deciding factors.

153. The naturally great interest in these, the second national elections in Korean history, had been stimulated by frequent Legislative-Executive clashes, by popular dissatisfaction with both the Government and the National Assembly and by the mounting inflation which threatened everyone's livelihood. With only 210 seats to be filled, more than 2,200 candidacies were registered.

154. Proclamation of the elections had been accompanied by directives from the President, the Minister of Home Affairs and other high officials. Their purpose was to ensure the conduct of the elections in a free and democratic atmosphere. This action attracted particular interest because of the intention expressed by "middle-of-the-roaders" and some alleged leftists to participate in the elections. These candidates had boycotted the elections in 1948 on the ground that elections in South Korea alone would make unification more difficult. This action had made them suspect in the eyes of the Administration.

155. The tension underlying these elections became more apparent after newspapers reported the rounding up in April and May of almost 200 underground agents of the South Korea Labour (Communist) Party, whose activities had been brought to an end under the National Security Act. As the campaign progressed, there were more and more announcements of the arrests of candidates, their managers and supporters. Arrests were made chiefly on charges of violation of the National Security Act or alleged violations of the election laws and regulations. The arrests were accompanied by unverified reports that many supporters of candidates were being threatened or even beaten by both police officials and other unidentified persons in an effort at intimidation. Withdrawals from the campaign took place in sufficient numbers to suggest the use of pressure. Some of the arrests were carried out in apparent violation of article 117 of the Election Law, which states that "A candidate or his manager shall not be taken into custody, confined, detained, or arrested during the election period, except when apprehended in flagrante delicto" (A/AC.26/II/L.27).

156. These departures from an orderly free atmosphere had their explanation. While publicly proclaiming a "free atmosphere", the authorities responsible for the maintenance of public order were apprehensive and tended to interpret the National Security Act most strictly in the face of the constant threat from north of the parallel. This interference was directed not only against those suspected of belonging to or sympathizing with subversive elements, but also against those who opposed government policies. Thus candidates were subject to fear that criticism of the Administration might be regarded as a treasonable attack on the Republic of Korea. Persons who had associated in the past with leftist groups or had favoured the controversial North-South Conference of May 1948 were either placed under pressure to withdraw from the campaign or obliged to conduct it under serious handicaps.

157. Until 25 June the Commission kept close watch on the general situation resulting from the elections, and in particular the negotiations that had been initiated among the various parties and groups of representatives. Attention was also paid to the grounds of appeal contained in the election petitions being submitted to the Central Election Committee. The newly elected National Assembly met for the first time on 19 June 1950 and elected its Chairman and Vice-Chairmen. Six days later the aggression occurred, thereby temporarily interrupting the work of the National Assembly. The aggression also prevented the Commission from completing its analysis of the elections and from preparing a full report to the General Assembly.

158. The outcome of the elections proved to the Commission that the majority of the electorate, being dissatisfied with their living conditions, and placing the blame for this on the old National Assembly, preferred candidates who were not openly associated with the parties of that Assembly. The new National Assembly contains only thirty-one members of the old. In fact, the two leading parties in the old National Assembly suffered a heavy defeat, losing 70 per cent of their strength in the Assembly. In view of the criticism against the old National Assembly, many candidates
thought their chances would be improved if they ran as independents. Out of 210 members, 133 were elected as independents.  

159. The Commission has arrived at the following general conclusions regarding the elections of 30 May 1950:

(a) Very considerable enthusiasm was everywhere shown by the electorate. A high percentage, almost 90 per cent, cast their votes.

(b) The electoral law and regulations were adequate and generally enforced. The organization of the elections and the work of the various election committees were commendable, and the electoral machinery functioned well.

(c) The secrecy of the ballot was respected.

(d) The lack of a developed party system and discipline led to an excessive number of candidates and made the choice of the voters needlessly difficult.

(e) As no clearly defined party programmes were placed before the electorate, votes were cast for individual candidates on their personal rather than on their party merits. In fact, a party label was regarded as a disadvantage.

(f) No undue pressure was exerted to influence the vote in favour of a particular candidate.

(g) There was certain concrete evidence of interference by the authorities with candidates and their election campaigns. This interference, in the main, was carried out by local police. Some candidates who were under arrest were actually elected, and the voters seemed to react against police interference by supporting those candidates with whom the police had interfered.

160. It is the view of the Commission that notwithstanding some cases of interference, the voters were able to exercise their democratic freedom of choice among candidates and cast their votes accordingly.

Chapter VII. Measures Taken by the Republic of Korea to Meet the Threat from the North

161. In its report to the fourth session of the General Assembly the United Nations Commission on Korea described the effect upon the Republic of the threat from the North in sentences which the Commission considers to be even more true in 1950 than they were in 1949:

"The Republic is a result of free elections and the expression of a people’s will. Psychologically, if not materially, the activities of the North have compelled the Republic to go on a war footing, and this spiritual mobilization has to some extent brutalized the conduct of government and engendered suspicion of those who remain independent and critical of spirit. This comes at a time when the feeling for freedom in the sense of the association of liberty with responsibility has hardly broken through the millennial tradition of government from above, or else has not advanced beyond the level of licence. The North has troubled the relative calm which is needed for the psychological and social translation of the laws of liberty into the practice of freedom through a careful nurture of procedural and institutional growth."

162. The safeguarding of its national security has been the constant anxiety of the Republic. On this goal, if not always on the method to attain it, the Executive and the National Assembly, despite all other differences, have been of one mind. A first concern of the new Government in 1948 was the establishment of a national defence force. By 1950 the training and equipping of an army of 100,000 men had progressed far enough to give the Government a reasonable measure of confidence in its ability, with the assistance of a large police force of 50,000 men, to maintain law and order, and to withstand any attack from the North not supported by an outside Power.

163. In late 1949 and the first half of 1950, the Government committed its forces to a prolonged campaign to stamp out internal disorder caused by guerrillas trained in North Korea. Public opinion was roused when made aware of these guerrilla activities, and the attitude of the authorities hardened considerably against those behind this campaign of subversion.

A. Internal security measures

(1) The National Security Act

164. The most important and most contentious phase of the Government’s security campaign was based on the National Security Act, promulgated in November 1948 and amended on 1 December 1949 (A/AC.26/II/L.1/Rev.1). This Act in effect outlawed the South Korea Labour (communist) Party. That party’s activities had already resulted in the arrest of many of its members: the Act drove the remaining members underground. Article I of the Act as amended would have made punishable “those who pose as a government, those who have formed organizations or groups with the object of provoking disturbance and revolt, and those who have taken action for the purpose of implementing the objectives of such organizations or groups”. Joining such groups with knowledge of their nature was punishable by imprisonment for not more than seven years. Direct action or incitement to achieve the aims

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40 When the National Assembly reconvened in Taegu and Pusan, 64 of the 210 members were missing. There is insufficient evidence to determine how many remained voluntarily in areas of the Republic of Korea occupied by the invaders, or for what reasons. The new National Assembly has not yet organized itself in a way to indicate how the independents will align themselves.

of such organizations was also a punishable offence, as was supply or promise of weapons, money or other assistance, if carried out without duress and with knowledge of the hostile nature of such organizations and groups.

165. The Act, as amended in December 1949, made its provisions applicable retroactively, denied the right of appeal, and extended punishment to include the death penalty. A storm of public protest against what were considered infringements of civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution led to early abrogation of the retroactive clause and the restoration of the right of appeal against the sentence of death. Although the amendments never came into force, the very fact that it had been considered necessary to enact them showed how determined had become the drive to suppress communists.

166. From the outset the National Security Act has been strictly enforced. During 1949, 46,373 cases were handled in the Republic and 118,621 persons arrested. Of this total, 31,523 cases, involving 85,414 persons, were sent to the Procurator's Office for further investigation, while 14,850 cases involving 33,027 persons were sent to Police Court for trial. In the first four months of 1950 a total of 32,018 persons were arrested, of whom 26,832 were sent to the Procurator's Office and 5,186 to Police Courts.

167. It was reported to the Commission that some of these arrests involved violation of constitutional liberties and even brutal treatment and torture. During the election campaign of April-May 1950 the Act was frequently invoked, and some candidates, their managers and supporters were arrested for what seemed mere exercise of the constitutional right of criticism of the Administration.

168. At various times members of the National Assembly have strongly criticized these police methods. On occasions when instances were quoted, the Government undertook to investigate and give redress, should the charges be proved. Moreover, frequent directives forbidding torture and directing compliance with constitutional guarantees under threat of severe penalty were issued by the Director of National Police, the Chief of the Seoul Police, the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Justice, and the Prime Minister, as well as by the President. While these directives implicitly admitted the existence of the alleged practices, they also showed that the Government was sensitive to the pressure of public opinion and was taking steps to improve an administration of justice still suffering from the legacy of Japanese police methods.

169. The anti-communist campaign brought forward evidence that many North Korean agents were operating in South Korea, with the result that the Government inclined to greater severity. Some complaints were made that persons who were not communists, but who opposed the administration, had suffered at the hands of the police. In late 1949 the Government adopted a policy of winning over alleged leftists or moderates, including those who had opposed the holding of elections in 1948. There was at that time a greater readiness on the part of the latter to co-operate with the Government, as the policy of the North Korean authorities had shown that any thought of a compromise with them was unrealistic. Proposals for a North-South Conference no longer found support. In October-November 1949 a "conversion" period was announced during which leftists and other opponents of the Government were invited to register and to declare their loyalty to the Republic. Such persons became members of the Government-sponsored National Protection and Guidance League, under whose auspices indoctrination lectures were given and surveillance over the recent converts was maintained. Tens of thousands registered. The National Protection and Guidance League announced from time to time the release of thousands of members whose behaviour indicated a conversion in good faith.

(2) STEPS TAKEN BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO STAMP OUT GUERRILLAS

170. Shortly after its arrival in Seoul, in December 1949, the Commission received information that guerrilla activity was continuing, particularly in the Taebaek mountain range area from the region of Mount Ohdae in the north-east to Mount Chiri in the south-west.

171. The Northern régime tried to make capital out of this guerrilla activity, the proportions of which it magnified in such exultant broadcasts as the following (A/AC.26/II/L.10):

"A recent issue of the monthly 'Noryokacha-Ji' points out that uprisings of farmers, in which 42,096 farmers participated in 50 uprisings, are spreading in North and South Cholla Provinces, North and South Kyongsang Provinces and North Chungchong Province. Guerrillas carried out land reforms and restored People's Committees. During November the following results are reported: 77,920 guerrillas were mobilized; 1,260 engagements were fought with the Army and the police; 1,800 police and soldiers were killed, 555 wounded and 313 captured; (1,303?) reactionary landlords, terrorists and traitors were executed; (1,402?) reactionary houses were burned down; a total of 4,071 reactionaries and puppets were purged. Among outstanding achievements listed are: battle launched by guerrillas of Chiri San, raid on the town of Muju, an offensive by the guerrillas on Cheju Island."42

172. The Commission formed a more accurate impression of the situation by visiting North Kyongsang Province, one of the most troubled areas. At Taegu in February 1950, the Division Commander of the Army of the Republic outlined in detail to members of the Commission the situation in the mountainous areas of North and South Kyongsang provinces. He informed the Commission that some 200 guerrillas were still active in this area; that since August 1949 divisional operations had resulted in 1,175 guerrillas killed, 314 captured, and 313 weapons and 9,017 rounds of ammunition seized; that in November 1949 some 600 rifles and 10 million rounds of ammunition had been landed from North Korea on the North Kyongsang coast near Pohang; that in the last six months the "hostile area" inside his operational command had been narrowed from 85-90 per cent of the whole area to 15 per cent. He defined a "hostile area" as one which actually aided the guerrillas with supplies and provisions, or refused to supply guides for, or otherwise failed to support, his troops.

42 See also A/AC.26/II/Monitor 3.
In early February 1950 the Committee of the Whole visited the scene of one operation against guerrillas in the Un Moon mountain area south-east of Taegu, where a force of seventeen companies totalling some 2,000 men was endeavouring to encircle and wipe out a band of sixty guerrillas. This was a good example of the strain placed upon the regular troops of the Republic in their operations against guerrillas.

In September 1949 Korean Army authorities estimated that armed guerrillas active in South Korea numbered slightly more than 3,500. In April 1950 they estimated that they numbered less than 600, confined to the mountain areas difficult of access. During that period 3,000 guerrillas were estimated to have been killed.43

During the whole of 1949, according to the same authorities, the casualties caused by guerrillas in the Republic included 1,637 police and auxiliary police, 436 government officials, and 4,727 innocent people killed. In the first four months of 1950 the corresponding figures were 374, 52 and 1,407 respectively. The following table demonstrates the decline in guerrilla activity in North and South Kyongsang Provinces in 1950:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>January-April 1949</th>
<th>1950 Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police and auxiliaries killed</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials killed</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians killed</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians kidnapped</td>
<td>1,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of raids by groups of more than fifty persons</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of raids by groups of less than fifty persons</td>
<td>1,778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This decline can be explained by the fact that the employment of more and better-trained troops made possible tighter control of guerrilla infiltration across the parallel, and quicker action against guerrilla raids in the interior. The successes of the army gained for it increased co-operation from the farmers.

The average farmer was chiefly interested in tilling his soil in peace. However, he had been torn between the guerrillas' demands for food supplies and the insistence of the army that those supplies be not furnished and that information of guerrilla movements be revealed. He was punished by the army if he yielded to these demands and by the guerrillas if he did not. So long as an area was subject to guerrilla raids, effective assistance could not be expected by the army from a farmer class defenceless against retaliation. The extermination of guerrillas throughout the Taebaek Mountain range restored the normal links between the people, the army and the police, and there was increasing co-operation with the army on the part of the farmers.

In late March 1950 two battalions of North Korea-trained guerrillas comprising 600 men crossed the parallel at night in the mountains of Kangwon Province. Speedy action by the Korean Army annihilated one battalion and reduced the other to scattered bands. A third battalion, which captured prisoners reported as having been ready to follow the initial force, never crossed the parallel. (See A/AC.26/II/CW.1/SR.8)

These successes demonstrated the ability of the Korean Army to prevent the sending of major guerrilla reinforcements by the North to continue its programme of terrorism and sabotage in South Korea. Two months before the act of aggression the guerrilla campaign had failed. For the first time since the Yosu-Sunchon revolt in October 1948, the Republic was relatively free of guerrillas and seemed capable of remaining so. A reassessment of South Korean forces had become possible, and the police were transferred to the mopping-up task while most of the army was freed for its primary task of preparing itself to function as a national defence force.

The infiltration of agents and of individual guerrillas, however, continued, and just before 25 June several guerrillas were captured who were more heavily armed than had been usual, and were carrying more ammunition, including, for the first time, demolition equipment.

The Commission noted that it was the absence of any large-scale support of the guerrillas by the population that made possible the successful prosecution of the campaign against them.

### B. The building up of the national defences

In its report to the fourth session of the General Assembly the Commission had reported that simultaneously with the increase in number and intensity of the border raids, propaganda efforts of North Korean authorities to cause dissension in the South and to subvert its citizens had been stepped up. All this had induced equal and opposite reactions in the South. The Government hastened the pace of its military preparations and pressed the United States for military aid beyond that already received. United States military personnel were advising and assisting in the training of the Republic's forces, as on the other side of the parallel military personnel of the USSR were reportedly performing like services for the Northern forces.

In January 1950 the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army informed the Committee that he believed the aggressive plans of the North Korean authorities to be mature, and that it was only a matter of time before they would be put into action. He was unable to say whether an attack would take place with the coming of spring. He believed, however, "that an attack would come whenever signs of weakness were shown by South Korea. The North Korean régime was hurrying to complete all necessary preparations before the National Army could be considerably strengthened as a result of arms under the Korea-United States Arms Pact". As Chief of Staff, he "was alive to the danger which could be perceived from all the preparations going forward in the North". (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/SR.2)

Information from the best available sources in the Republic indicated an increasing awareness, during the first half of 1950, of a growing disparity between the strength of the forces of the Republic of Korea and those of the North Korean authorities. In January 1950 the Chief of Staff of the Republic informed the Commission that, according to intelligence

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44 Figures for North Kyongsang Province only.
sources, the total strength of the North Korean Army was approximately 175,000 men, sub-divided into three categories: 91,500 in the “People’s Army”, 60,500 in a “Peace Preservation Army” and 20,000 in the “Voluntary Corps”, plus miscellaneous forces. The Voluntary Corps, he stated, was composed chiefly of Korean Communists from China, who had been previously resident in Manchuria and were veterans of the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army. In the following month he stated that the North Korean forces possessed more powerful and more numerous artillery weapons than did the army of the Republic of Korea, as well as 130 tanks and 60 armoured cars, and that their planes had been recently increased in number from 60 to 102. These increases he attributed to a growing volume of aid from the Soviet Union. (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/SR.2)

185. The army of the Republic of Korea, on the other hand, at this time consisted of about 100,000 men, organized into eight infantry divisions. These divisions were not equipped for offensive combat. The army had a few armoured cars but no tanks, and only one battalion of obsolete 105 mm. howitzers per division and anti-tank guns not exceeding 57 mm. in calibre. No air force existed.

186. General Roberts, Chief of the United States Korean Military Advisory Group, disagreed with the Republican estimates and considered that the approximate 100,000 strength of the Republic of Korea’s army was at least equal to, if not superior to, that of the North Korean Army. As to the quality and quantity of armament, however, he agreed with Major-General Shin Tai Yung, the Chief of Staff of the Army of the Republic (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/SR.3). He added that the equipment obtained from the United States Army was of a purely defensive character.46

187. In an interview with the Committee in January 1950, General Roberts had given complete data regarding the training mission undertaken by the United States Korean Military Advisory Group. This group consisted of about 500 officers and men, and had been established at the request of the Government of the Republic of Korea, upon the withdrawal of the United States occupation forces in June 1949, to advise and assist in the development and training of the Republic’s army and police. A training programme for officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men had been initiated. Military schools had been set up with both Korean and American officer-instructors. American advisors had been attached for training purposes to the major army units. A normal training programme had not yet, however, been completed. Training in tactics beyond the battalion level, he stated, had not yet been possible, particularly because of the diversion of troops from training to mopping-up operations against groups of guerrillas.

188. Information regarding the police of the Republic of Korea was obtained from the Deputy Director of National Security. He stated that the police force consisting of 50,000 men constituted, in part, a force auxiliary to the regular troops. He spoke of plans for the training of 10,000 police as combat units to take over from the army the operations against the guerrillas. This would permit the more intensive training of the army as a force for national defence against possible attack from the North.

189. In spite of the disparity between the figures for the North Korean forces given by the Chief of Staff and those given by General Roberts, both seemed to agree that the situation along the parallel was at that time well under control, presenting no immediate danger. General Roberts’ confidence in the ability of the South Korean Army to handle the forces of North Korea in case of attack was generally accepted. There had been no reports to occasion special alarm. In fact, the progress in training made by the Republican army and its success in quelling the guerrillas were encouraging. In brief, in spite of the disparity in strength of the forces of North and South, the tension along the parallel, the continued aggressive attitude of the North in its propaganda campaign and its efforts to infiltrate guerrillas into the South, there remained at this time general confidence in the ability of the South Korean Army to cope with whatever situation might arise.

190. On 10 May 1950, Captain Sihn Sung Mo, the Defence Minister of the Republic of Korea, stated at a conference in Seoul with representatives of the foreign Press, that North Korean troops were moving in force towards the 38th parallel and that there was imminent danger of invasion from the North. He said that the North Korean Army had grown to 183,000 trained men supported by a large number of planes, 173 tanks and 32 naval vessels. About 25,000 Koreans who had previously fought in the Chinese Communist Army had been incorporated in the Northern forces. The attention of the Commission was drawn to this statement, and it was agreed that the then Acting Chairman, Mr. A. B. Jamieson, should call upon the Foreign Minister to ask for information on the seriousness of the danger and the degree of imminence of the invasion, as envisaged by the Defence Minister.

191. At the meeting with the Foreign Minister, arrangements were made for a hearing of the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Kim Paik Il, and of the Chief of Intelligence of the Korean Army, Colonel Chang Do Yong. The important and detailed information obtained at this hearing was incorporated in the Commission’s records (A/AC.26/II/CW.1/SR.9) in the following terms:

“At the hearing held on 12 May 1950, Colonel Chang had stated that he would give information concerning North Korea in respect of the increase in manpower since January 1950, the increase in air and tank strength and the situation concerning guerrillas, both in North and South Korea. At the end of 1949 North Korea had possessed an army not exceeding 150,000 men, but since the beginning of the current year army manpower had grown to approximately 182,400. These were six divisions of the People’s Army numbering 94,500, three brigades of constabulary in position along the 38th parallel numbering 24,000, one air force division numbering 1,800, one armoured division amounting to 10,000 men and two divisions of naval forces. In addition, there were miscellaneous forces amounting to 37,000 men.

“In regard to air strength, Colonel Chang had recalled that in 1949 North Korea had possessed 80 planes at the most, or one air regiment. That force had grown in size, first to a battalion, and later to an air division of 197 planes.
“By April 1950 tank strength had grown from 100 in the previous year to 173. These tanks were not of the light variety, but were heavy ones of 33 tons.

“Colonel Chang had observed that the figures he had cited had originally been obtained by interrogation of captured North Korean soldiers and by reports of intelligence agents working in the North. They had been confirmed by the North Korean airman who had recently taken refuge with his plane in South Korea and the Korean army accepted them as bona fide fact. Colonel Chang had pointed out that among captured North Koreans there were some high-ranking officers who were in a position to know something about the over-all strength of North Korean forces and that the figure of 197 planes was rather conservative, since the defected airman had reported the number of planes as being 192.

“Included in the 94,500 men of the People’s Army were two divisions of well-disciplined and well-trained veteran Korean communist troops who had fought in China against the Chinese Nationalists. They had arrived in Korea in the middle of August 1949 and one division had been stationed at Sinuiju and the other at Nanam. The division stationed at Sinuiju had begun to move southward in the early part of February of the current year, and in March had taken up quarters at Sariwon, which was close to the 38th parallel. In addition, a report had very recently been received to the effect that the division stationed at Nanam as well as another division station at Wonsan, were currently engaged in a similar manoeuvre in the direction of the 38th parallel.

“Colonel Chang had reported the following concentration of forces along the parallel: 1st, 2nd and 3rd brigades of the constabulary acting as a first line force; immediately behind them, the 6th Division at Sariwon, the 1st Division at Yonchon and the 3rd Division at Chorwon. One tank regiment was stationed at Chorwon and another at Yonchon. A third tank regiment had just completed its transfer from the rear and was now stationed at Sariwon. Thus there were three divisions already massed immediately behind the 38th parallel and each division had been reinforced by one regiment of tanks. Colonel Chang then called attention to the fact that the method of training guerrillas at the two large guerrilla training schools in North Korea had recently been intensified. Colonel Chang recalled that the Kangdong political school near Pyongyang and the Hoiryung school had turned out about 6,000 trained guerrillas who had been sent to South Korea to stir up mischief. The Kim Sang Ho Division of guerrillas which had tried to infiltrate into South Korea had been completely annihilated, but it was alarming to note that more recent guerrilla arrivals were better trained and better equipped, being armed with heavy machine-guns and mortars.

“Colonel Chang observed that guerrillas were not the only forces employed by North Korea to occupy and divert the South Korean Army. The People’s National Defence Corps numbering about 3,300 men had been massed at the border line since 4 March 1950. It was engaged in infiltrating and raiding the border area with the apparent purpose of keeping the National Army busy, testing its strength and demoralizing both the Army and the people south of the parallel. While the National Army was occupied in coping with such raids the regular Northern armed forces could be prepared for any action that might be called for. About 80 per cent of all the infiltration and raids that had been made in the period since March of the current year had been carried out by the People’s National Defence Corps.

“In reply to a question as to the basis of the Prime Minister’s statement referring to the imminence of the danger of invasion, Colonel Chang had stated that the only basis of which he was aware was the increased manpower in the North, the massing of regular well-trained troops in the vicinity of the parallel, and finally the employment of the People’s National Defence Corps to infiltrate and test the strength of the National Army.

“Colonel Kim had added that the employment of guerrilla light forces along the 38th parallel was something new and different and raids by those forces were very frequent.

“Dealing with questions concerning the morale of the North Korean army, Colonel Kim had stated that it was very difficult to venture a reply but, in his own opinion, if North Korean troops, in the event of an invasion proved to be victorious at the parallel, their morale might be increased and they would fight on; if, on the other hand, they were crushed in their initial assault, Colonel Kim had expressed confidence that a large number would desert and surrender.

“Colonel Kim had expressed his deep concern over the disparity in the strength of the North and South Korean armed forces. Were both sides equal in equipment and manpower, South Korea could rely on its army’s better fighting spirit and morale. However, it had to be admitted that at the moment North Korea was two or three times superior in respect of military equipment and disposed of more planes, tanks, guns and machine-guns. Against such overwhelming odds, courage alone could not go far.”

192. Following this hearing, members of the Commission informally heard two officers from General Roberts’ staff, who substantially confirmed the information given by the Korean military authorities, modifying only to a small extent some of the figures quoted for the strength of the North Korean forces, and recognizing the growing disparity between the forces of the North and those of the South. They did not, however, agree on the imminence of any danger, and again expressed confidence in the ability of the Army of the Republic to handle the forces of the Northern régime in case of attack.
Part Three

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMISSION SINCE AGGRESSION

A. Movements of the Commission

193. On the morning of 27 June, the Cabinet of the Republic of Korea decided at a meeting held at 3 a.m. to transfer the capital to Suwon, twenty miles to the south of Seoul. On being informed of this decision, the Commission held an emergency meeting and unanimously decided to leave Seoul and proceed to Suwon. The Commission’s decision was based on the consideration that, whatever the outcome of the struggle for the city might be, if it remained in Seoul the Commission would lose contact with the outside world at a time when its reports to the United Nations on developments in Korea would be most urgently needed. It was clear from the history of bitter and unswerving hostility towards the Commission exhibited and propagated by the North Korean authorities for years that the Commission would have jeopardized its existence and certainly its usefulness in the event of the occupation of Seoul by the North Korean forces who were already on the outskirts of the city.

194. The Commission, accompanied by Colonel Ben C. Limb, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, left Seoul by road at 10.20 a.m. and arrived at Suwon at about noon. As no member of the Government could be found there, Colonel Limb suggested that the Government might possibly have left for Taejon, about seventy miles to the south. The Commission then proceeded in the direction of Taejon. Shortly after leaving Suwon, the Commission was overtaken by an armed convoy carrying personnel of the United States Korean Military Advisory Group. It followed that convoy to an airstrip where preparations were being made for evacuation to Japan. The officer in command stated that the Commission and its secretariat could, if they desired, also be evacuated to Japan. The Commission held its second emergency meeting that day and decided, in view of the lack of information as to the probable whereabouts of the Government and in view of the uncertainty as to whether the Commission would be able to function in Korea under the circumstances, to evacuate to Japan, there to hold itself in readiness to return to Korea subject to developments.

195. The Commission was evacuated to Camp Hachata, on the Island of Kyushu, Japan. On the following day, 28 June, inquiries were made of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, in Tokyo, concerning the possibility of the Commission resuming its functions on Korean soil. The Commission was informed that it was possible and feasible for it to proceed to Pusan. The Commission immediately resolved to send an advance party to Pusan at once to make such preparatory arrangements as might be necessary to enable the Commission to resume its functions in Korea. The party consisted of the Chairman (China), the Rapporteur (Australia), the representative of France, the alternate representative of India, the Acting Deputy Principal Secretary and two observers. The party arrived in Pusan on 30 June 1950. The remaining representatives on the Commission and members of the secretariat proceeded to Tokyo.

196. At its 39th meeting held in Tokyo on 1 July, the Commission considered a communication dated 30 June from the advance party in Pusan, which urged the earliest possible return of the remaining members of the Commission, together with a reduced secretariat, as facilities within limits were available in Pusan. The Commission decided that its seat should be transferred forthwith to Korea, as the four representatives already in Korea constituted a quorum and could function immediately. The representatives remaining in Tokyo were to act as an ad hoc committee to ensure communication between the Commission in Korea and United Nations Headquarters. On 30 June the Chairman, the Rapporteur and the two field observers had proceeded to Taejon, arriving there on 1 July, the day when the Government of the Republic of Korea reassembled in that city. This group established contact with the Government of the Republic, the Chairman made a broadcast that night to the people of Korea, and on 3 July the Chairman and Rapporteur took part in the welcome accorded to the first United Nations forces to arrive in Taejon. Three days later the representative of France and the alternate representative of India arrived in Taejon from Pusan, and on 6 July the 40th meeting of the Commission was held in Taejon. A resolution passed at this meeting provided for the establishment of a liaison group of the Commission to be available at all times at the seat of the Government of the Republic of Korea and for the establishment of the seat of the Commission at the earliest opportunity at Pusan. The liaison group consisting of two representatives, two field observers and a member of the secretariat took up its duties immediately, functioning first at Taejon and then at Taegu. It suspended its functions on 19 August and returned to Pusan when the Government of the Republic transferred its non-military departments to Pusan.

B. Present activities of the Commission

197. Since its return to Korea, the Commission has re-examined its original terms of reference under the General Assembly resolution of 21 October 1949 in the light of the fact of aggression. It considered that some of its functions as defined by that resolution had under the circumstances become inoperative. The Commission has concluded that, pending a decision by the General Assembly, its most important tasks are to submit the present report to the General Assembly, and to prepare itself to assist, should a favourable opportunity arise, in bringing about the unification of Korea.
198. As an organ of the United Nations in Korea, the Commission is following developments and is lending all possible support to the action of the United Nations to repel aggression. Its chief concerns have been in the political and humanitarian fields. It is applying itself to a study of the problems of the Republic arising out of the new situation. By public meetings and radio speeches it is keeping prominently before the public the character and the significance of the present United Nations action in Korea. The war raging in Korea has brought before the Commission urgent humanitarian and other problems from which it has not stood aloof. The Commission is studying the refugee problem and endeavouring to assist in such directions as seem to need special emphasis. The Commission is alllying itself closely with all efforts designed to promote compliance with the principles of the Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.

C. The duties of observers

199. At its 30th meeting held in Camp Hakata on 29 June 1950, the Commission decided to request the Secretary-General to expedite the arrival of the remaining field observers originally requested by the Commission on 2 March 1950. Five of these observers arrived in Pusan in the latter part of July. The Commission's field observers are drawn from four countries, Australia, Canada, El Salvador and the Philippines. The Commission has now assigned the following duties to its field observers:

(a) Observe political factors arising out of the eventual withdrawal of North Korean forces;

(b) Gather political information received from prisoner-of-war sources or other witnesses in the field;

(c) Establish facts on perpetration of atrocities on which international proofs to the United Nations could be based; and

(d) Obtain information on the scope of the refugee problem and its political and welfare implications.

D. Acknowledgments

200. The Commission wishes here to express its appreciation of the wholehearted and constant co-operation of the secretariat under the experienced leadership and guidance of the Principal Secretary, Mr. Bertil A. Renborg. The Commission also records its appreciation of the work in Korea of Mr. Charles L. Coates, Deputy Principal Secretary, and Mr. John P. Gaillard, Assistant Deputy Principal Secretary, in an exceptionally difficult period, and especially of their assistance in the preparation of this report.

Throughout this period the Commission has had the advantage of the advice and assistance of Colonel A. G. Katzin, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, who presented his credentials to the Commission at its 40th meeting at Taejon on 6 July 1950. The Commission has also had the advantage of the assistance of Mr. Constantine Stavropoulos, Special Political Adviser, in the preparation of its report.

E. Death of Colonel M. K. Unni Nayyar

201. The Commission regrets to have to report the death on 12 August 1950 of Colonel M. K. Unni Nayyar, member of the Indian delegation on the Commission. Colonel Nayyar was at that time serving with the Commission's liaison group at Taegu, and was killed when the jeep in which he was driving was destroyed by a land mine near the front north-west of Taegu.
Part Four

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Responsibility for the aggression

202. The invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea by the armed forces of the North Korean authorities, which began on 25 June 1950, was an act of aggression initiated without warning and without provocation, in execution of a carefully prepared plan.

203. This plan of aggression, it is now clear, was an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities, the object of which was to secure control over the whole of Korea. If control could not be gained by peaceful means, it would be achieved by overthrowing the Republic of Korea, either by undermining it from within or, should that prove ineffective, by resorting to direct aggression. As the methods used for undermining the Republic from within proved unsuccessful, the North Korean authorities launched an invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea.

B. Origin and nature of the conflict

204. The origin of the conflict is to be found in the artificial division of Korea and in the failure, in 1945, of the occupying Powers to reach agreement on the method to be used for giving independence to Korea. This failure was not due to anything inherent in the attitude of the people of Korea themselves, but was a reflection of those wider and more fundamental differences of outlook and policy which have become so marked a feature of the international scene.

205. This artificial division was consolidated by the exclusion from North Korea of the United Nations Temporary Commission, which had been charged by the General Assembly to observe the holding of elections on a democratic basis in the whole of Korea. In the circumstances, it was decided to hold such elections in South Korea alone.

206. Had internationally-supervised elections been allowed to take place in the whole of Korea, and had a unified and independent Korea thereby come into existence, the present conflict could never have arisen.

C. Prospects of unification

207. The Korean people, one in race, language and culture, fervently desire to live in a unified and independent Korea. Unification can be the only aim regarding Korea. It did, however, appear to the Commission, before the aggression took place, that unification through negotiation was unlikely to be achieved if such negotiation involved the holding of internationally-supervised elections on a democratic basis in the whole of Korea. Experience suggested that the North Korean authorities would never agree to such elections.

208. It was hoped that, at some stage, it might be possible to break down the economic and social barriers between the two political entities as a step toward unification. That too proved illusory, as the North Korean authorities persisted in their policy of aiming at the overthrow of the Republic of Korea.

209. After the consolidation of the division of Korea, propaganda and hostile activities on the part of the North Korean authorities accentuated tension which, in turn, stiffened the attitude of the Government and people of the Republic of Korea, and even further prejudiced such possibility of unification by negotiation as might have remained. Notwithstanding the continued efforts of the Commission, it appeared on the eve of the aggression that the Korean peninsula would remain divided indefinitely, or at least until international tension had slackened.

D. Development of representative government in the Republic of Korea

210. The necessity to safeguard the stability and security of the Republic of Korea from the threat from the North gradually became a controlling factor in all the major activities of the administration of the Republic, and absorbed energies and resources which were needed to develop the new form of representative government and to carry out the economic and social reconstruction programme.

211. The first two years of the new National Assembly reflected clearly the difficulties which it would be normal to expect in a body dealing with a new and unfamiliar political structure. It had become clear, long before the act of aggression occurred, that the Legislature was making good progress in its efforts to exert parliamentary control over all departments of government, and would not rest content until its relations with the Executive had been satisfactorily adjusted. The growing civic responsibility shown by the Legislature augured well for the future of representative government in Korea.

212. At the elections of 30 May 1950, the people showed very considerable enthusiasm, and the electoral machinery functioned well. Among the cases of interference with candidates which occurred, some were explainable in the light of the stringent precautions which the Government found necessary to take in order to safeguard the stability and security of the State against the threat from the North. Although there appeared to be little justification for interference in some other cases, the results of the elections, in which many candidates critical of the Administration were returned, showed that the voters were in fact able to exercise their democratic freedom of choice among candidates, and had cast their
votes accordingly. The results also showed popular support of the Republic, and a determination to improve the Administration by constitutional means.

213. The division of Korea added to the economic difficulties that had arisen at the end of the Japanese domination, and made it most difficult for the Republic of Korea to become self-supporting. Funds which might have been expended for the execution of the social and economic programme of the Republic were consumed by heavy defence expenditures. Nevertheless, when the aggression occurred, substantial progress was being made with that programme.

**E. Korean needs and aspirations**

214. Serious problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation, particularly the grave refugee problem, already confront the country. To these problems will be added problems of yet greater magnitude when the military conflict comes to an end. It will be quite beyond the capacity of the country to provide from its own resources means for rehabilitation. A healthy and viable democracy in Korea cannot come into being unless very considerable aid and assistance are provided from outside Korea.

215. Finally, as the division of the country and the resulting antagonisms were artificial, the Commission believes that, when the conditions under which they arose disappear, it will be possible for the Korean people of both North and South to come again together, to live in peace and to build the strong foundations of a free, democratic Korea.

Done in a single copy in the English language at House No. 328 at Camp Hialeah, Pusan, Korea, this fourth day of September in the year nineteen hundred and fifty.

(Signed)

Anup Singh (Chairman) (India)
A. B. Jamieson (Rapporteur) (Australia)
Liu Yu-Wan (China)
Angel Gochez Marin (El Salvador)
Henri Brionval (France)
Bernabe Africa (The Philippines)
Kamil Idil (Turkey)
Bertil A. Renborg (Principal Secretary)
ANNEXES

Annex 1

General Assembly resolutions of 1947, 1948 and 1949 concerning the problem of the independence of Korea

I
RESOLUTION 112 (II)
of 14 November 1947

[Note: For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Resolutions.]

II
RESOLUTION 195 (III)
of 12 December 1948

[Note: For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, Resolutions.]

III
RESOLUTION 293 (IV)
of 21 October 1949

[Note: For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourth Session, Resolutions.]

Annex 2

A. List of delegations to the Commission, field observers and secretariat

I. DELEGATIONS TO THE COMMISSION

Australia: A. B. Jamieson,*' Representative.

China: Liu Yu-Wan, Representative (from 25 January); T. T. Ssutu,* Alternate.

El Salvador: Angel Góchez Marin, Representative (from 29 May); Fidel Sánchez Hernández, Alternate (from 29 May).

France: Henri Brionval, Representative (from 15 February); Henri Costilhes,* Temporary Representative (until 14 February).

India: Anup Singh,* Representative; Chenchal Kondapi, Alternate (from 29 January); Colonel M. K. Unni Nayar, Alternate (from 25 July to 12 August).*

Philippines: Bernabe Africa, Representative (from 30 January); Maximino G. Bueno, Alternate (from 22 May).

Turkey: Kasim Gulek, Representative (from 26 January to 24 March); Kamil Idil, Representative (from 27 May).

II. UNITED NATIONS FIELD OBSERVERS

Major F. S. B. Peach (Australia), Squadron Leader R. J. Rankin (Australia), Wing Commander H. Mal-

* Present at the first meeting of the second session of the Commission held in Seoul on 15 December 1949.

*Alternate was killed on 12 August during a field trip to the front north of Taegu.

* Arrived Pusan, Korea, July or August 1950.

* Arrived Seoul 6 May, appointed Deputy Principal Secretary 1 August 1950.

* Acting Deputy Principal Secretary from 30 March to 31 July.

* Returned to Headquarters in July 1950.
Immediately following the adoption by the Security Council, on 27 June 1950, of its resolution concerning the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, the Secretary-General appointed a Personal Representative in Korea to represent him, in view of the special situation, in relations between the Secretary-General and the United Nations Commission on Korea, the Government of the Republic of Korea and all military forces operating in conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council.

Personal Representative of the Secretary-General: Alfred G. Katzin.

Special Political Adviser: Constantine Stravopoulos.

Annex 3

The appeal of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland (A/AC.26/II/L.47)

Adopted on 7 June 1950 at Pyongyang, North Korea, and handed to a member of the secretariat at Yohyon Railroad Station, North Korea, on 10 June 1950.

Secretariat note: Announcement of the Appeal was repeatedly made over the Pyongyang Radio on 7, 8 and 9 June 1950 in a communiqué which first explained the circumstances attending its adoption. Then, after the text of the Appeal, there was broadcast a resolution on procedure for its distribution. The full text of this resolution is reproduced in document A/AC.26/II/Monitor 11, pages 4-5. Inter alia the resolution stated that the Appeal should be distributed to “all political parties and social organizations in the South, except the Taiwan Nationalist Party, the Democratic Nationalist Party, the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, which are the pro-Japanese and reactionary political parties directed by Syngman Rhee, Kim Sung Soo, and the like”. It also excepted from distribution the nine so-called “criminals who have obstructed the peaceful unification of the fatherland”, listed in the text of the Appeal itself (proposal 4 (a)).

At Yohyon Railroad Station the secretariat representative signed for a copy of the Appeal in a register listing the political parties, social organizations and individuals to whom the three members of the Democratic Front at Yohyon were authorized to transmit copies. The text of this register is attached as an appendix.

Extract from communiqué issued by the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the attainment of unification of the Fatherland in Pyongyang on 7 June 1950

The Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland convoked an expanded meeting of the Central Committee today, 7 June 1950.

In the meeting the following agenda was discussed:

(1) The Appeal for expediting the peaceful unification of the fatherland addressed to all democratic political parties and social organizations of both South and North Korea and to all the people.

(2) The method of procedure to be followed in the distribution of the said Appeal.

The meeting thoroughly debated the draft appeal for expediting the peaceful unification of the fatherland, as submitted by the drafting committee in accordance with the resolution adopted at the 5th meeting of the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Attainment

54 In documents of which the original text is Russian, the title of this organization has been translated as “United Democratic Fatherland Front”.

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of Unification of the Fatherland (hereinafter referred to as the “DFAUF”). Complete agreement having been reached by the representatives of the various political parties and social organizations affiliated to the DFAUF, the draft appeal was adopted by unanimous vote.

Subsequently, the meeting discussed the question of the method of procedure to be employed in the distribution of the said Appeal to various political parties and social organizations in the South. Complete agreement having been reached, an appropriate resolution was adopted unanimously.

The full text of the Appeal for expending the peaceful unification of the fatherland and the resolution on the distribution thereof, as adopted by the expanded meeting of the Central Committee of the DFAUF, are attached hereto.

**TEXT OF THE APPEAL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF UNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND**

*Addressed to all democratic political parties and social organizations of both Southern and Northern halves of the fatherland and to all the people of Korea*

"Dear fellow countrymen,

"Dear members of all democratic political parties and social organizations of both the South and the North,

"Dear brothers and sisters,

"In June last year, the DFAUF made a proposal regarding measures for the peaceful unification of the fatherland. Up to the present, however, the aim of that proposal has not been realized.

"Before long, we will be observing the fifth anniversary of the historic liberation of 15 August 1945. And yet the 38th parallel still persists, dividing our country into two parts. In spite of the fact that five years have elapsed since Soviet troops liberated the Korean people from the yoke of the long Japanese domination, our country remains divided, wanting unification. Who is it that obstructs the unification of our fatherland? For whose benefit does the division continue? As we all know, the traitorous Syngman Rhee gang, who under the instructions of the American imperialists are opposed to the peaceful unification of the fatherland and to all the people of Korea.

"But for the opposition of the Syngman Rhee gang and the American imperialists to the Moscow decision on Korea this country would have been united as an independent democratic State long ago.

"Had not the American imperialists and their running dogs, the Syngman Rhee gang, obstructed the peaceful unification of the fatherland proposed by the DFAUF, our country would have been united last year. The responsibility for the present situation in which our fatherland still remains divided should be borne exclusively by the American imperialists and their servants, the Syngman Rhee gang.

"As all of us are fully aware, the Americans, having wilfully wrecked the work of the US-USSR Commission, brought the Korean issue before the United Nations General Assembly. This action, however, only contributed to obstructing the unification of the fatherland rather than facilitating it.

"In September 1947, the Government of the USSR proposed that the US and USSR occupation forces should be withdrawn from Korea simultaneously and that the solution of the Korean problem should be left to the discretion of the Korean people themselves.

"But the Americans rejected that fair proposal. Instead the American Government, unheeding the objections raised by the Korean people and the Soviet Union, caused the dispatch of a United Nations Commission to Korea through the use of the 'hand-raising majority' subservient to it within the United Nations General Assembly. What has the so-called United Nations Commission on Korea dispatched by the United Nations General Assembly done in this country?

"The Commission has failed because it has acted in the interest of the American imperialists and not of the Korean people.

"This Commission is acting in close collaboration with the traitorous Syngman Rhee gang and the pro-Japanese without lending its ears to the request of the Koreans. This Commission upholds the fascist policy of the Syngman Rhee gang.

"The United Nations Commission on Korea is publicly supporting brutal oppression against progressive persons, democratic political parties and social organizations, terrorism against the people, indiscriminate mass killing, and the suppression of the people's movement — all these carried out by the Syngman Rhee puppet gang. All the Korean people, therefore, are indignant over the activities of the United Nations Commission and are struggling in opposition to it and requesting its immediate withdrawal from Korea.

"Dear Fellow Countrymen!

"Our national economy is suffering tremendous loss and obstacles to its development because of the division at the 38th parallel. The abundant natural resources within the country are not being fully utilized for the benefit of the people. In the northern half of our fatherland the production of electric power, coal, fertilizers, metals and industrial goods is abundant and is increasing and developing day by day. And yet the resources produced in the northern half of our fatherland are not made available to the people in the southern half under the present divided conditions.

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“In the southern half of our fatherland production has come to a standstill, most of the factories have been ruined, unemployed workers number over one and a half million, up to now the farmers have not obtained land. The principal cause of all these things lies in the offence committed by the Syngman Rhee gang and their masters, the Americans.

“Wall Street merchants are converting the southern half of our fatherland into an export market for their commodities — commodities which can well be produced by Korean industry.

“The Americans are deliberately ruining the industries in the southern half of our fatherland while taking away such natural resources as rice, wolfram, and graphite, which are needed in our country.

“In the northern half of our fatherland, People’s Committees, constituting the people’s political regime, have been established by the spontaneous initiative of the people and the democratic freedom of the people is fully guaranteed. Throughout the people’s regime, from the lowest agency to the highest level, elections have been held twice and its central administrative organ has been elected through the joint expression of the will of the people both in the South and the North. The elections were carried out by secret ballot on the basis of general, impartial, and direct suffrage. Excepting only the pro-Japanese and traitors, all the people of various walks of life — labourers, farmers, intelligentsia, industrialists, merchants — participated in those democratic elections.

“On the other hand, there is no political body elected by the people in the southern half of our fatherland. There, the administrative system of the Japanese imperialistic régime still remains. There, provincial governors and county heads are still ruling the people arbitrarily. The ‘National Assembly’ resulting from the traitorous separate elections of 10 May 1948, was made up of faithful servants to Syngman Rhee. That ‘National Assembly’ contained only big landlords and reactionary capitalists but not a single representative of the labourers and farmers.

“In spite of that fact, Syngman Rhee arrested and imprisoned over ten members of that ‘National Assembly’, including Noh Il Whan, Lee Moon Won, and Kim Yak Soo.54

“The 30 May elections to the traitorous ‘National Assembly’, held under pressure of the United States, were not free elections. Many candidates, who were not favourable to Syngman Rhee and who tried freely to express their will, were molested and imprisoned.

“As a result of the intimidation, duplicity and terrorism which prevailed in the southern half at the time of the elections, the overwhelming majority of the successful candidates represent anti-popular elements. And therefore the present ‘National Assembly’, too, is not a representative organ of the people, any more than its predecessor.

“The reactionary Syngman Rhee gang have established a police State in the southern half of our fatherland and are oppressing and killing mercilessly those who fight for the unification of their fatherland and democracy.

“Of course the people are indignant over the cowardly attitude of those people. How can a patriot afford to think more of his personal well-being than the welfare of the fatherland and the people? How can one deviate from the path of justice because of oppression?

“In the southern half, we cannot find the remotest semblance of democratic freedom for the people. In the southern half of our fatherland, freedom is guaranteed only to pro-Japanese reactionary political parties, such as the Tainan Nationalist Party and the Democratic Nationalist Party (Hanook Democratic Party) 55 who serve the Syngman Rhee traitorous gang. All the other democratic, patriotic political parties and social organizations are suffering from preposterous molestation and their members have been unlawfully arrested, imprisoned, and even put to death without trial.

“The labourers and farmers have hardly any rights. Ordinary citizens in cities have no rights either. Freedom is enjoyed only by a minority handful of the pro-Japanese and the traitors on whom the Syngman Rhee puppet gang are dependent.

“Again, in the southern half, our national culture has been completely ruined. All noble aspects of our people have been erased and in their place American decadent, corrupt culture is imported and encouraged. Motion pictures depicting gangsterism and Ku Klux Klan, murdering barbarism, rape, and maltreatment of Negroes are imported and encouraged, while the good customs and morality of the Korean people are being deliberately ruined.

“Dear brothers and sisters:

“The Syngman Rhee puppet gang are subjugating the southern half of our fatherland to America, prompted

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54 Three of the thirteen National Assemblmen arrested in June 1949 and convicted in February 1950 on charges of violation of the National Security Act. The convictions have been appealed. (Note by secretariat.)

55 The Democratic Nationalist Party consisted, in early 1950, chiefly of former members of the Hankook Democratic Party and some former members of the Tainan Nationalist Party. (Note by secretariat.)
by the dirty greed of their superiors, the Americans, and of themselves. All the Korean people have realized through their bitter experience during the past five years what misfortune and disaster has been brought about by the artificial division of the land.

“We have never recognized the 38th parallel as a national boundary, and indeed we cannot afford to do so.

“The people both in the southern and northern halves of our fatherland are longing eagerly for its unification and wish to live in a country united economically, culturally and socially.

“Once again the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland appeals to all democratic political parties and social organizations and to all the people for the peaceful unification of the fatherland.

“The forthcoming 15 August Liberation Anniversary should be commemorated by the people of both the South and the North with a unified fatherland. We should celebrate it as the people of a unified, democratic and independent country.

“With a view to expediting the peaceful unification of the fatherland, the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland proposes to all democratic political parties and social organizations and patriotic persons the following:

“(1) That General Elections be held between 5 and 8 August to establish a unified supreme legislative organ;

“(2) That the supreme legislative organ thus elected should be convoked at Seoul on 15 August, the fifth anniversary of Korea’s liberation from the yoke of the Japanese régime.

“(3) That a Consultative Council of the representatives of all democratic political parties and social organizations of both the North and the South should be held from 15 June through 17 June either at Haeju or Kaesong to discuss and decide the following matters:

“(a) The various conditions for peaceful unification of the fatherland;

“(b) The procedure for holding the General Elections to the supreme legislative organ of Korea;

“(c) The creation of a Central Election Committee to direct the holding of the elections.

“(4) The Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland proposes the following conditions for participation in the above-mentioned Consultative Council of representatives of all democratic political parties and social organizations of both the South and the North:

“(a) That such traitors as Syngman Rhee, Lee Bum Suk, Kim Sung Soo, Shin Sung Mo, Chough Ok, Chai Pyong Duk, Pae Sung Wook, Yoon Tchi Young, and Cynn Heung Woo should not be allowed to participate in the Consultative Council;

“(b) That the United Nations Commission on Korea should not be permitted to interfere in the task of unification of the fatherland; the Korean people should solve the question of the unification of their fatherland by their own efforts and without foreign intervention.

“(5) That the present authorities of the two régimes in the South and North should assume the responsibility for guaranteeing public order during the period of the meeting of the proposed Consultative Council and the period of the elections.

“The Democratic Front for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland is firmly convinced that members of all democratic political parties and social organizations which respect the interest of the fatherland and all the people who aspire to the peaceful unification of their fatherland will fervently support its proposal to expedite the peaceful unification of our fatherland.

“Long live United Democratic Korea!

“Long live the united Korean people!”

APPENDIX

TEXT OF REGISTER

The appeal for expediting the peaceful unification of the fatherland adopted at the expanded meeting of the Central Committee of the DFAUF shall be distributed to the following political parties and social organizations and individuals in the southern half:

I. Political parties and social organizations

1. Central Committee of National Independence Federation
   Seoul
2. Central Committee of Korean Independence Party
   Seoul
3. Central Committee of Socialist Party
   Seoul
4. Central Committee of Independent Labourers and Farmers Party
   Seoul
5. Socialist Democratic Party
   Seoul
6. Central Committee of Tai Han Labourers and Farmers Party
   Seoul
7. Central Committee of Nationalist Republican Party
   Seoul
8. Central Committee of Min Joong Dang (People’s Party)
   Seoul
9. Women’s Nationalist Party
   Seoul
10. Central Committee of Tai Han Labourers Federation
    Seoul
11. Central Committee of Tai Han Farmers Federation
    Seoul
12. Central Committee of National Council of Korean Young Men’s Christian Associations
    Seoul
13. Central Committee of National Federation of Culture Organizations
    Seoul
14. Han Kook Literary Men’s Club
    Seoul
15. Chosun Press Association
    Seoul
16. Central Committee of Tai Han Nationalist Society
    Seoul
17. Central Committee of Tai Han Youth Corps
    Seoul
18. New Life Association
    Seoul
19. Central Committee of Patriotic Women’s League
    Seoul
20. Chosun National Alliance
    Seoul
21. Tai Han Science Institute
    Seoul
22. Korean Language Association
    Seoul
23. Han Keul Association
    Seoul
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<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Central Committee of National Independence Women's League Seoul</td>
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<td>25.</td>
<td>Buddhist Headquarters Seoul</td>
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<td>26.</td>
<td>Young Men's Buddhist Association Seoul</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Chunto Kyo Headquarters Seoul</td>
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<td>28.</td>
<td>Young Men's National Defence Corps Seoul</td>
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<td>29.</td>
<td>Patriotic Women's Association Seoul</td>
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<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Central Committee of Young Men's League for the Korean People's Liberation Seoul</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Young Men's League of Three Equal Opportunities Seoul</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Central Committee of National Students League Seoul</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>Chosun Bar Association Seoul</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>Journalist Society Seoul</td>
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<td>35.</td>
<td>Confucianist Association Seoul</td>
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<td>36.</td>
<td>Christian Cultural Association Seoul</td>
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<td>37.</td>
<td>Central Y.M.C.A. Seoul</td>
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<td>38.</td>
<td>Seoul Y.W.C.A. Seoul</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Patriotic Old Men's Society Seoul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**II. Newspapers, Press services, publishers and educational and cultural institutions**

**Press services**

1. Korean Pacific Press (KPP) Seoul  
2. Han Kook Press Seoul  
3. Kong Lip Press Seoul  

**Newspapers and radio stations**

4. Cha Yoo Shinmun Seoul  
5. Seoul Shinmun Seoul  
6. Dong-A Ilbo Seoul  
7. Kyung Hyang Shinmun Seoul  
8. Han Sung Ilbo Seoul  
9. Chosun Ilbo Seoul  
10. Yun Hap Shinmun Seoul  
11. Min Joo Ilbo Seoul  
12. Pyung Wha Ilbo Seoul  
13. Kook Min Shinmun Seoul  
14. Kook Do Shinmun Seoul  
15. Tai Pyung Ilbo Seoul  
16. Tia Yang Shinmun Seoul  
17. Han Kook Shinmun Seoul  
18. Shin Han Ilbo Seoul  
19. Women's Press (Puin Shinmun) Seoul  
20. Ka Jung Shinmun Seoul  
21. Industrial Press (Kong Eup Shinmun) Seoul  
22. Fishery Economic Press Seoul  
23. Shisa Ilbo Seoul  
24. Ye Sul Shinmun (Art News) Seoul  
25. Critical News (Bi-pan Shinmun) Seoul  
26. Students Weekly Seoul  
27. Seoul Times Seoul  
28. Chosun Broadcasting Corporation Seoul  
29. Seoul Broadcasting Station Seoul  
30. Kangwon Daily Seoul  
31. Kookmin Ilbo Seoul  
32. Tong Pang Shinmun Seoul  
33. Chonpuk Shinmun Seoul  
34. Cholla minbo Seoul  
35. Kunsan minbo Seoul  
36. Kunsan Shinmun Seoul  
37. Ho Nam Shinmun Seoul  
38. Mokpo Shinmun Seoul  
39. Yosu Ilbo Seoul  
40. Kwangju Ilbo Seoul  
41. Cheju Shinmun Seoul  
42. Min Sung Ilbo Seoul  
43. Taegu Shibo Seoul  
44. Yung Nam Ilbo Seoul  
45. Pusan Daily News Seoul  
46. Cha Yu Minbo Seoul  
47. Pusan Shinmun Seoul  
48. Kyung Nam Ilbo Seoul  
49. Pusan Ilbo Seoul  
50. Minju Joongbo Seoul  

**Publishers**

51. Koryu Publishing House Seoul  
52. Moon Kyo Sa (Education Co.) Seoul  
53. New Asia Economic News Seoul  
54. International Publicity League Seoul  
55. International Publishing House Seoul  
56. Students' Publishing House Seoul  
57. Park Moon Printing Company Seoul  
58. Soo Do Printing Company Seoul  
59. University Printing House Seoul  

**Educational institutions**

60. Seoul National University Seoul  
61. College of Liberal Arts Seoul  
62. College of Law Seoul  
63. Koryu University Seoul  
64. Chosun Christian University Seoul  
65. Tong Kook University Seoul  
66. Ewha Women's University Seoul  
67. Sook Myung Women's University Seoul
Central University
Seoul

Sung Kyun Kwan University
Seoul

Severance Medical College
Seoul

Seoul Women’s Medical College
Seoul

Seoul College of Pharmacy
Seoul

Tan Kook University
Seoul

Shin Hung University
Seoul

Kook Min University
Seoul

Han Yang Technical College
Seoul

Chosun Journalist Institute
Seoul

College of Agriculture
Suwon

Taegu Normal College
Taegu

Taegu Agricultural College
Taegu

Kongju Normal College
Kongju

College of Commerce
Chungju

National Marine College
Kunsan

III. Individuals

Note: Not reproduced. A list of 176 selected South Korean leaders of both the political right and the left, but excluding those important personalities listed above.

IV. United Nations Commission on Korea
(located at Seoul)

Sealed by: Yu Yong Joon
of the Board of Chairmen
Kim Chang Joon
Secretary-General

Annex 4

Report of field trips carried out by United Nations Commission on Korea field observers along the 38th parallel (A/AC.26/II/EMDOC 1.)

[Note by secretariat: This document was drafted in Seoul by the observation group on Saturday, 24 June 1950, the day following their return from Ongjin peninsula. It was not, however, possible to reproduce and circulate this document owing to the rapid march of events. The report was briefly explained to the Commission at its meeting in Seoul on Monday, 26 June 1950, and the decisions arrived at on the basis of this report were included in the cablegram dispatched by the Commission to the Secretary-General dated 26 June 1950 transmitting a report (reproduced as Security Council document S/1507 dated 26 June 1950) concerning the military situation. The report was further considered at a meeting of the Commission held in Camp Hakata on 29 June 1950 and a report was dispatched to the Security Council the same day (reproduced as Security Council document S/1518 dated 29 June 1950). The full report has now been reproduced for further consideration by the Commission.]

Team: Squadron Leader R. J. Rankin, Observer
Major F. S. B. Peach, Observer
Mr. C. L. Coates, Secretariat

I. DIARY

9 June 1950
Seoul to Kaesong, visiting Headquarters First Division at Susak en route. Visit to Tower Hill on 38th parallel.

10 June 1950
Kaesong to Paekchon and Yonan. Visit to Regimental Headquarters. Return to Yohyon for visit to 38th parallel and to observe crossing of UNCOK representative to meet emissaries from North Korea at Yohyon Station. Return to Paekchon.

11 June 1950
Paekchon to Kaesong. Visit to refugee centre. Then to Seoul.

13 June 1950
Seoul to Uijongbu. Visit to Headquarters Seventh Division and thence to Tong Duk Chon Regimental Headquarters and 38th parallel. Return to Seoul.

14 June 1950
Seoul to Chunchon and Wonju. Visit to Headquarters Sixth Division.

15 June 1950
Wonju to Kangnung. Visit to Headquarters Eighth Division.

16 June 1950
Kangnung to Chumunjin and 38th parallel. Return to Kangnung.

17 June 1950
Kangnung to Seoul.

21 June 1950
Seoul to the Ongjin peninsula by sea. Disembarked at Bupo and then by jeep to Ongjin. Visit to Regimental Headquarters.

22 June 1950
Visits to 38th parallel at Mt. Kachisan (opposite Chwiya in North Korea) and north-west of Ongjin.

23 June 1950
Return to Seoul by sea.

II. THE GENERAL SITUATION ALONG THE 38TH PARALLEL

The principal impression left with the observers after the field tour along the parallel is that the South Korean Army is organized entirely for defence, and is in no condition to carry out an attack on a large scale against the forces of the North. This impression is based upon the following main observations:

40
1. The South Korean Army in all sectors is disposed in depth. The parallel is guarded on the southern side only by small bodies of troops located in scattered outposts together with roving patrols. There is no concentration of troops, and no massing for attack visible at any point.

2. At several points the North Korean forces are in effective possession of salients on the south side of the parallel, occupation in at least one case being of fairly recent date. There is no evidence that South Korean forces have taken any steps or are making any preparations to eject North Korean forces from any of these salients.

3. A proportion of the South Korean forces are actively engaged in rounding up guerrilla bands that have infiltrated into the mountainous areas in the eastern sectors. It was ascertained that these bands are in possession of demolition equipment and are more heavily armed than on previous occasions.

4. So far as the equipment of the South Korean forces is concerned, in the absence of armour, air support and heavy artillery any action with the object of invasion would by any military standards be impossible.

5. The South Korean Army does not appear to be in possession of military or other supplies that would indicate preparation for a large-scale attack. In particular there is no sign of any dumping of supplies of ammunition or petrol-oil-lubricant, in forward areas. Roads generally are little used, and apart from a convoy of four trucks taking a company from Kangnung westwards to join in the rounding up of the guerrilla bands, no concentration of transport was anywhere encountered.

6. In general, the attitude of the South Korean commanders is one of vigilant defence. Their instructions do not go beyond retirement, in case of attack, upon previously prepared positions.

7. There is no indication of any extensive reconnaissance being carried out northwards by the South Korean Army, nor is any undue excitement or activity observed at the Divisional Headquarters or at regimental levels, to suggest preparation for offensive activity. The observers were freely admitted to all sections of the various headquarters including operations rooms.

8. The observers made a special point of inquiring what information was coming in regarding the situation north of the parallel. In some sectors, it had been reported that civilians had recently been removed from areas adjoining the parallel to the north to depths varying from 4 to 8 kilometres. Another report received during the night of Thursday 22 June at the regimental headquarters in Ongjin was to the effect that there was increased military activity in the vicinity of Chwiya, about 4 kilometres north of the parallel. No reports, however, had been received of any unusual activity on the part of the North Korean forces that would indicate any imminent change in the general situation on the parallel.

III. Administrative matters

A. Provisional organization of zones

In the unavoidable absence of the chief observer, it is not possible to make any but provisional arrange-ments for the organization of the observers already in Korea. Pending his arrival, however, it will be necessary to work according to a provisional plan which it is suggested should be as follows:

The length of the parallel should be divided into four zones, in each of which one team of two observers would normally operate. The boundaries of these zones will be fixed to comply with the requirements of communication and to provide the quickest way of obtaining information from Korean Army sources. The first zone will include Kaesong, the second Uijongbu, the third Chunchon and the fourth Kangnung. The four observers of zones one and two will be based on Seoul and will be expected to cover also the Ongjin peninsula. The observers covering the third zone will be based on Chunchon and those covering the fourth zone on Kangnung. The teams will be rotated in accordance with requirements subsequently to be determined, but in general an observer will be expected to spend not less than three weeks in each month out in the field.

B. Communications

Communication by telephone between the units of the Korean Army along the parallel are good but it is not easy to get messages quickly by telephone back to Seoul. Facilities for communicating with Seoul by telephone, however, do exist, and when liaison is properly established, communication by telephone with Seoul should not be unsatisfactory. From Kangnung, however, it will be necessary to send messages by radio, and provisional agreement has been obtained for the use of the KMAG (United States Korean Military Advisory Group) radio facilities, which are excellent.

For permanent arrangements, however, it will be necessary to establish an UNCOK radio net which will give facilities for each team to keep in direct contact with the Commission in Seoul. This will involve long-term planning and further examination of this problem will be necessary.

C. Transport

With the arrival of the four new jeeps it will be possible to make the teams independent of Korean Army transport. Two jeeps might be placed permanently at the disposal of the teams in Kangnung and Chunchon, the other two remaining in Seoul. For the efficient running of the transport, good drivers must be recruited and it will be desirable to obtain the services of an expert mechanic who could also act as motor transport officer. It will be necessary to obtain permission from the Korean Army for the UNCOK vehicles to obtain petrol and oil, and arrangements will also have to be made for the maintenance of the vehicles, possibly by the AMIK (American Mission in Korea) organization. As the observers themselves will on occasion drive the jeeps, they should be covered by proper insurance and should also be given such licences as may be necessary according to the Korean regulations. The jeeps, it is suggested, should be painted blue with suitable United Nations markings prominently displayed. In view of the condition of Korean roads, special attention should be paid to the seat padding and it will later be necessary to arrange for winterization. The trailers, when they arrive, should similarly be painted and marked.
D. Liaison

The officer deputed by the Korean Government accompanied the team throughout the trips and was of the greatest help. As the other teams arrive, extra liaison officers will have to be provided. Four interpreters, who will also be required to attend to executive matters for the observers, should also be recruited.

E. Equipment

For the efficient operation of the teams, the following equipment is necessary:

1. 4 pairs of binoculars;
2. 10 map cases;
3. 12 flashlights;
4. 12 camp cots;
5. 12 sleeping bags;
6. 24 blankets;
7. 12 first aid kits;
8. 4 compasses;
9. 12 duffle bags;
10. 12 mess kits;
11. 4 cooking stoves;
12. 6 water containers;
13. Insecticide.

It will later be necessary to provide winter equipment, including parkas, gloves, and snow boots.

F. Accommodation

If four observers are based on Seoul, it will be necessary to arrange accommodation for two observers at Chunchon and for two observers at Kangnung. The best arrangement from the point of view of living conditions will undoubtedly be to obtain permission from KMAG for the two observers to join the KMAG mess at Kangnung and Chunchon. It is understood that this would not be impossible if a request were made to KMAG Headquarters. If KMAG facilities are not used, the cost of providing alternative accommodation will be considerable.

G. Insurance

Apart from the motor insurance referred to above, it will be necessary to clarify the position as regards personal insurance of: (a) observers; (b) secretariat personnel working with the teams and (c) ancillary personnel.

(Signed)  R. J. RANKIN
Observer

F. S. B. PEACH
Observer

C. L. COATES
Secretariat