APUS ePress: Military History

David B. Culver
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts
Awarded: December 2020
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Jon Mikolashek
Abstract: The following thesis describes the deceptive measures implemented by the Soviet Red Army in preparation for Operation BAGRATION in June 1944. These deceptive measures, known by the Red Army as maskirovka, are seldom recognized in the prominent historiography of this operation, yet the magnitude of success achieved by the Red Army would not have been possible without them. This study explores primary sources, official histories, and works by prominent historians in an attempt to identify the gaps between the perceived importance of maskirovka by historians today, and the strategic and operational impact that it had on the German Wehrmacht seventy-six years ago. By bridging these gaps, maskirovka can be properly credited for Soviet success during Operation BAGRATION. Numerical and technical superiority do not always
equal success; the vagaries of the battlefield and the skill of the opponent often offset these advantages. Soviet leadership recognized this reality and successfully implemented maskirovka at multiple levels in preparation for Operation BAGRATION, helping ensure victory.

Philip Burstein
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA) CONC Civil War
Awarded: February 2018
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: This thesis examines the generalship of Robert E. Lee during the Civil War battle of Chancellorsville, May 1-4, 1863. At the start of the battle Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was in desperate straits. Outnumbered by more than two to one, with a Union force in front separated by only five miles from a second Union wing directly behind the Confederate fortifications, a Rebel defeat appeared to be inevitable. Yet five days later the vast Union host had been driven back to its starting point, having suffered some 17,000 casualties in the interim. The stunning contrast between the expected outcome and the actual one raised Lee’s reputation to new heights, with Chancellorsville being hailed by both contemporaries and future historians as his greatest battle. The fact that Lee was in command while the victory was being won does not necessarily mean that Lee himself deserves all the credit. A link has to be shown to exist between Lee’s decisions on the one hand, and the final triumph of his army on the other. This thesis evaluates Lee’s actions in the light of the circumstances known to exist at the time, the available alternatives, Lee’s stated strategic objectives, and the most likely outcome of his actions under reasonable assumptions about the behavior of the enemy army. The analysis is not favorable to Lee. His first decision, to fight a major battle at once under conditions of maximum disadvantage, could easily have led to the complete rout of the Confederate forces. His second decision, to divide his army and send Jackson marching toward the Federal rear, was even worse. The Union advance had already been halted; to take enormous risks in order to make an attack that had no possibility of achieving decisive results and would necessarily result in thousands of additional Confederate casualties made little sense. The fact that Lee was saved from most of the consequences of his own actions by three of the worst blunders made by any army during the entire war should not change our opinion of Lee’s generalship at Chancellorsville. His decisions were incorrect, and the fact that he held the field because his Union opponents showed truly extraordinary incompetence does not excuse him.

Daniel Jacobs Spivey
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA) CONC Civil War
Awarded: February 2018
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: This study will examine the constant succession of major tactical errors committed by Ambrose Powell Hill while commanding units at the brigade, division, and corps level during the American Civil War. This study will examine Hill’s pre-war life and what effect, if any, it had on his leadership style. This study will examine Hill’s performance during the Peninsula Campaign when he prematurely launched an assault against Union positions. This study will examine the constant squabbling between Hill and his senior corps commanders resulting in his arrest on two separate occasions. This study will examine Hill’s inexplicable decision to leave a large gap in his lines at Fredericksburg which nearly unhinged the entire right wing of Robert E. Lee’s army. This study will examine Hill’s slow pace at Chancellorsville resulting in the flank attack beginning while his troops were still filing into position. This study will examine Hill’s inability to control his troops west of Gettysburg resulting in the beginning of the massive battle. This study will examine the disastrous consequences of Hill’s failure to deploy a skirmish line near Bristoe Station. This study will examine Hill’s tactical decisions in the Wilderness and North Anna River eventually resulting in a stinging rebuke from Lee. Finally, this study will examine Hill’s decisions at Petersburg, the last resulting in his death on the battlefield.

McClean G. Bethea
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: February 2017
Capstone Instructor: Dr. John Chappo
Abstract: The following is a study of the United States military’s discarding of irregular warfare capabilities following the Vietnam War. At the expense of losing its hard-won counterinsurgency skills, the military rebuilt itself as a force only to be utilized in conventional conflicts. This paper will first examine how the American military struggled to implement counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Second, it will explore the military’s encounters with irregular warfare from 1975 to 2001. During this period, the military endeavored to avoid protracted irregular conflicts rather than maintain the skills to actually win them. Finally, this work will explore how the military’s neglect of irregular warfare competencies produced needless casualties and squandered precious time in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This study concludes that the American military consciously turned away from irregular warfare in an attempt to remake itself after the Vietnam War. Research has revealed that the military considered counterinsurgency outside of its “proper” missions. This work explores why the military chose this path and its adverse ramifications on irregular warfare capabilities. Furthermore, the military continued to neglect counterinsurgency despite shortcomings evident in irregular conflicts leading up to the Iraq War. The analysis of the post-Vietnam military’s dogged determination to avoid rather than prepare for protracted irregular warfare makes this a unique work that fills a historical gap.

James D. Chapman
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: May 2017
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Jeffrey Leatherwood
Abstract: This thesis examines the effectiveness of mounted cavalry charges against infantry during the American Civil War. Shortly into the war, military leaders realized the impact of rifling on battlefield tactics. Armed with rifled muskets, infantry could engage a cavalry charge and break it up long before contact could be made. The cavalry charge, critics claimed, was dead. Yet cavalry continued to execute charges up to the last battle of the war. The cavalryman most associated with the charge is arguably General George Armstrong Custer. By examining Custer's Civil War record between July 1863 and April 1865, when he commanded cavalry units, I show the effectiveness of the charge in the face of rifled weapons. My research strategy uses qualitative methods focusing on four case studies: Third Winchester, Cedar Creek, Waynesboro, and Sailor’s Creek; data have come from official reports and personal memoirs, reminiscences, and journals. This thesis challenges two widely held positions. First, the rifled musket did not make all mounted cavalry charges "suicidal." Additionally, it separates Custer’s Civil War record from the Battle of the Little Bighorn which has negatively—and retroactively—stereotyped him for “charging first and asking questions later.”

Pamela Y. DiVanna
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: August 2017
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Charles Grear
Abstract:During the Civil War, General Henry W. Halleck served as the commander of the army in the West, General in Chief of all Union armies, and Chief of Staff to President Lincoln; yet his name and contributions to the war are virtually unknown outside of academia. After graduating near the top of his West Point class in 1839, Halleck enjoyed fame as an author and lecturer with expertise in military history and the international laws of war, earning him the moniker ‘Old Brains’. During the Mexican American War, Halleck travelled with a small contingent of marines to California, and briefly fought in a series of skirmishes in Mazatlán. He later served as the military Secretary of State in California, helping to draft the state’s constitution. In 1854, he resigned from the army and eventually established the most successful law firm in San Francisco at the time. When the war began, Halleck answered the call of his country, leaving his life as a prosperous attorney and executive, and reported to Washington. This paper argues that interventions by the General strengthened the Union’s war effort at each of his command posts. For the duration of the Civil War, General Halleck advised, provided strategy, clarified policies, and managed the massive logistical needs of the army. Era newspapers, correspondence, telegrams, and contemporary literature provide the evidence to validate this argument, and demonstrate the General’s ability to translate his vast knowledge into military activity. General Halleck deserves greater recognition for his patriotic services and influence over the war than history has allocated.

Richard W. Forziati, Jr.
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: February 2017
Capstone Instructor: Dr. John F. Chappo
Abstract: This thesis will examine Union Sixth Corps Major General John Sedgwick and his performance during the Chancellorsville Campaign from April 28, 1863 to May 5, 1863. The foundation of this study will cover Sedgwick’s conduct both in the micro-tactical level and the larger operational scale with the overall focus on his triumphs and inevitable challenges. The research findings provided through official reports, dispatches, memoirs, and personal letters indicate Sedgwick performed strongly in an independent command role as emphasized by his consistent decisions and flexibility to unexpected events. Additionally, the use of statistics and logical inferences will further support the conclusion on Sedgwick’s positive achievements. This judgment is in contrast to a vast majority of existing historiography originated by immediate post-battle criticisms that characterize Sedgwick’s command style during the campaign as slow and tentative. Although the Chancellorsville Campaign ended in defeat for the Army of the Potomac, the highest moments of the campaign came from John Sedgwick and his Sixth Corps as shown by their participation in the sub-battles of Second Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks’ Ford.

William F. Lawson
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: May 2017
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Jeffrey Leatherwood
Abstract: This project examines the genesis, development, and application of the amphibious warfare doctrine as practiced by the United States in the European Theater of Operations during World War II. Special emphasis is provided to the development aspect so that the principles evolved may be applied to brief examinations of select operations, culminating with Operation OVERLORD on 6 June, 1944.

Matthew R. Prescott
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: May 2017
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Jon Mikolashek
Abstract: The following thesis describes the joint coordination and planning required for the 18 April 1942 Doolittle Raid to be successful. Without the unity of effort and coordination required to plan, train for and conduct the raid from both the United States Navy and Army, the successful execution of the raid would not have been possible. This study examines the requirements from both the Army and Navy to execute the raid, who thought of the idea to launch twin engine bombers off an aircraft carrier to attack Japan, what was the overall risk associated with conducting this raid and what coordination was required between the State Department, Chinese Leaders and military attaché’s to ensure the Raiders were allowed to land their aircraft in China once the raid was complete? Ultimately this thesis discusses how the Doolittle Raid helped shape a joint culture through the efforts of interservice leaders that were able to put biases aside in order to accomplish the mission for the greater good of the country; this is just one, of the many valuable attributes coming out of the one of the most successful raids in U.S. history.

Gloria J. Van Rees
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: February 2017
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Jon Mikolashek
Abstract: The following is a history of psychological warfare tactics as seen in the papers of Edward Lilly, former historian of the Office of War Information. The study considers Lilly’s position in the OWI during World War II and the subsequent collection of papers he gathered on the topic after the war. The study includes a discussion of military policy in World War II as it pertains to psychological warfare and the how that appears in the draft chapters of Lilly’s unpublished writings. The examination discusses the creation of psychological warfare tactics, as well as the men who made the decisions. The Edward Lilly papers are by no means a complete history of psychological warfare in World War II, but rather a specific window into the innovations of psychological warfare employed by the U.S. military to defeat the Axis powers in Europe.

Tormod B. Engvig
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: February 2016
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: The following is a study of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s heavy cruiser force, from the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1922 until the end of the Pacific War’s first year. It traces Japanese heavy cruiser development in the context of prewar imperial strategy and naval doctrine, and goes on to examine this force’s impact on the naval campaigns of 1941–1942. The study argues that while Japanese heavy cruisers were finely honed weapon systems—being tactically and technologically advanced, with highly skilled crews—their successes were largely squandered by lackluster senior leadership. While the cruisers inflicted significant damage on the Allied fleets in the Java Sea and in the Solomons, they were wedded to a navy undone by institutional shortcomings, inadequate logistics, and myopic doctrine.

Christopher D. Pelletier
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: May 2016
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: When studying what is perhaps the most controversial congressional committee in American history, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, it is easy to become swept up in the criticism and view it members as ignorant, foolish, or even malicious. This loses sight of the many positive contributions the committee made for their country during the Civil War though, and diminishes an important part of America’s history. By examining the committee’s findings and comparing them to the effects they would have on the war effort, this study seeks to illuminate how the Union was better able to achieve victory in the Civil War due to committee’s work. Additionally, criticism of the committee by historians will be addressed and responded to in an attempt to provide a more balanced view of the committee than has been previously available.

Benjamin L. Taliaferro
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: February 2016
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: The following examines the correlation between John F. Kennedy’s shift in American Foreign Policy and Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba. It summarizes Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy and then analyzes Kennedy’s “Flexible Response” in order to demonstrate the shift which occurred between the administrations. It then examines how this shift impacted Khrushchev’s decision making, summarizing the series of events that led to the Soviet Premier’s idea to place Soviet strategic weapons on Cuba in defense of Castro’s Revolution. The study also includes a discussion of the historiography of the subject and an examination of Eisenhower and Kennedy’s styles of leadership, focusing on how their different preferences shaped the policies their administration’s pursued.

Robert D. Wible
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: February 2016
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: This study examines the events leading up to and including the controversial actions of General Daniel Edgar Sickles on July 2nd 1863, at the Battle of Gettysburg, during the American Civil War. It is a study of the performance of General Sickles during the Battle of Gettysburg, specifically, the decision he made to re-deploy Third Corps from its assigned position on Cemetery Ridge to the Emmitsburg Road. This study will examine the ascension of Dan Sickles through the ranks of leadership within the Union Army and his professional relationship with his superiors. Additionally, his experiences during the Peninsulas Campaign, Battle of Fredericksburg and the Battle of Chancellorsville will be studied to determine how these battles influenced his judgment and conduct at Gettysburg. Finally, this study will look closely at the effect of the Peach Orchard position on the Confederate attack that targeted the left flank of the Union position on Cemetery Ridge.

Rodney Scott Bryan
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: February 2015
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: This study examines the reasons why the German plan to invade the Soviet Union would have succeeded had they invaded in 1940 rather than 1941. It examines the historical background prior to the invasion and that by 1941, the Red Army was (or would be soon) more than twice the size the Germans anticipated, making a decisive, quick victory much more difficult. For most of the previous year, Stalin had decided to greatly expand the Red Army. This was in reaction to the surprise of the total, rapid and complete German victory over France in 1940. In 1941, the Germans were overconfident and ignored the Soviet buildup. As a result, they violated many of the Principles of War and were too ambitious in their objectives. Had they limited their objectives to those assigned to Army Groups’ Center and South they could have more easily secured their objectives.

Keith A. Milks
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: February 2015
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: This research examines the role of the United States’ 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit in Operation Mountain Storm, a 2004 counter-offensive to the Taliban’s annual ‘spring offensive’ in Afghanistan. Tactical, strategic, and logistical innovations made the mission a success at a time when other theaters in the War on Terror were faltering. This thesis takes advantage of interviews with Mountain Storm veterans, after-action reports, combat narratives, news reports, and witness statements to examine the mission and the innovations that ultimately did not carry over to Iraq, and were only adopted in Afghanistan after many years and hundreds of U.S. casualties later. The delay in adopting these practices in Iraqi and Enduring Freedom hampered combat efficiency, interoperability with Afghan forces, and relationships with the Afghan people, and is a stark reminder that failure to adopt and improvise is detrimental to any sound military theorem.

Joseph L. Trudeau
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: February 2015
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: The following thesis explores the nature of music in the Continental Army during the American Revolution. The dual function of field musicians and “bands of music,” playing in the harmoniemusik style, explain the complex and integral role musicians played in the army. The development of music standardization, including Baron Steuben’s drum beatings in Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, corresponds to the appointment of Lieutenant John Hiwell as Inspector and Superintendent of Music. His five extant Music Returns are examined to show trends in personnel and equipment shortages in the later years of the war.

Jay Fagel
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: November 2014
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: This thesis chronicles and analyzes the facets of Japanese society that manifested in a cultural of cruelty exhibited by Imperial soldiers during the Asian-Pacific War. The study examines the influence the Meiji Restoration reined upon modern Japan in the late 19th Century and the early 20th Century. It will explain how and why the Meiji leaders successfully indoctrinated a sovereign nation into a virtual cultural adherence to an ideology of a divine and infallible Emperor. This ideology was also used as a tool to foment insatiable obedience and duty to military service as a means to protect the Emperor, the nation and its people. The use of mystic religious tenets and ancient military codes were altered to further militarize public schools and institutions, and increase military élan amongst its soldiers. All of this was accelerated under the reign of the Showa Emperor until his renouncement in 1946. Finally, this paper will expose the duplicity of the Imperial throne as it denied any culpability for its role in Japan’s wartime behavior. In the end, modern day Japan still struggles to accepts its responsibility for its actions as its ancient culture and mores remain significant obstacles to the naked truth of its execution of atrocities.

David O. Gray
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: November 2014
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: Major General Lew Wallace was one of the rising stars of the Federal officer corps prior to the battle of Shiloh in 1862, having played a critical role in the victory at Fort Donelson. His career as an active commander was severely limited following the battle of Shiloh when some felt he failed to arrive at the field of battle when expected. This study argues that the reasons given for his being placed on the shelf (accepted by most prominent historians) are in error. An examination of the timeline of day one of Shiloh with a particular focus on Wallace’s division is critical to understanding what happened. The execution of the march is examined in some detail along with placing its impact in context. Explaining how the accepted narrative developed and assessing its accuracy is the final portion of the study. An injustice was done to a Federal officer of quality, and thereafter the Union was denied his services during a critical period of the war. This cannot be undone. However the memory of Lew Wallace can now be more properly understood and valued.

Amanda C. Liskey
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: November 2014
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: Children’s history has long been overlooked, but this has recently started to change. The American Civil War changed the lives of children in countless ways. Through an in-depth study of how young people lived before, during and after the War it is possible to learn how the War changed the lives of the children involved as well as those of later generations. This study of children (black and white, male and female, northern and southern) was completed through the use of diaries, memoirs and other historical studies. This paper demonstrates how some of the effects on children were to be expected such as: the death of parents; loss of property; disruption of family life; and living in a constant state of fear. Other effects were unexpected such as: changes in economic and social status, changes in the way education was seen, and the acceptability of women not to marry.

Anne M. Midgley
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA) CONC American Revolution
Awarded: August 2014
Capstone Instructor: Dr. John F. Chappo
Abstract: This study is a micro-history of the American War of Independence based on the experiences of Charles Hulett, who entered the war as a sixteen-year-old New Jersey militiaman. The study examines the political, social, and military milieu of colonial and revolutionary New Jersey, including the province’s demographics and religious denomination affiliations, which influenced the choices made by the residents to either support the British Crown or the Whig rebellion. The study traces Hulett’s career through the war as he experienced life as a militiaman in colonial New Jersey, a member of revolutionary New Jersey’s state troops, a conscripted drummer in the American Continental Army, and a British provincial soldier in the New Jersey Volunteers. The study demonstrates that in order to develop a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the Revolutionary War period, one must understand the impact of the war upon the life and choices of an ordinary American soldier. It differs from other micro-studies by highlighting that an individual’s choice between the Whig concept of liberty and loyalty to the British Crown often turned on pragmatic concerns and emotional ties, rather than upon lofty ideals. For Hulett, the choice to enlist with the Loyalist New Jersey Volunteers in 1780 followed compulsory service with the Continental Army as a nine-month draftee. His actions illustrate that in some cases, Americans made decisions based on the will to survive a long and brutal civil war, not on the resolution to pursue ideological goals.

David W. Thomas
Program: Military History: Capstone-Thesis: Master of Arts (MA)
Awarded: November 2014
Capstone Instructor: Dr. Robert Young
Abstract: This study examines the impacts and nature of the secret aid that Pierre August Caron de Beaumarchais provided the American rebels in the early days of the Revolutionary War and if the American government was unjustified in withholding payment. The secret aid was a business transaction that was agreed upon by both parties that carried with it obligations to fulfill the terms of the arrangement. This study also looks to validate or invalidate the works of Elizabeth Kite who wrote one of the most extensive texts on the subject. This study concludes that the secret aid was essential to the success of the American Revolution and was a contractual business arrangement requiring compensation that the American government was unjustified in withholding. This study also concludes that Kite’s interpretations were correct.